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CHAPTER 1 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
In 1807, the British parliament passed a Bill ending its participation in the transatlantic slave 
trade. The abolition movement responsible for this legislation went on to have a profound 
influence on Britain’s foreign policy, ultimately leading to the end of this trade by the 1860s. 
In West Africa, regional exports gradually evolved from being dominated by captives 
destined for New World plantations, to commodities such as palm oil for European and North 
American industrial and consumer markets. This process became known in later literature as 
the ‘commercial transition’ and has become one of the key themes in West African 
historiography (Law 1995b, p1). However, there are two aspects of this process that have so 
far not been adequately addressed. Firstly, no one has questioned why, from a comparative 
perspective, there was a marked variation in the speed and nature of the commercial transition 
across the region. Secondly, few studies have actively analysed the long-term roots of the 
process and, in particular, the development of the ‘non-slave’ export economies of the region 
in the centuries before 1807. This thesis addresses two main questions. Part 1 of this study 
asks what were the long-term patterns of the non-slave trade in West Africa’s three most 
important slave exporting regions, and how did these influence the nature of the commercial 
transition in the nineteenth century? Part 2 explores what, from a comparative perspective, 
were the most important pan-regional variables determining the very different reactions to 
abolition and the commercial transition?  
This study will argue that the nature of the nineteenth century commercial transition was a 
continuation of earlier patterns of trade, meaning that only a long-term regional analysis can 
adequately explain why and how different areas moved from the export of captives to 
commodities. These regional variations can be explained by five key factors: 1) the nature and 
duration of long-term trade relations; 2) the identity of the principal European trade partner; 
3) certain aspects of the ecology of the different regions; 4) the regional political contexts; 
and 5) the development of institutions that either encouraged or discouraged elite participation 
in non-slave exports. This is the first study, to the best of my knowledge, that has used a long 
term, comparative analysis to explore West Africa’s trade over the long eighteenth century in 
relation to the nineteenth century commercial transition. I believe, therefore, that it provides a 
unique perspective and generates fresh insights into the political and economic development 
of three important regions and their relationship to a changing Atlantic world.  
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1.2. ABOLITION AND THE COMMERCIAL TRANSITION IN WEST AFRICA 
In 1842, the author of a British Parliamentary Report on West Africa and the state of the slave 
trade1 stated that: “...a trade in produce has been gradually growing up and gaining upon the 
Slave Trade in proportion as the enterprise of the British merchant pushes on the one and the 
vigilance of the British cruiser checks and cripples the other...” The report was written 35 
years after the passing of the ‘Abolition Bill’ by parliament in 1807, which outlawed 
participation in the transatlantic slave trade for British merchants. This trade had begun in the 
late fifteenth century by the Portuguese, who required labour for their expanding Atlantic and 
American empires. By the late eighteenth century it had reached its apogee in West Africa2 
with thousands of captives embarked annually onto European and American vessels and sent 
to labour in the plantations and mines of the New World. At first, Britain was the only major 
slave trading nation to cease their involvement in the traffic of African captives to the 
Americas.3 They were eventually joined, often unwillingly, by the French, Dutch, Spanish 
and Portuguese/Brazilians following a long diplomatic and military campaign which finally 
halted the traffic by the 1860s. 
The 1807 Bill was the result of a sustained campaign by what became known as the 
abolitionist movement. This had begun in the eighteenth century and was a product of a 
changing intellectual and religious climate. Writers such as Montesquieu and Rousseau 
argued that slavery was in principal contrary to human nature,4 and Adam Smith argued in the 
‘Wealth of Nations’ (1776) that wage labour was more economically productive to society 
than coerced labour. In fact, Klein (2010, p190) has argued that it was this, rather than 
humanitarian concerns for the African victims of the trade, that drove the movement: “The 
anti-slave-trade campaign was based fundamentally on a belief in free labour as one of the 
most crucial underpinnings of modern society and the institution that guaranteed mankind’s 
progress out of its medieval past.”  However, the campaign did have a profoundly moral side, 
especially for dissenting Protestant movements, such as the Quakers and Methodists who 
were among the first to actively campaign for the trade to end (Jennings 2013).  
                                                 
1
 Parliamentary Papers 1842 (551) (551-II) Report from the Select Committee on the West Coast of Africa; 
together with the minutes of evidence, appendix, and index. Part I.--Report and evidence. Dr Madden’s Report p 
XX.   
2 The trade in the West Central region of Africa, what is now Congo Brazzaville and Angola, was to expand into 
the nineteenth century. See below section 1.3. 
3 Denmark had abolished its own trade in 1802, although its merchants were never a major carrier of slaves. The 
French had temporarily ceased their involvement after 1794 in the wake of the revolution and Haitian rebellions 
but resumed trading in 1803. The United States did officially prohibit its citizens from engaging in the 
transatlantic slave trade, but this prohibition was easily circumvented, especially given anti-British sentiment 
(Thomas 1999, pp523,545–48, Brooks 1970, p115). 
4In the “Spirit of the Laws” (1748), Montesquieu writes that “The state of slavery is in its own nature bad. It is 
neither useful to the master nor to the slave.” (Book 15, Chapter 1). However, in the same Chapter he goes on to 
argue that “It is impossible for us to suppose these creatures (Africans) to be men…”     In the opening Chapter 
of “The Social Contract” (1762), Rousseau begins by stating “Man was born free, and he is everywhere in 
chains” arguing that society should not constrain the freedoms of its citizens. 
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The extent to which abolition was a moral or an economically rational decision has been 
fiercely debated. Some historians, most famously Eric Williams (1944), have argued that 
plantation slavery in the Americas was already in decline and therefore British withdrawal 
from the transatlantic slave trade represented nothing more than the abandonment of a failing 
sector of the economy. Others, most notably Drescher (2004, 2010), Eltis (2005) and Davis 
(2006) have instead made the case that the slave plantations of the New World were 
flourishing at the beginning of the nineteenth century and remained an economically dynamic 
model of production until the institution of slavery itself was outlawed. When seen in this 
light, the Bill of 1807 would have been contrary to the economic interests of Great Britain, 
although realistically it is unlikely that its merchants or traders suffered much as a 
consequence of the decision (Inikori 2009, p171, Klein 2010, p190).  
In the eyes of abolitionists, the shift towards commodity exports was a fundamental 
component in the strategy to undermine the slave trade and bring ‘civilisation to Africa’. 
Campaigners against the slave trade in the 1790s, such as Thomas Clarkson (1789, pp8-9) and 
the former slave Olaudah Equiano (1794, p357), were already arguing that promoting 
alternative forms of commerce was the most effective means by which export slavery might 
be undermined. This was to become dogma amongst abolitionists in the nineteenth century 
(Law 2013, p4), most famously articulated by David Livingston’s linking of ‘Commerce, 
Christianity and Civilisation’.5 It was for this reason that the trade in commodities came to be 
known as ‘legitimate commerce’, being perceived as a means of weaning Africans away from 
export slavery and towards the kinds of productive activities viewed as morally acceptable by 
Europeans (Buxton 1840, p264).6  
Among historians of West Africa, the impact of this change from slave to commodity exports 
has been a key debate since the 1950s (Law 1995b, pp1-3). Dike’s (1956) study of the Bight 
of Biafra argues that, as the region started to produce more palm oil and export fewer people, 
the power of the traditional ruling elite was undermined, leading to increasing levels of social 
disruption. This reasoning was later developed and extended by Hopkins (1973) who argued 
the ending of transatlantic slavery created a severe economic shock which weakened elites by 
removing their main source of income. This ‘crisis of adaption’7 fuelled conflict and 
instability, eventually creating conditions of vulnerability which enabled the partition of West 
Africa by European powers in the 1880s and 1890s. However, this crisis also marked the 
beginning of what he argued was the ‘modern economic history’ of the continent, dominated 
                                                 
5 ‘…by guiding our missionary labours so as to benefit our own country, we shall thereby more effectually and 
permanently benefit the heathen….We ought to encourage the Africans to cultivate for our markets, as the most 
effectual means, next to the Gospel, of their elevation.’ Livingston (1858, p720) 
6 The term is objectionable on many levels; Law (1995, p26) argues that it is both Eurocentric and obscures the 
fact that Africans had always exported non-slave products. Furthermore, all of the commodities exported during 
the nineteenth-century were at least partly produced by some form of coerced labour. The expansion of 
‘legitimate commerce’ thus led to a huge increase in slave ownership within Africa (Lovejoy 2011, p161). 
7 The term was used in a 1968 article about the endemic warfare in Yorubaland in the later nineteenth century. 
Hopkins argued that the rise of palm oil exports led to a severe crisis for elites who had previously based their 
power and wealth on raiding and slave exports. This in turn led to social disruption, violence and increasingly 
frequent interventions by Britain which ultimately led to colonisation (Hopkins 1968) 
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by small scale producers rather than elites. Hopkins’ thesis has attracted both support and 
criticism. Lovejoy (2011, p184) has argued that the development of ‘legitimate commerce’ 
led to West African societies establishing, not a more modern economy, but instead a slave 
mode of production.8 This process was to separate Africa from the dominant capitalist 
economies in the rest of the Atlantic, which had largely abandoned slavery by the end of the 
nineteenth century.  
Eltis (1987) and Eltis & Jennings (1988) have argued that external trade, with some 
exceptions, had very little impact on the majority of the inhabitants of West Africa and 
therefore only modestly affected long-term development. However, this argument does not 
apply to the areas from which most slaves were exported – Biafra, the Gold Coast / Asante, 
Dahomey and Yorubaland (Eltis & Jennings 1988, p958).9 These were areas of relatively high 
population density containing, according to recent estimates, around 15 million people 
(Frankema & Jerven 2014).  In these areas the Atlantic trade had a substantial impact on 
many coastal societies, but less so on the savannah states of the interior.  A more substantive 
criticism of Hopkins comes from studies which, like Manning, (1990, p142) argue that “The 
merchants, warlords, and monarchs who dominated the capture of slaves also dominated the 
exploitation of slaves within the continent”. This was also argued by Latham (1973) for the 
Biafran port of Old Calabar and later applied more generally by Austen (1990, pp101-02). In 
addition, Austin (2013, p259) has argued that Hopkins’ analysis underestimated the extent to 
which the elites from the period of the slave trade maintained their wealth and power during 
the era of ‘legitimate commerce’.  
However, these studies fail to account for the fact that the impact of abolition and the 
commercial transition varied considerably across both the time and space of West Africa 
(Law 1995b, p5, Law et al. 2013, p23). Figures 1.1a., 1.1.b. and 1.1.c. show the number of 
slaves exported from West Africa’s most important regions of embarkation. On the Gold 
Coast, the sale of captives fell to negligible levels immediately after 1807. In the Bight of 
Biafra, there was also a post-abolition recovery but this was followed by a steady decline 
from the late 1820s, and by the 1840s the export of captives had more or less ceased. Lastly, 
in the Bight of Benin, there was a similar dramatic fall in slave exports but only after 1815, 
after which time exports recovered and continued up to the 1850s. The patterns of commodity 
trading were also strikingly different. On the Gold Coast, the nineteenth century saw an 
increase both in gold and palm oil exports (Garrard 1980, p163, Lynn 1997, p39). The Bight 
of Biafra became the biggest exporter of palm oil in the first half of the nineteenth century, 
                                                 
8
 This is when “…the social and economic structure of a particular society included an integrated system of 
enslavement, slave trade and the domestic use of slaves….”, in contrast to societies with a “lineage or domestic 
mode of production”, where slaves exist either as a marginal feature or an institution but where the social and 
political systems are based on ethnicity and kinship. Lovejoy 2011 (pp10-12). 
9 They might in addition have included the Senegambian region, which although a minor region with regards to 
slave exports was heavily involved in commodity trading throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth Centuries 
(Searing 2003). Sierra Leone, as the base of British abolition efforts and the destination of a resettlement 
programme for thousands of Africans captured in other regions was also profoundly impacted by contacts with 
the Atlantic (Wyse 1989). 
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exporting significant quantities by at least the 1820s (Lynn 1997, p19). By contrast, exports of 
commodities from the Bight of Benin were virtually non-existent until the 1840s (Manning 
1982, p52).  
There are two main reasons for this gap in the literature. Firstly, much of the work cited above 
on the impact of abolition and the rise of ‘legitimate commerce’ within Africa fails to analyse 
the commercial transition in the context of the long historical development of Africa’s non-
slave trade.10 This is in part because the transatlantic slave trade dominated commercial 
exchange with the Atlantic during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. More 
importantly, its scale and the horrors it inflicted upon millions of captives have since come to 
occupy an extremely powerful place in the collective memories of Europeans, Americans and 
Africans (Thomas 1999, pp10-11, Hilton 2010, Klein 2010, ppxv-xix). Accordingly, most 
research has focussed on the trade in people with very few studies on the development and 
relative importance of other forms of commercial exchange, and how these influenced the 
nature and speed of the commercial transition. The focus on the trade in people has had the 
additional effect of making British abolition efforts against transatlantic slavery deemed to be 
the most important driver of West African economic and political change. Other studies of 
West Africa and the slave trade have recently concluded that to explain inter-regional 
differences, scholars must give far greater weight to factors that were endogenous to the 
region, rather than limiting their search to the decisions and actions of Europeans.11 This 
study will apply this reasoning to the commercial transition. Secondly, most of the studies on 
this period of West African history generally target single case study regions.12 The resultant 
literature has focussed on explaining how factors specific to individual areas influenced 
patterns of historical change.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 This was noted by the editors of a recent volume on the commercial transition (Law et al. 2013, pp8–10) and 
investigated by two contributors to the same volume (Eltis 2013, Austin 2013a).  
11 For example, the debates on the high levels of mortality experienced by both slaves and crew during the 
middle passage (Hogerzeil & Richardson 2007, Klein & Engerman 1997, Eltis 1989, 1984) and the impact of 
African resistance (Behrendt et al. 2001, Richardson 2001). 
12
 These include, but are by no means limited to; Bight of Benin: Manning 1982, Reid 1986 , Law 1991, Bay 
1998, Law 2004, Mann  2007,  Monroe 2012,  Norman 2012; Gold Coast: Reynolds 1974, Wilks 1975, Wilson 
1991, DeCorse 1992, Wilks 1993, McCaskie 2003, Perbi 2004, Austin 2005, Shumway 2014, Sparks 2014, 
Biafra: Latham 1973, Northrup 1978, Martin 1988, Dike & Ekejiuba 1990, Lovejoy and Richardson 2004, 
Nwokeji 2010. Two edited volumes on the commercial transition, Law (1995) and  Law et al. (2013) also, with 
some exceptions, look at individual regions / states in isolation and do not use a comparative perspective. In 
addition there have been studies on specific commodities such as gold - Garrard 1980, kola - Abaka 2005, 
Lovejoy 1980 and palm oil - Lynn 1997. 
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Figure 1.1.a. Numbers of slaves exported from the Gold Coast, 1740 – 1840 
 
Figure 1.1.b. Bight of Biafra, 1740 – 1840   
 
Figure 1.1.c. Bight of Benin, 1740 – 1840 
Source: slavevoyages.org
13
 
 
                                                 
13 All the data in this thesis comes from the version of the database at www.slavevoyages.org, downloaded on 
01/06/2016 
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1.3. METHOD AND APPROACH: A COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
The central question of this thesis is what determined the different responses of African 
societies to the changing political and economic conditions in the early nineteenth century 
Atlantic economy. To explore this question, this thesis will focus on the three most important 
slave trading regions within West Africa which, according to the transatlantic slave trade 
database, accounted for around 80% of all embarkations from the seventeenth to the 
nineteenth Centuries; the Gold Coast, the Bight of Benin and the Bight of Biafra. These 
trading zones were used by European traders from at least the early eighteenth century as a 
way of referencing different parts of the coast (see Map 1.1).14 Within these regions, the bulk 
of slaves came from just a few ports with sophisticated trading networks connecting Europe 
and the Americas to internal suppliers of captives (Eltis et al. 1999, Klein 2010, pp106-7).  
The Gold Coast roughly corresponded to modern day Ghana and ended at the Volta river (see 
Map 1.2). The three ports of Elmina, Cape Coast Castle and Anomabo, located in territory 
controlled by the Fante, handled the majority of slave embarkations in the eighteenth century. 
From the 1740s both slaves and gold came almost exclusively from the Asante empire, which 
had become the dominant power in the region and will be the focus of the first case study. 
The Bight of Biafra extended from Cape Formosa to Cape Lopez in Gabon (Map 1.2), but the 
almost all of the trade, both in captives and commodities, was conducted through the ports of 
Bonny, Old Calabar and Elem Kalabari which were supplied from the interior Igbo and Ibibio 
regions (see Chapter 6). These areas, and the trading network that connected this interior 
region with the coast, will be the focus of the second case study. The Bight of Benin began at 
the Volta river and continued to Cape Formosa in modern day south east Nigeria (Map 1.2). 
In the 1720s the main areas through which slaves were traded and the most important port, 
Whydah, were conquered by the Dahomean empire. As this region then essentially controlled 
the supply and marketing of the majority of the region’s captives until the early nineteenth 
century, it will be subject of the final case study. 
The temporal scope of this research covers the period from roughly the middle of the 
seventeenth century. This covers the period from when north European nations, in particular 
Britain, the Netherlands and France, began to expand their American possessions, demanding 
ever increasing numbers of coerced labourers to work the plantations of the new world (Eltis 
2000, pp61-62, Klein 2010, pp31-33) and continues until 1860 when the transatlantic slave 
trade ended. The thesis deals with West Africa, which in this context refers to the area from 
modern day Senegal to Cape Lopez in Gabon. Further south, the region known in the slave 
trade database as West Central Africa, covered two other slave trading zones. Firstly, the 
Loango coast, which stretched to the river Congo and Angola (Da Silva & Sommerdyk 2010, 
pp80-84) and secondly Angola.  Portuguese / Brazilian merchants had a near monopoly on the 
                                                 
14 The map is taken from the “Universal Dictionary of Trade and Commerce Vol II, 1774, 4th ed.” by the 
economist Malachy Postlethwayt (p945). He was a vocal supporter of slavery, an advocate of the Royal Africa 
Company and was strongly in favour of expanding trade and British influence within Africa (Brown 2010, pp88-
89). The image in Map 2 is taken from https://archive.org/stream/universaldiction02post#page/n943/mode/2up, 
p945, accessed 17/11/2016 
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slave trade in Angola and, while north European merchants were dominant in Loango in the 
eighteenth century, they were entirely displaced by the Portuguese after abolition (Lovejoy 
2011, p53). As my archival and primary data is entirely from British, French and Dutch 
sources, and because the structure and business of the slave trade in West Central Africa was 
very different (Lovejoy 2011, pp73-77), this region is largely outside the scope of this study.    
Map 1.1. Major coastal regions from which captives left Africa, all years 
 
Source: http://www.slavevoyages.org/assessment/intro-maps (accessed 16/01/2017) 
In order to understand the varying long term patterns of commodity trading in West Africa 
from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, two new time-series datasets were 
constructed, and are introduced in Chapters 3 and 4. The first provides the most accurate 
estimate to date of the quantities of food taken from Europe and bought in different regions of 
the West African coast by slave traders for the middle passage. The second is an updated and 
improved dataset of British customs records detailing both imports from and exports to 
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Africa, as well as providing specific quantities, nominal prices and regional variations in the 
composition of exports and imports. In addition, Chapter 2 provides qualitative data from 
both archival and published sources from Britain, the Netherlands and France on shipping 
patterns and commercial exchange in Africa. By combining these time-series data with the 
information in the slave trade database, I have tried to arrive at a deeper understanding of the 
regional variety in patterns of commodity trade which developed alongside the slave trade. 
Having established these long-term patterns of commodity trade, I move in part 2 to the 
comparative study of the three case study regions, using the patterns identified in part 1. The 
current literature on the commercial transition has highlighted some factors that influenced 
both economic and political changes in West Africa. To investigate reasons for the extent of 
the variation in both the long-term patterns of trade and the timing of the commercial 
transition in the three case study regions, it was first necessary to identify shared common 
variables, and differentiating factors. On the basis of this investigation, I created an 
explanatory model was created and that I used as a guiding framework to structure the case-
study analyses in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 (see Figure 1.3).  
Map 1.2. Enlarged section from Postlethwayt’s 1755 map showing the three case study 
regions, boundaries marked 
 
Source: see footnote 13 
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1.4. MAIN ARGUMENT 
The first part of the thesis argues that the nature of the commercial transition in the different 
case study regions in the nineteenth century was a continuation of existing long term patterns 
of trade. In the Bight of Biafra, the transatlantic slave trade stimulated substantial growth in 
both commercial agriculture, for the provisioning of ships for the middle passage, and 
commodity production for slave merchants in the period before abolition. The subsequent rise 
of the palm oil industry can therefore be regarded as the continuation of an existing trend, 
including the market institutions that were developed to facilitate the commodity export 
sector. Over the long term, non-slave products dominated output from the Gold Coast region 
except for a relatively short period in the eighteenth century. Exports of captives were already 
falling from the 1780s, so the abrupt ending of transatlantic slavery in 1807, and subsequent 
increase in gold production and forest products should be interpreted as a reversion to the 
earlier, and long established form of trade. Finally, the area of the Bight of Benin that came to 
be controlled by the kingdom of Dahomey focused exclusively on slave exports. In contrast to 
the other two regions, there was no response to the demand for slave ship provisions, nor to 
increasing demand for other export commodities during the eighteenth century. The relatively 
late transition to commodity exports should thus be seen in the context of the region’s long 
history of specialisation in slave trading.  
Having established the stylised facts of these regional patterns of trade, the second part of the 
thesis presents a new interpretation of the commercial transition. In the Gold Coast and the 
Bight of Biafra particular institutions developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to 
manage trade, control and monopolise violence and extend the power of certain elite groups. 
These institutions allowed powerful families and individuals to profit (both financially and 
socially) at least as much from using slaves in the internal economy to produce export 
commodities, as they could from selling captives into transatlantic slavery. In the Gold Coast, 
elite status was highly dependent on the production and possession of gold. Demand for gold 
guaranteed a strong domestic market for coerced labour, which could effectively compete 
with export of captives to the Americas. In the Bight of Biafra, trade with the Atlantic world 
provided the wealth that underpinned the power of powerful groups, families and individuals 
across the region. However, there were no ideological or economic barriers to trading in 
commodities as opposed to slaves. This meant that when demand for African commodities in 
European markets began to rise at the end of the eighteenth century, households could 
respond by using their free and coerced labour to increase production of other commodities, 
due to the support of groups who could trade and market these goods to foreign merchants.  
By contrast, the Dahomean state developed in a late seventeenth and eighteenth century 
context where a militarised, slave raiding institutional model enabled the monarchy, with the 
support of elite families and lineage groups, to monopolise wealth and power. The transfer of 
large amounts of labour to other forms of economic activities, such as palm oil production, 
directly threatened this power. It was only under extreme pressure in the late 1840s, due to the 
increasingly effective abolition efforts of the British, the rise of regional competitors and 
military setbacks, that it became worthwhile for elites to invest in the development of a 
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commodity export sector. The following section will set out which factors were relevant, and 
which were not, in the development of institutions that were either accommodating to the 
commercial transition or which encouraged a focus on the export of captives.  
 
1.5. EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
Shared factors that cannot explain regional variation in the commercial transition    
There are two factors that were common across all major slave exporting areas in West Africa 
and, as such, cannot provide a satisfactory explanation for the varying ways in which African 
societies responded post-1807 to abolition. First, the efforts undertaken by the British to 
prevent other nations from continuing the slave trade. Second, changes in either the African 
supply of slaves, or the demand for slaves from New World plantation owners. After first 
substantiating these claims, the chapter will continue with an overview of explanatory factors 
that account for the observed variation.   
 
British slave trade patrols 
The decision by the British parliament to withdraw from the transatlantic slave trade, and to 
dedicate a good deal of military and diplomatic effort to abolishing the traffic in coerced 
labour to the Americas, ultimately led to the end of the trade by the 1860s (Klein 2010, 
pp188-211). However, abolition efforts in the period up to the 1830s, although not entirely 
unimportant, did not have a decisive impact on the commercial transition in the three case 
study areas. The particular case of the Gold Coast will be dealt with in greater detail in 
Chapter 5, but for now I will provide a broad overview of the military and diplomatic efforts 
of British attempts to halt transatlantic slavery before the late 1830s to underpin the claim that 
if African merchant elites had wanted to continue the export of slaves, they had ample 
opportunities to do so.    
Table 1.1 shows the areas where the British concentrated the activity of their anti-slave 
patrols during the first 30 years of the abolition era. Until the 1820s the vast majority of ships 
captured were in the Sierra Leone region of Africa, and the Caribbean, where the British had 
permanent settlements and harbours. The patrols then switched their focus to the Bights of 
Benin and Biafra, the centres of most of the slave trading in West Africa during this period. 
Defying the fact that the squadron was based in Freetown, the Gallinhas region down the 
coast was able to develop a new, thriving market in slaves, mainly to Cuba (Jones 1983). In 
the period when the navy began to concentrate its efforts in the ‘Bights’ there was a 
resurgence in slave numbers from this region, probably driven by more competitive prices of 
captives compared to other major slave markets further down the coast in Angola (Appendix 
1.1, 1.2). There were three principal reasons for the lack of effectiveness in British abolition 
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efforts: a lack of financial commitment to upscale navy patrols, anti-British hostility and the 
illegality of boarding foreign vessels or attacking African territory without due cause.  
Table 1.1 Ships captured and condemned by the Royal Navy 1808 – 1839 by region of 
capture 
  
Bight of 
Benin 
Bight of 
Biafra 
Sierra 
Leone 
Gold 
Coast 
West Central 
Africa 
Atlantic Caribbean 
1808 – 1815 9 15 48 2 2 2 38 
1816 – 1820 7 4 25 3 0 1 2 
1821 – 1825 11 35 8 4 0 0 2 
1826 – 1830 34 44 15 2 0 1 22 
1831 – 1835 6 33 4 1 0 2 16 
1836 – 1839 28 48 33 10 9 1 25 
Source: TNA - FO315 (data from Grindal 2016, pp761-83) 
The British government was initially unwilling to support its enthusiastic anti-slavery rhetoric 
with any significant expenditure on a military force capable of deterring slave traders. Until 
the establishment of an official anti-slavery patrol in 1818 under Sir James Yeo, the navy 
relied on an ad hoc squadron of vessels based around Sierra Leone (Wills 2012). Even then 
the patrol consisted of only 6 ships covering some 2,000 miles of coast and, although this 
figure was to rise it was never sufficient to seriously deter slavers.15 Furthermore, many of the 
vessels in the patrol in its earlier days tended to be older vessels, which could often be outrun 
by slave ships (Brooks 1970, p111). Anti-British sentiment also hampered the cause, 
especially in France and America. After the war of 1812, the United States, despite being on 
paper an ally of Britain in the fight against the slave trade, made no serious efforts to limit the 
involvement of their nations. Even when slavers were caught they were rarely punished in 
American courts (Brooks 1970, p115).  
Perhaps the biggest difficulty was establishing an acceptable legal framework for stopping 
and searching foreign vessels without risking an international incident (Ryan 2011). Boarding 
the vessel of another nation constituted a violation of sovereignty and was therefore a 
legitimate reason to declare war. This was something Britain was anxious to avoid after the 
conclusion of the Treaty of Paris in 1814, which finally brought peace to the continent after 
the Napoleonic Wars.  In practice this meant that it was relatively easy for ships to evade 
                                                 
15
 The number remained under ten during the 1820s, and began to increase in the 1830s and by 1848 there were 
27 naval ships. However even this was far from enough as admitted by a naval officer during the 1842 
parliamentary enquiry into West Africa. When asked “Is it your opinion that the trade could effectually and 
permanently put down by ships of war?” he replied “No, I do not think it could; it would take all our navy to do 
it, I should think, to watch the coast”, Clegg to enquiry, paras 1599 – 1604. While the French and the Americans 
were later to join in this effort their anti-slave patrols seem to have had even less impact (Brooks 1970). 
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being captured by simply flying the flags of nations, such as the United States, whose vessels 
were off-limits to the British (Brooks 1970, p62). Law (2010) supports this, noting that 
boarding vessels was often contrary to international law. In addition, he notes that 
international maritime law also recognised that each sovereign nation controlled the 3 miles 
of water from their shores (essentially a cannon shot). British ships following slavers into the 
lagoons and rivers of Africa were therefore violating this widely accepted principle.16 This 
legal argument was used by Africans to protest against British actions, such as the destruction 
of slave barricoons at Gallinahs by a British officer in 1840. A review of these actions by a 
parliamentary committee endorsed the opinion of the local rulers and the commander was 
later sued by a Spanish trader for damages suffered by the destruction of his property. The 
eventual outcome of the case was to declare that British captains could not be held personally 
liable for their actions, which gave them an effective carte blanche to engage in military 
action in Africa, but this was not until 1848 (Law 2010, p155).  
At the same time, reasons for the falling number of slave embarkations from West Africa may 
also have included the impact of trading south of the equator becoming a more attractive 
prospect for slave merchants. Eltis (2009) argues that abolition mainly affected the trade 
which sailed around the Northern Atlantic Gyre17 which was dominated by North European 
trading nations. The bilateral trade between the Americas and Africa, which used the 
Southern Atlantic Gyre, was largely unaffected and grew considerably during the first few 
decades of the nineteenth century. During the initial negotiations with Spain and Portugal on 
the subject of the slave trade, Britain agreed that the slave trade south of the equator would be 
excluded from their abolition efforts.  In addition, this region had remained unaffected by the 
conflicts in the second half of the eighteenth century in the north Atlantic and local slave 
supplies were more reliable. As West Central Africa had been the largest supplier of captives 
until the 1750s, the shift southwards could also be seen as a resumption of a more established 
long term pattern of trading that had briefly been interrupted by the rise of West African 
export slavery (Eltis 2009, p128).  
The slave trade patrols did eventually become more successful in the 1830s and this was, in 
the analysis of both Eltis (2009) and Law (2010), mainly the result of the British defying 
international law in the name of their humanitarian goals. The Equipment Act of 1839 
authorised the British navy to seize vessels of other nations if they were simply equipped for 
the slave trade, without carrying any slaves (Thomas 1999, p658). Spain agreed to this 
measure in 1835 but the Brazilian parliament refused, leading the British to unilaterally 
impose this law in 1839 until Brazil reluctantly agreed to accept it in 1842 (Law 2004, p157, 
Martinez 2011, p92). The Royal Navy was also prepared to violate African territorial 
sovereignty, bombarding Whydah in 1841 (Law 2004, p190) and Lagos in 1851 (Mann 2007, 
p84). They expanded the remit of the patrol to Brazilian and Cuban waters in the 1850s and 
1860s, which meant that slaves could no longer be imported in sufficient numbers for the 
                                                 
16 Opposition to the character of British anti-slavery policy was also to be found in Britain. The Duke of 
Wellington publicly opposed the 1839 equipment act had a ‘criminal character’ (Thomas 1999, p658)  
17 A system of ocean currents that rotate clockwise around the Atlantic north of the equator 
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trade to be profitable (Reid 1986, p 282, Law 2004, p191, Klein 2010, p196). In the long term 
these efforts not only enforced the ending of the transatlantic slave trade but also set a 
precedent which put Africa outside of the norms of international law and laid the legal 
foundations for the justification of colonialism (Law 2010).  
In summary, in both the Gold Coast and Biafra the commercial transition was well under way 
before abolition efforts began to have a meaningful impact. In the case study chapters I will 
be argued that certain aspects of British abolition policy are important for understanding the 
timing of the move away from export slavery, but they cannot explain the ultimate causes of 
different inter-regional transitions in export composition.  
 
Changing demand for, or changing supply of, African slaves 
Changes in the demand for or supply of African slaves are also unlikely to explain the intra-
regional variation in patterns of the commercial transition. Austin (2013, p249) suggests that, 
in some areas of West Africa, the supply of slaves came under strain towards the end of the 
eighteenth century because those bearing the brunt of slave raiding had learnt to defend 
themselves more effectively.  This forced raiders to seek new sources of slaves at ever 
increasing distances from the coast which increased costs, forced up slave export prices and 
led to fewer slaves reaching embarkation ports (Klein 2001). Other literature has effectively 
argued that the violence attending the slave trade led to depopulation, which further restricted 
supply (Inikori 2011, p669, Nunn 2008, p142, Manning 1990, p171). However, the expansion 
of ‘legitimate commerce’ saw a corresponding rise in domestic slavery, since coerced labour 
was a prerequisite for any increase in West African commodity production (Austin 2008a, 
2008b, 2009, Lovejoy 2011, p161). If slaves were simply transferred from one to another 
form of economic activity, a possible supply shortage cannot have been a leading cause of the 
retreat from slave exporting. Moreover, regarding the domestic African economy, studies by 
Austin (2005, pp43,130–133) and Lovejoy & Richardson (1995a & b) indicate that the 
internal market for slaves was fairly integrated. Their data is based on a limited number of 
observations from the interior regions and the coast, but it nonetheless reveals a significant 
degree of price convergence. So even if sources of supply would have dried up in some areas, 
the internal West African trade in slaves created a situation in which those who wanted to sell 
slaves to European vessels, would have opportunities to find supplies from elsewhere.  
As for demand, some sources suggest that planters in the Americas had a preference for slaves 
from the Bight of Benin and the Gold Coast rather than from the Bight of Biafra (Eltis 2000, 
pp186–87). Ultimately, however, the priorities for slave traders were speed of embarkation 
and reliability of credit arrangements, enabling supply of the greatest numbers of captives as 
quickly and cheaply as possible (Eltis et al. 2007, p1339). When merchants in the Bight of 
Biafra, and particularly the port of Bonny, began efficiently embarking large numbers of 
captives, planters were happy to buy Biafran slaves (Lovejoy & Richardson 2004, p364, 
Nwokeji 2010, pp22,42). In other words, as long as demand remained high, local traders 
continued to have an opportunity to sell.   
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Demand for coerced labour from Atlantic and African markets remained high and evenly 
spread. Within the Americas, recent scholarship has generally supported the argument of 
Drescher (2004, 2010) that the plantation system was growing in the late eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.18 The value of coerced labour continued to grow in all parts of the 
Americas, thus ensuring that there were still considerable profits to be made from the 
transportation of slaves across the Atlantic (Figure 1.2). This was a consequence of the fact 
that, with the exception of some non-sugar producing states in the United States and the island 
of Barbados, no slave importing region was able to achieve a fully self-sustaining slave 
population (Tadman 2000, Curtin 1972, p60). This ensured that there was always, until at 
least the 1850s, a demand for slave imports from Africa. Thus, the variegated commercial 
transitions cannot be adequately explained by differences in internal market prices for slaves.  
Figure 1.2. Price indices of the average costs for slaves in Brazil, Cuba and the US 1790 - 
1870 
 
Sources: Bergard (1995), Miller (1986), Historical Statistics of the United States Table Bb209 – 214, de Queirós 
Mattoso, Klein & Engerman (1986) 
Factors that may explain regional variation in the commercial transition   
This thesis argues that the following five factors did have an impact upon the different paths 
of commercial transition in the three regions it explores. The first factor relates to certain 
aspects of region-specific ecologies. All regions were able to produce commodities for 
export to Atlantic markets. The Asante either directly or indirectly controlled the areas where 
gold was produced and transported to the coast. In addition, the Asante exercised a near 
monopoly on kola nuts. These were a kind of stimulant, which was not considered haram 
among the Islamic states of the savannah.  Nonetheless, during the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries a series of jihads created a new, strongly Islamist empire which 
consumed increasing quantities of kola and whose only source for this product was in 
                                                 
18 See for example Davis (2006) who argues that plantation system of the American south was run according to 
principles of mass production which would become standard working practices in the twentieth century.  
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territories held by the Asante (see Chapter 5). The Bight of Biafra was particularly well 
endowed with both oil palms and riverine trade systems necessary to transport oil to the coast 
(Lynn 1997, pp61-62). In the Bight of Benin, despite the absence of palm oil exports in the 
period under study, the region was endowed with an ecology suitable for oil palms (see 
Chapter 7).  
The eastern side of the Bight of Benin, partly controlled by Dahomey, was also suitable for 
palm oil production (Bold 1822, p62). In the second half of the nineteenth century, the focus 
of Dahomey’s trade shifted eastwards towards the towns of Cotonou and Godomey. From this 
area, palm oil could be transported directly to these towns by rivers from the interior (Law 
2004, pp228-30). After 1850, the production of palm oil and, from the 1860s, of palm kernels, 
increased rapidly. Manning (1982, p52) estimates that by the 1880s, around 5,000 tons of oil 
and about 7,600 tons of palm kernels were being produced yearly for ocean-bound exports 
from Dahomean territories.19 Thus, this region’s lasting focus on the slave trade was not 
because there were ecological constraints to the production of tropical forest commodities for 
export markets.  
However, some aspects of each region’s ecology were important due to their influence over 
the other factors outlined below. In the case of the Asante, the presence of gold within their 
territories was crucial to state and societal development. Within the Bight of Benin two 
unique geographical features were significant. Firstly, a break in the rainforest belt, which 
contained more savannah-like conditions, also known as the ‘Benin Gap’ (Law 1991, p19); 
secondly, a system of interconnecting lagoons at the coast. These had important consequences 
for the regional political situation. In the Bight of Biafra, ecology also played an important 
role. The poor quality of the soil meant the coastal populations had always been dependent on 
importing foodstuffs from further inland in exchange for fish and salt (see Chapter 6). This 
commerce was important as it formed the basis of the trade in slave ship provisions during the 
eighteenth century and in palm oil during the nineteenth century. 
The second factor is the duration and nature of external trade relations. From the 
sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, the types of products exported and the nationality of the 
main trading partner remained fairly consistent in each region. Therefore, earlier 
developments in trade with the Atlantic strongly influenced the nature of the commercial 
transition. The presence of gold was of central importance for the Gold Coast region and the 
Asante.  In fact, the first Europeans to go to West Africa in the fifteenth century went in 
search of gold (Shumway 2014, p25, 51). For the first two centuries of contact with the 
Atlantic world, this region’s trade output was dominated by gold which in turn had a powerful 
influence on the development of institutions and elite attitudes to external trade.  
                                                 
19
 To put this into context, according to the British customs’ records, exports of palm oil from the Bight of 
Biafra did not regularly exceed 5,000 tons until the 1820s. In 1855 the port of Calabar was exporting around 
4,000 tons of oil, the Cameroons 2,110 tons and Brass 2280 tons. Only the ports of Bonny and Elem Kalabari 
exported more (Lynn 1997, p21).  
  
33 
By contrast, in the Bight of Benin external trade expanded rapidly from the 1660s and, as 
already established, only slaves were traded to Europeans. Embarkations from the region were 
usually well under 1,000 a year in the 1640s but over 10,000 people a year were regularly 
being taken from the region by the beginning of the eighteenth century. The Gold Coast did 
not begin exporting so many captives until the 1750s.20 This had a decisive impact on the 
development of the Dahomean state and, more importantly, on the development of an elite 
culture based on militarism, which was profoundly suspicious of other types of external trade. 
In the Bight of Biafra, the export of slaves only became significant from the 1740s onwards, 
although captives had been embarked there since the sixteenth century. In both the Gold 
Coast and the Bight of Benin external trade was a crucial factor in the development of 
centralised states in the late seventeenth century. The relatively late expansion of external 
trade in Biafra meant that the region remained characterised by far smaller, decentralised 
political entities, often no bigger than villages. Trade was coordinated by a trading network 
under the control of the Aro people that allowed the region to export significant quantities of 
both captives and commodities. In this environment, power and wealth were entirely 
dependent on trade, not on military success or the maintenance of states. 
Related to the previous factor was the nationality of each region’s main trade partners. 
Slave merchants along the Bight of Benin sold far more captives to the Portuguese and French 
than they did to the British, while slave merchants in the Gold Coast and Biafra did most of 
their business with ships from Bristol, Liverpool and London. As will be shown in Chapters 3 
and 4, the British tended to buy far more commodities and food provisions in West Africa 
than other European traders. The extent to which national European trade preferences 
influenced regional trade specialization in Africa in the eighteenth century is unclear and 
ecology may have been central in determining the former’s preferences as well, but the 
identity of the trade partner was important in explaining the nature of local commercial 
transitions.  
Next, there is the regional political context. The Asante and Dahomean states were both 
militarily powerful, expansive empires under a centralised authority supported by powerful 
elite families and lineage groups. Furthermore, these states had their origins in the mid- to late 
seventeenth century and established military superiority over their neighbours by the adoption 
and effective use of firearms. By the 1740s, the Asante had defeated all major rivals and 
achieved political and economic regional hegemony. However, Dahomey was never able to 
secure such a position, which was mainly due to regional ecological barriers to military 
control. The dryer conditions of the Benin gap allowed the cavalry-based armies of Oyo to 
threaten Dahomean territories until the 1800s, while the coastal lagoon system permitted the 
establishment of rival slave trading centres. These threats, in turn, strengthened the military 
ideology of the ruling elites, and this ideology also affected the types of trade they were 
willing to engage in. In the Bight of Biafra the lack of centralised states meant that there were 
no substantial territories to either defend or attack, thus eliminating the need for powerful elite 
                                                 
20 www.slavevoyages.org 
  
34 
individuals or families to maintain permanent military forces, or to base their power or 
legitimacy on military success.  
Finally, there was the attitude of the different regional elites to household participation in 
trade. As will be argued in the case study chapters, the main unit of production for all major 
export commodities were households, supported by coerced labour. However, transporting 
and marketing goods to Atlantic traders required complex trade networks, the ability to 
provide and guarantee credit and to establish relationships of trust with foreign traders. This 
was beyond the capacity of individual households and required the support of more powerful 
individuals or groups who had previously managed the sale and marketing of slaves. In the 
case of Asante and Dahomey external trade was managed by the state and aristocratic elites, 
while in the Bight of Biafra it was the Aro network working with coastal trading organisations 
and influential individuals in the interior. The literature indicates that in Asante and Biafra the 
aforementioned groups were prepared to engage in both the slave and commodity trades 
(McCaskie 2003, p42; Wilks 1993, p127; Nwokeji 2010, pp183-85). In Dahomey, the 
monarchy, the elite families and lineage groups were, for the reasons outlined above, 
profoundly distrustful of all types of trade as a means of securing wealth (Law 1991, p344).  
The model in Figure 1.3 provides the framework for the analysis in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. This 
model illustrates my main argument, namely that the interrelated factors determining the 
initial patterns of trade with the Atlantic world that evolved over the eighteenth century, and 
sometimes even earlier, continued to influence the nineteenth century commercial transitions, 
and that the exogenous shock of abolition in 1807 accelerated this transition, but did not put it 
in motion.  
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Figure 1.3. Explanatory model for region-specific commercial transitions 
 
 
1.6 DATA AND SOURCES 
In his overview of currently available datasets Manning (2012) notes that there had been no 
new statistics on trade with Africa in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries since the 
publication of the Johnson et al.’s (1990) limited dataset on the British customs records from 
1699 to 1808. Moreover, there have also been very few quantitative studies of regional 
economic development in pre-colonial West Africa since Curtin’s (1973, 1975) study of 
Senegambia, and Inikori’s (2002) work on Africa’s contribution to Britain’s industrial 
revolution.21 The data collected for this research may thus be considered as a contribution to 
what remains a rather underdeveloped field of empirically grounded research.  
The main sources used in this thesis are derived from archives in the United Kingdom, The 
Netherlands and France. In the national archives in London, I explored two main sources. 
Firstly, the customs records, which detail goods arriving from and leaving for Africa in 
British ships and form the basis of the dataset detailed in Chapter 4. Secondly, the T70 series, 
which include the records of the Royal Africa Company (RAC).22  Research on the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries was greatly aided by the four volume transcription 
                                                 
21 A notable exception would be the work of Rönnbäck on economic change along the Gold Coast in the 
eighteenth century. See in particular Rönnbäck (2014, 2015) 
22 The RAC continued operating until 1752 when the business was officially wound up by an act of parliament 
and its assets transferred to the Africa Company of Merchants (Pettigrew 2013, p176). 
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of RAC letters by Law (1997) and the records of the private merchant Henry Morice from the 
1720s. After the 1750s, the T70 series includes the accounts, reports and letters from the 
government-subsidized forts on the African coast, although this information is largely 
confined to the Gold Coast region. I also found a number of other useful sources in the 
National Archives. These included the accounts of the Bristol merchant James Rogers (C107 
series), and some new accounts of individual slaving voyages. In addition, there were the 
government Blue Books and reports and accounts from British officials as they began to 
establish and extend imperial power on the coast.  
Another important source of information from the United Kingdom was the private accounts 
and letters of slave merchants held at the Maritime Archives and Public Library in Liverpool. 
The most important of these were those of William Davenport (D/DAV series) and Thomas 
Leyland (DX series), but they also included the log books of other slave trading ships. At the 
Bristol Library I had access to the Bristol presentments which listed all the ships leaving that 
port along with their cargoes from 1789. Finally, the Parliamentary archives held at the House 
of Commons in London provided additional macro-level data on the trade and commerce of 
Great Britain. They also included several important reports and commissions which examined 
the slave trade, the British presence in Africa and the progress of abolition and ‘legitimate 
commerce’. 
In the Netherlands, the records of the Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie (MCC), held in 
Middelburg, provided a very rich source of information. The most important documents were 
the accounts of the voyages to Africa for both slaves and commodities which were 
particularly useful for the level of detail recorded. This included exactly where goods and 
captives were bought, as well as prices in Africa. The archives also hold records of sales of 
goods in Europe as well as letters and instructions to captains. In France, the archives of the 
Loire Atlantique in Nantes have the account books for various important French merchants in 
the second half of the eighteenth century, providing important insights into the different ways 
the transatlantic slave trade operated.  
There are a number of important accounts written at the time. Firstly, there are books written 
by those who had first-hand experience of either trade in slaves or commodities. They came 
from diverse backgrounds, working as captains (Phillips 1693, Barbot 1732, Newton 1765, 
Crow 1830), surgeons (Dapper 1676, Atkins 1735, Falconbridge 1788), surveyors (Smith 
1745) or residents on the coast (Bosman 1705, Meredith 1812, Monrad 1822). Their 
motivations seem to have largely been to share or perhaps monetize their experiences in an 
exotic location. One source which has not yet been used extensively by historians is that of 
Parfitt (1796), a commodity trader hired in the 1790s to explore non-slave commercial 
opportunities in West Africa.23 Those working as captains during the era of the commodity 
trade such as Adams (1822) and Bold (1823) seem to have been looking to sell their 
                                                 
23 British Library, Add Mss 12131, ‘Mr Parfitts information on Trade between Sierra Leone and Cape Lopez w. 
Islands St Thomas etc.’ and ‘Extract of a Diary Kept by E.L. Parfitt on the Board the Sierra Leone Company’s 
Ship Calypso’, Papers Relating to Sierra Leone, ff. 174 – 320. See Schwarz 2007, p262 for biographical details. 
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experience in Africa to the new breed of traders working in a post abolition world. In either 
case, their observations rarely go beyond the coastal ports and are most reliable when they 
talk of trade, rather than the societies and peoples of West Africa.24 
 
The eighteenth century saw two important histories of the kingdom of Dahomey by Norris 
(1789) and Dalzel (1793), although the purpose of the latter was predominantly an anti-
abolitionist tract seeking to prove that African states were far too savage to ever be persuaded 
to give up the slave trade. There are also contemporary accounts by people within the 
abolition movement, which aimed to highlight the ugly realities of slave trading for African 
captives and crew members involved in slave voyages. However, as many were written by 
men with no direct experience of Africa such as Clarkson (1788) or Buxton (1840), they are 
more useful as sources for the experiences of British participants in the slave trade. The 
exceptions are the accounts by Falconbridge (1788), a ship’s surgeon, and Equiano (1794) a 
freed slave who was probably captured from the region around the Bight of Biafra.25  
In the nineteenth century, greater European involvement in the interior of Africa led to more 
in-depth studies of the states of societies trading with the Europeans. Some of these accounts 
were due to the missions sent by the British government to the states of Asante (Bowdich 
1819, Dupuis 1834), and Dahomey (Forbes 1851) to discuss the ending of the slave trade. 
Others were written by a new generation of British officials posted to manage colonial 
possessions as opposed to trading stations (Cruikshank 1853, Burton 1864), explorers (Lander 
1832, Laird & Oldfield 1837) and missionaries (Waddell 1863).  
 
 
1.7. ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS 
 
This thesis is divided into two parts. Chapter 2 introduces the first part with a broad overview 
of regional patterns of trade. In this chapter, I look at evidence from three different trading 
organisations working from around 1700 to the 1760s. This chapter argues that recognised 
regional patterns of commodity trading were already established in the eighteenth century and 
that these continued into the era of abolition. However, the data presented is limited as it 
doesn’t quantitatively examine either commercial agricultural output or the period in the 
decades before abolition. These will be subject of the following two chapters. 
Chapter 3 examines regional patterns and European demand for slave ship provisioning in the 
long eighteenth century, and explores the extent to which the eighteenth century 
intensification of the trans-Atlantic slave trade boosted commercial agriculture in the coastal 
                                                 
24 See Law (1982) for an analysis of the problems of using Barbot and Dantzig (1974) on Bosman for some 
discussion of the reliability / validity of using these sources 
25 Recently Carretta (2005) has suggested that Equiano may in fact have been born in America. This provoked a 
somewhat acrimonious debate (see Lovejoy 2006, Carretta 2007, Lovejoy 2007), although it seems that the 
balance of opinion is that Equiano’s account was based on his own experiences of being kidnapped from 
Igboland and brought to the coast (Byrd 2006, Sweet 2009) 
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areas of West Africa. Together with Ewout Frankema, I have analysed the provisioning 
strategies of 187 British, French, Dutch and Danish slave voyages conducted between 1681 
and 1807, and call for a major downward adjustment of available estimates of the slave trade 
induced demand impulse. During the eighteenth century, an increasing share of the foodstuffs 
required to feed African slaves was taken on board in Europe instead of West Africa.  I 
explain this trend as resulting from the falling relative costs of European provisions and the 
increasing risks in the late eighteenth century trade, putting a premium on faster embarkation 
times. However, there was also considerable variation in provisioning strategies among slave 
trading nations and, more importantly, across main regions of slave embarkation. Traders in 
the Bight of Biafra, and to a lesser extent the Gold Coast, provided considerable quantities of 
commercially produced foodstuffs, and in these areas the expansion of the slave trade did 
provide a boost to commercial agriculture. By contrast, in the Bight of Benin ships tended to 
bring the greater bulk of their food with them from Europe and/or stocked up with provisions 
from other areas along the coast.  
Having examined exports of foodstuffs, Chapter 4 turns to other kinds of export commodities, 
notably palm oil, ivory, gums and sylvan products such as dyewoods. Using a newly 
constructed dataset on the quantities and prices of African commodities over the long 
eighteenth century, this chapter quantifies the changing nature of the non-slave trade with 
West Africa in the era before the abolition of the British transatlantic slave trade. Together 
with Jop Woltjer, I have found that previous estimates of both the volume and value of the 
commodity trade are underestimates which fail to account for regional variations in output. 
Our data shows instead that from the 1770s there was a significant expansion in what would 
later be called ‘legitimate commerce’. This growth was centred around the Bight of Biafra and 
the vast majority of these goods were purchased by slave ships, not the specialist bi-lateral 
traders who had dominated the trade earlier in the century. I argue that slave merchants were 
motivated by both rising prices in European markets and by the relative stability of prices on 
the African coast. Furthermore, both European and African merchants in some areas of the 
Bight of Biafra faced increasing levels of risk and competition in the latter decades of the 
eighteenth century. This may have prompted some of them to diversify their portfolios of 
goods through investment in the commodities trade to better manage these risks. 
The data in part 1 clearly shows that there were distinct long-term regional patterns of trade. 
In the Bight of Biafra, the slave trade provided a substantial stimulus to the development of 
other types of exports. In the Gold Coast, the slave and commodity trades seem to have been 
compatible until the 1780s, but both types of export were in decline in the two decades before 
abolition. In the area of the Bight of Benin controlled by Dahomey, the exports were captives 
destined for slavery in the Americas. This suggests firstly that participation in either the slave 
or commodity trades was a result of internal decisions, not on the efforts of abolitionists. 
Secondly, it shows that transatlantic slavery did not necessarily crowd out other forms of 
market activity. The following Chapters will examine, using the model developed earlier, the 
factors motivating the elites and households in the case study regions to either respond to, or 
ignore, the market for non-slave exports. 
The first case study, of the Gold Coast region and more specifically the Asante empire, shows 
that the export of people was a relatively short interruption to a pattern of trade dominated by 
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the application of coerced labour to the production of commodities and, more specifically, 
gold. Institutional developments made gold the most important marker of status and wealth 
within the region and more specifically Asante. This in turn meant that there was always a 
strong internal market for slaves as factors of production. A near monopoly of regional output 
through control of goldfields and lack of external threats meant the Asante state was far less 
dependent on slave exports to acquire crucial European imports. It also led to the Asante 
developing strong links to northern savannah markets, affording them the opportunity to 
rapidly develop an alternative export commodity, kola, to service the new Islamic states of the 
interior at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Crucially, both elites and households stood 
to gain from the end of transatlantic slavery, which explains why the withdrawal of the 
region's biggest buyer of slaves in 1807 was sufficient to effectively end the export of slaves.  
In Biafra, the wealth and power of elite institutions, both in the interior and at the coast, was 
always dependent on trade, and not on the maintenance of more centralised states or the 
broadcast of military power. This was probably in large part due to the relatively late 
expansion of export slavery in the region, which meant that networks developed that did not 
require centralised states or large scale raiding to handle large numbers of captives. These 
networks always handled both slaves and commodities and, as with Asante elites, were not 
materially disadvantaged by the commercial transition. Households could harness the coerced 
labour that would otherwise have been exported to gain access to goods that enhanced their 
living standards. Consequently, when British abolition efforts finally became effective in the 
late 1830s, it was in the context of an already highly developed and expanded commodity 
export economy and was therefore sufficient to end the export of slaves.  
By contrast in Dahomey there were strong, path dependent reasons why a commodity export 
sector did not develop until transatlantic slavery was effectively over. Firstly, its institutional 
development was heavily influenced by a late seventeenth century regional political context, 
in which slave exports formed the basis of wealth and power. This encouraged the 
development of a highly-militarised state, which enhanced the wealth and power of elites. It 
was also a necessary development, given the inability of any one polity to gain any kind of 
regional hegemony, meaning the state was always threatened, either militarily or 
economically, by other regional powers. The high labour demands of both the military and a 
more powerful elite meant that labour was always directed towards the goals of elites and not 
households. In that event, the development of a significant export commodity sector was only 
possible in the 1840s in the context of more effective British abolition efforts and domestic 
military setbacks. 
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CHAPTER 2  
REGIONAL PATTERNS OF TRADE IN THE MAJOR WEST AFRICAN 
SLAVE EXPORTING REGIONS OVER THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
“...the bowels and surface of Africa, abound in valuable and useful returns...” 
Olaudah Equiano (1794 p357) 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Part 1 of this thesis will quantitatively examine the patterns of the commodity trade in the 
three case study regions and to reveal how they interacted with transatlantic slavery in the 
century before abolition. The current literature on West African trade in the century before 
abolition has focused almost entirely on the commerce in captives. There has been very little 
quantitative analysis of the development of the trade in commodities and commercial 
agriculture and how this interacted with transatlantic slavery. This contrasts with studies of 
earlier periods, when commodities played a far bigger role in the trade between Africa and the 
Atlantic. Non-slave products, especially gold and ivory, initially attracted Spanish and 
Portuguese traders to the region (Lovejoy 2011, p36, Thornton 1998, p26). The initial rise in 
demand for coerced labour for the Iberian empires of the Americas from the 15th to early 
seventeenth Centuries was largely met by the West Central African region (Lovejoy 2011, 
p47). Until North European nations began to acquire sugar producing Caribbean Islands in the 
1630s, they generally focused their trading efforts on the acquisition of commodities.  
Even after by states such as England and the Dutch Republic began to expand their plantation 
economies, commodities were still an important part of their overall trade with Africa. 
Supporting earlier work by Van den Boogaart (1992), Den Heijer’s (1997) research into 
Dutch West India Company (WIC) accounts shows that between 1674 and 1740, 64% of the 
goods dispatched to Africa for trade were intended for non-slave commodities. Of these, ivory 
and gold made up by far the largest percentage (86.6% gold, 10.3% ivory) in terms of value, 
but other products were still bought in large quantities.26 Even though the British were buying 
ever more slaves from the 1650s, it wasn’t until the last decades of the seventeenth century 
that their value passed that of commodities (Eltis 1994). However, after the 1680s there was a 
huge expansion in the transatlantic slave trade and by the beginning of the eighteenth century 
captive labour had become West Africa’s most important export. This has led many scholars 
to devote insufficient attention to the growth and development of other African exports (Eltis 
2013, pp31-32). Part 1 of this thesis will show that this neglect has meant that important long 
term patterns have been ignored, and these patterns are crucial for understanding the nature of 
                                                 
26 For example, while only consisting of 0.54% of the value of goods the WIC still imported 1,323,548 pounds of 
Pepper against 2,955,533 pounds of Ivory (Den Heijer 1997) 
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the commercial transition in the nineteenth century. Some have argued that the export of 
captives undermined and crowded out other forms of commercial exchange (Inikori 2007, 
2011, Rodney 1972). By contrast, the following chapters will show that export slavery, in 
some areas, greatly stimulated trade in other products.  
During the period under study, the different regions of West Africa generally exported the 
same kinds of commodities, even if the relative quantities changed over time. Along all parts 
of the coast, slave ships could buy food to feed themselves and their cargoes of captives in 
advance of the middle passage. Eltis (2013) suggests the scale of this trade in provisions was 
not exceeded by ‘legitimate commerce’ until the 1850s. The extent and regional variations of 
this trade will be examined in Chapter 3. In addition, some agricultural products were bought 
with the intention of selling back in Europe. Pepper had been purchased since the sixteenth 
century but from the 1770s palm oil, which had previously only been bought to provision 
slave ships, became increasingly sought after for its industrial applications in Europe. Many 
regions also exported sylvan products from the tropical rainforests (the most important being 
dyewoods27, hardwoods and beeswax) and ivory. Most of the region’s gold came from the 
Gold Coast but some was also available along the windward coast in modern day Cote 
d’Ivoire. Finally, gum Senegal was purchased in large quantities from the Senegambian 
region in the east. There have been no attempts to quantify the scale of this trade since the 
publication of Johnson et al. (1990)’s dataset on the British custom’s records in the eighteenth 
century. The growth and development in the trade in these products will be the subject of 
Chapter 4.  
This chapter will first provide a broad overview of West African patterns of trade from the 
fifteenth to the eighteenth Centuries. It will then continue with the beginning of my 
quantitative study of the patterns of trade with an examination of data on commodity trading 
in the earlier eighteenth century. I will argue that the expansion of slavery in the Bight of 
Biafra did not crowd out other forms of commerce. On the Gold Coast the early eighteenth 
century saw continued engagement in commodity exports while the slave trade expanded. 
However, by the 1780s, both slave and commodity exports seem to have begun to decline.  In 
the Dahomean controlled area of the Bight of Benin, there is no evidence of slavery crowding 
out other forms of commerce, as captives were always the only item of trade.   
 
 
 
                                                 
27 In particular, camwood from around Sierra Leone and the Windward Coast and redwood from the Bights of 
Benin and Biafra. See Chapter 4 for more details. 
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2.2. TRADE WITH THE ATLANTIC WORLD 
Figure 2.1.a. Number of slaves embarked from the Gold Coast sixteenth to nineteenth 
centuries 
 
Figure 2.1.b. Number of slaves embarked from the Bight of Biafra sixteenth to 
nineteenth centuries 
 
Figure 2.1.c. Number of slaves embarked from the Bight of Benin sixteenth to nineteenth 
centuries 
 
Source: slavevoyages.org 
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The Gold Coast 
As noted above, gold and to a lesser extent ivory, were the most important exports from this 
region until the early eighteenth century. From this point until the 1780s, the trend was for 
exports of captives to rise, although in common with all regions there was a good deal of 
variation from year to year.28 As noted by Austin (2013) all the case study regions saw a 
decline in the numbers of captives exported from the mid-1780s. However, in the case of the 
Gold Coast it was also mirrored by a fall in the output of non-slave products, particularly 
gold. Parfitt (1796) noted that ships trading around the English, Dutch and Danish forts on the 
Gold Coast (Cape Coast / Anomabo, Elmina & Accra respectively), could find “Gold at all of 
them, Ivory at some of them in particular Accra…” However, it seems that in practise, little 
gold was acquired with the intention of importing it back to the UK, but rather as currency for 
trade within West Africa. From the 1750s the price of gold on the coast began to rise 
substantially and from the 1770s the region turned into a net importer of the precious metal 
(Johnson 1966, Metcalf 1987).  
Along the Gold Coast barters were always converted into a trading currency called the ounce, 
which was in theory the equivalent to the value of an ounce of gold. This was a means by 
which complex assortments of goods from different points of origin could be valued in 
relation to the price of slaves (Richardson 1979, pp137-38). In the first half of the eighteenth 
century the price of an actual ounce of gold to a trade ounce had doubled from 1:1 to 1:2. 
Johnson (1966) quotes a British trader in 1777 complaining that it was necessary to buy gold 
in other parts of Africa at more than the prime cost of his goods so as to trade at Annamabo. 
In his analysis of the accounts of one British trader, Metcalf (1987) notes that by 1776 93.6% 
of his barters for slaves included gold and that this constituted around 25% of the total cost. In 
1791, the Captain of the British ship, the Jupiter, was trading around Cape Coast Castle on 
behalf of the Bristol merchant James Rogers.29 In his first letter he assures his employer that 
he will be able to fill the holds of another of his ships, the Dragon, with slaves and ivory. To 
fill up his own ship with a complement of captives he needed to get hold of gold without 
which he couldn’t make his purchases. In order to do this he sold a quantity of ivory to the 
Governor of Cape Coast Castle in exchange for gold dust which he could then use to purchase 
slaves.30  
This shortage of gold supports the estimates by Garrard (1980, pp127-70) who uses various 
accounts and observations of traders and foreign visitors to Akan territories to create baseline 
                                                 
28 These fluctuations were a result of numerous factors, but warfare across the Atlantic played a big role. In 
particular; War of Spanish Succession (1702 – 1713), War of the Quadruple Alliance (1718  -1720), War of 
Jenkins’ Ear (1739 – 1742), War of the Austrian Succession (1742 – 1748), French and Indian War / Seven 
Years War (1754 – 1763), American Revolutionary War / Fourth Anglo Dutch War (1775 – 1784), French 
Revolutionary / Napoleonic Wars (1793 – 1815), the Haitian revolution (1791 – 1804) 
29 Rogers was a Bristol merchant and an important source for the period. The survival of so much of his 
correspondence is due to the fact that he went bankrupt in 1794 and his estate / assets were seized by the courts. 
For a full account of his career see Morgan (2003)  
30 TNA C107/11 Capt. Smith to Rogers from the Jupiter – 27th February, 17th April, 24th July 1791 
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estimates (Figure 2.2).31 As exports of gold rose substantially in the nineteenth century (see 
Chapter 5) the decline from 1750s was unlikely to have been the result of scarcity but instead 
reflected a deliberate decision to restrict the quantities sent to the coast. Thus, from the end of 
the eighteenth century, the Atlantic export sector of the region’s economy was shrinking.  
Figure 2.2. Estimated Akan exports of gold to the Atlantic market 1500 – 1900 (ounces)
Garrard (1980, p169) 
 
The Bight of Biafra 
Even though slaves had been exported from this region since the sixteenth century, their 
numbers did not significantly expand until the 1740s. From this point they rapidly grew until 
by the 1790s the Biafran ports of Bonny, Elem Kalabari and Calabar had become the most 
important slave embarkation points in Africa. However, this growth did not come at the 
expense of commodity exports.  Parfitt notes that at Calabar, “…palm oil is very plentiful. 
Ships carry very large quantities home of late from place – It is in general bought for salt, 
one measure or crew of salt for one of palm oil.” (p52) Further down the coast, the 
Cameroons river is a place where there was “….a great quantity of ivory to be purchased…” 
(p54) and in Gabon traders could buy Redwood, Ebony and Wax (p67). Parfitt advised traders 
to firstly pick up redwood, wax and ebony in Gabon and then proceed to Calabar for oil.  
                                                 
31 These estimates are then tested against archaeological evidence and studies of gold production in the Asante to 
provide rough, and according to the author, conservative figures, which are referenced by Austin (2005, p46). 
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How this operated in practice can be seen through an analysis of the letters written to James 
Rogers by his captains trading in the region.32 In 1788, Capt. Richard Rogers of the Pearl who 
had already been some months at Old Calabar wrote to James Rogers that he expected to 
“dispatch Capt. Kennedy in July with 260 prime slaves & 1 ½ ton of ivory, 28 punch. palm oil 
& 5 to 6 tons Red Wood”33. He would then follow after with “…250 slaves, 1 ½ ton ivory, 20 
punch palm oil and 7 ton redwood”34. The same ship was performing similar duties 2 years 
later with a Capt. Garnett writing that, “We have done everything in our power to assist your 
Pearl…..We have on board 103 punch 97 buts of your Pearl’s purchase & only 8 tons of 
wood our purchase & 5 ½ tons of ivory.”35   
The commodity trade at Biafra’s main slaving port Bonny seems to have been less developed 
in the pre-abolition period and only really began to seriously expand in the 1820s (see 
Chapter 6). Nonetheless, it seems that a market was developing, although perhaps on a 
smaller scale than at Old Calabar. In 1802 Capt. Kneal of the Liverpool ship Lottery was 
instructed to go to Bonny and barter his cargo for “…290 negroes, besides which we expect 
you will be able to procure a quantity of Palm Oil…”36 The next year, Capt. Ceasar Lawson 
was told to “…barter at Bonny for prime Negroes, Ivory and Palm Oil….”. He was provided 
further instruction “…procure some Palm Oil on reasonable terms which is likely to bear a 
great price here, we therefore wish you to purchase as much as you can with any of the cargo 
you may have….”37  
Thus, in the Bight of Biafra, commodity trading and the slave trade seem to have been 
complementary, rather than antagonistic. The quantitative evidence that will be presented in 
Chapters 3 and 4 will show that non-slave markets in the region were stimulated by the 
expansion in number of captives sold to Atlantic slave traders. 
 
The Bight of Benin 
Slave exports from this region began to expand earlier, and with far greater intensity, than in 
the other two regions. Over the course of the eighteenth century over a million captives were 
embarked from its ports compared to around 700,000 from the Bight of Biafra and about 
630,000 from the Gold Coast. Over a third of embarkations were from just one port, Whydah, 
which had been conquered by the Dahomeans in the 1720s (see Chapter 6). While merchants 
from the other case study regions were engaging in other forms of trade, only one rather 
doubtful qualitative source gives any indication that this area was engaging in any other major 
business but slavery. Norris (1789, p147), an anti-abolition writer who wrote a history of 
                                                 
32 Rogers was primarily a slave trader but like many of contemporaries was supplementing his main business 
with purchases of wood, oil, ivory and wax (see Chapter 4 for more details). 
33 C107/11 Richard Rogers Ship Pearl to Rogers April 1788 
34 C107/11 Richard Rogers Ship Pearl to Rogers 17 June 1788 
35 C107/11 Capt. Garnett to Rogers 1791  
36 LRO 387 MD 42 Leyland to Capt. Charles Kneal 21 May 1802 
37 LRO 387 MD 43 Leyland to Capt. Caesar Lawson 18 July 1803 
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Dahomey, stated that “large quantities” of palm oil were being exported from the kingdom to 
Great Britain, but I can find no other source that supports this claim. Furthermore, all studies 
of the region agree that slaves were the only significant export (Akinjogbin 1967, Manning 
1982, Law 1991, 2004).  
Parfitt does say that ships looking to trade in Gabon were advised to stop at either Lagos or 
Whydah to buy what he refers to as “Jebboe Cloths”, which presumably refer to cloth from 
the Ijebu region of southern Yorubaland near Lagos (Adams 1823, p96). Apparently, these 
made useful articles of trade when bartering for ivory, beeswax, redwood or ebony around the 
Cameroon River and Gabon. In addition, Adams (1823, p97) suggests there was some 
demand for this cloth in Brazil where it was “….held in much estimation by the black 
population;….not only on account of its durability, but because it is manufactured in a 
country which gave many of them, or their parents, birth.” Bold (1823) notes that “..vessels 
intending to trade to the Southward (i.e. South of Bight of Benin) should here lay a stock of 
Jaboo cloths, which are there greatly esteemed.” However, he was referring to cloth from the 
kingdom of Benin, not Dahomey. In addition, this was clearly not a key item of trade as when 
he provides a list of trade goods suitable for the Cameroon market he does not mention cloth 
from the Bight of Benin (p84). Norris (1789) and Dalzell (1794) both wrote extensive 
histories and descriptions of Dahomey which included numerous references to its production 
of cloth, yet neither ever mention that it was important as an item of export.38 It is probably 
then safe to assume that while some quantities of local cloth were bought by European 
traders, this was not a major item of trade.  
The datasets in the rest of part 1 will all confirm that at no point did the region that came to be 
controlled by the Dahomeans ever engage in non-slave exports to the Atlantic.  
 
2.3. TRADE IN AFRICA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
Both internal and regional trade will be discussed in greater detail in the case study chapters, 
but it is worth noting here that there were both similarities and significant differences between 
the three regions with regard to their involvement in trade within West Africa. In all three 
areas there was always a trade between the coast and the interior in salt and fish due to the 
relative paucity of natural sources of protein and salt in the forest regions.39 Likewise salt, 
mined or extracted from brine lakes, and cattle/meat were traded south from the savannah. 
Within the region around the Bight of Biafra, fish and salt from the coast and salt from 
Urburu Lake on the savannah were traded for yams, iron and brass in the forest zone, as well 
                                                 
38 Dalzel (1793) gives descriptions of local cloth (ppvliv,122) and also mentions how it was sometimes 
distributed as a reward (pp137,147,190). Norris (1789) likewise provides descriptions of the cloth worn by 
Dahomean (pp87,146) but again makes no mention of it being exported 
39 Protein sources were few due to the presence of the tse-tse fly which limited the number of animals that could 
survive (Alsan 2015) and salt could only be obtained through pot-ash which was a far inferior product to imports 
from the coast or the savannah (Lovejoy 1986, p1) 
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as slaves (Northrup 1978, p73, Lovejoy 1985, p686). Along the Bight of Benin a trade in fish 
and salt from the coast to the interior was noted from the seventeenth century and likely 
increased in tandem with the expansion of the slave trade which had a “multiplier effect upon 
trade even in purely indigenous commodities…” Law (1989, pp220-21). There was also a 
thriving trade along the coastal lagoons and rivers between the slave and gold coasts and 
which eventually allowed goods to be traded with the Oyo empire in what is today south west 
Nigeria. Trade goods from the Gold Coast could be exchanged for high quality Yoruba cloth 
or jewellery and again it is likely that European trade did stimulate this commerce (Law 
1989a, pp213,214, Law 2004, p28). Along the Gold Coast fishing and salt production were 
one of the key (non-agricultural) industries (Shumway 2014, p27) and was noted as an 
important item of trade with their northern neighbours (Bowdich 1819, p334).40 
However, long-distance trade was very different. The Akan region in what is today southern 
Ghana, had a long history of commercial exchange with the interior savannah markets in 
Hausaland and Borno. Gold, salt and kola nuts41 were exchanged for manufactured goods 
such as textiles, leather, ironware (Lovejoy 2004, p15, 156, 176 & Lovejoy 1985, p683). The 
Dahomeans seem to have developed regular trade links with other African polities, at least by 
the nineteenth century. The explorer Clapperton reported meeting traders working for the 
Dahomean king at the town of Kiama in Borgu, which sat on the trade routes between both 
Dahomey and Asante to Hausaland. They reportedly exchanged European trade goods for 
around 200 slaves in the area and boasted that the “….it is from Dahomey that the people of 
these countries receive all their rum and European articles.” (Clapperton 1829, pp83,84,123, 
Law 1989b, p58).42 However, all of this trade was dependent on transatlantic commerce, and 
there is no evidence that the Dahomeans, unlike the Asante, were engaging in the exchange of 
commodities / products which they had themselves produced. Long-distance trade between 
the regions around the Bight of Biafra and Hausaland never seemed to have developed, 
perhaps as suggested by Nwokeji (2010, pp167-168) due to political instability in the areas 
separating the forest regions from the north. This instability may have discouraged Hausa 
merchants from investing in the trade for products such as kola, especially when they were 
available via the Asante (see Chapter 5).  
 
 
 
                                                 
40 In the nineteenth century Wilks (1975, p68) notes that the Asante allowed their coastal vassals to pay their 
tribute in salt. 
41 Kola nuts will be discussed in some detail in Chapter 5. They were small fruits that contained considerable 
quantities of caffeine and were an important export as they were a stimulant that was not explicitly forbidden in 
the Koran and therefore of great value in the wealthy Muslim kingdoms in Hausaland and Borno.  
42 While Clapperton was prepared to accept this statement, it cannot have been true given the rising importance 
of the port of Lagos at the time (Mann 2007, p40) and the fact that slaves from Yorubaland had been traded for 
European goods via such ports as Porto Novo throughout the eighteenth century (Law 1989b, pp55–56) 
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2.4. THE COMMODITY TRADE IN THE EARLIER EIGHTEENTH CENTURY  
The qualitative and secondary data presented so far suggests certain patterns of trade were 
already well established in the eighteenth century. We now turn to the first quantitative data 
on the commodity trade, for the period from around 1700 to the 1760s. It will exclude 
commercial agriculture for the provisioning of slave ships, which will be covered in the next 
chapter. The data comes from three sources. Firstly, the records of the British Royal Africa 
Company, which had been granted a royal monopoly over the trade with Africa in the 1670s. 
In the first three decades of the eighteenth century it gradually lost out to privately backed 
enterprises but was still an important carrier of both slaves and commodities (Hair & Law 
1998, p259, 260). Secondly, data from private traders, operating out of Bristol, which was the 
largest slave trading port in England at the time (Richardson 1987, Vol II, pvii). Finally, I 
examine of the archives of the Dutch Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie (MCC), which 
became the Republic’s largest carrier of slaves after the Netherlands West India Company lost 
its monopoly in the 1720s (Postma 1990, p133). 
The Royal Africa Company sent out two types of ship to Africa; one for slaves and the other 
for commodities (Tables 2.1 & 2.2). What is striking is that while the Bight of Benin took in 
30% of their slaving ships, only 7% of commodity vessels sailed there. By far the most 
important regions for non-slave items were Senegambia and the Gold Coast, where the British 
also kept the majority of the trading forts.  
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Table 2.1. Royal Africa Company commodity ships by destination 1679 - 1752 
  
1679 - 
1689 
1690 - 
1699 
1700 – 
1709 
1710 – 
1719 
1720 - 
1731 
1732 - 
1752 
Total % Total 
Senegambia 8 9 4 3 12 25 61 40 
Sierra Leone  8 0 2 7 12 1 30 20 
Gold Coast  0 0 3 5 26 11 45 30 
Bight of Benin  0 0 0 0 9 1 10 7 
Bight of Biafra 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
West Central Africa  0 0 0 0 5 0 5 3 
Source: Database of commodity vessels to Africa: Eltis (2013) 
Table 2.2. Royal Africa Company slave ships by destination 1679 - 1752 
  
1679 – 
1689 
1690 – 
1699 
1700 - 
1709 
1710 - 
1719 
1720 - 
1731 
1732 – 
1752 Total % Total 
Senegambia  40 12 13 1 14 0 80 15 
Sierra Leone  9 7 4 0 3 0 23 4 
Gold Coast  22 11 49 21 18 0 121 23 
Bight of Benin  90 22 29 7 11 0 159 30 
Bight of Biafra  66 7 2 0 0 0 75 14 
West Central Africa  42 11 6 0 6 0 65 12 
Source: slavevoyages.org 
In terms of exactly what was bought we can turn to the invoice books of the Royal Africa 
Company.43 These are a series of accounts of all the goods that were returned for sale in their 
vessels from 1721 to 1741 (see Table 2.3). By value, gold and ivory from the Gold Coast 
were by far the most significant items of trade.44 The Bight of Benin also exported ivory, 
which almost certainly came from the Volta regions around the western Slave Coast or from 
the Kingdom of Benin, and not from the area around Whydah (Strickrodt 2015, p115, Den 
Heijer 1997, p134, Johnson & Feinberg 1982, p437). Gold was a significant item of trade 
along the Bight of Benin, and especially at Whydah, until around the 1760s although it was 
                                                 
43 It should be noted that the RAC’s patterns of trade were probably exceptional during this period. The directors 
of the RAC were actively following a policy of increasing their investment in ‘articles of home return’ (i.e. 
commodities) to compensate for their inability to actively compete with independent traders after they lost their 
legal monopoly on slaves in 1698 (Law 2013, p129).  
44 Over the period the total value of commodities per region was: Gold Coast £84,030, Senegambia £28,588, 
Bight of Benin £17,529, Sierra Leone £10,169 
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brought from Brazil by Portuguese vessels to be either re-exported to other European nations 
or exchanged for slaves (Law 1990b, p 107 – 12, Den Heijer 1997, p134).  
Table 2.3 Value of Commodities (£) bought by RAC ships by region of trade 1721 – 1741 
and number of observations (Obs) in the sources 
 Beeswax Gold Gum Hides Ivory Mallaguetta Palm Oil Wood 
Region Value 
(obs) 
Value 
(obs) 
Value 
(Obs) 
Value 
(Obs) 
Value 
(Obs) 
        Value 
(Obs) 
Value 
(Obs) 
Value 
(Obs) 
Bight of 
Benin  
15,372 
(7)   
2,146  
(12)   
11 
 (1) 
Gold Coast 
1,271  
(9) 
61,696 
(16) 
23  
(4)  
17,336 
(47) 
1,379 
 (5) 
354  
(9) 
1,970  
(10) 
Senegambia 
17,051 
(17) 
433  
(3) 
1,882  
(9) 
15  
(5) 
9,168  
(34) 
1  
(1) 
23  
(1) 
15  
(3) 
Sierra 
Leone 
2,580  
(3) 
2  
(1)   
2,827  
(8)  
11  
(1) 
4,750  
(5) 
Total Value 20,902 77,503 1,905 15 31,477 1,380 388 6,746 
Source: TNA T70/957, T70/958, T70/959, T70/960 
We now turn to the records of private traders. The data in Table 2.4 is taken from Richardson 
(1986, 1987) and shows 63 slave ships from the port of Bristol 1720 to 1734. The figures in 
brackets in the second column indicate the total number of ships sent from Bristol during the 
period. This sample shows ships which recorded bringing back African commodities, 
although none mentioned gold. The sample does not indicate exactly where the commodities 
were bought, only where the majority of slaves were purchased. This means that it is very 
possible that ships bringing back wood from the Gold Coast had first purchased it in Sierra 
Leone or the Windward coast (where dyewoods were more common).  
Whilst limited, the sample does at least indicate that voyages to most regions bought a range 
of commodities in addition to slaves. The single ship shown going to the Bight of Benin 
followed the same strategy as RAC vessels in only purchasing ivory. By contrast, traders were 
picking up a far greater range of products in the Bight of Biafra and the Gold Coast. 
Richardson (1986 Vol 1, p xvi) has noted that of the 594 vessels which left Bristol for Africa 
from 1698 to 1729 only 20 were specialist commodity ships but “….most Bristol slave ships 
returned home from the New World with some African products, and the quantities involved 
were sometime large.” Dyewoods, bought from the Cross River region around Calabar, the 
Loango coast and Sierra Leone, were particularly important for the textile industry in South 
West England (Behrendt et al. 2010 pp84-85). While Bristol merchants bought less ivory than 
the RAC, it was still an important product and most was traded through the ports of Bonny 
and Calabar (Behrendt et al. 2010, p83). 
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Table 2.4 Average quantities of commodities purchased / Bristol ship by region (1720 – 
1734) 
Region 
Number of 
voyages: sample 
(total) 
Average  
Dyewood 
lbs 
Average 
Guinea 
Grains lbs 
Average 
Ivory 
lbs 
Average Gum 
Seneca  
lbs 
Average 
Bees 
Wax lbs 
Bight of Benin 1 (3) 
  
3,528 
  Bight of Biafra 33 (89) 5,741 5,683 3,177 
 
672 
Gold Coast 9 (48) 6,669 1,661 4,629 1,512 
 Senegambia 9 (10) 2,242 364 
  
1,004 
West Central 12 (24) 23,494 10,000 3,024 
 
2,129 
Source: Richardson (1986, 1987) 
Next, we address the records of the Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie (MCC). These 
have some weaknesses for the purposes of this study, as the company’s main regions of slave 
trading were the Windward Coast and the Loango coast of West Central Africa (Vos 2009, 
Sommerdyk 2015). However, their ships did trade in all the areas relevant to this study and 
most importantly their records detail exactly where they traded. Up until the 1750s the MCC 
was still sending specialist commodity ships to Africa, called ‘Retour schepen’. I have taken a 
sample of 7 of these ships from the 1730s to the 1750s, which included details of exactly 
which products were bought in different parts of Africa. 45 The ships began trading around the 
Windward coast, in particular Cape Lahou, and then moved down to the Gold Coast and onto 
Popo on the Bight of Benin. In these areas they bought gold and ivory, before proceeding to 
the area around modern day Gabon / Cameroon to buy beeswax, redwood and more ivory. 
There are no records of any ‘retour schepen’ stopping at Whydah.  The company’s slave ships 
also followed this regional pattern. Table 2.5 records the average quantity of commodities 
bought by MCC slave ships based on a sample of 51 voyages between 1742 and 1803. This 
was overwhelmingly dominated by ivory from the Windward and Gold Coasts. None of the 
slave ships that bought slaves from the Bight of Benin also bought commodities. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45 Africaanse Galey MCC 173, Guinese Galey MCC 500, Groot Prooijen MCC 483, Prins Willem de Vijfde 
MCC 964, Philadelphia MCC 893, Vrouw Johanne Cores MCC 1204, Mercurius MCC 754 
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Table 2.5. Average quantities (lbs/ounces) of commodities bought by MCC slave ships by 
region and number of observations (obs) 1742-1803 
 Ebony Gold Malaguetta Redwood Wax Ivory 
Region Lbs (obs) Ounces (obs) Lbs (obs) Lbs (obs) Lbs (obs) Lbs (obs) 
Gabon / Cameroons 33,200 (1) 104 (2) 300 (1) 1,800 (1) 6,144 (4) 4,862 (9) 
Gold Coast 
 
76 (12) 
  
7,000 (1) 2,482 (22) 
Windward Coast 
     
1,066 (66) 
Source: MCC Negotieboeken  
The MCC records indicate that purchases of wood, ivory and beeswax were not from ports in 
the Bight of Biafra, but from further down the coast around modern day Gabon and the 
Cameroon. However, Behrendt et al. (2010, p86) show that local merchants in the Cross River 
region around Calabar were opening up trading relations with the Cameroon grasslands and 
also to palm oil producers, so as to meet rising demand from Britain for pepper, redwood, oils 
and ivory from the 1760s. They estimate that on average from 1750 to 1808 ships from Bonny 
carried around 36 pieces of ivory while those from Old Calabar around 220 (Behrendt et al., 
p94). The ‘waste books' of the slave trader William Davenport from Liverpool shows that he 
was selling an average of 737 gallons of palm oil a year between 1767 and 1780 which he had 
bought from traders at Old Calabar, as well as quantities of mallagueta pepper, ivory and 
dyewoods.46 
 
2.5. CONCLUSION  
Qualitative and secondary sources together with quantitative data from the earlier eighteenth 
century all reliably suggest that there were well established regional patterns of trade in the 
eighteenth century. The Gold Coast engaged in both slave and commodity trading until 1880s, 
when both sectors began to decline. In the Bight of Biafra both types of exports operated side 
by side, but the data presented so far does not give any indication of the scale or value of the 
non-slave trade. However, there is no evidence that the area of the Bight of Benin controlled 
by Dahomey traded in commodities bought for sale in Europe.  
 
 
 
                                                 
46 LRO D/Dav Waste Book. The waste book was a ledger which recorded sales (Radburn 2009, p9). The latter 
products were probably bought both at Calabar and from the Cameroons (Radburn 2009, pp42–79). 
  
53 
CHAPTER 3 
REGIONAL PATTERNS AND EUROPEAN DEMAND FOR SLAVE 
SHIP PROVISIONING IN THE LONG EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: DID 
THE SLAVE TRADE PROVIDE A BOOST TO WEST AFRICAN 
COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURE? 47 
 
“The most common cheapest, and most commodious diet is with vegetables, 
horse beans, rice and indian corn….One or other is boiled on board at constant 
times, twice a day into a Dab-a-Dab (sometimes with meat in it) and have an 
overseer with a cat-o-nine tails to force it upon those that are sullen and 
refuse.” 
John Atkins ‘A Voyage to Guinea, Brazil and the West Indies’ (1737), p171 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter considers the provisioning strategies followed by the slaving ships of different 
European nations and the varying responses from West African regions. Historians have 
recently begun to explore the potential effects of the slave trade on the development of 
commercial agriculture in Atlantic Africa (Law et al. 2013). The introduction of New World 
crops, such as maize and manioc, enlarged the cultivation choice-set of African farmers and 
became important to the organisation of the slave trade, in similar ways as African food crops 
(e.g. black rice) may have underpinned the organisation and expansion of New World 
plantation economies (Carney 2001, Carney and Rosomoff 2011, see Eltis et al. 2007 for a 
critical review). Large numbers of captives needed to be fed during their journey to the coast, 
their stay at the coast before embarkation, their time on board before departure and during the 
ocean crossing. Captains taking in insufficient stocks put their cargo at higher risks of 
starvation and disease.48  
The provisioning strategies of slave traders have remained understudied though. The literature 
generally assumes that the lion’s share of food provisions required for slave voyages was 
produced in West Africa and sold by local farmers or middlemen to the slave ships. Based on 
                                                 
47 This chapter is based on an article co-written with Ewout Frankema (European Review of Economic History, 
forthcoming 2017) 
48 Miller (1979, pp95-102) and Newson (2007, pp72,85) argue that the poor diets of slaves from the Angolan 
port of Luanda, both during their stay at the coast as well as during the ocean crossing, raised mortality rates in 
comparison with other regions of embarkation. 
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this assumption, David Eltis has argued that the increasing intensity of the eighteenth century 
slave trade must have boosted West African food exports. In a first attempt to estimate the 
magnitude of the slave trade induced demand impulse, he reached the provisional conclusion 
that food exports approached a total annual value of one million British pounds (current 
prices) during the late eighteenth century, which exceeded the total value of West Africa’s 
commodity exports to Britain up to the mid-nineteenth century (Eltis 2013). 
Studying the Gold Coast, Klas Rönnbäck has argued that the demand for provisions by slave 
ships was too insignificant to generate any direct positive linkages for commercial agricultural 
development. Reasoning from a set of baseline assumptions regarding the size of the urban 
population in the seventeenth and eighteenth Centuries, and the derived demand for 
marketable foodstuffs from the non-farming population, he estimated that slave ships and 
slave forts may have added ca. 27% to urban demand at the peak of the trade, and contributed 
ca. 3-4% to total agricultural production in the coastal regions (Rönnbäck 2015, p166). 
Rönnbäck, somewhat surprisingly, qualifies this contribution as ‘rather marginal’ (2015, 
p172). More importantly, however, Rönnbäck, like Eltis, fails to bring any new data to the 
table which might scrutinize his main assumptions, including the idea that slave traders 
bought their provisions exclusively at the Gold Coast.            
This chapter has two aims. First, to estimate the comparative magnitude of the demand 
impulse to West African commercial agriculture, using primary sources on food sales from 
company account books, retrieved from a much larger and more diverse sample of slave 
voyages than hitherto has been compiled. This new dataset allows for deeper insights into the 
eighteenth century development of provisioning strategies, which appear not as 
straightforward as many scholars have hitherto assumed. Second, to gain a deeper 
understanding of the commercialisation of agriculture in different parts of West Africa, by 
exploiting the temporal and spatial variation in slave ship provisioning.  
This chapter uses primary sources on actual provisions taken on board in European ports of 
departure and along the West African coast from 187 British, Dutch, French and Danish slave 
journeys conducted between 1681 and 1807. The dataset includes voyages by private 
merchants and chartered companies, such as the British Royal African Company (RAC) and 
the Dutch West-Indische Compagnie (WIC). In addition, 1 analyse the instructions captains 
received for the provisioning of crews and slaves, as well as ships’ logs and chartered 
company correspondence shedding light on the provisioning logistics. Journeys undertaken 
from the New World are excluded (e.g. Brazil, Cuba, US), as the current dearth of primary 
sources on this area of the trade warrants a separate study.      
This study yields two major conclusions. First, a growing proportion of the required calories 
and proteins for slaves were taken on board in European port cities over the course of the 
eighteenth century. I argue that this change in provisioning strategies was driven by declining 
relative prices of European provisions to slave purchasing prices, in combination with the 
increasing business risks faced by slave traders. Both the falling relative provisioning prices, 
and the rising share of European provisions, generate revised estimates of the slave-trade 
induced demand-impulse which are about 70 to 80% lower than those of Eltis. Since the 
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economic weight of late eighteenth century food exports was considerably smaller than 
previously assumed, I argue that the commercial transition from slave to commodity exports 
in the first half of the nineteenth century must have involved rather modest losses of food 
exports, and cannot have deepened the rupture of Atlantic Africa’s international trade to any 
great degree.  
Second, I document substantial differences in the provisioning strategies of British, as 
compared to continental, slavers are documented and, most importantly for this thesis, clear 
regional differences. British traders relied extensively on African provisions, although they 
too were stocking up on food in increasing quantities in Liverpool and Bristol during the 
eighteenth century. These different provisioning strategies, of British versus continental 
traders, are due to the different positions the British held at the West African coast – 
especially the large range of fortified trading stations - as well as the more developed food 
markets in regions where British slavers conducted most of their trade; the Bight of Biafra 
and to a lesser extent the Gold Coast. In the Bight of Biafra, the provisioning trade was 
substantial enough to stimulate commercial agriculture. In addition, the data indicates that the 
Bight of Benin at no time engaged in a substantial provisioning trade. Agricultural 
commercialisation was thus a localized response to increasing slave trade induced demand for 
foodstuffs. On a broader plain, the eighteenth century expansion of the slave trade had just a 
modest impact on commercial agricultural development along the Atlantic African coast.   
 
3.2 DID THE TRANSATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE BOOST WEST AFRICAN 
COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURE? 
The provisions slave ships took in from European ports typically included a few staples, 
principally wheat (often in the form of biscuits), beans, peas, rice and barley. For crew 
members, luxury items were added such as salted meat, stock-fish, butter, bread, cheese, suet, 
sweet oil, beer, wine and spirits. Provisioning of slaves and sailors on the slave ships was 
usually strictly segregated.49 Moreover, throughout the eighteenth century special supply 
ships brought fairly large quantities of European provisions to the forts at the African coast, 
either to complement or replace consumption of local foodstuffs by European staff. In Africa, 
captains picked up foodstuffs common to the regions where they traded; rice from the Upper 
Guinea and Windward coasts, maize, millet or sorghum from the Gold Coast, yams from 
                                                 
49 For four MCC ships, surviving accounts of the daily quantities of food used show separate diets for sailors and 
captives, presumably also to emphasize social or racial hierarchy. These accounts were retrieved from the 
‘Consumptieboeken’, which were separate to the ‘Negotieboeken’ which detailed purchases of food at the coast, 
from: Brandenburg 4e reis ZA: MCC290, Geertuda en Christina 4e reis ZA: MCC 420, Nieuwe Hoop 3e reis 
ZA: MCC 835, Zeemercure 1e reis ZA: MCC 835. For example, the consumption accounts of the Nieuwe Hoop 
from 1766 – 1768 report that the crew consumed bread, meat, bacon, blue & grey peas, salt fish, rice, sweet and 
rape oil, while slaves were given horse beans, barley, yams and African beans called gobbegobsen. French and 
Danish ships are also recorded as stocking separate food supplies for their personnel, who also ate at different 
times than slaves. Interestingly, my British sources do not speak to such a strict separation of slave and crew 
provisions, in particular regarding the consumption of staple foods. 
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Biafra and Gabon and manioc from the Congo and Angola. Plantains, coconuts, limes, 
oranges and other fresh provisions supplemented these staple foods. West African palm oil 
served as an important source of unsaturated fat in slave diets (Harms 2008, pp112-19, 
Mandelblatt 2009, pp411-12, Klein 2010, pp94-96). Fresh water and firewood was also 
sourced from Africa in great quantities. As a rule, slaves were fed a kind of gruel comprised 
of whatever combination of the above had been bought, seasoned with salt and mallagueta 
pepper. Small portions of salted meat, stock-fish and tobacco were occasionally handed out to 
slaves, but most of this was reserved for crew members. 
According to David Eltis, slave provisions constituted by far the biggest export market for 
commodities in the coastal areas of West Africa during the long eighteenth century. Before 
1650, sugar exports from São Tomé accounted for almost all of the cultivated crops exported, 
but the volumes of cash-crops traded in the eighteenth century paled in comparison to West 
Africa’s nineteenth century export boom (Eltis 2013, pp35-36, Frankema et al. 2015). Eltis 
made a first attempt to estimate the total value of West African food exports. Even though he 
acknowledges that his estimates are crude, and invites colleagues to improve upon them 
(2013, p45), his prime conclusion is nonetheless important: if annual food exports did indeed 
rise up to one million British Pounds in the late eighteenth century, and exceeded the average 
annual value of West African commodity exports to Britain during the first half of the 
nineteenth century, the abolition of the slave trade must have prompted a significant loss of 
non-slave export revenue and may have seriously distorted food markets, following an era of 
rapid growth up to 1807.        
Eltis’ estimates are based on two core assumptions. First, that most of the required provisions 
were sourced from Africa, and that European provisions constituted a negligible share, 
somewhere in the order of 1 to 2%, of the purchasing price of slaves (2013, p38). Second, 
following Curtin’s (1973, pp168-9) classic study on the Senegambian slave trade, that slave 
maintenance costs constituted a fixed 25% of their exchange value throughout the eighteenth 
century. Both assumptions, combined with an annual time-series of slave purchasing prices, 
thus allowed Eltis to estimate the average annual value of African-sourced provisions in the 
Atlantic slave trade during 1681-1807. Appendix 3.1 1 shows his estimates and explains his 
calculation procedure in greater detail.  
The assumption that the lion’s share of food provisions for the middle passage was produced 
by African farmers is repeated over and over again in the slave trade literature, but this has 
never been subjected to empirical verification.50 The analysis of surviving account books of 
slave trade merchants indicates that, in the course of the eighteenth century, nearly half of all 
calories and proteins required to keep slaves alive on board European slave vessels – note that 
voyages from the New World are excluded - were sourced from European ports of departure. 
                                                 
50 This assumption informed the estimates of Eltis (2013), Klein and Engerman (1979) and Rönnbäck (2015) and 
is also put forth in other key studies such as Carney and Rosomoff (2011, p47) and Mandelblatt (2008, pp411, 
421). In his study of the Danish slave trade on the Gold Coast Hernaes (1998, p337) even claimed that it was 
impossible to bring sufficient food supplies from Europe and that the ‘millie trade’ (maize) must therefore have 
given a major impulse to the local Gold Coast economy. 
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The slave trade may thus have stimulated commercial agriculture in the hinterland of some 
European port cities (e.g. Bristol, Liverpool, Nantes, Middelburg), as much as it stimulated 
commercial agriculture in West African regions of slave embarkation. This implication casts a 
different light on the relative magnitude of the slave trade induced demand for West African 
food exports, and raises new questions concerning the provisioning strategies of slave traders.  
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the 25% food share of slave purchasing prices is not the 
only figure one can select for this exercise. Curtin argued that the total costs of maintaining a 
slave was about half its market value per year. Obviously, food was a key component of those 
costs, but also a highly variable one depending on local harvest conditions, food prices and 
the time spent in captivity before embarkation.51 Curtin stressed that during extensive waiting 
periods slaves were often put to work to contribute to their own maintenance (1973, p170). 
The insecurity about average time spent ‘in store’, the added value of slave labour and the 
market prices of slave food, all turn the 25% estimate into a somewhat arbitrary choice. In an 
essay on the French slave trade Klein and Engerman (1979) state that “the bulk of foodstuffs 
consumed by Africans in the crossing were purchased on the African coast, with rice and 
yams serving as the staples of the diet. The costs for these foods and for the water represented 
less than 5% of the total costs of outfitting the vessels and therefore offered little financial 
restrain on adding extra food.” (p270). Although Klein and Engerman focus on the 
maintenance costs during a slave’s time on board the ship, they do not attach much weight to 
food provisions within total outfitting costs.52 It should be noted though that Klein and 
Engerman’s estimate is based on just a single observation, a voyage of a French slaving 
vessel, La Reine de France, which appears in the dataset along with 27 other French slave 
voyages. The resultant analysis suggests that, although the 25% estimate appears valid for the 
period up to the 1740s, this is far too high for the period 1750-1808, when the trade grew to 
its peak.  
Rönnbäck (2015) has made the valid point that any measurement of effective slave trade 
related demand should be assessed against the existing size of domestic African food markets. 
Without bringing in any new data, but by adopting some baseline assumptions, he estimated 
the demand effect at the Gold Coast may have ranged between 3-4% of total agricultural 
production and 27% of total urban demand (2015, p166). However, in a sensitivity analysis of 
                                                 
51 Curtin (1973) estimated the costs of feeding slaves around Saint Louis in Senegambia. He showed that prices 
of millet (the main staple) in the 1750s varied depending on rains and other harvest circumstances, from 
£2.60/ton in a good year to £19.50/ton in a very severe year. Curtin settled on an average of £6.80/ton. By asking 
how much millet a slave might need to live, he suggested a figure of £2.74 per year of millet, excluding costs for 
housing, clothing, guards and additional foodstuffs. As an average slave would sell for between £10 to £12, this 
implied that slave-owners had to pay maintenance costs between a quarter (in a very good year) to a half (in an 
average year) to four fifths (in a very bad year) of the eventual selling price. In Gajaaga, a kingdom on the upper 
Senegal, slaves could only be delivered once a year in the annual high season. This meant that slaves brought to 
this market had a price “on a sliding scale, rising by 80% from a low point after the departure of the annual fleet 
to the high point just as the last boats prepared to sail at the end of the next high season.” (1973, pp169-70). 
52 The term ‘outfitting costs’ refers to the total expenses incurred to prepare a slave ship for the journey, 
including the exchange commodities required to purchase slaves, the provisions of crew members, ship 
maintenance costs and also the food rations reserved for slaves during their time on board the vessel.   
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the main parameters, he reaches intervals from a 9 to 80% contribution to urban demand in 
the final quarter of the eighteenth century (2015, p178). This indicates the pressing need for 
more precise estimates based on new empirical evidence. Before proceeding to offer such 
evidence, I ought to make a final remark: whatever demand impulse the slave trade may have 
given to commercial agriculture in the coastal areas of West Africa, must have come at the 
expense of production in the raided areas. As most of the captives had been engaged in 
agriculture prior to capture, the Atlantic slave trade caused a relocation of food production, 
promoting the development of food markets in the areas of embarkation, but curbing both 
production and consumer demand in raided coastal or inland areas.  
 
3.3 SOURCES AND METHOD 
I compiled a sample of 187 merchant accounts of slave voyages conducted by trade 
companies from four European nations between 1681 and 1807. Data on British slave 
voyages came from the account books of the RAC, which detail the cargoes bought in 
England and, in the 1720s, the provisions bought in Africa.53 For the earlier period, (1680 to 
1699) I use correspondence from the British forts on the West Coast of Africa, compiled by 
Robin Law (1997). Additionally, there are the records of five ships owned by a private trader, 
Humphrey Morice, who was involved in the trade in the 1720s.54 These ships bought most of 
their slaves along the Gold Coast and in the Bight of Benin. For the post-1740 period there are 
two main sources: the papers of the Liverpool merchant, William Davenport, who sent around 
20 vessels to Africa from the 1760s to the 1780s and specialised his commercial operations in 
the Biafra region;55 and the Bristol Presentments, a weekly register of shipping from the port 
of Bristol which began in 1789 recording the cargoes and arrival and departure dates of 40 
slaving vessels.56 The latter concentrates on ships going to Biafra and the Cameroons, but like 
the Davenport papers also includes ships trading in other regions. The downside to these 
records is that they do not detail what provisions were bought in Africa, and I will take up this 
issue further later in this chapter. 
For data on French voyages I rely on the private trading accounts of French slave merchants 
based in Nantes.57 These sources offer quantities and values of food provisions taken on board 
at the start of the slave journey, but do not provide information on the provisions bought 
elsewhere in Europe or Africa. There is also Rinchon (1964)’s study of the voyages of one 
particular slaving captain, Van Alstein, who sailed on the Bight of Benin and the West-
Central African coast (Congo and Angola). This source provides full details of both food 
purchases in Europe and Africa and also gives some African food prices. For the Danish trade 
                                                 
53 The principal source is the T70 series at The National Archives, London 
54 From the M7 series at the Bank of England, London  
55 The records are held at the Liverpool Record Office and Keele University and were accessed through 
www.britishonlinearchives.co.uk.   
56 From the archives of Bristol Central Library. 
57 From the Archives Départementales de Loire Atlantique. 
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I use the work by Svalesen (2000). It provides detailed information of only two voyages 
conducted by one ship, but does contain detailed instructions from the Royal Chartered 
Danish Guinea Company on provisioning logistics, and their orders on daily slave rations 
(2000, p112), which applied to all the ships the company sent out. 
For the Dutch trade the archives of the Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie (MCC) are 
the most important sources.58 These records detail exactly what provisions were bought in 
Europe, what was bought in Africa, and in many cases exactly where. In addition, they 
provide prices of Dutch (Province of Zeeland) provisions and some scattered food price 
observations at the African coast. Most of the trade along the coast was conducted by barter, 
but the MCC converted all of the trade goods into either guilders or Flemish pounds, allowing 
for comparison of prices of individual items, which can be used for wider estimations of 
spending by other slave ships. Another advantage of this source is that the MCC traded 
regularly in all areas of Africa, with the exception of the Bight of Biafra.59 I use the Appendix 
of Leo Balai’s (2011) Het Slavenschip Leusden for the provisioning of three WIC ships in the 
1720s, which includes detailed information on the instructions for ships' captains from the 
company.  
Table 3.1 summarizes the ‘national’ coverage of the sample. I make a distinction between the 
era when chartered companies and private traders were both active (1681-1740), and the later 
era of private trade (1741-1807).60 The sample covers over 1% of all British, French and 
Dutch voyages and about 0.7% of Danish voyages in the private trade era. For 36 of the 187 
voyages there is information on the total intake of foodstuffs in both Europe and Africa (see 
Table 3.2). In 129 cases the European provisions are fully specified, while the African 
provisions are not.   In 12 cases there is full information on African provisions, but not on 
European provisions. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
58 From the Zeeuws Archief Middelburg. 
59 When trade in the Biafra region reached its apogee the MCC was entering a period of crisis, suffering from 
rising insecurity in the Atlantic world and especially the 4th Anglo-Dutch war. 
60 Until the early eighteenth century, most of the slave trade was a jealously guarded government monopoly. In 
Great Britain, the Royal Africa Company (RAC) and in the Netherlands the West-Indische Compagnie (WIC) 
were the sole permitted traders. The French government experimented with a series of chartered companies. 
Slaves to the Spanish empire could only be handled through the asiento contract. These companies were unable 
to prevent interlopers and smugglers from carrying slaves, partly due to fact that they couldn’t meet the demand 
of their markets, but also because they operated notoriously inefficient business models (Thomas 1999, Klein 
2010, Den Heijer 1994). By the 1730s most nations, with the exception of Spain, had abandoned the concept of 
chartered companies and left the trade to the private sector. 
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Table 3.1. Sample of slave ship voyages by nationality (flag), 1681-1807 
  1681-1810 1681-1740 1741-1807 
  
Share of 
total trade 
Company era Private trade era 
  % 
Number of 
voyages 
sample % 
Number of 
voyages 
sample % 
Great Britain 47 3,840 34 0.88 7,384 84 1.14 
France 14 873 1 0.12 2,557 27 1.13 
Netherlands 5 544 2 0.75 705 37 5.53 
Denmark 2 88 0 0 296 2 0.68 
Spain/Uruguay 0 7 0 0 70 0 0 
Portugal/Brazil 24 1,975 0 0 3,924 0 0 
British 
America/US 
8 185 0 0 1,781 0 0 
Totals 100 7,512 37 0.49 16,717 150 0.90 
Source: Transatlantic Slave Trade Database (TSTD); for my sample see text and Appendix 3.2a. 
While the coverage of British, French and Dutch voyages is good, the absence of similar 
coverage for voyages conducted from Portugal, Spain, Brazil and British America/US is a 
major limitation. Portuguese and Brazilian ships sailed mainly on West Central Africa (WCA 
hereafter), a region which played a major role in the eighteenth-century expansion of the 
trade, supplying roughly one-third of the number of slaves that crossed the Atlantic between 
1681 and 1807. Although there is ample qualitative evidence that slave ships departing from 
Brazil were stocking up on large quantities of manioc flour in home ports such as Rio de 
Janeiro, it has proven impossible to retrieve quantitative estimates of the proportions of home-
sourced versus Africa-sourced provisions.61 This study excludes the southern part of present-
day Angola, the focal area of the Portuguese and Brazilian ships, but it does include the 
Northern part of the West Central African coastline, where trade was dominated by European 
vessels.62 I will consider the implications of this omission as I go along. A summary of the 
dataset is presented in Appendices 3.2a and 3.2b.63 
                                                 
61 See for slave provisions from Brazil, Miller (1997, pp351-57); Curto (2004, pp132-33) and Newson (2007, 
p85).  
62 da Silva and Sommerdyk (2010) have argued for separating the West Central African Coast into a Northern 
region, referred to as the Loango coast, including Cabinda, Congo North, Congo River, Kilongo, Loango, 
Malembo, Mayumba, Mpinda and Rio Zaire, and a southern region in modern-day Angola concentrated around 
the ports of Luanda and Benguela. The Southern area was entirely dominated by Portuguese and Brazilian 
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Although a coverage of around only 1% of the voyages made by British, French, Dutch and 
Danish slavers may seem small, nonetheless it is distinguishable as the first dataset able to 
serve as a starting point for a more systematic empirical investigation of food provisioning 
strategies by European slavers. I approach the data in two steps. First, I use the sample of 36 
‘full data’ voyages to distinguish European from African provisions, and separate out 
provisions for crew members and fort personnel. Sailors and fort personnel were mainly fed 
on European provisions, which were separately recorded from ‘Negro Provisions’ in the 
account books of the slave trading companies. Next, I express all foodstuffs in metric weights 
(kilos), and convert all food types (rice, barley, corn, yams, beans etc.) into their caloric value 
(Kcal) and protein content (grams), using FAO nutrition tables.64 Appendix 3.3 lists the metric 
and nutritional conversion rates. 
Table 3.2 presents preliminary results based on the sample of 36 voyages. It demonstrates that 
the share of European provisions is, in many cases, far too high to verify Eltis’ hypothesis that 
these constituted a negligible share of total food provisions.65 Only the British ships observed 
operating during the company era sourced the lion’s share of their provisions (96%) from 
West Africa. For other nations and periods the shares of provisions sourced from Africa and 
Europe are very different. Unfortunately, the ‘full data’ sample has a rather weak coverage, so 
it is important to be cautious when drawing further conclusions at this stage. Without any 
observations of British voyages in the 1741-1808 era, it remains unclear for instance, whether 
the different shares carried by British and continental vessels are due to different national 
provisioning strategies, or because of more generic changes during the eighteenth century.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
traders, whereas the North was mainly visited by Northern European vessels. The trade in the North was 
organised by small merchant networks in contrast to the much more centralised, state-run trade in the South.    
63 The complete dataset, including source references, will be presented in an online Appendix Table at the 
African Economic History Network website (www.aehnetwork.org). 
64 http://www.fao.org/docrep/w0073e/w0073e08.htm#P14552_1185427 
65 Note that Eltis suggests that non-African provisions are about 1 to 2% of slave purchasing costs. If total 
provisions constitute 25% of slave purchasing costs, the European share is 4 to 8% of total provisions.    
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Table 3.2: Average share of provisions from Europe and Africa in 36 'full data' voyages  
  
 
1681-1740 
 
1741-1807 
  Obs. Company era Obs. Private trade era 
  
 
% Europe % Africa 
 
% Europe % Africa 
Great Britain 18 4 96 0 .. .. 
France 1 91 9 4 68 32 
Netherlands 0 .. .. 11 53 47 
Denmark 0 .. .. 2 76 24 
Totals 19 
  
17 
  
Source: see Table 3.1 and Appendix 3.2b 
Therefore, the second step is to use the information on total caloric intake of these 36 ‘full 
data’ ships to derive a benchmark estimate of ‘required’ provisions per slave per day. This 
allows me to deduce of how much of these day-rations was covered by European or African 
provisions in the larger sample of 151 voyages, in which I observed only one of the two areas 
of food provisioning. A subsistence diet with 2,000 Kcal and 40 grams of protein per slave 
per day is assumed. These values are in line with the ‘bare-bones subsistence diet’ adopted in 
the comparative living standards literature (Allen 2001, Allen et al. 2011, see for an 
application to Sub-Saharan Africa Frankema and van Waijenburg 2012) and sufficiently 
reflect the slave feeding instructions that captains received.66 Even though 2,000 Kcal is a 
bare minimum compared to current WHO recommendations of around 2,500 Kcal for an adult 
male with a sedentary lifestyle, it suffices to keep people alive without losing muscle power.  
I obtain the total number of required day-rations by multiplying the number of slaves 
embarked from the trans-Atlantic slave trade database (TSTD hereafter) with the average 
number of days the median slave spent on board. The estimate of required day-rations is not 
adjusted for slave mortality during the voyage, as captains would most likely have 
provisioned based on a best-case scenario (i.e. negligible mortality). I also include a security 
margin as slave ship captains were well schooled in the unpredictability of their voyages 
(insecure slave supplies, adverse weather conditions, diseases, food rot, privateers and so on).  
I also account for factors of region and era-specific voyage duration. Embarkation times 
depended on the concentration of slave supplies, and the fact that middle passage (MP) took 
longer from some regions than from others. Shorter expected voyage lengths would have 
translated into lower provision requirements. I assume that provisioning strategies were based 
                                                 
66 Studies on British navy sailors show they consumed around 4,500 Kcal per day, which seems a large 
difference, but it needs to be taken into account that slaves were confined for most of the day (Macdonald 2006, 
177). 
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on the average number of days of the MP, plus one standard deviation as a security margin. I 
further assume a linear slave intake rate. That is, for a slave vessel taking in 300 slaves in 100 
days, and I add additional rations for three extra slaves per day. This is a conservative 
assumption, as slaves tended to be purchased in larger quantities towards the end of the TAC 
(Hogerzeil and Richardson 2007). I use 20-year interval means and standard deviations of the 
actual time spent at the coast (TAC), and on the MP, for the seven major West African slave 
trading regions (Senegambia, Sierra Leone, Windward Coast, Gold Coast, Bight of Benin, 
Bight of Biafra and West-Central Africa). A check of  the representativeness of the ‘full data’ 
sample on voyage duration revealed that in 71% of these cases the observed ship remained 
within one standard deviation from the mean, with only one notable outlier. All the data on 
voyage length were taken from the TSTD and are presented in Appendix 3.4.  
Figure 3.1 tests the accuracy of the estimation method for the ‘full data’ sample, and shows a 
scatter plot with the predicted number of day-rations on the x-axis, and the observed number 
of day-rations on the y-axis. The figure confirms my expectation that ships carrying more 
slaves for longer periods of time carried more supplies. Moreover, the procedure does not 
seem to systematically under- or overestimate the required number of day-rations. The slope 
of the regression line (y = 1.03x) is close to unity and the correlation is strong (R2 = 0.54). A 
similar test for protein requirement indicates that the far majority of ships took much more 
than the 40 grams per day per person than I envisioned, especially in the form of beans and 
peas, but this is less relevant as calories posed the main constraint to storage space.  
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Figure 3.1: Scatter plot of required day-rations predicted by my baseline model 
(horizontal-axis) versus actual observed no. of day-rations (vertical-axis)  
 
Source: See Appendix 3.2b.  
Note: This sample includes English RAC, Dutch MCC, Danish and French ships as indicated in Appendix 3.2.a. 
Two outliers were removed as they carried exceptional quantities of food from Europe - sufficient to make a 
double journey, and much more than recorded for any other ship. These traders probably sold part of their stocks 
to West African trading forts or other slave ships before heading across the Atlantic. This supports one of this 
chapter’s central claims, namely that European provisions played a much larger role in the logistics of the 
transatlantic slave trade than hitherto has been assumed.  
Even though the error margins to both sides of the regression line appear to be evenly 
distributed, there are quite a few ships carrying much more, or far less, provisions than the 
baseline model predicts. The likely explanation, supported by archival sources, is that 
‘overloaded’ vessels took additional food supplies to African forts to alleviate local food 
scarcities.67 Ships carrying far less than the model predicts may have taken the risk to sail off 
without any safety margins.68 Serious delays at the coast, or instances of food scarcity, often 
                                                 
67 British forts at the coast, while buying provisions locally, also relied heavily on imported foodstuffs from 
Europe. For example, the Company of the Royal Adventurers to England Trading with Africa, who took over the 
management of the forts after the dissolution of the RAC, relied on regular deliveries of bread, flour and meat 
delivered on ships from England: TNA T70/928 – 932. I assume that the Dutch forts also bought food from 
visiting vessels, and speculated that this accounts for ships such as the Middelburgs Welvaren (1755) and 
Vliegende Faam (1757) buying respectively 372% and 263% of required total provisions (see Appendix 3.2a and 
3.2b). 
68 In the full data sample of ships, 4 vessels (three RAC ships and 1 private vessel from France) sailed with under 
50% of the required Kcals to give their captives a sufficient daily quantity of calories. Sailing with insufficient 
provisions in order to free up space for more captives was apparently a common strategy on Portuguese / 
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forced captains to take that course of action (Behrendt 2001, pp190-91). The bottom-line, 
however, is that the estimation model appears sound enough to be applied to the larger sample 
of voyages which have incomplete information.  
 
3.4. MAIN RESULTS  
The first result is that the demand patterns of different European nations varied considerably. 
Figure 3.2 presents, for four consecutive periods, the percentage share of required Kcal 
supplied by European provisions loaded onto British, French, Dutch and Danish slave trade 
vessels. This figure clearly shows that the French, Dutch and Danish ships took in the major 
part of the required Kcal in Europe, but that for British slavers the picture is strikingly 
different. These slavers tended to rely much more on African-sourced provisions, although 
they too, increased their intake of European provisions throughout the course of the 
eighteenth century. Such large shares of European provisions cannot be neglected when 
estimating the magnitude of West African food exports.  
There was considerable variation in the quantities of European provisions taken on board. The 
British RAC ships in the ‘full data’ sample took, on average, only 4% of their required Kcal 
from England, although one ship, the Portugal, did take 36% in 1729. Even though the French 
and Dutch reliably brought at least around 50%, or considerably more, of their Kcal from 
Europe, there were also quite a few outliers. For example, the Dutch ship “Middelburgs 
Welvaren” bought a huge quantity of provisions in West Africa, totalling 326% of their 
caloric requirements, while still bringing substantial quantities of beans and barley from the 
Dutch Republic. It appears, therefore, that slave traders sometimes shipped food to or within 
Africa which wasn’t required for the slaves on board. Nonetheless, despite the outliers, the 
overall trend is clear: over the eighteenth century the trade relied to a greater degree on 
European sourced provisions.   
Why has the contribution of European provisions to the logistics of the transatlantic slave 
trade been overlooked for so long and by so many experts? The most likely explanation is that 
the literature has, repetitively, focussed on British slave ship records of the RAC, which are 
more complete and more readily accessible than most other slave-trade related sources. As 
noted above, the RAC obtained almost all its provisions from Africa. Indeed, one may easily 
conclude from written instructions on slave provisioning by the South Sea Company, the 
successor to the RAC, that food provisions were largely an African affair,  
“The following account of a proportion of provisions for 100 Negroes to be taken in at 
Guinea: 80 chests corn at 5 ackeys per chest is 400 ackeys. 4 bushels of salt at 1 ackey per 
bushel is 4 ackeys. 20 gallons Palm Oil at 8 tacks per gallon is 13 ackeys 4 tacks. 50 ch 
                                                                                                                                                        
Brazilian vessels (Miller 1997, pp351–55). The impact on captives was described by a British sailor in Suriname 
in the 1770s who described a newly arrived group of slaves as “…such a set of scarcely animated automatons, 
such a resurrection of skin and bones, as forcibly reminded me of the last trumpet.” (Stedman 1796, p209). 
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Malaguetta at ackeys per is 4 ackeys. The above is according to the present usage of the 
Royal Africa Company.” 69   
Nonetheless, whereas in the 1680s and 1690s European provisions constituted a negligible 1 
or 2% in RAC voyages, this share, on ships of private British companies, rose to an average 
of 34% during the apogee of the trade. The literature has also largely ignored the records of 
the Dutch and the French traders, whose provisioning strategies were fundamentally different.  
Figure 3.2. Percentage share of total required Kcal supplied by European provisions, 
voyages by nationality, 1681-1807 
 
Source: See text and Appendix 3.2a, available at www.aehnetwork.org 
Secondly, the results provide empirical support to the conclusions of Behrendt (2001, 181-4) 
and Eltis (2013, 44-5), who have noted that there were considerable regional differences in 
the type and quantity of provisions sold along different parts of the West African coast. Table 
3.3 shows the average amounts of calories piled up at European ports for ships heading off to 
the Gold Coast, the Bight of Benin, the Bight of Biafra, and the WCA (North). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
69 The South Sea Company: minutes of the Court of Directors 1713 (Donnan 1965, p157) 
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Table 3.3. Average European Kcal taken to regions of embarkation (first column) and 
percentage shares of European Kcal of total requirements by nationality, 1681-1807 
  million Kcal British French Dutch Danish 
Gold Coast 30.27 14% 
 
99% 65% 
Bight of Benin 40.46 9% 64% 89% 
 
Bight of Biafra 48.58 29% 73% 133% 
 
West Central Africa (North) 111.02 13% 98% 111% 
 
Source: See text and Appendix 3.2a 
The table shows that ships sailing to WCA took, on average, more than double the quantity of 
calories from Europe. This difference cannot be explained by greater voyage length, since the 
average time the median slave spent on board was not that much longer than that for the other 
regions of embarkation (see Appendix 3.4). A large part of the gap is explained by the fact 
that British slavers were much less active at the WCA coast70 (TSTD). It would be 
misleading, however, to conclude from Table 3.3 that British slave ships would procure most 
of their provisions at the WCA coast (c. 87%). Slave ships did not necessarily buy their 
provisions at the same place they bought their slaves. The few British ships that traded at 
WCA probably first visited the British forts at the Gold Coast to stock up before continuing 
their journey further south, in a similar way as they would do when visiting the Bight of 
Benin (see below). 
Slave captains recognised that they could not rely on local markets for provisions when 
trading along the Loango coast. Behrendt (2001, p184) suggests this was due to a more 
unforgiving climate which led to more frequent famines. Sommerdyk (2012, p121 and 137) 
agrees, but also points out that this trade in slaves involved smaller numbers and slower intake 
rates, with lower levels of market organization (e.g. merchant networks, credit facilities, etc.) 
than was common in the Gold Coast and the Bight of Biafra. Consequently, the region’s slave 
traders may simply not have been able to manage the logistics of supplying sufficient 
quantities of food. That French and Dutch ships took along almost their entire required 
provisions from Europe suggests that they were more likely to sail straight on to the WCA 
coast than were the British. The sub-sample of French slave ships shows that the three ships 
bound for WCA in the 1760s to 1780s sourced, on average, 99% of the required calories from 
France, while the three ships sailing to Benin in the same period took a significantly lower 
49% from Europe.71  
                                                 
70 During the long eighteenth century, British slavers took only 13% of their slaves from WCA, compared to 
42% for the Dutch and 46% for the French (TSTD). 
71 There is also evidence that Brazilian slavers were willing to take the risk to depart with insufficient provisions, 
rather than paying the inflated prices charged during regular periods of drought (Miller 1979, p102). Carney and 
Rosomoff (2011, 68) quote a Portuguese governor of Angola who ordered that all ships coming from Brazil 
should carry sufficient manioc flour to feed their slaves during the return voyage. 
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By contrast, the Gold Coast was recognised as an important area for provisioning, especially 
for ships going onto the Bight of Benin or West Central Africa (Shumway 2014, p54, Sparks 
2014, p44).  RAC correspondence compiled by Law (1997) shows repeated references to 
ships needing to ‘corn’ along the Gold Coast before proceeding to Benin (ref. 625, 904, 
1349). The Danish ship, Fredericus Quartas, was required to stock up on corn at Annamabo 
before sailing to the Bight of Benin in 1700,72 and the slave captain Phillips (1693, 
pp202,205,209) spent considerable time buying sufficient corn before moving on to Whydah. 
Accounts of British slaving voyages written in the eighteenth century also make regular 
mention of the need to stock up on provisions at British forts along the coast (Smith 1745, 
pp115,126,142,164, Atkins 1735, p74,99).  
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, Rönnbäck’s (2015, 166) study shows that demand 
from slave ships may have increased coastal production for the market by around 3% – 4%.  I 
offer my own estimates of the annual quantities of food stuffs that may have been purchased 
during the apogee of the transatlantic slavery from 1760 to 1807. The sample includes full 
data for three ships, two Dutch and one English, which provisioned on the Gold Coast during 
this period.73 The English ship took in the most provisions, which is used as a high estimate, 
while the Dutch ships took far less, and I use this is used as a low estimate. I then took the 
number of ships visiting the Gold Coast during the period multiplied them with these 
estimates to find a median number (Figure 3.3). Thus, the region might have annually 
exported between 100,000kgs and 300,000kgs of corn/millet per year, which is a substantial 
quantity, although far less than was produced in the Bight of Biafra.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
72 Letter from the Governor Thrane of Christiansborg fort to the Directors of the West India and Guinea 
Company in 1700 (Justesen and Manley 2005, p95) 
73 Prince Willem de Vijfde (1766, Voyage ID 10963, MCC 1005 + 960.3), Vergenoegen (1787 Voyage ID 
11056, MCC 1089.1 + 1093), Ranger (1790, Voyage ID83272, Liverpool Record Office 147-zmisc). 
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Figure 3.3. Estimated kgs of maize/millet (‘000) sold to Gold Coast slave ships 1760 – 
1800 
 
Source: slavevoyages.org, see text 
In the Bight of Biafra, the exchange of provisions produced by farmers in the interior for use 
as coastal commodities, such as salt, had been observed since the sixteenth century.74 This 
internal trade was essential, as the coastal regions were unsuitable for large scale agriculture, 
making them dependent on imports, especially when the population grew during the 
eighteenth century (Behrendt et al. 2010, 102, Northrup 1978, 174). This exchange was made 
possible by the many navigable rivers of the Niger Delta, and sophisticated inland trading 
networks, which will be explored in Chapter 6. For the purposes of this chapter, the key point 
is that the trade routes which had previously handled the exchange of agricultural produce in 
earlier periods, were now able to rapidly expand to handle considerable quantities of yams 
and palm oil for the provisioning of slave ships. The Biafran data is based on estimates by 
Behrendt (2001, p182) & Behrendt et al. (2010) that British ships were buying between 
10,000 and 50,000 yams for the middle passage. Taking this as a high and low estimate, I 
have multiplied this by the number of ships which the slave trade database indicates as having 
the Bight of Biafra as their principal region of slave purchasing. The result shows that the 
region was probably exporting between 1.5 and 2 million yams a year, a far more substantial 
trade than the Gold Coast. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
74 This was noted by the explorer Duarte Pacheco Pereira at the beginning of the sixteenth century (Fage 1980, 
p71) and the Dutch physician and explorer Olfert Dapper in the later seventeenth century (Dapper 1676, pp136-
37). 
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Figure 3.4. Estimated number yams (millions) sold to Biafran slave ships 1760 - 1800 
 
Sources: slavevoyages.org, see text 
Thus, by the end of the eighteenth century, when British traders had shifted their focus to this 
region, we would expect that the transatlantic slave trade might have had an impact on 
commercial agriculture. Out of a total regional population of around 1 to 1,5 million,75 around 
14,000 slaves were exported each year in the peak period of 1781-1800 (TSTD). Assuming 
this trade required 225 day-rations per slave, and that 80% of this was sourced from domestic 
crops, this would have commanded around 7,000 year-rations of food. In view of the size of 
the total population, this only required a supply rise of 0.5% to 0.7%. Yet, if just 10% of all 
staples were produced for the market, slave trade induced demand may have contributed some 
5 to 7% to market exchange of foodstuffs. 
Table 3.3 also shows that Dutch slave ships piled up massive amounts of food when heading 
for the Bight of Biafra, but this must have been for a very different reason than scarcity of 
local food supplies, since food markets at Bonny and Old Calabar did adequately serve the 
much larger British fleet. The most likely explanation, which will be further elaborated upon 
in section 7, is that Dutch ships rarely visited the Biafran coast, and therefore lacked the 
connections with local merchants that the British had established during the second half of the 
eighteenth century. Stocking up in Europe may thus be interpreted as a precautionary measure 
against insecure market access in West Africa. 
Additionally, the data shows that the Bight of Benin provided no significant quantities of 
foodstuffs to slave ships beyond fresh provisions while ships were loading (see also Law 
2004, p192). To overcome this problem, RAC ships were instructed to take on rice along the 
Windward coast or ‘corn’ at the Gold Coast, before heading to ports such as Whydah or Jakin 
on the ‘slave coast’ of Benin. This pattern continued into the private trade era, when similar 
                                                 
75 Ballpark figures for the early nineteenth century derived from backward extrapolations of the 1952 census, see 
Inikori and Daget (1988); Nwokeji (2000). 
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provisioning strategies were adopted by the Dutch slavers of the MCC.76 In 1789 a British 
slave ship surgeon who was familiar with West Central Africa stated that the “….country 
finds no slaves provisions - we are therefore obliged to carry provisions partly from Europe 
and (when to be got) partly from the Windward Coast of Africa."77  
 
3.5 CHANGING RELATIVE PRICES AND TRADE RISKS  
Why did European slavers purchase more provisions in Europe as time wore on? One of the 
explanations is that the costs of food from Europe, as a share of total outfitting costs (see for a 
definition of the term footnote 52), were declining sharply over the course of the eighteenth 
century, mainly due to a rapid rise in slave prices. Let’s assume for the moment - I get back 
returning to this in section 7 - that European-sourced provisions were no cheaper than 
African-sourced provisions, meaning the price of a day-ration consisting of 350 grams of 
barley, 100 grams of horse-beans, 100 grams of rice and 0,01 litre of palm oil gives us an 
upper benchmark estimate of slave provisioning costs.  
This ration offers just over 2,000 Kcal and about 80 grams of protein. Consistent with Eltis’ 
assumption that slaves spent on average 4.5 months waiting at or near the coast, and 3 months 
on board the slave ship, day-rations are taken as 225 per slave.78 I take annual British price-
series of barley, beans and rice from Clark (2004), with a 30% mark-up. Lacking price-series 
for palm-oil, I add a fixed average price per gallon based on scattered African price 
observations. To check the trend in British provisioning prices over the eighteenth century, I 
also construct a time series for barley, beans and rice on Dutch markets collected by 
Posthumus (1946). Although the Dutch price series have large gaps, the index-trend shows 
that Dutch staple food prices kept pace with British food prices (see Appendix 3.5). The slave 
prices are taken from the same source as Eltis (2013), which consists of a series for 1681-
1700 from Eltis (2000) linked to a series for 1701-1800 from Richardson (1991), all in current 
prices.            
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
76 Later in the eighteenth century, the MCC records show that no African provisions were ever bought by MCC 
ships from the Bight of Benin. Instead, food purchases were made along the Windward or Gold Coasts. 
77 John Knox (1789) “Minutes of Evidence taken before a committee of the whole house To whom it was referred 
to consider the circumstances of the slave trade” p. 93. 
78 Conceptually, it seems odd to consider food provisions for slaves waiting at the coast as part of West African 
food exports, since pre-embarkation maintenance costs will have been factored into the purchasing price of 
slaves. For reasons of comparability, however, I will maintain the assumption of 225 day-rations required.  
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Figure 3.5.a. Index-series of slave purchasing prices (African coast) and slave 
provisioning prices (British staples), 1680-1800 (1701 = 100)    
 
Source: Food price index based on Clark (2006); Slave price index based on Eltis (2005) and Richardson (1991). 
 
Figure 3.5b. Slave provisioning price (225 day-rations) as percentage share of average 
slave purchasing price, 1680-1800 (10-year moving average in bold) 
 
Source: see figure 3.5a. 
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Figure 3.5a shows the index-series of slave purchasing prices and slave provisioning prices 
(1701 = 100), and Figure 3.5b shows the slave provisioning prices (i.e. 225 day rations) as 
percentage share of slave purchasing prices. Together, these graphs help us understand why 
European slave traders may have increased their reliance on European provisions. In the mid-
1750s slave purchasing prices started to rise from an index level of 114 in 1756, to a mere 535 
in 1800. Slave prices experienced a temporary drop in the 1770s and 1790s, but never 
reverted to pre-1750 levels. Provisioning prices remained much more stable. Although there 
was a sizeable surge from 1770 to 1800, most of this was a price shock associated with the 
Napoleonic wars in the 1790s, when the index shot up from 103 in 1798 to 191 in 1800.  
The implication of these diverging price developments is that the relative costs of food 
provisions fell over the course of the eighteenth century, from about 20%-25% of total 
outfitting costs in the early decades to about 5-10% in the closing decades of the eighteenth 
century. Hence, if relative food prices had played a role in merchants deciding where to buy 
provisions (Europe or West Africa), the impact of this choice on the overall profit margin of 
slave trading companies decreased enormously. Since no accurate information is available on 
the long-term price trends of African food staples, it is impossible to assess the long-term 
trend in European and African food price gaps – and an important topic for future research -, 
but scattered price observations of African rice, corn and yams presented in section 7 suggest 
that these gaps were not that large.  
Given the declining relative cost of provisions, stocking up on food before departure became 
an increasingly attractive means to reduce voyage time and related business risk. The trans-
Atlantic slave trade, while potentially lucrative, was a highly insecure enterprise (Behrendt 
2001, Morgan 2007, Haggerty 2009, McDade 2011), and the most successful merchants were 
those who best managed its risks. Moreover, as the eighteenth century progressed the risks 
increased due to rising competition among slavers, difficulties in finding the right cargoes to 
suit rapidly changing African consumer tastes and the need to protect increasingly valuable 
cargoes of slaves against disease, slave revolts and piracy (Haggerty 2009, pp819-22). 
Radburn’s (2015) study of the role of credit in slave ventures shows that the financial 
instruments used were more fragile than has previously been considered. The credit crises in 
the 1770s and 1790s, brought on by intensified Atlantic warfare, placed huge strains on 
investors (pp665,685-86). These conflicts also made the voyage more dangerous, with the 
British seeing a 47% increase in the number of ships captured or destroyed in the period from 
1760 to 1808, as compared to the previous 40 years.79 In Section 7 I will further elaborate on 
this argument. 
 
 
                                                 
79 Data from TSTD. 
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3.6. REVISED ESTIMATES OF WEST AFRICAN FOOD EXPORTS, 1681-1807    
It is now time to revise Eltis’ estimates. First I take the total number of slaves embarked in the 
period 1681-1807, according to nationality of the slaver (flag), and insert my estimates of the 
share of European provisions in total provisioning requirements. This chapters’ estimates of 
the share of European provisions in total provisioning requirements is inserted into the total 
number of slaves embarked in the period 1681-1807, defined by nationality of the slaver 
(flag). For British slavers, it is assumed 5% for 1680-1740 and a linear increase to 40% during 
1740-1807. For Dutch slavers, the assumption is 80% for the WIC era up to 1740, and 90% 
for the MCC traders after 1740. For French vessels, I assume 50% up to 1740 and 75% 
thereafter, and for Danish ships 50% before 1740 and 66% thereafter. Lacking any estimates 
for the Luso-Brazilian trade, I conservatively assume that ships departing from the New 
World sourced only 20% of food for the MP from their home ports, putting the revised 
estimates on the very safe side. 
Next, I refine Eltis’ assumption of provisioning costs being a fixed 25% share of slave 
purchasing prices, using the shares reported in Figure 3.5b. In so far as African provisions 
continued to offer a cheaper alternative, these shares represent an upper-estimate of the 
relative provisioning prices. This chapter maintain Eltis’ assumptions for converting the value 
of exchange commodities f.o.b. to c.i.f. (multiplying f.o.b. series by 2), and the mark-up of 
3% for the consumption of African provisions by slave ship crews.  
Figure 3.6 compares the five year-interval estimates of the overall slave-trade induced 
demand impulse on West African commercial agriculture with the estimates offered by Eltis. 
The difference is found to be vast. In effect, I estimate that the slave trade induced demand 
had a monetary value of around £60,000 in the first decades of the eighteenth century, 
increasing to c. £110,000 per year in the middle decades and c. £150,000 during the heyday of 
the trade in the 1780s to 1800s. My estimates for the latter period are about 70 to 80% lower 
than those offered by Eltis. This difference has two causes. First, the non-African share in 
slave provisions was too significant to ignore. Second, Eltis’ estimates were hugely inflated 
by assuming a fixed 25% of rapidly rising slave purchasing prices after the mid-1750s. Yet, in 
the more likely scenario that provisioning prices remained stable, or rose to a much lesser 
degree, food provisions must have constituted a rapidly shrinking proportion of the total 
outfitting costs.  
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Figure 3.6. Estimates of the average annual value of African-sourced provisions 
compared to Eltis estimates, 1681-1807, in constant British £ of 1700    
 
Sources: Eltis 2013; for my own estimates see text and Appendix 3.6. 
 
3.7. WHY DID BRITISH PROVISIONING STRATEGIES DIFFER AND WHAT 
WERE THE IMPACTS ON DIFFERENT REGIONS? 
The question that remains is why British slave traders adopted different provisioning 
strategies than continental slave traders, and how did this impact on different regions? This 
final section reviews four possible explanations, which are all in some way connected to the 
management of business risk: 1) differential access to West African food markets; 2) different 
price bids of African and European staple foods; 3) different sensitivity to slaves’ dietary 
preferences; and 4) differential techniques to preserve food for ocean-bound journeys.  
Beginning with the last two factors, it is generally acknowledged that techniques to prepare 
and conserve food improved during the eighteenth century, and fitted into a pattern of 
ongoing ‘professionalization’ of the slave trade (Leuftink 1991, Behrendt 2001), one result of 
which was the declining mortality rates on board slave ships (Klein et al. 2001, p100). It is 
highly implausible, however, that the Dutch and French traders’ greater reliance on European 
provisions could be explained by their having any greater structural knowledge of food 
conservation techniques than the British. 
The argument on dietary preferences of African slaves poses a similar problem. Many sources 
indicate that European slavers were well informed on the advantages of feeding their captives 
with African staple foods. Instructions to, and observations by, ships’ captains of all nations 
advised to prepare food with some local ingredients, even if it was just a condiment such as 
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palm-oil or melegueta pepper.80 Traders believed that this reduced sickness and mortality, and 
that it helped to get Africans slowly used to European food. It cannot entirely be ruled out that 
British slavers were, on the whole, more sensitive to the dietary preferences of slaves than 
Dutch or French slavers, but the many documented cases of British slavers using force to feed 
slaves who refused their food makes this an unlikely interpretation (Rediker 2007, pp263-64 
and 284-88).81 
It is far more likely that the Dutch and French had other reasons to rely on European 
provisions. Were food price differentials sufficiently large to influence provisioning choices? 
And if so, were these consistent with the different strategies pursued? Figures 6a and 6b 
present the food price observations gathered from the RAC accounts for the years 1680-
173082, complemented by yam prices in Biafra in the 1780s derived from Behrendt et al. 
(2010), and rice and yam prices from the MCC records.83 Figure 3.7a compares West African 
rice prices with British domestic prices of rice and wheat flour. Figure 3.7b compares British 
barley and bean prices with West African corn and yam prices.84 All prices have been 
standardized in pence per 2,000 Kcal using the metrics listed in Appendix 3.3.  
Figure 3.7a indicates that West African rice prices were considerably lower than European 
rice prices. Part of this difference may be explained by differences in quality, but with a price 
gap of 300% the Windward coast obviously offered more value for money. That said, large 
price differences between Sherbo and Cape Coast Castle show that it also mattered where or 
when slavers bought foodstuffs in West Africa. It is possible that the price of rice sold to 
slavers at Cape Castle followed British market prices, and perhaps the rice was even first 
imported from Europe in order to supply British forts, before being partly resold to British 
slave ships. 
                                                 
80 In their instructions to captains, the directors of the West India Company recommended that all beans be 
flavoured with “….een weinig sap” and “…wat oly de palm” (quoted in Balai 2011, p250). Likewise the Royal 
Africa Company stated that its ships were to purchase a proportion of corn, palm oil and malaguetta pepper 
(Donnan II, 164). Later ships of the Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie regularly stocked up on palm oil 
and pepper, regardless of other provisions they bought. A recipe for soup served aboard French slaving vessels 
included locally bought corn, pepper and palm oil as well as beans or rice (Mandelblatt 2008, p412). 
81 There is also evidence that African slave raiders used food as a strategy to dislocate their captives from their 
home environment, by feeding them staples they were not used to. Smallwood (2008) and Byrd (2010) argue 
that as soon as people were kidnapped, captured or sold a process began to separate them from the social context 
which had previously defined them as members of a community, and reduced them to commodities (Byrd 2010, 
29). Smallwood (2008, pp43-44) argues that the food given to slaves was an important part of this process. 
82 For the forts, the data comes from Sherbo (Sierra Leone) and Cape Coast Castle (Gold Coast) for 1686, 1687 
and 1688. These primarily show purchases of African products in local currencies which are converted into 
pound sterling. For ships, I have taken information ship accounts in the invoice books of the RAC, which show 
both quantities and prices of European foodstuffs.   
83 Information to derive prices for yams can be found in Behrendt et al. 2010, pp90-91,102,108,135,140,170; 
Behrendt 2001, p182; Thomas 1999, p418. 
84 The British annual price series are farm-gate prices from Clark (2006) to which  were added a 30% mark-up to 
adjust for transportation and transaction costs incurred in getting foods from the countryside to the belly of slave 
vessels in the harbours of Bristol and Liverpool. This 30% mark-up closes the gap between the farm-gate prices 
and the unit prices reported in the slave ship trading accounts studied here. 
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Figure 3.7.a. British prices of rice and wheat flour versus West African rice prices, pence 
per 2,000 kcal 
 
 
Figure 3.7.b. British prices of barley and beans versus West African prices of corn and 
yams, pence per 2,000 kcal 
Sources: GB Data: Clark (2006), MCC Data: Zeuuws Archief, MCC Inventaris, Reizen 1730 – 1790, Yams 
Biafra:  Behrendt et al. 2010, Yams, Palm Oil, Corn (Gold Coast): Ronnback 2014, Rice Sherbo (SL): TNA 
T70/880, Rice Cape Castle (GC): TNA T70/763; Notes: GB is Great Britain, GC is Gold Coast, SL is Sierra 
Leone, MCC is Middelburgse Commercie Compagnie. 
 
Figure 3.7b indicates, though, that a West African rice diet was not necessarily cheaper than a 
diet of European barley and beans. The costs of corn from the Gold Coast were also in the 
same range. In fact, there seems to have been only one major bargain available in West 
Africa, namely yams from Biafra, which were much cheaper than any other staple sourced 
from either Britain or West Africa. Yams were harvested only once a year, which increased 
pressures on captains to time their voyages accurately, but once obtained, yams could be 
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successfully stored for long periods of time (Behrendt 2001, p183). Moreover, as noted in 
section 3.4, the densely-populated regions around the major slaving ports of Bonny and Old 
Calabar, with their highly efficient trading networks, were able to significantly increase 
production. Large supplies of yams at low prices may thus have reduced the time spent on the 
coast, lowering the risk of slave rebellions, diseases or naval attacks and, more generally, 
raising cost efficiency.  
Lovejoy and Richardson (2004, pp378-80) have argued that faster loading times and superior 
credit arrangements were the main reasons why British slave traders began to favour what 
was originally considered a ‘horrid hole’, with its less desirable slaves and higher rates of 
mortality for both captives and crew.85 Ready and cheap access to yams in Biafra may have 
been another factor supporting this shift. Yet, Biafra only became of central importance to the 
British trade after the 1750s which Nwokeji (2010, pp49–53) has argued had much to do with 
the opening up of new markets for slaves in the densely populated central region. Cheap yams 
may thus explain why British slave ships continued to rely on African provisions to a greater 
extent than the French or the Dutch - who traded much less in this area - but they cannot 
explain the already existing differences in provisioning strategies.    
Behrendt (2001) has argued that “During peak periods of the slave trade, English food 
supplies could not meet the requirements of all Guineamen. Merchants thus relied on African 
provisions, particularly during late summer and fall….” (p181). There is no doubt that the 
slave trade at its peak required huge quantities of food. If one were to count the crew and 
slaves aboard ships out of Liverpool as additional mouths to be fed, then they would have 
added some 5% to 7% to the total population of Lancashire in an era when the city was itself 
growing rapidly.86 Yet, even if British slavers departing from Liverpool and Bristol had 
difficulties in sourcing food from their immediate hinterlands, it would still have been an 
option to call in at London, the largest commercial and naval hub of Western Europe, or other 
European ports for that matter, as was common practice in the purchase of exchange 
commodities, such as textiles, guns, alcohol, tobacco, iron and copper rods.87 French slavers 
leaving from the port of Nantes sometimes first sailed northwards to the Dutch port of 
Rotterdam to take in provisions.88 
The most likely explanation for the differences in provisioning strategy, therefore, cannot be 
found in the availability of foodstuffs in Europe, but rather in the differential access to West 
African food markets. British ships could pile up food at various fortified coastal stations in 
                                                 
85 Slaves from Biafra were lower valued by buyers in the New World as they were regarded as more disease 
prone. This is also borne out by analyses of mortality rates during the middle passage with slaves from the Biafra 
region dying at nearly twice the rate as those from other areas (Klein 2010, Thomas 1999). 
86 Population estimates from Wrigley (2007). 
87 Records from the accounts of forts along the coast of Africa show that they were importing trade goods from 
around the world, including Swedish iron, Indian textiles, Danish guns, Brazilian tobacco and Caribbean rum. 
TNA T70/928 – 930.  
88 Based on personal correspondence with Gerhard de Kok. I thank him for sharing this insight. Mandelblatt 
(2008) notes that while the majority of provisions on French ships were bought in France, they also purchased 
rice in London and Salt Beef from Ireland (p417). 
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Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast, before taking a leap to the Bight of Benin, where food 
access was problematic. The Dutch had fewer forts along this part of the coast and with the 
critical exception of Elmina, these were also playing a less significant role in the slave trade 
itself. With less dependable supplies along the coast it made sense to stock up in Europe, even 
if this may not have given the best value for money. MCC ship logs reveal that there were 
very few places along the coast where they could obtain reliable supplies.89 This is not to say 
that French, Danish or Dutch ships did not buy any West African commodities at all, but they 
did buy much less of the main staples.   
French ships had even fewer permanent establishments along the coast for stopping over. 
Writing in 1764, the Nantais merchant Joseph Mosneron, stated that the captain of his ship 
decided to set sail for the Caribbean, despite not having his full complement of slaves 
because: “Les provisions de France étaient en grande partie consummées….” (Pétré-
Grenouilleau 1995, p75). Other captains, like Van Alstein, had to sail to the islands of 
Fernando Po and São Tomé: “II n'en est pas de meme de la Cote d'Or ou de Juda; quand on 
manque de vivres, on peut aller relacher a l'Isle des Princes ou a celles de Saint-Thome et 
d'Annobon qui n 'en sont pas eloignees.” (Rinchon 1964, p264). Since most French merchants 
were, unlike the British and Dutch, not specialised in the slave trade, but undertook it as a side 
activity to bilateral commodity trade with the Caribbean (Michon 2007), there were lower 
incentives for them to invest in reliable African coastal stations.90  
The idea that Dutch and French slave traders may have had more diversified portfolios is also 
important in another respect. Recent research by Gerhard de Kok reveals that landowning 
elites in the Dutch province of Zealand invested heavily in the MCC trade.91 They outfitted 
ships with supplies from local farms, some of which they owned themselves. Differences in 
European investor-supplier networks may thus offer an additional explanation as to why 
Dutch slavers piled up the bulk of their provisions in home ports, such as Middelburg. Future 
research will need to clarify whether such links were weaker in Bristol and Liverpool, and 
whether path-dependencies in the commercial organization of the slave trade can account for 
different logistic approaches. 
But even the British, with the advantage of having a string of forts along the West African 
coast, faced considerable problems with West African supplies at a time when the trade was 
just a fraction of its eighteenth-century peak. Correspondence from and to RAC officials 
                                                 
89 My database of MCC ships provides 75 observations of specific locations used by ships to purchase 
provisions. Of these, 27 come from the short stretch of coast from Axim to Elmina on the western side of the 
Gold Coast, and 34 from the equally small area between Grande Mesurado and Sestra Kru on the Windward 
Coast. The prominence of the latter area may be due to the fact that it saw less competition from more 
established traders on other parts of the coast (Vos 2009, p32). 
90 An analysis of the Chaurand papers in the Nantes archives from 1777 to 1787 (101 J 26, 27, 28) shows that 
they sent out 27 West India ships to only 11 slave ships. These slave voyages were all concentrated between 
1783 and 1787, a period of rapid growth in West Africa and that after 1787 they withdrew from the slave trade to 
again concentrate on the bilateral trade with St Domingue. A further study of the comparative impacts of 
specialisation in the British as opposed to the French slave trade would merit further study.  
91 Based on personal communication with Gerhard de Kok. 
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stationed in the forts along the Gold and Slave Coast in the 1680s and 1690s, reveals that, 
especially in the months of March to July, there were frequent mentions of food ‘scarcity’ 
causing trouble to traders (see Figure 3.8). In 1686, Captain Woodfine stated that he was 
unable to move on to Whydah until he had sufficient corn, and that there was none to be had 
except at inflated prices92. Likewise, Captain Jefferies, in 1692, mentioned he was unable to 
move on to the Bight of Benin for want of sufficient corn.93 Local forts, which were often 
suppliers of slaves as well as provisions, were equally affected by insecure food supplies. In 
1681 the factor at Accra stated that he was unable to buy more slaves as there was no corn to 
be had.94 Figure 3.8 shows that the average monthly prices of corn coincided with numerous 
mentions of scarcity. The reasons for failing supplies were not only related to the seasonality 
of harvests. Local wars and disputes, as experienced by the Egya fort, near modern day Cape 
Coast in Ghana95, could put a complete ban on food supplies reaching the coastal forts. Such 
problems were not confined to the Gold Coast or the Bight of Benin. In Senegambia food 
shortages caused by warfare or drought were also the ‘biggest bottleneck’ in the slave 
purchasing chain (Searing 2003, p81). 
Figure 3.8. Monthly mentions of provisioning problems in RAC correspondence (left-
hand axis) and monthly corn prices in gold ackies (right-hand axis), 1680 - 1699 
 
Source: Calculations based on the letters between British forts and slave ships compiled by Law (1997a).  
Note: Gold ackies were an African coastal currency unit worth c. 1 British shilling (12 pence). 
If the possibility of speedier embarkation was the main reason for the British to shift their 
trade to the Bight of Biafra, this indicates that they, too, were sensitive to provisioning-
induced risks of delay. There is tentative evidence that the demand for African foodstuffs was 
stretching supplies in the main regions of embarkation. For instance, during the severe 
contraction of the slave trade in the late 1770s to the early 1780s, caused by the American 
War of Independence, slave captains from Britain going to the Gold Coast and the Bight of 
                                                 
92 Law (1997) Book 2, May 16 1686 Ref 904  
93 Law (1997) Book 3, November 13 Ref 10  
94 Law (1997) Book 1, October 25 1681 Ref 417  
95 Law (1997) Book 2, March 8 1687 Ref 647  
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Biafra took far fewer European provisions with them. When the slave trade resurged after the 
conflict had ended, so did the quantity of European provisions.96 Apart from structural 
shortages, supplies may have become less predictable as slave raids undermined agricultural 
production and disrupted local trade routes.  
The effects of internal wars must have been more severe in some regions than in others. In 
this respect, it is interesting to see that British slave vessels sailing off to the Windward Coast 
and the Gold Coast took about 62% of total provisions from their home ports, while vessels 
sailing to Biafra brought about 34% in the 1790s and 1800s. This issue will be discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 6, but the difference seems consistent with Nwokeji (2010), who has 
argued that the demographic impact of slave raiding in Biafra was mild compared to the 
region around the Bight of Benin, which suffered a serious decline in population (Manning 
1982, 30-34). In Biafra fewer slaves were obtained through violent slave raiding and instead 
far more through the use of judicial punishment (Nwokeji 2010, pp68,76,130,179, Martin 
1988, p27, Lovejoy 2011, p82). According to Nwokeji (2001, p626) a more balanced sex ratio 
and the willingness of people to accept and incorporate outsiders meant that “….Igboland 
retained a high population density not because it escaped heavy slaving…..but in spite of it.”  
In summary, British access to African provisions was not only more secure because of a string 
of forts that could mediate the risk of local food shortages, but also because it shifted its trade 
to the region where local merchant networks were geared towards ensuring a quick, abundant 
and secure supply of foodstuffs to slave traders eager to minimize their embarkation times.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
96 During the period of the American civil war, ships belonging to the Liverpool merchant William Davenport 
were taking as little as 3% of their provisions from Liverpool. However, by the 1790s ships were taking on 
average of 30%. This figure did vary according to region and ship captain. The log of the slave ship Ranger 
(STD ID: 83272, LRO: 387 MD 55), one of the few to itemise the food given to slaves, shows that they were fed 
around 3700 kcals / day with European beans and rice and around 2000 kcals of corn from the Gold Coast. To 
put this into perspective, sailors on British ships who were far more physically active were fed around 4800 kcals 
/ day in total (MacDonald 2004, p177). 
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3.8. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have asked to what extent the increasing demand for food provisions by 
European slave ships may have boosted West African commercial agriculture in the long 
eighteenth century. Exploring the provisioning strategies of British, French, Dutch and Danish 
slave ships has shown that a considerable share of the calories and proteins required to 
maintain African slaves were supplied from Europe. It has also revealed that the relative costs 
of European-sourced slave provisions remained relatively stable, while slave purchasing 
prices quintupled between 1755 and 1807. Hence, the Atlantic slave trade played a smaller 
role in the development of West African commercial agriculture than previous studies have 
suggested, and was definitely much smaller than the aggregate value of such West African 
commodity exports to Britain during the mid-nineteenth century.  
Apart from assessing orders of magnitude, my analysis has revealed two interesting patterns 
of variation in slave ship provisioning strategies. Firstly, British slavers relied to a much 
larger extent on African food markets than continental slavers. I have hypothesized here that 
the main reason for this difference is that British slavers enjoyed more secure access to 
provisions, especially because their string of trading forts on the West African coast reduced 
the risk of supply failure.  
Secondly, I have also observed notable differences in the size of food exports across various 
regions of slave embarkation. Expanding food exports in West Africa were confined to a few 
key regions. In the Bight of Biafra, the slave trade stimulated the development of coastal food 
markets and placed a stepping stone for the nineteenth century commercial transition. In the 
Gold Coast, the provisioning trade was important but, as will be argued in later chapters, not 
influential in the commercial transition, which was initially based on other exports from the 
interior. In those areas where markets for food provisions remained underdeveloped, i.e. 
WCA and Benin, the commercial transition either failed to accelerate the non-slave sector or 
development occurred much later. In the next chapter, I will examine the expansion of the 
trade in commodities that were destined for sale in Europe.  
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CHAPTER 4 
COMMODITIES, PRICES AND RISK: THE CHANGING MARKETS 
FOR NON-SLAVE PRODUCTS IN PRE-ABOLITION WEST AFRICA97 
“…..procure some Palm Oil on reasonable terms which is likely to bear a great 
price here, we therefore wish you to purchase as much as you can with any of 
the cargo you may have……” 
Instructions from Thomas Leyland, Liverpool Merchant, to the captain of the 
slave ship Enterprise, 180398 
  
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
In the decades prior to the abolition of the British slave trade in 1807, those campaigning for 
an end to the traffic in Africans to the Americas made regular mention of the potential for 
trade in ‘legitimate commerce’.99 They seemed to have shared the assumption with a number 
of modern scholars, in particular Rodney (1972) and Inikori (2007, 2011) that the transatlantic 
slave trade had effectively crowded out other forms of commerce, necessitating an active 
change in the way commerce with Africa was conducted by British merchants. This view has 
been contradicted, however, by some contributors to a recent volume (Law et al. 2013), who 
have suggested that this may not have been the case. In their introduction, Law et al. argue 
that the trade in commodities continued and even grew in absolute, if not relative, terms, 
throughout the eighteenth century (p10).  
Later in the same book Austin (2013) argues that from the 1780s the supply of slaves was 
generally falling while their prices were rising, suggesting that either supplies of captives 
were in decline, or there was a competing demand for slave labour in Africa (Whatley 2014). 
The former argument certainly fits the ‘gun-slave cycle’ thesis, in which rising demand for 
slaves triggered an increase in violence through slave raiding and warfare. This then led to 
more effective defences being put in place by those who were being raided, consequently 
increasing the costs of acquiring slaves needing to be taken from ever increasing distances 
from the coast (Klein 2001). The demand side thesis is based on work by Searing (2003, 
pp130-55), who argues that slave exports from the Senegambian region began to compete 
with local demands for slave labour. These included coastal industries such as salt and 
fishing, commercial agriculture further inland for export to the drier savannah and desert 
                                                 
97 This chapter is based on a working paper written with Pieter Woltjer which can be found at: 
https://www.aehnetwork.org/working-papers/commodities-prices-and-risk-the-changing-market-for-non-slave-
products-in-pre-abolition-in-west-africa/. The paper is currently under review at the Journal of African History. 
98 LRO 387 MD 43 Leyland to Capt. Caesar Lawson 18 July 1803 
99 See, in particular, Equiano (1794, pp356–58), Clarkson (1788, pp8–23) 
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regions, and the production of gum in the interior. A combination of famine and warfare 
exacerbated labour shortages, which gradually diminished the pool of potential captives for 
export. Austin suggests that, in certain parts of West Africa, demand for coerced labour for 
agriculture, production of finished goods and mining may have begun to compete with the 
commerce in slave exports. For example, Lynn (1997, pp12-13) notes that palm oil exports 
were increasing in the regions around the Bight of Biafra from the 1760s. The reduction in the 
numbers of available slaves for export would therefore have pushed up prices.  
However, as Austin (2013, p250) acknowledges, this hypothesis is not based on any firm data, 
and even Searing’s conclusions are, by his own admission, indirect. What is currently lacking 
in the literature is accurate quantitative data on the non-slave trade with Africa, which can be 
applied to a regional analysis of trade patterns, in the pre-abolition period. At present, the only 
quantitative data that exists on the non-slave trade with Africa are the statistics on British 
trade compiled by Johnson et al. (1990), which are based on the custom ledgers held at the 
National Archives in London. These ledgers contain the total recorded imports, exports and 
re-exports at Britain’s principal ports from 1699. Even though they may not be the ideal 
source, as they cannot account for smuggling, clerical errors, tax evasion and the fact that 
many ships bought and sold goods in other European countries, they do still represent the 
most complete record of Africa’s commodity trade for the eighteenth century (Johnson et al. 
1990, p8). Johnson’s work was a heroic achievement, involving the inputting of between 30 
and 35 thousand items of data onto individual punch cards which were then inputted onto a 
1980s computer (Johnson et al. 1990, pp6-8).  
Nonetheless, whilst providing a very useful overview of Britain’s commodity trade, the data 
does have notable significant limitations. Firstly, the precise volumes of goods are not 
recorded, neither are current prices given. Instead, the official value listed in the ledgers is 
used. This multiplies the volume of goods with an unchanging official price (see below 
section 2) and provides, as is argued below, a rather inaccurate picture of the actual patterns 
of trade. The records also do not provide any specific geographical details as the customs 
records, until the nineteenth century, did not record from which regions commodities were 
bought (Johnson et al. 1990, p 49). This in itself is not an insurmountable hurdle as most of 
the commodities produced tended to come from specific regions. For example, it is known 
gum senegal was almost exclusively bought from Senegambia (Webb 1985). However, 
Johnson aggregated the products under certain categories, making it hard to know with any 
certainty where goods originated. For instance, the ledgers list several different types of gums 
including gun animi, gum Arabic and gum copal, all of which were sourced from different 
areas. 
This chapter seeks to provide a dataset which offers two important improvements on the work 
of Johnson. Firstly, I provide a far more thorough, if not entirely precise, geographical 
breakdown of regional patterns of trade. Individual commodities are disaggregated and 
recorded individually, allowing us to provide a more accurate estimate of where they were 
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sourced.100 In addition, it uses new data from Eltis (2013), who records details of over 2,000 
voyages undertaken by specialist commodity vessels sailing to Africa to trade for non-slave 
products between the 1560s and 1807. By combining this with the fresh data herein, the 
chapter can provide a more geographically precise analysis of the patterns of the non-slave 
trade, as well as a better understanding of its operation and relationship to the slave trade. 
Secondly, I present a newly constructed time series of prices for commodities in both Africa 
and Europe over the eighteenth century. These, combined with the recorded volumes of 
goods, provide a far more accurate figure for the real value of the commodity trade, and 
provide a better understanding of how changing markets within the Atlantic world influenced 
the decisions of both African and European merchants. 
This chapter also seeks to contribute to a growing body of literature which seeks to better 
understand the development of British trade with Africa in the eighteenth century. Behrendt 
(2001) has argued that patterns of trade were determined by changes in the climatic and 
agricultural seasons in Europe, Africa and the Americas and, as argued in Chapter 2, better 
supplies of food in certain regions such as the Gold Coast and the Bight of Biafra might have 
also played a role in the growth of slave exports. The nature of credit systems in Africa 
(Lovejoy and Richardson 2004), and between the Caribbean and Europe (Radburn 2015), may 
have influenced where slaves were embarked and sold. Other studies have examined the rise 
of the slave trade in Liverpool, and how investments in human capital101 and risk management 
strategies allowed this port to assume such a dominant position in the second half of the 
eighteenth century (McDade 2011, Richardson et al 2007, Haggerty 2009).  
One area which has been the subject of relatively little research during the apogee of the West 
African transatlantic slave trade in the later eighteenth century, is the interaction between the 
trade in slaves and commodities. Non-slave products, such as ivory, gold and pepper, had 
been of similar importance as slaves to British merchants until the late seventeenth century 
(Eltis 1994, Van den Boogaart 1992) and ‘legitimate commerce’ became, at least in theory, 
the only items of trade with Britain after 1808. However, to date no study has quantitatively 
examined how the commodity trade developed and how it interacted with the trade in captives 
in the eighteenth century. This chapter will be the first to provide an analysis of the patterns of 
Africa’s non-slave exports to Britain in the decades before abolition.  
                                                 
100 The Johnson et al. (1990) dataset provides very little information about the geographical origin of the goods. 
This is in part because the customs records do not record where items were bought, but also because goods are 
aggregated into groups. For example, Camwood, a product which almost exclusively came from Sierra Leone 
and Barwood/Redwood, which was sourced on the eastern side of African West Coast, are listed together under 
‘dyestuffs’. Gums were overwhelmingly purchased in Senegambia (Curtin 1975), while palm oil, aggregated 
under ‘Oils and Fats’ most likely came almost exclusively from the regions around the Bight of Biafra (Lynn 
1997). By entering each product separately, we solve the aggregation issue and this, alongside reference to other 
sources and literature made it possible to estimate, with reasonable accuracy, where the goods came from. 
Furthermore, through the use of a new dataset on specialist bilateral ships by Eltis (2013), I am also able to show 
how the business of commodity trading developed over the eighteenth century. 
101 In particular, knowledge of local African markets and the development of relations with merchants with 
contacts in the interior 
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The results show that from the late 1770s, there appears to have been a significant shift in the 
focus and volume of commodity trading. From 1760 to 1808 the volume of non-slave goods 
traded grew by a factor of four, which is substantially more than official figures indicate. 
Furthermore, and contrary to what literature suggests (Law et al. 2013, pp9-10), the 
commodity trade grew faster (in absolute terms) than the trade in slaves for the Americas. 
Secondly, I show that the geographic focus of the commodity trade changed, from one 
dominated by products from the western Senegambian region to one where the eastern side of 
the West African coast became considerably more important. This study’s data indicates that 
until the 1770s the commodity trade with Africa (with the important exception of gold) was 
largely in the hands of specialist bilateral traders, principally working from London, focusing 
on Senegambia and particularly the gum trade. However, political and military events in the 
wider Atlantic region caused this trade to considerably diminish. From this point a far greater 
share of African commodities were being imported from the regions around the Bight of 
Biafra on the Eastern side of the coast. Additionally, it is argued that this it was principally 
slave traders, not specialist commodity merchants, who were responsible for purchasing these 
products. To my knowledge, this is the first time that this pattern has been both identified and 
quantitatively analysed.   
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section two sets out the methodological and data 
contributions to the literature on trade with West Africa in the pre-abolition period. Section 3 
presents the main results regarding the changing volume, structure and nature of Britain’s 
commodity trade over the course of the eighteenth century. The chapter then seeks to answer 
two important questions. Firstly, why was it that demand seemed to be growing for African 
products? Secondly, why were slave traders - and more specifically those going to the regions 
around the Bight of Biafra - and not specialist bilateral commodity merchants, so motivated to 
purchase commodities in such increasing volumes? I argue that British consumers during this 
period began purchasing increasing quantities of finished manufactures, which required 
primary products found across West Africa. In addition, commodity traders then seem to have 
been effectively crowded out of the new market by slave traders attracted to non-slave 
products.  
I suggest three reasons as to why this might have been the case. To begin with, slave traders 
began to face pressure to reduce crowding on their ships, which may have encouraged them to 
buy other products to compensate. Secondly, the mark up on commodities was especially 
favourable. Prices at the coast seemed to have remained relatively stable, largely owed to the 
fact that, unlike slaves, most commodities bought by Europeans were not particularly valuable 
in Africa. Furthermore, some merchants may have been using commodities as a means of 
attracting more business from slave ships and therefore were not motivated to raise prices. 
However, the value of ivory, palm oil and dyewoods was rising dramatically in Europe, 
probably due to inflationary pressures caused by warfare and increasing demand. Finally, 
commodities may have offered slave traders a means of reducing their credit risks, as they 
could realise their profits much faster on non-slave products. 
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For this thesis, the most important result is that in the period before abolition demand in the 
Atlantic region for non-slave goods was already rising. The data shows that, as with the 
provisioning trade, these goods were coming in increasing quantities from the eastern end of 
the coast, predominantly the Bight of Biafra.  
 
4.2.  METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
The analysis of the flow of commodities between Africa and Europe over the eighteenth 
century requires a measure of the value of trade that is independent of changes in prices, or 
changes in the value of the British Pound. The work of Marion Johnson et al (1990) on the 
English customs records does this through a so-called quantum index, which weights the 
quantities of commodities traded for each year using fixed, base period prices.102 These base 
period prices were built almost exclusively on official prices that were set in the late 
seventeenth century. This means that all goods imported and exported over the eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century were assigned a single, ‘official’ price by the customs, which was left 
unchanged for over a century and a half,103 making the value of import and export flows 
comparable over time. Unfortunately, the official prices turn out to be unrepresentative for the 
actual prices observed during the later years.  
Index-number theory shows that fixing the base-period prices to a single year can cause 
serious distortions, particularly if this is done over long periods of time. This so-called 
‘substitution bias’ is the result of consumers substituting away from goods when they increase 
in relative price and vice versa (Ehemann 2007, pp256-57). An index that relies on weights 
from some past period will thus overweight the goods that have decreased in price and 
underweight those that have undergone price increases, biasing the quantum index in the 
process. Table 4.1 provides a summary of the average prices observed in the data for four 
important African commodities over several decades, and compares them to the official prices 
used to calculate the “official value” of goods used in the Johnson et al. dataset.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
102 Note that such a quantum index does not necessarily measure changes in volume or weight, instead it allows 
one to compare the ‘real’, total value of a range of goods over time. 
103 Note that throughout this paper imports will refer to goods entering Britain, exports will refer to goods 
entering Africa. 
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Table 4.1. Average import prices vs official prices, 1730s-
1810s 
Decade  
Ivory Palm oil Beeswax Redwood 
(£/cwt) (£/cwt) (£/cwt) (£/ton) 
1730s 5.3 2.2 2.8 3.7 
1740s 5.8 2.6 2.8 6.2 
1750s 7.1 2.8 3.4 2.8 
1760s 10.0 3.3 3.3 2.3 
1770s 14.9 3.0 3.4 2.1 
1780s 15.7 4.1 4.6 2.0 
1790s 11.8 4.9 5.4 2.6 
1800s 21.9 5.9 6.7 4.5 
1810s 23.5 2.8 9.2 5.5 
Official 6.00 1.00 4.75 40.00 
 
Sources: Johnson et al. (1990), see Table 4.3 for sources on current 
prices. 
 
Clearly, the official prices – both in absolute and in relative terms – differed substantially 
from the observed prices, particularly for the later decades. Most notably for redwood, the 
official price does not correspond to the average prices observed from the 1730s onwards. 
What served as the basis for the official prices is not exactly clear, not even for the customs 
officers recording the trade flows at the end of the eighteenth century.104 This chapter revisits 
the English customs records and constructs a quantum index that takes the changing prices 
into account, thus eliminating, or at least limiting the bias that plagues the official values used 
by Johnson et al. (1990). In addition, it provides a much more detailed dataset of the 
commodities traded with Africa, which allows an analysis of the changing patterns of trade, 
both its composition and its geographical scope. 
 
                                                 
104 “The Estimates in this office by which the goods imported and exported are valued were made about the year 
1697 probably by the first appointed officer, for the office was instituted in that year, upon what principle he 
formed his estimates it is difficult to ascertain at this day ….” TNA, CUST 17/12, 1790 
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Quantum index 
To re-estimate the real value, or so-called volume index, of goods traded with Africa it was 
necessary to augment the ‘official’ quantum index described above in two important respects. 
First, instead of weighting the various commodities by the official prices of 1697, I rely on 
nominal prices observed over the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Second, these 
weights are updated roughly every twenty years, linking the resulting separate indices using a 
procedure called ‘chaining’. This chain index avoids the problem of out-of-date weights, 
currently plaguing the available estimates of the volume of African trade. 
Equation (1) provides an example of a basic, fixed-weight quantum index. This index 
captures the change in the volume (Q) of a composite basket of i goods between period 3 and 
the base period 0; p and q are the price and quantity of each good 𝑖 respectively. 
𝑄𝐿 =  
∑ 𝑝0𝑖𝑞3𝑖𝑖
∑ 𝑝0𝑖𝑞0𝑖𝑖
 
 
(1) 
 
The fixed-weight volume index is thus the ratio of the total value of goods in period 3 
measured at base-periods 0’s prices to the total value of goods in the base period itself. In this 
Laspeyres index, only prices for period 0 factor into the equation, making it particularly 
sensitive to the choice of base-period. When there are substantial price changes over time, 
picking a different base year could significantly alter the results. 
Equation (2) addresses this issue by linking a series of separate fixed-weight volume indices 
in which the base-period is continually changed. This chain index (Qc) still measures the 
change in aggregate volume between period 3 and the base period 0. This time, however, it 
does not rely solely on the base-period prices, it also factors in the prices for the intermittent 
periods 1 and 2 respectively. 
𝑄𝐶 =  (
∑ 𝑝0𝑖𝑞1𝑖𝑖
∑ 𝑝0𝑖𝑞0𝑖𝑖
) (
∑ 𝑝1𝑖𝑞2𝑖𝑖
∑ 𝑝1𝑖𝑞1𝑖𝑖
) (
∑ 𝑝2𝑖𝑞3𝑖𝑖
∑ 𝑝2𝑖𝑞2𝑖𝑖
) =  ∏ 𝑄𝜏
𝐿
3
𝜏=1
 
 
(2) 
 
The volume index derived from equation (2) is no longer affected by the choice of base-
period and will, if prices change over time, provide an answer different from the fixed-weight 
Laspeyres index in equation (1). A drawback of the chaining method, however, is that it is 
substantially more data-intensive. Whereas the fixed-weight method requires only a single set 
of prices, the chained volume index requires a different set of prices for each individual chain. 
Lacking prices for every year and product in the sample, means that instead of shifting 
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weights every year, they are shifted every twenty years. The issue of out-dated weights is thus 
addressed, while not posing too severe constraints on the dataset. 
 
Data 
To reconstruct the volume index of West African trade, data on the quantity and prices of 
both imports originating from Africa, and exports flowing into the region, is used. For the 
quantities, I rely on the British customs records (CUST) held at the National Archives in 
London.105 This source details the exact quantity of commodities traded between Britain and 
Africa on an annual basis in pounds, gallons, number etc. As opposed to the work of Johnson 
et al. (1990) I disregard the official prices and do not sum the value of the individual products 
into aggregate categories. This allows me to assign my own, up-to-date prices to these 
products, as well as observe the composition of trade in full detail.  
The data on the prices of West African commodities is, to my knowledge, the most extensive 
ever assembled for the eighteenth century. It includes 2,667 observations for the European 
market prices and 323 observations for prices on the West African coast, from a variety of 
British and Dutch merchant and government sources (see Table 4.2).106 In order to get to a 
unit price for all of the goods and commodities it was necessary to standardise the weights 
and measures given in the sources.107 All of the observations were converted into either 
pounds (weight) or gallons (volume), and relied on Denzel (2010) to convert all currencies to 
British pounds.108 For British goods exported to Africa I have relied on the records of both 
crown protected109 and private traders110, supplemented by data on prices from secondary 
sources111, providing 1,464 observations for the period (Table 4.3). Lastly, for the prices of 
slaves in the Americas I have used the time series by Eltis et al. (2005) for the British 
Caribbean, and the yearly observations in the slave trade database of prices in Jamaica. For 
the African coast, I rely on data by Lovejoy & Richardson (1995), and data on coastal slave 
                                                 
105 TNA CUST 3/30-3/80, 17/1-17/30 
106 For each of the price observations the data is converted into a standard unit price of British £/lb, except for 
palm oil that is measured in British £/gallon and then taken an average price for the year. In years without 
available observations, the prices were extrapolated based on proxies and an estimation of the movement in the 
prices of goods. For the proxies I have relied on the dataset by Clark (2006) of the unit prices of goods in Britain. 
For palm oil, I used oil lamp and soap, the two products often manufactured from palm oil (see Lynn 1997). For 
African dyewoods, come data uses the series Wood, for Beeswax: Candles and for Malaguetta Pepper: Pepper 
107 In the eighteenth century, there was no standard system of measurement, so for example the weights used to 
measure goods in the Dutch town of Middleburg were different to those of Amsterdam. In the British sources 
beeswax could be listed as cakes, lbs or barrels and cloth might be given in yards or by weight. 
108 The complete details of workings and the full datasets are available on request. 
109 The invoice books kept by the Company of Royal Adventurers Trading with Africa who ran the British Forts 
on the coast from 1768 - 1816. They received regular shipments of trade goods from England which were priced 
both by their prime unit cost in England and their price in Africa. 
110 The account books of 28 Liverpool slave voyages from 1769 to 1808 
111 Principally the time series of English prices by Clark (2006) 
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prices collected from the records of the Middelburgse Commercie Compagnie from 1742 to 
1803.112 
 
Table 4.2. Observations of prices for African commodities, 1737-1816 
Commodity Coast 
European 
Market 
Total % of sample 
Beeswax 50 75 125 4.2 
Gum 3 8 11 0.4 
Ivory 197 2,439 2,636 88.2 
Mallaguetta 24 8 32 1.1 
Palm Oil 25 48 73 2.4 
Redwood / Barwood 19 56 75 2.5 
Camwood 1 14 15 0.5 
Ebony 4 19 23 0.8 
Total 323 2,667 2,990 100.0 
Sources: Zeeuws Archief MCC, De Reizen 76 voyages, MCC Venduboeken 1738 - 1740, MCC Factuurboeken 
van verkochte retournen 1729 – 1736, LRO D/Dav Ivory Book, LRO D/Dav Waste Book, TNA T1/566, TNA 
T1/594 9 – 12, TNA T70/1583, TNA C107/6/11, Letter book, etc, of Robert Bostock 1779 - 1792 V1&2 LRO 
387 MD 54/55, PP 1788 Report on the slave trade, PP 1816 (506) Report from the Select Committee on Papers 
Relating to the African Forts, Bennet & Brooks (1965), Sheriff (1987), Webb (1985) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
112 The full dataset is available on request  
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Table 4.3. Observations of prices for British trade goods, 1768-1816 
Trade Goods 
European 
Market % of sample 
 
Trade Goods 
European 
Market % of sample 
Alcohol 96 6.6  Lead 32 2.2 
Calico 29 2.0  Linen 108 7.4 
Finished Cotton 103 7.0  Military Stores /Guns 116 7.9 
Cowries 12 0.8  Pans / Rods 61 4.2 
Gunpowder 76 5.2  Pewter 22 1.5 
India Fabric 507 35.6  Tobacco 91 6.2 
Iron 67 4.6  Woolens 105 7.2 
Wrought Iron 39 2.7     
Sources: TNA T70/928/929/930/931/932; LRO D/Dav Ships Accounts: Andromache & Hector 1769 – 1776, 
Swift, Deadnaught & Dalrymple 1772 – 1777, Lord Cassiles & May 1771 - 1776, Essex and Christopher 1784 – 
1788, King George, King of Prussia 1767 - 1779, Preston 1780 - 1784, Quiote 1783 - 1785, Mars and Rover 
1768 - 1787; LRO Thomas Leyland Records Account Books, La Convention 387 MD 40, Lottery 1798 – 1799 
387 MD41, Lottery 1802 - 1811 387 MD 42, Enterprise 1803 – 1804 387 MD 43, Fortune 387 MD 44, TNA 
James Rogers Paper Morning Star C107/6 
Notes: For certain products, it is difficult to match them exactly to the categories in the Johnson dataset. It is 
therefore assumed Lead to equate to “Ball & Shot” as it was most commonly used in the creation of ammunition 
for muskets. Pans and Rods are equated to “Brass & Copper” and Pewter to “Other metals”. 
 
4.3. THE VOLUME AND STRUCTURE OF THE AFRICAN COMMODITY TRADE 
Figure 4.1 compares the newly constructed volume index of African commodity imports, 
based on the quantity and price data discussed above, to the Johnson series based on the 
official values recorded in the CUST series. The figure shows that, up to the 1780s, the two 
series move roughly in tandem. After this point the two indices begin to diverge significantly. 
Given the fact that the data underlying the quantities of African commodity imports is 
identical for both series, the discrepancy between both originates entirely from the updated set 
of prices. As previously noted, the official prices used by Johnson et al. are not representative 
for the primary African commodities, introducing a bias that gets larger over time. The almost 
four-fold rise in the quantity of commodities bought by British merchants from 1770 onwards 
is in sharp contrast to their purchases of slaves. In 1770, British ships embarked 41,738 slaves 
from Africa, which is above the mean of 33,583 for the period until 1808, and not too far 
below the 49,906 captives taken in 1799 which was the highest year on record.113 The rise in 
                                                 
113 Source: slavevoyages.org 
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the volume of commodity trade was therefore far more substantial than that of the slave trade, 
which was largely static.  
Figure 4.1. Volume of African commodity imports, official versus new estimates  
 
Notes: trend derived using Hodrick-Prescott filter, with a smoothing factor set to 100. 
Sources: see text. 
In terms of the prices of African commodities in European markets, the pattern until the 1770s 
was one of relative stability, before steadily rising, from the 1780s onwards. The combined 
indices of Africa prices shows that by the beginning of the nineteenth century, commodity 
prices were growing faster and with less volatility than those of slaves (see Figure 4.2). This 
means that given the falling prices of the goods required to barter for goods on the coast114, by 
the time of abolition prices for commodities appeared to be more favourable than they were 
for slaves. 
 
 
 
                                                 
114 I have assumed that commodities and slaves across West Africa are traded for a broadly similar range of 
goods, and acknowledge that a different assortment of goods was required for some commodities, especially in 
the Cameroons and at Bonny. However, this assortment tended to be low value items whose price trends 
mirrored those of the other goods. 
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Figure 4.2 Price indices British trade with Africa 
 
Sources: see text. 
As for the origin and composition of the commodity trade, this data shows that there are two 
trends in the non-slave trade with Africa that have so far not been expressly noted in the 
literature. Firstly, there was a rapid growth in commodity trading in the eastern regions 
around the Bight of Biafra and secondly, it was largely slave traders who were responsible for 
the overall increase in the volume of the non-slave trade. The rapid expansion of commodity 
imports opened markets in Africa in areas that were previously focused on selling slaves. The 
new estimates, based on the revised price data discussed above, reveal that the composition of 
these commodity imports was quite different from the picture painted by Johnson et al. 
(1990), who rely on the official figures from the CUST records. Table 4.4 summarizes the 
findings by Johnson at al. who claim that the most important imports were dyestuffs, followed 
by gum and then ivory.115  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
115 See the contributions in the volume by Johnson (p11), Doorn, Lindblad & Touwen (pp25,28) and 
Hogendoorn & Gemery (p46) 
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Table 4.4 Composition of commodity imports from Africa according to official 
sources, 1737-1808 (% share official value) 
Decade Dyestuffs Ivory Gum Other 
1730s 26 6 3 65 
1740s 31 11 9 49 
1750s 48 8 18 25 
1760s 42 10 29 18 
1770s 45 7 31 17 
1780s 57 16 10 18 
1790s 26 16 15 43 
1800s 45 10 14 32 
Source: TNA CUST 3/30-3/80, 17/1-17/30  
Table 4.5, based on the new estimates reveals quite a different picture. First, the value shares 
of dyestuffs are greatly exaggerated in the official figures because of the upward bias in the 
official value, particularly for Redwood (see table 4.1). In addition, from ca. 1780 there was a 
notable expansion in palm oil and to a lesser degree ivory that, as argued in chapter 2, were 
principally sourced from the eastern side of the West African coast, and in particular the 
regions around the Bight of Biafra116, which was also the focus of the British slave trade 
(Lynn 1997).117  
Table 4.5. Composition of commodity imports from Africa according to new estimates, 
1737-1808 (% share nominal value) 
 Dyestuffs   Other 
Period Redwood Camwood Other Ivory Gum Palm oil Beeswax Other 
1737-39 3 0 4 8 4 0 4 77 
1740-49 6 1 3 16 12 0 9 54 
1750-59 7 0 1 18 32 0 8 34 
1760-69 3 0 0 24 47 0 4 20 
1770-79 2 0 0 18 49 1 4 26 
1780-89 3 0 0 38 16 7 3 33 
1790-99 1 0 2 21 16 10 4 46 
1800-08 3 0 0 21 20 16 3 37 
Sources: see text. 
The CUST records show that between 1770 and 1808 nearly 35,000 tons of dyewoods were 
imported into Britain from Africa. However, the new data shows that 88 percent of this total 
was redwood, a product mainly sourced from the port of Calabar or further down the coast in 
Gabon or the Cameroons, while only 12 percent was Camwood from Sierra Leone or Gambia. 
Palm oil was probably coming almost exclusively from Calabar (Lynn 1997, p19). Finally, 
                                                 
116 This included the main slaving ports of Bonny, Old Calabar and Elem Kalabari as well as territory that 
encompasses the modern day countries of Cameroon and Gabon.  
117 In the last 30 years of the slave trade 35% of slave ships headed for Biafra, 20% for West Central Africa, 19% 
for the Gold Coast, 9% to Sierra Leone, 8% to the Windward Coast, 6% to Benin and 5% to Senegambia.  
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there is also evidence to suggest that during this period, new and lucrative markets for ivory 
and beeswax were opening up in the Cameroons, where Duala merchants were selling either 
directly to ships, or to Efik brokers based around Old Calabar (Feinberg & Johnson 1982, 
Behrendt et al. 2010, pp92-93).118 An analysis of the cargoes of Liverpool vessels trading in 
the port of Old Calabar by Behrendt et al. (2010, pp97-98) shows that nearly all were buying 
commodities in addition to slaves. My own analysis of 91 Bristol ships which sailed to Africa 
between 1790 and 1807 shows that of the 48 vessels that traded in the Bight of Biafra, 65% 
bought some combination of palm oil, redwood, ivory or beeswax (Appendix 4.1). Slave 
merchants in other areas also followed this trend, with 58% of all voyages to regions outside 
Biafra taking on board commodities as well as slaves. 
As will be discussed in section 4, there were numerous incentives and reasons why slave 
traders began buying greater quantities of commodities, but the initial catalyst seems to lie in 
the changing political situation in the Atlantic in the second half of the eighteenth century. In 
a recent update to the Transatlantic Slave Trade Database, all bilateral commodity vessels 
were removed and assembled into a separate data set.119 This data clearly shows that Britain, 
and more specifically the port of London, was by far the most significant bilateral trader with 
Africa, especially after the 1740s (Appendices 4.2a and 4.2b). In the first half of the 
eighteenth century, the ships visited most parts of the coast in fairly even numbers, although 
the primary destination was to have been the Gold Coast. The situation changed in the 1750s 
with a relatively rapid expansion of the bilateral trade with the Senegambia (Table 4.6). This 
is reflected in the customs records which show that during this period imports of gum, which 
was always Senegambia’s most important export product (Webb 1985, p151), increased 
around 7 times to nearly 350,000 lbs in 1769.120 The reasons for this expansion seem to have 
been largely driven by a combination of politics and the fact that gum senegal was a uniquely 
attractive product. Gum comes from the exudate of some species of acacia tree which were 
only to be found in the Senegambian region.121 Gums were important in the production of 
paint, paper and in the cosmetics industries (Johnson et al. 1990, p48). However, the main use 
of gum senegal, was as a stabiliser in the dyeing industry and crucially there were no 
acceptable alternatives, which meant that controlling the source held out the prospect of a 
                                                 
118 For example, the accounts of the Liverpool slave dealer William Davenport show that he was expanding his 
operations in the Cameroons region in part because of the relative abundance of high quality ivory (Radburn 
2009, p56) 
119 The data was collected by David Eltis, Steven Brehendt and David Richardson and should be referenced to 
Eltis (2013). The authors note that some of these might be described as ‘doubtfuls’, i.e. they might either have 
been slave traders or commodity vessels. Personal communication with David Eltis 6/6/2014.  
120 Our data shows that gum imports would only exceed this total during a single year in 1840. The customs 
records also indicate that beeswax and ivory, both products found in the Senegambian, were also imported in 
greater numbers during the period when bilateral trading was expanding in the region.  
121 During the period of this study the source for almost all of the gum imported came from around the Senegal 
river valley (Webb (1985, p 153). 
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monopoly of a product crucial to one of the continent’s most important industries (Johnson et 
al. 1990, pp28,46, Inikori 2002, p397). 122   
The British, with the active support of Manchester cotton manufacturers captured 
Senegambia’s principal port, Saint Louis, in 1758 (Berg 2004, p139, Inikori 2002, p398) 
which coincides with the rapid increase of gum imports. They were able to hold it until it was 
lost to the French in 1779, during the American Wars of Independence, and bilateral trading 
to the region abruptly ceased (Table 4.6).123 This also led to a dramatic fall in investment in 
the specialist commodity trade with Africa.  From this point, only the port of Bristol was 
active in sending a reduced number of non-slave ships to Africa (see Appendix 4.2b). These 
ships did not specialise in a particular region but instead adopted what was known as a 
‘coasting strategy’ which involved sailing along the entire West African coast stopping at a 
number of different ports to purchase commodities (Lynn 1991, pp363–67, Lynn 1997, 
p88).124   
Table 4.6. British commodity vessels’ destinations, 1650-1808 
 1650-
1700 
1700-
1719 
1720-
1739 
1740-
1759 
1760-
1779 
1780-
1808 
Senegambia 28 9 48 49 268 3 
Sierra Leone 12 17 27 9 5 15 
Windward Coast 3 0 0 8 6 6 
Gold Coast 2 19 50 11 1 14 
Bight of Benin 0 0 20 0 4 0 
Bight of Biafra 0 0 1 0 3 13 
West Central /South East Africa 0 3 9 20 7 1 
Unknown 25 128 173 116 102 70 
Total 70 176 328 213 396 122 
Source: Eltis (2013) 
                                                 
122 The value of the trade can also be seen in the importance attached to retaining control of Senegambia during 
peace talks after the Seven Years War and the American war of Independence. The chief French negotiator in 
1763 was told that “La traite de la gomme est l’objet le plus pressant qui fait cherir aux Anglais la possession du 
Senegal et qui rend sa restitution d’autant plus instante.” Britain’s representative at negotiations in the 1780s 
noted that “The real importance of Senegal arises almost wholly from its gum trade. There was imported in one 
year about 700 tons, and the average annual imports may be computed at about 400 tons. The price is now £270 
- £270 / ton….there is more speculation or rather gaming in this article than in any other.” Quoted in Inikori 
(2002, pp399-401). 
123 The value of the trade can also be seen in the importance attached to retaining control of Senegambia during 
peace talks after the Seven Years War and the American war of independence (Inikori 1992, pp399-401). 
124 The future abolitionist and scribe of ‘Amazing Grace’ John Newton describes such a voyage (Newton 1765, 
p83). It was also followed by the commodity ships of the Dutch Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie who 
typically traded first along the Windward Coast, then travelled to the Gold Coast and along to the Cameroons 
and Gabon (see for example, Zeeuws Archief MCC 196, 201 Afrikaanse Galey, 1149, 1168 De Vliegende Faam, 
1371, 1379 Zanggodin)   
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This decline in the bilateral commodity trade with Senegambia coincided with the 
aforementioned expansion of the overall quantity of the non-slave trade in the regions around 
the Bight of Biafra. After the end of the American War of Independence, the quantity of 
commodities imported from Africa recovered to pre-war levels, only to fall again after the 
outbreak of the French revolutionary wars.125 After 1797 there was once more a sustained rise 
in the amount of commodity imports126, and in the years prior to abolition more African 
commodities were being bought than at any time during the previous century (Figure 4.3). 
These commodities must have been largely bought and transported on slave ships, given the 
fact that there were far fewer British bilateral traders operating during this period. From 
around 1712 until the 1770s, the ratio, of slave to commodity ships averaged at around 10:1 
for British vessels. From the 1780s this changed significantly; rising to a high of 110:1 in 
1798 and averaging at around 50:1 in the three decades before abolition. 
Figure 4.3. Total quantity (lbs) of commodities imported into Great Britain 
 
Note: trend is given by the 5-year moving average. 
Source: TNA CUST 3/30-3/80, 17/1-17/30. 
Surviving accounts from individual slaving voyages certainly indicate that the British captains 
and merchants were enthusiastic buyers of commodities as well as slaves. Slave merchants 
regularly instructed their captains, to buy both slaves and commodities. For example, in 1803 
the Liverpool slave merchant Thomas Leyland wrote to the captain of his ship the Enterprise 
with instructions for his voyage to Bonny: “…barter at Bonny for prime Negroes, Ivory and 
Palm Oil…. procure some Palm Oil on reasonable terms which is likely to bear a great price 
here, we therefore wish you to purchase as much as you can with any of the cargo you may 
                                                 
125 This was consistent with the pattern of slave exports which also rose and fell in the outbreak of war and 
resumption of peace 
126 Perhaps due to Britain establishing naval dominance over the French which meant its merchant shipping 
could set forth with greater security (Davis & Engerman 2006). According to the slave trade database, the French 
captured 48 slave vessels in 1794, compared to only 9 the previous year. From this high point (from a French 
perspective) the number of ships captured fell to 1 in 1801 (slavevoyages.org). 
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have.”127 The Bristol merchant, James Rogers, was an equally enthusiastic buyer of 
commodities, with his captains regularly writing back from Africa to inform him of their 
progress in the purchase of both slaves and non-slave products. For example, Richard Rogers 
wrote to inform him from Old Calabar in 1788 that he had “…. on board at present 48 slaves 
and 12 pawns…likewise have purchased about 300 cwt ivory and 3 ton redwood..”128 There 
were so many ships trading for commodities at Old Calabar that his ships were on at least one 
occasion forced to sail down to Gabon, which was also a crowded market.129  
 
4.4.  EXPLAINING THE CHANGES IN THE COMMODITY TRADE FROM THE 
1770S 
This section will analyse the patterns and development of the commodity trade in the later 
eighteenth century, and the interactions between the exports of people and goods from Africa. 
The literature on the British slave trade in the later eighteenth century suggests that rising 
numbers of slave embarkations were driven by increased demand, and competition led to 
changes in how voyages were organised (Behrendt 2001, Richardson et al. 2007, Radburn 
2015). I firstly address, the question of why there was such a dramatic uptake in the export of 
commodities from Africa and secondly, why particularly slave merchants increasingly 
became engaged in the trade of these goods. In doing so, the aim is to further our 
understanding of what was motivating slave merchant decision-making at the apogee of the 
transatlantic slave trade in West Africa.  
 
Rising demand in Europe 
The literature on consumption patterns in Britain suggests that items that previously might 
have been the privilege of the wealthy few, were increasingly consumed by a greater number 
of households (McKendrick et al. 1985). This consumer revolution was driven, to some 
extent, by a willingness on the part of households to work harder to be able to afford to buy 
goods such as furniture, cutlery, decorations, ornaments, which had become markers of 
success and respectability (DeVries 1994 & 2015). Furthermore, the end of the eighteenth 
century was a period of rising wages, especially in the growing urban centres of Britain which 
provided a ready market for status goods (Allen 2007, 2009).  Berg (2002, 2004) has also 
persuasively argued that, especially within Britain and the Netherlands, there was a desire to 
reproduce the luxuries of Asia using European technology and resources from their colonies 
and regions of trade.  
                                                 
127 LRO 387 MD 43 Leyland to Capt. Caesar Lawson 18 July 1803. Leyland had given a near identical order the 
year before for his ship Lottery in 1802 (LRO 387 MD 42 Leyland to Capt. Charles Kneal 21 May 1802). 
128 TNA C107/11 Rogers to Rogers April 1788 
129 TNA C107/6 Cod to Rogers February 1792 
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Gum Senegal was one such example, as it allowed printers to mimic the calicoes of Asia. 
However, after control of the gum trade was lost to the French, British traders found that there 
was a good deal of demand for the goods found in relative abundance on the eastern side of 
the coast. The elephants of the Cameroons and the regions around the Bight of Biafra 
provided the raw materials for the piano keys, billiard balls, knife handles and ivory combs 
which were becoming increasingly seen as signs of middle class respectability (Johnson 1978, 
p 548). Liverpool’s growing soap industry, as well as the Lancashire wool manufacturing 
sector, provided a growing market for palm oil (Lynn 1997, p85)130 while redwood was in 
demand both as a dye for the textile industry (Inikori 2002) and for the manufacture of violin 
bows, knife handles and furniture.131 Finally, the Bight of Biafra also provided beeswax for 
candles, and pepper, to satisfy a growing desire for a more varied diet (Pomeranz 2000, p94). 
This increased demand must go some way to explaining why the volume of commodities was 
far greater than in the period from the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries which was 
studied by Eltis (1994) and van den Boogaard (1992). However, it does not explain why it 
was slave merchants, rather than specialised bilateral traders, that were largely responsible for 
the expansion.  
 
The crowding out of the commodity traders 
It seems that the expulsion of the British from much of the Senegambian region had a number 
of important consequences. Firstly, commodity ships faced considerably longer journey times 
in order to reach the growing markets on the eastern side of the coast. Atlantic trade winds 
and currents made the bilateral journey between Senegambia and Europe relatively simple. 
However, to get back from the Bight of Biafra, vessels were obliged to follow the trade winds 
down to the equator, across the sea to the Caribbean and then finally back to Europe. This 
meant far higher wage bills and, unlike slave ships, they did not have the advantage of being 
able to sell a valuable cargo of captives in the Americas. Secondly, trading in the Biafran and 
Gold Coast regions, the most important embarkation points for British slaves in West Africa, 
put them in direct competition with large numbers of slave vessels for commodities. This had 
not been the case in Senegambia, which was a relatively unimportant slave exporting region 
at that time.  In the 1788 report on the slave trade to the British parliament132 Captain Dean, 
described as a “Commander of a Vessel in the Wood and Ivory trade” related how his 
                                                 
130 Norris (1789, p146) also noted that Palm Oil was used by “British wool-combers” as well as “soap boilers” 
131 Vegetable Substances; Materials of Manufactures. Published under the superintendence of the Society of the 
Diffusion of Useful Knowledge (London: Charles Knight) 1833, p362. Turning and Mechanical Manipulation 
intended as a work of general reference and practical instruction on the lathe and the various mechanical pursuits 
followed by amateurs.” By Charles Holtzapffel, Vol 1, London, 1843, pp73,76. 
132 PP Report Of The Lords of the Committee of Council appointed for the Consideration of all Matters relating 
to Trade and Foreign Plantations; Submitting To His Majesty's Consideration The Evidence and Information 
they have collected in consequence of his Majesty's Order in Council, dated the 11th of February 1788, 
concerning the present State of the Trade to Africa, and particularly the Trade in Slaves; and concerning the 
Effects and Consequences of this Trade, as well in Africa and the West Indies, as to the general Commerce of 
this Kingdom. 
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business was “… much hurt from the Slave Ships purchasing the said Articles, which the 
Persons in his Branch of the African Trade go solely to bring home.” In 1792, the captain of 
another commodity ship, the Triton, complained of having to compete with slave ships in 
Gabon “......we find great opposition here, there are no less than 12 sail & 4 of them are for 
Red Wood….”133 
It seems that these factors put a good deal of strain on the potential profit margins of specialist 
commodity merchants. Syndenham Teaste, a commodity trader from Bristol, told a 
parliamentary committee in 1788 that “…his House is in the Trade, and therefore goes on 
with it; but if his Capital was out of it, he would not now go in to it….” due to the low profits 
he made (p73).  This assessment is supported by the fact that by the end of the 1780s he 
seems to have been the only merchant in his city regularly investing in bilateral voyages to 
Africa. An analysis of the Bristol Presentments shows that between 1790 and 1796 (the year 
Teaste seems to have retired) there were 16 merchants who invested in specialist bilateral 
traders from Bristol. Teaste alone was responsible for around 50% of the voyages and in some 
years (1795 and 1796) was the only trader. Among other investors during this time the 
majority only invested in one or two bilateral voyages, the exception being James Rogers who 
sent 5 commodity vessels in 1791 and 1792. It seems that this branch of trade was attracting 
little in the way of investment.   
The next question is why slave merchants were motivated to buy increasing quantities of non-
slave goods. As shown in Chapter 2, slave ships had been buying both slaves and 
commodities throughout the eighteenth century.134 However, the scale of involvement in the 
non-slave trade was very different from 1770. In terms of current values, the share of 
commodities in the total trade from Great Britain to Africa experienced a four-fold relative 
rise from the 1760s to 1807 (Figure 4.4). As illustrated in Figure 4.2, the real value of African 
commodities increased nearly 7-fold during this period, an exceptional rise. This is puzzling 
as there was still an enormous demand for slaves driven by a dynamic and expanding 
American plantation system (Eltis et. al 2005, Drescher 2004, 2010), which would continue to 
grow well into the nineteenth century (Davis 2006). Not only was demand growing, but 
studies of the profits of the slave trade have shown that it generated a generous rate of return, 
although at a higher level of risk, for its investors (Daudin 2004, Inikori 1981, Richardson 
1976). The new trade added complexity to the preparation for a voyage, as commodities 
required a different mix of trade goods than slaves,135 and there is evidence that at the time 
many people were far from positive about the prospects for the development of any trade 
other than slaves with Africa. The next section will suggest that the changing political and 
economic climate in the latter part of the eighteenth century created both ‘push and pull’ 
factors which encouraged slave traders to begin investing in the commodity trade.  
                                                 
133 TNA C107/6 Letter from Prosser to Rogers April 1792  
  
134 As one Bristol merchant in 1725 said of ivory ‘...in that commodity there’s no mortality to be fear’d “. 
Quoted in Behrendt et al. (2010), p87.  
135 See Behrendt et al. 2010, p 89 for a discussion of ‘bundle of goods’ required for ivory at Old Calabar and 
Radburn 2009, p 57 for a comparison of the goods needed for ivory and slaves in the Cameroons.  
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Figure 4.4. Share of commodities in the total value of British trade from Africa 
 
Source: see text. 
 
Legal pressures 
From the 1780s, merchants may also have been under pressure by parliamentary legislation 
designed to increase the space allotted to slaves (Thomas 1999, p 510, Klein 2010, p151). The 
Dolben Act was passed in 1788 and stipulated that ships of up to 201 tons could take no more 
than 1.67 slaves/ton, and vessels of higher tonnage could only take one more slave for every 
addition tonnage of ship. Those who took more slaves would be required to pay a fine of £30 
for every excess captive (Donnan II, 1965 p 583). This was then refined in 1799 to a 
requirement that each slave should be allotted a minimum of 8 square feet (Garland & Klein 
1985, p 249).  The trend in the slave/ton ratio does seem to broadly follow in the wake of 
these legislative acts, and some slave merchants were instructing their captains not to take 
more slaves than permitted.136 However, an analysis of the slave trade database reveals that a 
reasonable proportion of merchants were prepared to take on more slaves than permitted by 
legislation.137 This would reasonably suggest that more commodities were bought because 
fewer slaves were purchased.  
However, it is not possible to say with confidence whether this was due to the fact that ships 
were forced to sail with fewer captives, and therefore had more space and money for other 
purchases, or if they were making an active choice to load up with relatively more 
commodities at the expense of slaves. For example, in his instructions to the master of his 
                                                 
136 For example, the Liverpool slave merchant Thomas Leyland told the captain of his ship the Enterprise to “…. 
barter at Bonny for prime Negroes, Ivory and Palm Oil. By law this vessel is allowed to carry 400 negroes and 
we request that they may all be males if possible to get them.” LRO 387 MD 43 Leyland to Capt. Caesar Lawson 
18 July 1803 
137 For this analysis I took British ships which weighing 201 tons or less from 1789 to 1799 and calculated slaves 
embarked / reported ton and slaves embarked* / standardised ton. The first calculation gave a sample of 266 
vessels and showed that 30% carried more than 1.67 slaves / ton. The second gave a larger sample of 874 ships 
and showed that 50% carried more than 1.67 slaves / ton.  
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ship Lottery in 1798 Leyland tells him to sail to Bonny in the Bight of Biafra and purchase 
“…choice, young and healthy negroes…”138 The Captain, John Whittle, was eventually to 
purchase 502 slaves, which was within the legal limit. However, four years later in 1802 he 
wrote to another captain on the same ship also going to Bonny, directing him to “…barter for 
290 Negroes, besides which we expect you will be able to procure a quantity of Palm Oil….” 
This time ‘only’ 339 slaves were embarked.139  
Yet regardless of whatever considerations were motivating slave merchants it is still clear 
that, in general, commodities were becoming a more attractive product to them. As noted in 
the introduction, merchants in ports such as Liverpool relied on highly skilled captains with 
in-depth knowledge of local African markets to manage the highly risky business of slave 
trading (Richardson et al. 2007, Klein 2010, p100), and therefore would not have invested 
capital in commodities unless they were sure it would yield a suitable return. In the next 
section I examine the potential returns on commodities.  
Figure 4.5 Average number of slaves / standardised ton on British slave ships 1740 – 
1808 
 
Source: Slavevoyages.org. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
138 LRO 387 MD 41 Leyland to Capt. John Whittle 2 July 1798 
139 LRO 387 MD 42 Leyland to Capt. Charles Kneal 21 May 1802 
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Mark-ups and prices 
For British merchants, commodities became an especially favourable buy, partly due to the 
fact that coastal prices for African products remained relatively stable over this period, in 
contrast to slaves which were becoming ever more expensive at the coast. This feature of the 
African market has, to this study’s knowledge, never been identified. Initial reference is made 
here to data on ivory, which yielded the greatest number of price observations both in Europe 
and in Africa. It is a very useful commodity to work with as it was traded from all parts of 
West Africa and had been a staple product in the portfolios of English merchants since the 
seventeenth century (Eltis 1994, Feinberg & Johnson 1982). Furthermore, the CUST records 
show that in 1760 only 50,000 lbs of ivory left Africa, but by the 1790s up to 300,000 lbs 
were imported yearly (see Appendix 4.3). Therefore, if increased demand did lead to price 
inflation across the region, it would be evident in the prices paid to Africans for this product.  
A simple OLS regression was run on the observed prices for ivory in our dataset (Table 4.7). 
Model (1) includes a dummy for prices observed at the coast and period controls. The 
regression confirms the overall price rise discussed previously. Prices in 1760-79 and 1780-99 
were significantly higher than the reference period: 1740-59. In addition, it shows that prices 
at the coast, over the entire period were well below the prices paid in European markets. 
Interacting the coastal dummy with the period dummies in model (2), it can be seen that, from 
the 1760s onwards, there was a widening gap between the prices paid at the coast and in 
Europe for ivory. This pattern of relatively stable prices at the coast, when prices in European 
markets were rising rapidly, was also found in our more limited datasets for other 
commodities. In addition, the standard deviation for slave prices was far greater than the one 
for any of the commodities traded for at the time (see Appendix 4.4).  
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Table 4.7 Coastal vs market prices ivory, 1740-1799 
 (1) (2) 
 Price Ivory Price Ivory 
Intercept 13.8*** 13.0*** 
 (0.38) (0.39) 
1760t79 13.8*** 14.8*** 
 (0.47) (0.47) 
1780t99 27.02*** 30.2*** 
 (0.87) (0.90) 
Coast -9.4*** -0.47 
 (0.81) (1.27) 
Coast_1760t79  -11.7*** 
  (1.70) 
Coast_1780t99  -27.9*** 
  (2.65) 
   
N 2641 2641 
Adjusted R2 0.38 0.41 
Notes: standard error in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
I speculate that the relative stability of coastal prices was probably largely due to the fact that 
most of the major products sold to the Europeans, were not as valuable in Africa as they were 
in Atlantic markets, and could be produced at a very low opportunity cost in Africa. Palm oil 
had long been produced by households for their own consumption all along the coast (Lynn 
1997, p34) and it is likely that, until the early nineteenth century, the additional quantities 
exported could easily have been met by existing household labour, without the need for 
additional investments in technology or slaves. Furthermore, the region that supplied Calabar 
with its oil in the 1780s and 1790s had also long supplied the town with palm oil for the 
provisioning of slave ships (Northrup 1976, p363). According to a contemporary source 
redwood grew “…in great abundance, in the country surrounding Old Calabar…” (Adams 
1822, p172), which would have meant the costs of transporting it to ships would have been 
relatively low.   
One other possible reason for the stability of prices is that merchants may have been selling 
commodities as a means of attracting ships for their main business of slaving, and therefore 
were less concerned about their profit margins on non-slave products. For example, exports of 
palm oil seem to have been initially centred around the port of Old Calabar, with lesser 
quantities coming from the Cameroons and Gabon (Lynn 1997, p19). Behrendt et al (2010, 
p86) argue that the Efik merchants at Old Calabar were forced to expand their output of non-
slave products in response to the growing popularity of their rival ports of Bonny and Elem 
Kalibari. Calabar was never able to export more than around 5,000 slaves a year (and 
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frequently far fewer), compared to Bonny which was able to send over 12,000 captives to the 
Americas in 1792.140 In addition Bonny offered better credit arrangements, lower transaction 
costs, and faster boarding times, along with a reputation of supplying higher quality slaves 
(Lovejoy and Richardson 2004). This meant that Old Calabar needed to develop other exports 
to attract foreign traders who might otherwise have visited its rivals. This was especially 
important in the aftermath of the American War of Independence, which had severely 
disrupted merchant shipping and had had a particularly damaging impact on slave exports 
from the Bight of Biafra.141  
Slaves were still the main business of traders in both Africa and Britain right up until 1807, 
and there is no evidence to suggest that British merchants were moving away from the export 
of captives to the Americas. While good returns on commodities may have been an incentive 
to buy more of them, it is unlikely to have been sufficient in itself. Studies of the slave trade 
have always noted that it was a risky enterprise and, as noted in the introduction, ports such as 
Liverpool became successful due to their ability to minimise this risk (Haggerty 2009, 
McDade 2011). The next section will argue that the growing trade in commodities might have 
been used as an additional risk reduction strategy. 
 
Changing economic environments  
One area that was becoming increasingly problematic was the issue of credit and debt. A 
recent paper by Radburn (2015) has examined and quantified changes in the credit system, 
known as bills of exchange, which underwrote the slave trade. In brief, merchants were able 
to exchange slaves for promissory notes to be redeemed in England. This allowed planters in 
the West Indies time to recoup their investment before having to pay for slaves, and gave 
slave traders a more efficient system of payment than exchange for plantation products. This 
system was probably crucial in the expansion of the trade in the second half of the eighteenth 
century (Pearson and Richardson 2008, p765). However, uncertainty across the Atlantic 
market, caused by warfare and planter indebtedness, led to increasingly longer dated bills, 
meaning that during periods of particular instability slave traders had to wait up to three years 
before they could cash their bills. This problem seems to have been widely recognised at the 
time and merchants responded with a variety of strategies.142 They could pass on their bills of 
                                                 
140 From 1780 to 1808 an average of 6,934 slaves were exported each year from Bonny compared with 2,435 
from Old Calabar 
141 By 1780 the ports of Bonny, Old Calabar and Elem Kalabari had seen a 96% fall in slave embarkations since 
1775. While numbers were to recover by around 1784, this represented a huge loss of income for the region’s 
merchants.  
142 For example, Thomas Clarkson, in his “Essay on the impolicy of the African slave trade” (1788) wrote that: 
“The average time of a voyage is one year. At the expiration of the period, the vessel returns. On inspecting the 
bills which are bought home, and which have been received for the slaves, it appears that they are not payable 
on average, till two years after sight. The merchant therefore cannot enjoy the profits of his voyage till three 
years after he has sent his vessel to the coast. In the interim he is called upon to pay the goods for which he has 
shipped…” p28 
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exchange to other traders in exchange for goods that would stock their next voyages. This 
involved a discount and meant lower profit margins, but nonetheless ensured the business 
kept making money. One Liverpool slave merchant, William Davenport, was to do this with 
around 90 of his bills (Morgan 2005 p746), and it was a common practice for the traders of 
the Middelburgse Commercie Companie.143 Radburn (2015) argues that another policy was 
for merchants to expand their range of American markets to areas that could offer shorter 
dated credit.  
However, another strategy was to invest in additional types of business that realised cash, or 
at least shorter dated bills of exchange. Commodities could be exchanged for bills dated 
between 2 to 4 months144 allowing traders to realise fast and reliable profits, although at a 
lower rate of return, which provided a ready source of funds for their principal business of 
slaving. 145 In the sample of Bristol ships used here, the merchant who invested most heavily 
in commodities, James Rogers, was, according to one study, under mounting pressure from 
his creditors in the early 1790s (Morgan 2003). However, even more efficient traders seemed 
to have felt the need to supplement their slave business with commodities. James Anderson 
was one such trader who Richardson (1996) found to be the most effective in the city. Figure 
4.6 below shows when Anderson was sending ships back to Africa, and when he could expect 
the remittance for bills of exchange from previous voyages.146  
Figure 4.6. James Anderson, overview of business 1790–1796 
 
Sources: Bristol Presentments, TNA C107/59, (Richardson 1996) 
                                                 
143 Sincere thanks are due to Gerhard de Kok at Leiden university for this information about MCC bills of 
exchange 
144 James Rogers was given bills for between 2 to 4 months for sugar traded in the West Indies (TNA C107/59), 
while William Davenport exchanged his ivory for 3 month bills in England (Radburn 2009) 
145 One detailed study of the accounts of the Liverpool slave merchant William Davenport argues that 
commodities were bought because of their short dated bills of exchange (Radburn 2009) 
146 The analysis is based on the assumption that bills for slaves would mature in equal proportions at 24, 30 and 
36 months based on correspondence and bills in the James Rogers papers (TNA C107/59), and those for 
commodities in 3 months based on the same sources and Radburn (2015) 
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From 1790 to 1792 Anderson outfitted 8 vessels for Africa, lost one and only received 
remittances from 4 previous voyages. It is within this period that I find his heaviest 
investment in commodities, with 4 out of his 7 slaving vessels carrying additional produce 
cargo, and during which he sent out a specialist commodities ship. From 1793 more of his 
bills for slave voyages matured and he began to move away from commodities to concentrate 
solely on slaves, which brought a higher return. Even though he was to lose 3 ships to French 
privateering, he could clearly afford to suffer the losses without the use of alternative 
incomes. This was not, it seems, his only strategy to handle the increased risks of the period. 
Like other merchants, he found ways to reduce his journey time (Ronnback & Solar 2015).147 
In 1790 the two ships he outfitted, and which also returned, completed their journey in 13 and 
22 months respectively.148 In 1792 the three ships tightened their running time to 12, 7 and 10 
months while by 1794 this had further reduced to 7 and 8 months. Shorter voyages were more 
profitable for many reasons, but crucially they meant less cash needed for wages, and, more 
importantly, meant creditors could be paid off more quickly. There were other strategies open 
to merchants seeking to minimise risk. Both Haggerty (2009) and Behrendt (2007) note that 
long term investment in human capital meant successful slave merchants could handle 
complex market conditions in both Europe and Africa. McDade (2011) argues that spreading 
risk across larger groups of investors was one of the keys to Liverpool’s success as a slave 
port. It would be argued here that commodity purchases were another strategy open to 
merchants seeking to navigate the hazardous waters of the slave trade in the three decades 
before abolition.  
 
4.5. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have examined the changing market for African commodities in the decades 
before the British abolished their transatlantic slave trade. By constructing a new time series 
of the quantities and prices of goods imported from Africa in the customs ledgers, the chapter 
has clearly shown that there was a far more substantial increase in the value of the trade than 
the previous data implied. Furthermore, I argue that this was driven by slave traders, and was 
primarily a phenomenon of the Eastern and more specifically Biafran/Cameroonian region of 
the West African coast, revealing a significant reversal of the pattern of commodity trading 
until the 1770s. These British traders also seem to have bought relatively fewer slaves while 
purchasing greater quantities of non-slave products. I therefore hypothesise that this trend was 
driven by a number of different factors. Firstly, commodity prices were rising in Europe, 
while prices on the coast remained relatively stable, in marked contrast to the cost of slaves. 
In addition, the period saw increasing levels of risk, and parliamentary legislation to reduce 
crowding on ships, which may have further encouraged captains to purchase more 
commodities as a risk reduction, profit enhancing strategy. The new data suggests that the 
                                                 
147 Liverpool merchants, who were Britain’s most efficient carriers of slaves (2007), had managed to reduce their 
average journey time by around 15% between 1785 and 1805 (slavevoyages.org) 
148 The Pilgrim and the Hector – Bristol Presentments 
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African commodity trade in the Bight of Biafra began to expand long before, and independent 
of, the Abolition Act of 1807, based on strong demand from European markets.  
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SUMMARY PART 1 
 
The new data in Chapters 2 – 4 shows that the area of the Bight of Benin controlled by the 
Dahomeans never exported any other ‘product’ in significant quantities other than slaves, 
despite rising demands for commodities. Secondly, the Gold Coast exported a relatively high 
proportion of provisions, and from the 15th to the late eighteenth century exported large 
quantities of gold and other products such as ivory. However, from around the 1760s its 
exports of commodities (largely gold) began to decline. This pattern was followed by falling 
embarkations of captives from 1780s. Thirdly, in Biafra, local trading elites were, throughout 
the eighteenth century, always willing to supplement their incomes with non-slave exports of 
either commodities or provisions, in response to external demand. These long term trade 
patterns predict the very different timings of the commercial transition in the three case study 
regions. The Gold Coast almost immediately abandoned export slavery after 1808. In Biafra, 
slaves were rapidly replaced by palm oil so that by the late 1830s very few captives were 
leaving the region for the Americas. By contrast, in the Bight of Benin, the Dahomeans 
remained set on continuing slave exports, only beginning to develop a non-slave export sector 
in the 1840s, and continuing their involvement in the transatlantic slave trade until the 1860s. 
To understand these patterns, we now turn to the case study chapters.    
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CHAPTER 5 
THE GOLD COAST; GOLD, WEALTH AND POWER AMONGST THE 
AKANS 
“Sika ne ɔhene” Gold is King (Asanti proverb)149 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION  
In Chapter 1, I argued that the abolition efforts of the British navy were not sufficiently 
effective, before the 1830s, to deter Atlantic traders from buying and transporting West 
African slaves. However, the literature on the subject has generally taken the view that the 
British naval patrols and their castles made embarking captives from the Gold Coast 
particularly difficult, and were therefore the reasons why this region moved so quickly away 
from the transatlantic slave trade. Eltis (2009) argues that; “The Gold Coast castles were too 
exposed and too much a part of a European government presence to be well suited to 
clandestine slave trading...” (p728). This view is supported by Lovejoy (2011) “...the system 
of trade centred on European trade castles at Cape Coast, Elmina……made it difficult to 
smuggle slaves. Some slaves were taken farther west, but Asante was forced to abandon the 
slave export business.” (p164). Johnson (1986, p100) writes that “…on the Gold Coast, 
abolition of the slave trade was largely effective…” before the 1820s. Studies of the Asante 
kingdom by Wilks (1975, p680 – 681) and McCaskie (2003, p26) assume that the abolition of 
the slave trade cut the region off from the transatlantic slave trade, thereby forcing the state to 
look for alternative markets for its products.  I will instead argue that, by engaging in a more 
long-term analysis of the patterns of trade in the region, it would be more appropriate to apply 
the demand side hypothesis modelled on Senegambia, which has been suggested by Austin 
(2013a). While the withdrawal of the British from the slave trade in 1808 was a significant 
shock, I will argue that its effect acted more as a catalyst to an already established trend. 
Essentially, the change from a slave to a commodity export economy was because the 
application of coerced labour to production had already become more valuable to the region’s 
elites and households than exporting captives to the Atlantic market.  
Furthermore, the chapter will show how the presence of gold was crucial in shaping the 
region’s states and societies from the fifteenth century, strongly influencing the area’s long-
term trade patterns, internal politics and institutional developments.   Unlike that of the states 
in the Bight of Benin, gold ensured that the Akan states were never dependent on the 
transatlantic slave trade as a source of wealth, or as a means of asserting and maintaining the 
power of elites. External commercial relations were important as the Asante (and other states 
before them) relied on imports of firearms to maintain their military effectiveness (Thornton 
                                                 
149 Quoted from Wilks (1993, p127) 
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1999, pp57–64). However, they could obtain foreign manufactures through sales of gold or 
ivory, thereby releasing themselves from dependency on exports of captives. As will be 
argued in Chapter 6, palm oil had a similar impact around the Bight of Biafra. Many recent 
studies of the region have focused on the changes wrought by either the Atlantic slave trade in 
the eighteenth century (Shumway 2014, Sparks 2014, Ronnback 2014, Ipsen 2015) or the 
very significant developments in the nineteenth century (Wilks 1993, Dummet 1998, 
McCaskie 2003, Austin 2005). There are few examinations which link the earlier seventeenth 
century history of the region studied by Kea (1982) with the events and developments in the 
following centuries. This study seeks to demonstrate that initial trade contacts and political 
developments are crucial for understanding later patterns of trade. I will argue that in this 
region, the transatlantic slave trade should be seen more as a relatively brief interruption of 
very different longer term export patterns.  
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Initially, I show how, over the longue durée, the 
region’s trade output had generally been based on the application of coerced labour to the 
production of export commodities. Next, I argue that the withdrawal of the British from the 
slave trade was a significant shock, especially given their dominance of the trade along the 
Gold Coast. However, the presence of British held forts, and the military campaign waged by 
the British navy against slaving vessels from other nations, cannot explain the sudden, and 
near complete stoppage of slave embarkations from the region. Warfare on the coast may 
have played a role, but continuing demand for coerced labour in the Americas, and the fact 
that exporting people remained hypothetically more than possible, suggest that other, 
endogenous factors were of greater importance. 
Three factors were particularly crucial. Firstly, the value of the new trade in commodities was 
at least equal to, and probably exceeded that of the slave trade. Secondly, and in contrast to 
the Dahomeans (Chapter 7), the Asante faced no significant external enemies or economic 
competitors from the 1740s until their confrontations with the British in the later 1820s. As a 
result, there was less need for labour for the military, meaning households were freer to 
pursue their own economic agendas. Thirdly, political developments meant that most slaves 
originated in areas to the north of Asante. Their status as outsiders afforded them less 
opportunity to incorporate themselves into households / lineage groups, giving them fewer of 
the rights and protections enjoyed by free people or even enslaved Akans (see below for a 
definition of this term). Consequently, their labour could be more intensively exploited, 
making them better suited to production than export.  
Next, I will show that the presence of gold, and later kola, within the territories of the Asante 
had to a range of major impacts on institutional development and labour decisions. The 
Asante state, unlike those in the Bight of Benin, developed within a context where the control 
and monopoly of gold was the defining characteristic of power and wealth. This provided a 
strong incentive to increase the production of households, whose members could in turn use 
greater numbers of coerced labourers to help increase their own wealth. The growth of 
markets for kola on the savannah provided additional opportunities for both elites and 
commoners to enrich themselves, and in doing so gain greater social prestige. Both the state 
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and aristocratic elites were motivated to support this productive activity, as it did not threaten 
their power, while increasing their wealth.  
 
Area of study 
This study will mainly be limited to the Akan speaking territories which lie roughly within the 
forest, coastal and southern savannah zones stretching from the Volta river in eastern Ghana 
to south eastern CÔte d’Ivoire.  The peoples of this region, speak related languages and have 
several broad cultural and agricultural practises in common as a result of shared historical 
experience (Chouin & De Corse 2010, p123). However, at a more local level the area also 
possesses a great diversity of ethnicities, cultures and polities, making it beyond the scope of 
this wider comparative study to investigate them all. The focus will be on the kingdom of the 
Asante. Map 5.1 shows the greatest extent of the Asante kingdom in the nineteenth century, 
although it is important to note that the state only exercised more direct control in the core 
metropolitan region shown in Map 5.1.150  
Outside this zone, it could broadcast power through its military or diplomatic corps and 
enforce tribute, but those in the outer provinces enjoyed greater autonomy than those closer to 
the capital.  These areas, which contained both the Asante kingdom and the Fante states of the 
coast, are the focus of this study as they were responsible for trading the vast majority of the 
region’s America-bound slaves, and therefore were most affected by the shift from export 
slavery to ‘legitimate commerce’. As in the other case study regions, the slave trade was 
concentrated in just a few ports which possessed the required commercial infrastructure and 
connections to inland networks to handle the complex credit arrangements required to 
facilitate exchange between Atlantic and African merchants (Eltis et al. 1999). In this area, the 
Fante port towns of Anomabo, Cape Coast Castle and Elmina handled around 87% of all 
embarkations from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries. 
In terms of ecology, the coastal regions occupied by the Fante were characterised by a 
combination of mangrove, coastal scrub and grassland. Further inland the core areas of the 
Asante empire consisted mainly of dense forest, except in areas where clearances created 
regions where agriculture was possible. Further north, the forest gave way to drier savannah 
areas (Taylor 1952). Crucially for this study, the empire also contained the most of West 
Africa’s gold supplies which had been exported since at least the twelfth century (Dummet 
1998, pp29-31, Map 5.2). 
 
 
                                                 
150 The Asante themselves measured this area in terms of the time taken for a messenger from the capital at 
Kumasi to leave and return from the frontier which was given at one month. At distances further from this, direct 
control was considered impractical (Herbst 2000, p49) 
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Map 5.1. Expansion of the Asante state 1700 - 1807 
 
http://www.abina.org/resources/maps/, accessed 30/11/2016 
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Map 5.2. Principal alluvial gold mining areas: eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
(shaded) + major kola producing areas in Asante (inside the black circle) 
 
Source: Dickson (1969), p180, Abaka 2005, p13 
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5.2. LONG-TERM TRADE CONTACTS 
The impact and importance of the early trade between Europeans and the Gold Coast is 
disputed. In a series of articles Wilks (1978, 1985, 1993), supported by Austin (2008, p611) 
and Yarak (1996), developed what has become known as the ‘big bang’ theory of Akan state 
development, namely the rapid change in the forest areas from a largely hunter/gatherer 
economy to one based on food crop production. Gold had been imported from West Africa to 
the Mediterranean since around the twelfth century via a Muslim community of traders 
known as the Wangara. This trans-Saharan trade had probably been the source of most of 
Europe’s gold during the middle ages. It was gold that first drew Portuguese traders to this 
region in the 1480s (Thornton 1998, p32), and by the early sixteenth century sources suggest 
that they were buying between 24,000 and 26,000 oz/year (Wilks 1993, p4). Wilks argues that 
this was facilitated by a highly sophisticated inland trading system, suggesting that the gold 
fields in the Akan territories were already being exploited before the arrival of European 
traders. The Portuguese found themselves in direct competition with Malian merchants able to 
supply almost all the products demanded by local consumers, such as manufactured cloth and 
metals. The Portuguese, however, had the capacity to use their ships to supply slaves, 
principally from the Kingdom of Benin, which greatly encouraged exports of gold (Law 1991, 
p116). Between 1500 and 1530 Wilks estimates that over 12,000 slaves were imported into 
the region via their fort at Elmina. These additional labour inputs allowed for large scale 
clearances, which in turn made agriculture possible within the forest environment.  
However, recent archaeological investigations, summarised by Chouin & Decorse (2010), 
have shown convincing evidence that the forest region had been settled by more complex, 
agricultural polities since around the ninth century, although many of these settlements were 
abandoned in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, possibly due to the impacts of the 
bubonic plague. These findings demonstrate that the expansion of agriculture in the region 
was not dependent on European intervention. However, the authors do acknowledge that at 
the time the Portuguese arrived on the Gold Coast, this was an area undergoing a recovery.  
As such, intensive labour would have been required to at least cut back forest regrowth and 
begin planting for agriculture, would have benefited from imports of slaves.151 Alternatively, 
captives could have been put to work in mining to expand the region’s output of gold. In the 
sixteenth century, North Europeans did not have American empires and therefore had few 
demands for slaves, while the Portuguese and Spanish were able to acquire most of their 
captives from West Central Africa (Van den Boogaart 1992). This meant that trade, at least in 
the Gold Coast, was focused on commodities, which is most clearly and physically 
demonstrated in the most expensive European investments in the region (until the railways of 
the twentieth century), the trading forts. The purpose of these forts was to protect the gold and 
ivory traded on the coast from attacks by pirates from the sea, and other European rivals, and 
                                                 
151 To give some idea of the scale of the labour required, Wilks (1993, pp56-59) estimates that clearing one 
hectare of virgin forest would have required moving 1,250 tons of moist vegetation, needing 500 days’ labour, 
given the available technology. 
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only later were they primarily used to hold captives before embarkation on the middle passage 
(Lawrence 1963).  
The importance of this pattern of trade to this thesis is that the region’s early trade contacts 
with the Atlantic world were based on the importation of unfree labour and its application to 
the production of food, gold and other commodities. Thus, slaves within the region were 
highly valued for their productive capacities, as well as their potential as commodities for the 
Atlantic market. This is very like the situation at the beginning of the nineteenth century in 
the Bight of Biafra (Chapter 6), but in stark contrast to the Bight of Benin where Atlantic 
trade was entirely based on the export of people. Long trading contacts also led to the 
development of the most urbanised coastal environment in West Africa, which was not a 
product of transatlantic slave trade, and therefore not dependent on it (Kea 1982, p26, 
Shumway 2014, pp51,52). Finally, it should also be noted that, while the Atlantic trade 
became increasingly important to the region, the gold trade continued to the savannah and 
trans-Saharan markets.152 As a result, the export economy was never wholly beholden to 
Europe and the Americas.  
It was only towards the end of the seventeenth century that slaves became a more important 
item of export, especially for the British (Eltis 1994, p249, Shumway 2014, p 25). However, 
even then gold was still the main attraction for many traders. Den Heijer’s (1997) research 
into Dutch West India Company (WIC) accounts shows that between 1674 and 1740, 64% of 
the goods dispatched to Africa for trade were intended for non-slave commodities, and of 
these around 87% were intended for gold.153 However, in terms of value, slaves were already 
generating slightly more income for the WIC in the last decades of the eighteenth century, and 
were far more valuable than gold and ivory in the period between 1701 and 1730 (Den Heijer 
1997, pp129, 136,159). From around the 1730s, slaves became the region’s principal export, 
but this did not last long as slave exports began to decline in the 1780s (Austin 2013a). I will 
argue in Chapter 7 that declining numbers of captive exports from the Bight of Benin can be 
largely explained by exogenous shocks, especially the Haitian revolution and the withdrawal 
of the French, who were then the most important trading nation in that region. However, in 
the Gold Coast, no such external explanation has been identified in the literature. 
The trade with the northern savannah remained an extremely important part of the Asante 
economy in the eighteenth century. Garrard (1980) estimates that between a third and a half of 
all gold was flowing to northern markets (Table 5.1). Wilks (1975, p257) suggests that trade 
in other commodities was also increasing from the 1730s and there are well documented cases 
of considerable fortunes made by Asante elites involved in the northern trade (McCaskie 
2003, p59,60). By at least 1806 Muslim Hausa merchants were established in Kumasi under 
the protection of the state. They maintained links with a diaspora linking the forests of Asante 
                                                 
152 Garrard (1980) estimates that in the sixteenth century northern markets probably took more gold than that of 
the Atlantic. In the seventeenth century, this changed with around 25% going north to the Savannah kingdoms of 
the interior and 75% to Europeans.  
153 During this period, the TSTD indicates that Dutch vessels were responsible for around 20% of slaves 
exported. The WIC was responsible for over 90% of these.   
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with major urban centres in the interior, such as Kano. From 1800, the government in Kumasi 
began a policy of channelling all its northern trade through the market town of Salaga, which 
made it far easier for Asante producers to market their kola and gold to foreign traders (see 
below).154 The reasons behind this policy were twofold. On the one hand, the state needed a 
new trade centre after the destruction of the town of Gbuipe by the Asante, which had 
previously been an important merchant hub (Wilks 1975, p262). On the other hand, declining 
revenues from slave outputs and / or a desire to diversify the economy away from dependence 
from on the Atlantic might also have played a role (Wilks 1975, p262, Lovejoy 1982, p254). 
However, crucially, the decision was taken before the British withdrew from the slave trade, 
indicating that abolition was not a key driver of economic change. Unlike the Dahomeans and 
the merchants in Biafra, the Asante already had well established trade networks with 
alternative markets in Africa. The existing growth in these markets prior to 1808, made it 
easier for them to rapidly re-orientate themselves away from an Atlantic, slave export 
economy.   
In the nineteenth century, the region’s exports were once again dominated by export 
commodities. The broad story of economic change in Asante during this period is fairly 
uncontested (Wilks 1975, Austin 1995, McKaskie 2003). Central to this change was the rise 
of the Sokoto caliphate in the first decade of nineteenth century under the leadership of 
Usman den Fodio. He was an ethnic Fulani who had been a scholar at the Hausa court of 
Gobir, but had become disenchanted with what he considered as the decadence of the region’s 
rulers, and had launched a jihad aimed at restoring Islamic purity (Last 1969, Lovejoy 1978). 
He and his followers were to eventually conquer a vast swathe of territory roughly analogous 
to the northern regions of today’s Nigeria. For the Asante, this created a new, rich economic 
zone that could effectively compete with Atlantic markets as both a market for, and supplier 
of, goods. It was the kola nut, or rather a specific variety cola nitidia, that was probably the 
most important commodity in the trade with the north. This nut is a powerful stimulant155 and 
is not specifically mentioned in the koran as being haram. As a result, its consumption was 
generally tolerated in Muslim regions (Sharrett 1995, p21). In an atmosphere of Islamic 
revival, demand for kola nuts soared, which was to greatly benefit the Asante. Their empire 
encompassed almost all the region’s cola nitidia trees, giving them a near monopoly on 
regional output (Abaka 2005, Lovejoy 1980). In exchange they received slaves, leather goods, 
shea butter and livestock, as well as Hausa cloth which was becoming increasingly 
sophisticated both in quality and design (Austin 2013b). 
With regard to the Atlantic trade, the main export was gold and these exports increased 
significantly after abolition (Table 5.1). This was almost certainly to ensure that enough 
European and American trade goods, in particular weapons, ammunition and cloth that were 
seen as vital to the Asante state and society, continued to be imported (see Section 5.1 for an 
estimate of the volume and value of these trades). The Gold Coast also had a far more diverse 
                                                 
154 Salaga was located north east of the capital near crucial fording points of the Volta river and on the caravan 
routes to the markets of Hausaland (Lovejoy 1982, p254).  
155 Containing both caffeine and theobromine, stimulants found in coffee and cocoa (Lovejoy 1995, p98) 
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export economy in the nineteenth century than it had during the era of slave exports. In the 
eighteenth century, there is no evidence that anything other than gold or ivory was exported in 
any quantity.156 The CUST records indicate that from the 1820s the region was exporting 
increasing quantities of ivory, hardwoods (teak and ebony), dyewoods (camwood and 
barwood) as well as pepper and palm oil.157 Furthermore, the provisioning trade seems to 
have continued, at least along the eastern side of the coast.158  
Table 5.1. Akan gold exports, 1651 – 1850 (ounces) 
 Northern Trade European Trade Total 
1651 – 1700 500,000 1,500,000 2,000,000 
1701 – 1750 400,000 1,200,000 1,600,000 
1751 – 1800 400,000    800,000 1,200,000 
1801 – 1850 200,000 1,400,000 1,600,000 
Source: Garrard (1980, p163) 
Examined over the longue durée, the Akan region’s export economy was only ever briefly 
focused on the export of people. For at least the first two centuries of external trade contact, 
and then again from 1808, output from the Gold Coast was dominated by commodities, not 
slaves. Thus, the early and complete withdrawal of the area from the transatlantic slave trade 
should be viewed as a reversion to the norm, not an aberration. However, a number of 
questions remain, in particular regarding the actual impact of British abolition. This will be 
subject of the next section. 
                                                 
156 For example, the region did not export either hardwoods or dyewoods, which were both in demand. Richard 
Miles, a former governor of Cape Coast Castle who worked for the Company of Merchant Venturers from 1765 
to 1784 in his evidence to a parliamentary committee in 1789 stated that: “I never knew a single stick (of woods) 
of any kind produced on the Gold Coast.” PP, Minutes of Evidence taken before a committee of the whole house 
to whom it was referred to consider the circumstances of the slave trade” (1789), p 115  
157 From 1828 to 1840 British ships visiting the Gold Coast imported the following quantities: 
Hardwoods/Dyewoods: 2535 tons, Foodstuffs (coffee, rice, pepper, maize, coconuts): 423 tons, Palm oil 12, 504 
tons, Ivory 7317 cwt, Beeswax 281 cwt, gums (animi/copal) 425 cwt (TNA CUST 4/23-4/35) 
158 Meredith (1811, pp179,180) mentions that maize  and other agricultural products are sold east of Winnebah. 
Bold (1822), discussing the area around Accra notes that the  “…whole of the neighboring country (which is 
extremely fertile) has recently been cultivated to a very considerable extent, and is now become celebrated for 
the produce of maize, or Indian wheat…” (p59). In 1817, the governor of the fort at Commenda noted that 
agricultural production had increased due to “….vessels having come to this part of the coast for the cargoes of 
corn…” TNA T70/1603 State and Condition of Commenda Fort. 
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5.3. A NEW INTERPRETATION OF THE IMPACT OF ABOLITION 
The British, for almost all of the eighteenth century, embarked the greatest numbers of 
captives and had the most substantial physical presence on the Gold Coast. The sudden 
withdrawal of British ships from the trade in 1808 can explain the timing of the ending of 
slave exports from the region. However, in the eyes of some officials, the presence of the 
British meant that the Akans were incapable of continuing the export of people, thus forcing 
them to switch to commodity exports. This was argued, for example, in an 1827 report: “That 
the number (of slaves) exported from the Gold Coast is small, can be attributed only to the 
obstacles which the European settlements oppose……Should this part of the coast be 
abandoned, all efforts to suppress the slave trade will be vain.”159 Yet there is evidence to 
suggest that had there been sufficient slaves to buy, then traders from the Americas would 
have stepped in, at least initially. Local merchants such as Samuel Brew were known to have 
retained contacts with Spanish traders and were accused of continuing to sell slaves (Bowdich 
1819 p339). Reynolds (1974, pp39,40) quotes a number of primary sources suggesting that 
Spanish and Portuguese ships continued to visit the coast, especially around the Dutch fort of 
Accra.  
American vessels were also active during this period and, even though their government had 
officially outlawed the trade, hostility to the English meant that they were unwilling to 
enforce their treaties or aid in the abolition campaign. As a result, many US merchants carried 
on trading with impunity (Brooks 1970). My own analysis of vessels reported arriving at or 
passing by the main British fort at Cape Coast Castle shows that in the immediate wake of 
abolition there was an increase in the number of Portuguese and American ships (Figure 5.1). 
Thereafter this decreased, but sufficient numbers were passing by to pick up slaves, had any 
been available. For example, in 1812, 8 ships from Portugal/Brazil and 2 from the US passed 
by Cape Coast. For the period from 1808 to 1820 Portuguese ships to West Africa carried an 
average of 280 captives, and those from the US 122. Had the ships in 1812 decided to embark 
slaves somewhere on the Gold Coast region, they could have loaded around 2,480 slaves. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
159 CO267/93 1827 Report of the Commissioners of Inquiry in the State of the Colony of Sierra Leone, Second 
Part, p25 
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Figure 5.1. Number of ships reported arriving or passing Cape Coast Castle 1789 - 1791 
/ 1800 - 1802 / 1810 – 1818 by nationality 
 
Source: TNA: T70/1561 - 1604 
The next question is whether these forts could act as an effective military deterrent to 
determined slave traders, which I would argue they did not. For a start, the British 
government pursued a policy during this period of reducing both the number of settlements 
and personnel stationed permanently on the coast, and relinquishing ultimate authority to the 
governor in Sierra Leone.160 Even before this policy was enacted, the British forts were far 
from being an effective military deterrent to slave ships. Crews on slaving voyages tended to 
be fairly substantial, given the need to control large numbers of unwilling prisoners, and were 
for this reason also very well armed (Thomas 1999, Rediker 2007, Harms 2008). While 
slightly smaller than during the apogee of the trade, crews in the era of abolition averaged 25 
men per ship.161 With the exception of the major forts at Cape Coast Castle and Anomabo, the 
British forts were not particularly well manned or armed, and had long been the subject of 
parliamentary criticism for their generally poor defences and lack of proper maintenance.162 In 
1811, Henry Meredith, an employee of the British company of merchants, published an 
account of the Gold Coast. He had been present at Cape Coast Castle during the Asante 
invasion and recounted how the small garrison was only barely able to keep out an assault by 
Asante forces. Perhaps as a result of his experiences, one of his key aims was to try and 
convince the British government to invest more money and provide more soldiers for the forts 
(Meredith 1811, p128). As can be seen from Table 5.2, his concerns were justified as, apart 
from Cape Coast Castle and Anomabo, the British forts were neither well manned nor 
sufficiently equipped. At Winnebah, where he was governor, Meredith wrote that “…garrison 
                                                 
160 An 1817 report recommended that “….the number of those forts and settlements should be diminished by the 
disposal or abandonment of such as may, upon strict inquiry, appear not be of service in a sufficient degree fully 
to compensate for their expense” Report from the Committee on African Forts (431).  
161 Source: TSTD, crew size 1808 - 1860 
162 One report noted that forts were “….in bad condition and some of them so ruinous as to be in no degree 
tenable…” and that local officials were abusing their positions to make money at the expense of other 
merchants. T70/177 Return from the commissioners for the Trade and Plantations to the honourable House of 
Commons, relating to the General State of the trade with Africa the Condition of the forts and settlements there 
belonging to the African Company January 1777, p7 
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of this fort amounts to no more than seven soldiers; a number not capable of defending itself 
against the natives…”, and noted further that the fort was not even able to employ its guns 
against the landing area due to the number of houses built between it and the beach.  
Even at Cape Coast, he noted that the governor was never able to enforce his authority over 
the Fante (Meredith 1811, pp99,172,174). Another weakness of the forts was that, at that 
time, they seemed to have relied entirely on European soldiers.163 It has long been known that 
the West Coast of Africa hosted a range of tropical maladies that, more often than not, proved 
fatal, or at the very least debilitating, to Europeans, severely limiting their military 
effectiveness (Curtin 1972, p9, Shumway 2014, p63, Rönnback & Öberg 2016). Sparks’ 
(2014) history of Anomabo has demonstrated that power rested securely in the hands of local 
elites, and attempts by overbearing British officials to force events usually led to their 
humiliation or removal. This fact was acknowledged in an 1816 report which noted that “…as 
a means of checking the slave trade, our forts on the Gold Coast do not appear to be of any 
further use than merely to prevent its being carried on within their own walls. Outside of that 
small range, they either have not, or do not exercise any jurisdiction.”164 
Table 5.2. British personnel and ordnance at Gold Coast forts 1811 & 1816 (excluding 
Cape Coast Castle and Anomabo) 
Fort No. European 
Staff (soldiers) 
No. Cannon (remarks) No. Muskets (remarks) 
 1811 1816 1811 1816 1811 1816 
Sekondi 4 5 (3) 0 N/A 7 N/A 
Commenda 8 10 (8) 28 34 6 6 
Dixcove 10 10 (8) 29 31 (‘Gun carriages 
rotten’) 
6 (old) 8 (‘In bad 
order’) 
Appollonia 7 8 (7) 0 N/A 5 N/A 
Accra 14 12 (9) 29 29 (‘the cannon 
indifferent except a 
few’) 
12 12 
Tantumquerry 9 9 (8) 17 N/A 10 N/A 
Winneba 8 9 (7) 13 13 (‘The Guns are 
very old’) 
12 12 
Prampram 2 Closed 0 Closed 0 Closed 
Source: TNA T70/1593, PP: (506) Report from the Select Committee on Papers Relating to the African Forts 
1816, pp181-192 
 
                                                 
163 Rönnback (2014) finds no record of Africans being employed in a military capacity. Likewise, in an 1816 
report on the Gold Coast forts, which lists both African workers and slaves, there is no mention of non-European 
solders; PP: (506) Report from the Select Committee on Papers Relating to the African Forts 1816, pp182–91 
164 PP: (506) Report from the Select Committee on Papers Relating to the African Forts 1816, p137.  
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A further complication is that by 1816 the Asante had acquired direct control over routes to 
the coast, allowing them to easily bypass the small and rather ineffectual forts. One of the key 
features of the Asante state was its system of roads which headed away from Kumasi like 
spokes on wheel to the north and south of its territories (see Map 5.3). This allowed it to more 
effectively project power from the centre, and to better receive tribute from its more distant 
vassals (Wilks 1975, McCaskie 2003).  In the 1740s it had extended road V to the coast as far 
as Accra, but access to the Atlantic along roads VI and VII were blocked by the Fante coastal 
coalition. This coalition was a loose alliance of states along the coast, from the Pra River to 
Accra, based on the kinds of cross-cutting horizontal lines of authority described by McIntosh 
(1999). These were strengthened by the development of a shared culture, centred on the 
religious shrine of Nananom Mpow, and language (Shumway 2014, p131). Nonetheless, this 
union was not entirely stable, and individual states and towns within it were often at war with 
each other. However, it was able to lessen the negative impacts of the slave trade for the Fante 
people by providing some measure of protection against enslavement, and was also strong 
enough to protect the region from the Asante and other regional powers throughout the 
eighteenth century (McCarthy 1983, p7). 
Map 5.3. The great roads of Asante 
 
Source: Wilks (1975) p8 
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While Elmina had always been closely aligned to the Asante due to the long-standing Dutch 
alliance with Kumasi165 (Yarak 1990), road VII still needed to pass through Fante territory. 
As will be argued below, control of the slave trade was probably not a key foreign policy 
objective of the Asante state, and warfare in the south was expensive as the Fante controlled 
walled towns and possessed firearms which required a heavy military commitment to 
overcome (Klein 2001). It was not until 1806 that the Asante were either provoked or had a 
sufficient pretext to commit to a large-scale campaign against the Fante. Whatever the 
ultimate reasons, the proximate cause for war, outlined in a letter by Asantehene to the British 
envoy Bowdich (1819)166, was a succession dispute in Assin, a tribute kingdom of the Asante 
on the borders of the coastal coalition. According to sources, one of the claimants to the 
throne sought and gained the support of the Fantes, who also murdered Asante messengers / 
diplomats sent to the coast. A series of invasions followed in 1807, 1811 and 1816 which saw 
the total defeat of the Fantes and which were marked by an unusually high level of brutality 
and slaughter.167 
This war may have been an important contributing factor to why the slave trade was to end so 
abruptly after abolition. Commercial activity, which required that Europeans could entrust 
large quantities of trade goods to local merchants in the expectation that slaves would be 
delivered at an agreed future date, would have been severely curtailed with the presence of 
Asante forces blockading the trade roads. Correspondence from the British forts along the 
coast make it clear that the conflict was extremely damaging to trade. In 1807 officials 
mention that Asante raids threatened the British fort and that there was little that they could 
do to prevent them or protect their Fante allies. The governor of Tantumquerry fort noted that 
"...they (the Fante) consider themselves no better situated in regard to the protection of the 
British than a flock sheep which is dispersed in every direction would have the right to expect 
from a lamb…"168. In 1811, the fighting meant it was impossible to continue any kind of 
trading, with one official telling his superiors in London that “...in mentioning trade I may at 
once declare that it is nearly annihilated at all your forts except Accra and Appollonia….”. 
169 Trade was still badly affected in 1814 when the Governors at Sekondi, Accra and Dixcove 
forts all noted that trade between the interior and the coast continued to suffer due to the 
instability and mistrust caused by the conflict.170  
                                                 
165 Yarak (1990) argues that Dutch activity on the coast diminished considerably during the nineteenth century, 
which was itself closely linked to the decline of the WIC and the rising power of the English. This meant they 
were always more reliant on the support and goodwill of the Asante (Chapter 2).  
166 Also confirmed by an earlier account by Meredith (1812), the governor of the British fort of Winneba, who 
witnessed the conflict at first hand 
167 Dupuis (1824), a British diplomat sent to Kumasi to renegotiate a peace settlement with the Asante notes 
“….the utter extermination of the Fantes was contemplated, and orders were issued to spare neither the aged nor 
young children; but both sexes, and all ages were for a time doomed to expire by the sword and the musket, or in 
the flames of their houses.” p255 
168 TNA T70/1586 Hamilton to Torrance 12th July 1808 , see also Torrance to Committee 12th June 1807 
169 T70/1593 White to committee 1st July 1811. See also correspondence on  January 1811, 26 March 1811, 26 
May 1811 and  when he notes that “In mentioning trade may at once declare that it is nearly annihilated at all 
your forts except Accra and Appollonia….”.  
170 T70/1598 19, 22, 27 April 1814 
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However, while no doubt disruptive in the short term, the result was that the entire Fante coast 
was then in theory part of the empire of the Asante “…with the reservation of a judicial 
authority to the company over such towns as stood in the vicinity of any of the castles…” 
(Dupuis 1824, p263). Thus, by around 1816, the Asante had the potential to control both the 
supply and sale of slaves along a 200km stretch of coast that had supplied the Americas with 
around 15% of its coerced labour in the previous century. As noted in Chapter 1, the demand 
for such labour had not diminished in the nineteenth century. It is also important to note that 
this window of opportunity was not long open. Despite some losses, a British coalition with 
various southern powers was able to defeat an Asante army at the battle of Katomonso in 
1825. In subsequent peace negotiations, the Asante agreed to give up their right of tribute 
from the coastal towns and to ensure that lawful, or non-slave, trade would continue, which 
essentially saw the exchange of Asante to British power over the coast (Wilks 1975, pp182–
192). However, in the 18 years before this, had the Asante kings wanted to export substantial 
numbers of slaves, it would have been possible.  
 
As will be argued in Chapter 7, the Dahomeans were able to devise new ways of exporting 
slaves from different parts of the Bight of Benin during the 1840s, when the slave patrol was a 
far more effective operation. They did have an advantage that slaves could be more rapidly 
transported along the inland lagoons which paralleled the coast (Law 2004, pp192,193). 
However, the Dahomeans also had more limited routes upon which to march slaves from the 
interior to the coast. The Asante could simply have taken slaves down road V to western ports 
such as Pram Pram which had no European presence by 1816. Alternatively, slaves might 
even have been carried to the Bight of Benin for sale. One obvious place, would have been 
Little Popo, located in modern day Togo near the Volta river. The Asante had long 
maintained trade relations with the town and exerted at least some political influence there 
(Wilks 1975, p 57). In addition, the river had long taken goods, for instance salt, to northern 
markets such as Salaga (Reynolds 1974, p27) and was to serve as an artery of commerce for 
palm oil from the Krobo region from the 1820s (Lynn 1997, p39). The town of Salaga was 
already an established slave market in the early nineteenth century (see below for further 
discussion) and was situated within a few days journey from the mouth of the Volta. Law 
(2004, p40) shows that Gold Coast merchants had been taking the sea route to Benin since the 
mid-seventeenth century to trade for cloth and other goods. Strickrodt (2015, p195) notes that 
there is some evidence to suggest that small numbers of slaves were being taken by canoe 
from Accra for sale in Popo. However, there is no evidence to suggest that there was any 
concerted effort to develop an alternative outlet for coerced labour by the Asante.   
To conclude this section, I argue that the gold coast region displayed a long-term preference 
for commodity exports and neither the British withdrawal, nor the disruptions caused by the 
Asante-Fante wars, provide a fully satisfactory explanation for why the Asante did not re-
engage with transatlantic slave trading after 1808. It seems that to understand why the Gold 
Coast region withdrew so abruptly from the slave trade, as well as explain when it happened, 
it is necessary to examine factors internal to the wider Gold Coast region. The next section 
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will investigate what factors might have been influencing the Asante at the turn of the 
nineteenth century.  
 
5.4. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN 1808 
 
The financial cost of abolition 
The first factor considered is whether the Asante suffered financially by moving away from 
slave trade. To calculate this I firstly estimate the combined value, in GB£, of the exports of 
gold and kola from 1808 to 1850. Secondly, to construct another hypothetical estimate of how 
much the Asante would have gained had they continued trading in gold and slaves, and not 
diverted labour towards kola production and mining. Comparing these two totals gives at least 
a rough approximation of whether or not the Asante were paying any kind of financial price 
for giving up the export of captives. These calculations are also based on the assumption that 
the increase in production could be met with the labour available within the kingdom. To test 
this, I estimate how many extra people would be required to mine gold and grow kola, and 
compare the findings with what we know about labour capacity. This method is far from ideal 
and is almost certainly a very pale reflection of reality for a number of reasons.  
Firstly, given the limited data, it isn’t possible to show changes over time. The final 
calculation only shows the overall value of trade for the period as a whole. Secondly, all of 
these goods were bartered for commodities and manufactures of the Americas, Europe or the 
Savannah. The sterling price of these goods cannot fully reflect their social, political or 
economic value to the elites and households in Africa (although Sections 6 and 7 will deal 
with these issues in more detail). However, this was a monetised region and goods were 
assigned monetary values that can be at least roughly compared to sterling as evidenced by 
Austin (2015, pp128–34) and Lovejoy and Richardson’s (1995) work on slave prices in the 
African interior. Additionally, there are no equivalent records to the British customs ledgers 
which itemise the volumes of kola which were produced and sold, as it was only marketed to 
northern savannah markets. As a result, all of the figures used come from estimates and 
assumptions based on scattered references in primary sources. To account for this, I calculate 
low, high and median estimates of kola output from Asante to add to the slightly more reliable 
figures for gold provided by Garrard (1980).  
Finally, the calculation for commodity exports is a rather conservative figure. It does not 
include the output of other commodities such as palm oil and woods which, as stated in 
Section 5.3, had become relatively substantial by the 1840s. However, as already mentioned, 
it is likely that the majority of these goods, and especially palm oil, were coming from the 
eastern side of the Gold Coast and therefore outside Akan areas. Furthermore, the calculation 
does not account for the internal trade in slaves. Following abolition, the falling prices of 
slaves led to a rise in slave ownership along the coast (Adu-Boahen 2010, Manning 1990, 
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144). These slaves were largely supplied by the Asante who were, by the 1840s, according to 
contemporary sources, exporting large numbers of captives taken from areas to the north 
(Cruikshank 1853, Vol 2 p244, McSheffrey, 1983, p353). However, I am not aware of any 
study on the numbers of those exported and, until the 1820s, the coastal areas (at least in 
Fante territories) were still devastated by the conflict with Asante and were not in the position 
to take advantage of opportunities for slave ownership (Sanders 1982, p53).171 For these 
reasons this trade is excluded from my calculations.   
The output of gold from the Asante kingdom is based on the estimates found in Garrard 
(1980).172 Gold prices on the coast are taken at £3 12sh / ounce (Wilks, 1975, p418, Garrard 
1980, pp258,259) and are assumed to reflect international gold prices by remaining extremely 
stable during the period under study (Officer & Williamson 2016). There are no accurate 
figures on the output and production of kola until the colonial era but it is possible to calculate 
a rough estimate. For full details of the workings and sources see Appendix 5.1. The basis for 
the calculations comes from sources quoted in Lovejoy (1980). One such source suggests that 
in around 1820 roughly 1,000 donkeys per year were leaving from the Salaga market laden 
with kola nuts, and another that, in the 1850s, this figure had increased to 6,000 (Lovejoy 
1980, p116). I have taken these as base measurements for the low and high estimates of 
output. Kola nuts were measured in headloads, or apakan, each weighing around 80 lbs, and, 
according to one source, each donkey could carry around 100 lbs or 1.2 headloads (Lovejoy 
1980, p116). Prices were measured in headloads and sources quote figures which range from 
around £0.375 (Wilks 1975, p268) to £2.5 (Bowdich 1819, p333) per load. These have been 
taken as low and high estimates. If we then multiply the low estimate for the number of 
donkeys by 1.2 by the low-price estimate, we have a very conservative estimate of value. The 
high estimate uses the figure of 6,000 donkeys quoted by sources in Lovejoy and headload 
price of £2.5 from Bowdich.   
For the hypothetical value of the slave trade, had the region continued exporting captives after 
1808, I have taken the average slaves exported per year from the Gold Coast between 1770 
and 1808, and compared this to the average slaves embarked in the Bights of Benin and 
Biafra between 1809 and 1850. These all average around 4,800 per year, so this figure is 
taken as an estimate of output. Slave prices I rely on the price data on the coastal value of 
slaves in Lovejoy and Richardson (1995). It is also the case that the region would have 
continued to export gold, but that the quantity would probably have been less. As will be 
argued in Section 7, increases in production required additional inputs of coerced labour, 
which would have been scarcer if slaves were still being exported. I have therefore taken gold 
output figures from the second half of the eighteenth century, as they were somewhat lower 
than those of the next century when more labour was available.  
                                                 
171 The governors of the various forts along the Gold Coast made regular mention of how the war had disrupted 
trade. See for example TNA, T70/1601 1816 State and Condition of Commenda Fort, 1816 State and Condition 
of Annamabo Fort, T70/1603 1817 State and Condition of Apollonia Fort, 1818 State and Condition of Accra 
Fort, 1818 State and Condition of Tantumquerry Fort. 
172 These are also used by Austin (2005) 
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Figure 5.2. Estimated value (GB£) of the trade in kola, gold + hypothetical slave exports 
and gold with a slave trade 1808-1850  
 
Sources: see above 
The combined value of the hypothetical nineteenth century gold and slave trade from 1808 to 
1850 is £4,670,771. The value of the commodity trades is higher on every estimate except 
when taking the low value for kola (£4,353,750) and even then the difference is not 
substantial. Furthermore, as will be shown in Chapters 6 and 7, the transatlantic slave trade in 
West Africa in the nineteenth century was extremely volatile with output impacted by 
changing prices, the growing effectiveness of the slave trade patrol and regional political 
events. By contrast, both gold and kola seem to have enjoyed both stable prices and steadily 
rising demand over the entire period.173  
The state also benefited directly from the commodity trade. For example, it took steps to 
ensure that its own kola merchants enjoyed greater advantages than private traders. The 
government would not allow Asante farmers or traders into the market until its own officials 
had arrived, and they were also exempted from a toll paid on each load of kola (Lovejoy 
1982, p251). These measures, along with the fact that the king owned more slaves and land, 
probably ensured that the state had a substantial minority share of the trade, and of course also 
benefitted from the taxes levied on foreign merchants and its own citizens who paid tolls to 
use the roads to Salaga (Austin 1996, p26). Furthermore, individuals were required by law to 
send each nugget of gold they found to the capital, where it would be turned into gold dust. A 
proportion of this was claimed by the state, some by the chief or stool holder of the land, and 
the rest was given back to the household who originally mined or panned the gold. 
Furthermore, gold was also liable as a duty on the death of a household head (Wilks 1993 
pp148,149, McCaskie 2003, p48). Therefore, increased production led to more wealth flowing 
                                                 
173 Lovejoy’s (1980, p120) data on the retail price of kola nuts in Savannah markets over the nineteenth century 
suggests that prices, once one has accounted for inflation, were remarkably stable until the 1890s. 
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upwards to the king, thus increasing his ability to reward elite supporters and maintain his 
position as the kingdom’s economic top dog (see Section 5.5).  
This increase in production, with the land-extensive or Niebeor/Domar conditions of the 
region, required a more intensive use of coerced labour (Austin 2005 pp166,167, Perbi 2004, 
pp70-86, Wilks 1993, p96). It must be assumed that if this had meant that elite groups faced 
shortages of labour to support them and their retinues, or the kingdom did not produce 
sufficient food for its major urban centres, then the use of slaves in the production of gold and 
kola would have been opposed (Arhin 1990, pp525,526). However, there is no indication that 
this was the case in the first half of the nineteenth century. Austin (1995 p164) estimates that 
one man could mine around 1/62 of an ounce of gold per day. Garrard (1980, p163) suggests 
that output increased from around 27,000 ounces per year in the later eighteenth century to 
35,000 ounces/year in the first half of the nineteenth century. To produce 8,000 extra ounces 
per year would therefore require between 320,000 to 496,000 extra days worked per dry 
season.174 Given an average dry season of around three months from late November to 
February (Wilks 1993, p56), this meant that an additional 3,500 to 5,500 labourers were 
required during the ninety-day period.  
Kola also needed considerable labour inputs. It was most intensively grown in the clay loam 
soil and ochrosal forest zone of the central region of the Asante kingdom (see Map 5.2). Kola 
trees were typically planted alongside yams, cocoyams and cassava in between the ‘hills’ or 
mounds built from soil and vegetation which served as beds for their propagation. These 
mounds offered shade and protection for kola seeds which, when fully grown trees 
themselves, provided shade and helped prevent soil erosion. Harvesting took place in the dry 
season, which meant that labour did not need to be diverted from the production of 
subsistence crops except when previously fallow land needed to be cleared.175 Abaka (2005) 
shows that this dry season labour was fairly intensive. The nuts needed to be picked, 
processed176 and stored in specially made huts called apata which kept out the sunlight. Tree 
management was a year-round job and involved cutting away the roots and branches of other 
trees that could act as transmitters of pests or pathogens, and cutting down and removing trees 
which became sick or infected.  
To give some idea of the scale of the new trade we can take the estimates of the number of 
headloads taken to Salaga. Wilks (1975, p268) quotes sources which say that each headload 
contained around 2,000 nuts. If we multiply this by the low, high and median estimates we 
have rough figures for the number of nuts produced. Abaka (2005, p33) quotes colonial 
reports from the early 20th century as giving an average annual yield of 765 nuts per kola tree. 
Dividing this figure by the total production figures means that in the first half of the 
                                                 
174 During the rainy seasons artisanal mining in Asante was impossible and labour was required in food 
production (Dummett 1998, p51). In the dry season, existing household labour was still necessary for a wide 
range of agricultural and household tasks (Wilks 1993, pp56-63). 
175 Wilks (1993, p59-61) suggests that forest clearance was necessary around once every three years. 
176 This involved soaking the nuts, washing and draining them, removing bad nuts and then ‘curing’ them in 
baskets wrapped in banana leaves (Abaka 2005, pp32,33)  
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nineteenth century Asante households were tending between 3,137 and 39,216 trees with a 
median figure of 21,176 trees (full workings see Appendix 5.2), representing a significant 
investment in time and labour. 
However, these labour demands could almost certainly have been met by existing labour 
capacity. The population had probably been growing from the fifteenth century for a number 
of reasons. Firstly, the ‘Columbian exchange’ with the Americas had introduced a range of 
new crops such as maize and cassava, which allowed for longer growing seasons and 
improved the calorific quality of diets (Kiple 1984, pp24,25). Secondly, the early exchange of 
gold for slaves for purposes of forest clearance expanded the agricultural potential of the 
forest zone (Austin 2005, p56). Thirdly, the conquests and expansion of the Asante empire in 
the eighteenth century led to many captives being sold, but also many were retained within 
the kingdom which swelled the population and increased its productive potential (Bowdich 
1819, p323). Finally, the security brought by Asante military conquests (see below), and the 
law that forbade the selling of free Asantes into slavery (Maier 1990, p122), meant that the 
transatlantic slave trade did not have the destructive demographic impact that it had in other 
regions such as the Bight of Benin. The evidence suggests that in the earlier nineteenth 
century the population of Asante grew and did not contract until the 1860s (see Appendix 
5.3.b.). Furthermore, over the last twenty years of the slave trade the region was exporting an 
average of 7,325 captives (TSTD). If these were diverted from the Atlantic, into the domestic, 
economy there would have been more than enough additional workers to meet the new labour 
demands for use in kola and gold production.  
This evidence suggests that over the first half of the nineteenth century, the region as a whole 
did not lose out financially by the ending of the transatlantic slave trade. Furthermore, there 
was sufficient labour to substantially increase production.177 The next question is why the 
Asante elites, like those in the Bight of Biafra, were prepared to support the development of 
an economy based on commodity production. Hopkins’ (1973) analysis of the impact of 
abolition was that it led to the rise of small scale units of production whose growing wealth 
came at the expense of elite groups who had previously grown rich from the slave trade. As 
will be argued in Chapter 7, this analysis can, to an extent, be applied to the Dahomean state, 
which maintained a slave export model for as long as it was able largely due to the huge 
economic, military and political benefits enjoyed by its elites as a result of capture and sale of 
captives. However, in the case of the Asante and, for different reasons the Bight of Biafra, 
elite groups were prepared to not only tolerate, but actively support, household producers 
using coerced labour to produce exports instead of selling the slaves to external markets (see 
Section 5.6). For the Asante state, an important reason was that, unlike Dahomey, it did not 
face any significant external threats either to its borders or regional economic power from the 
1740s. As such, it needed to devote far fewer resources to military activities and the result 
was a very different attitude towards trade.  
                                                 
177 Although some groups may have suffered, such as the caboceers in the Fante region who had previously 
controlled the marketing of slaves to Europeans (Sparks 2014). 
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The Asante and regional hegemony  
The forest clearances and population boom in the sixteenth century were instrumental in the 
development of a number of states that began to compete for control of the region’s gold and 
people. The second half of the seventeenth century saw a military revolution among the 
various emerging Akan states. The introduction of firearms, paid for with gold and slaves, led 
to a change in both battlefield tactics and the mass mobilisation of populations (Kea 1982, 
pp154-64, McCaskie 2007, p10). The new methods in war allowed the Denkyira and the 
Akwamu to become the region’s dominant powers from the 1660s, especially after the former 
captured most of the region’s gold-producing land in around 1690. However, the military 
revolution soon spread to other areas and the Denkyira were in turn defeated by a Kumasi 
based coalition in 1701 led by Osei Tutu, and the priest Anokye, seen as the founding figures 
of the Asante state. By 1742 the Asante had defeated their last serious rivals for power, 
Akyem (in the region around Accra) and incorporated the kingdom of Akwamu (Wilks 2001 
pp118–25). Thereafter, they continued a period of expansion, which both consolidated their 
power over the region and produced a large flow of captives to be sold to growing numbers of 
European traders at the coast (Maier 1990).  
After their defeat of the Akwamu in the 1740s the Asante did not face any serious military 
threat to the integrity of their state. Campaigns from this period were about the enforcement 
of their authority or to exact tribute payments, not to protect their borders from equal or 
greater powers. This security was perhaps due to the fact that unlike the Dahomeans their 
territory did not border on savannah territories, home to more powerful militarised states and 
empires (see Chapter 7). In addition, their territory controlled trade routes to the interior, so 
they were able to restrict the sales of guns to the states and societies on their northern borders, 
therefore maintaining an insurmountable advantage in warfare (Wilks 1975, p20).178 In their 
southern territories the various kingdoms did possess guns, but lacked centralised political 
authority. This ensured that, while effective defensively, they lacked the political unity to 
organise offensive warfare, although they did regularly rebel against central authority.179  
The result was twofold. Firstly, there was less of a need to maintain a highly-militarised state 
like that of Dahomey, which also meant there were lighter labour demands on their 
population. There was, for example, no standing army (Maier 1990 p 125, McCaskie 2003, 
p85), meaning that there were fewer non-productive elements in society who required the 
labour inputs of producers to feed and support them. Furthermore, this relative security meant 
fewer costly wars which reduced both the treasury and manpower.180 In the 80 years from 
                                                 
178 One possible exception might have been the rebellion in 1798, led by the mainly Muslim states of Gyaman 
and Kong in support of a deposed king. They had access to cavalry which posed a severe threat to the infantry 
armies of the Asante, but never able to threaten the core area of the state (Wilks 1975, p254, Dupuis 1821, 
pp245, 246) 
179 See for example, Dupuis (1821, p244) for the 1781 revolt by Assin, Akim and Aquapin.  
180 Wilks (1975) notes that the disastrous campaign against the British and Fante forces in 1826 involved 40,000 
men and cost the treasury around 29,000 oz gold dust and 20,000 oz gold nuggets which was equivalent to 
around 1 year’s national income (p439). Austin (2005) suggests that losing campaigns against the Ewes, the 
  
132 
1740 to 1820, the Asante are recorded as campaigning for 35 years, but also enjoyed 46 years 
without going to war (Maier 1990, p 130, Table 5.3). Of course, simply because there is no 
official record of conflict this does not mean there was no military activity. However, as will 
be argued in Chapter 7, official Dahomean ideology required that the king campaign 
annually. The absence of wars in official Asante chronology indicates at the very least that it 
was less concerned with warfare from an ideological standpoint. As a result, the state had less 
pressure to directly manage and control the labour forces of the kingdom, which would be 
crucial to household labour decisions.  
The absence of pressing threats to the kingdom’s territorial integrity in the eighteenth century, 
also allowed for the development of elite coalitions favouring the promotion of trade and 
wealth above war. Wilks (1975, p481) suggested that in the nineteenth century two very broad 
‘parties’ dominated nineteenth century Asante state policy: 
 “ …those subscribing to mercantilist policies and reading the state as essentially organised 
for the promotion of trade – the adherents of the peace party – and those subscribing to 
imperialist policies and regarding the state as essentially organised for the control of 
territory and the exaction of tribute – the adherents of the war party.”  
While this interpretation of Asante history has been subject to some criticism as being overly 
simplistic (Aidoo 1977), others have used the framework as means of analysing the broad 
coalitions impacting Asante state policy (Austin 1996, p4). Wilks (1975, p678) suggests that 
the ‘peace party’ only became more influential after abolition when slave raiding became less 
profitable. However, as noted in Section 3, the Asante had already begun investing in the 
northern trade before 1808. State policy was already being influenced by those advocating 
investments in trade as well as war. In Chapter 7 we will see that no such faction ever 
emerged among the ruling coalition in Dahomey, and that this was probably largely owing to 
threats faced by the state from other states such as Oyo, or hostile competitors such as the 
Popos or Porto Novo along the coast.181 The security enjoyed by Asante elites encouraged the 
development of alternative policy options to warfare. The politics of the region also had an 
impact on the origin of the slaves acquired by the Akans and this in turn played a role in 
determining how they were used.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Fante and the British from 1869 – 1873 led to such heavy losses from casualties and disease that it contributed to 
a decline in the kingdom’s population (p58) 
181 There has been at least one interpretation of Dahomean history which suggests that there were, as in Asante, 
‘Peace and War’ parties favouring either commodities or slave trades. Yoder (1974) labelled these the ‘Fly and 
Elephant’ parties which, according to his analysis, developed in the 1840s. However, this hypothesis has not 
been taken up by other scholars.  
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Outsiders as slaves 
During the period of the Asante expansion, the southern area of modern day Ghana provided 
the rich pool of slaves for capture. However, the associated violence and insecurity also 
motivated people to organise better means of defence. One example comes from the Krobo 
people of eastern Ghana, who moved into the defensible mountain areas north of Accra, 
which kept them safer from raiders (Wilson 1991). The coastal peoples themselves engaged in 
slave trading, which provided them with guns. They also built walled towns and created self-
defence militias, known as Asafo, companies which provided a substantial military deterrent 
(Shumway 2014). As a result, slave raiding and buying by the Asante came to increasingly 
focus on the territories to their north (Lovejoy 2011, p175, Austin 2005, p 116), although 
many captives were also bought in the market at Salaga.  
The “…stateless or near-stateless peoples on both sides of what is now Ghana/Burkina Faso 
border..”  (Johnson 1986 p346) were much easier targets as the Asante were able to prevent 
the people of the region acquiring firearms, thus ensuring they possessed an overwhelming 
military advantage (Wilks 1975, p67). Furthermore, the open savannah terrain made it more 
difficult to evade capture. Archaeological work in the area suggests that people were being 
forced to adopt the kinds of offensive measures suggested by the predatory state theory in the 
nineteenth century (Swanepoel 2009). Maier (1990, p128) estimates that in the late eighteenth 
century, Asante’s five northern provinces all gave tribute in slaves, estimated at around 1,000 
each / year. This figure is to be contrasted with a total of just 500 from all of its five southern 
provinces. 
The ‘foreign’ origins of these slaves is important, as these captives were non-Akans and this 
made them significantly more valuable as workers. Free Akans were organised around 
matrilineal clans, the abusua, which traced their roots to a common ancestress. Those outside 
the abusua were essentially non-people who could be treated as such until granted some rights 
of kinship (McCaskie 2003, p96). The authority to grant such rights was in the hands of the 
state or its local representatives, giving them a powerful tool of coercion to control the large 
numbers of slaves living amongst free people (McCaskie 2003 p 97). Incorporation depended 
on many factors but was considerably easier for those who already spoke an Akan language 
and were accustomed to the local culture.  
Those from northern regions were handicapped by their lack of a common language, and were 
often physically different from their owners with distinctive facial scars that marked them 
clearly as outsiders (Lovejoy 2011, p169). Within Akan society they were referred to as 
ndonko so as to separate them from Akan slaves and were subject to a good deal of 
discrimination (Lovejoy 1982, p271). Cruikshank (1852, p244) describes the “Donko” as 
characterised by “…an extraordinary degree of stolidity and brutishness and exhibit a very 
low type of intellect and breeding.” He goes on to note that, along the coast, northern slaves 
who arrived as children had a far better chance of quickly assimilating, but an adult was 
destined to remain as “...a dull, stolid beast of burden all the days of his life…” (p245). In a 
telling remark, he notes that adult slaves were far more valuable than children, suggesting that 
their value was a reflection of their immediate labour potential.  
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As the Akans were absorbing large numbers of people from outside their territories, there 
were means by which the non-free might eventually gain more rights. This might be through 
military service as in the case of the Asafo companies in the Fante areas, or by slow 
integration over several generations (Shumway 2014, p150, Perbi 2004, p113) However, it 
was probably the case that slaves from outside of Akan territories could not generally be 
expected to quickly assimilate and gain at least some of the rights enjoyed by their owners, 
which might have made them doubly appealing to those who wished to increase their wealth 
through production by exploiting unfree labour.  
To summarise these sections, the Asante were orientating their economy away from slave to 
gold and kola exports in the late eighteenth century. The lack of external threats created 
sufficient stability to encourage certain elites to begin investing in trade instead of war, and 
the commodity trade was at least as, if not more, valuable than the export of captives. 
Furthermore, the slaves that were being captured or imported into Akan territories were more 
suited to production than to export. The next section will examine the impact of gold on the 
development of Asante state and society, and argue that its centrality in the culture meant that 
it would always be prioritised over slave exports. 
 
5.5. GOLD AND THE ASANTE STATE 
The aim of the Asante state, or more specifically the palace organisation based around the 
Asantehene or king, was the preservation of its own power and wealth. However, it faced a 
number of challenges common to many West African ruling groups. Firstly, projecting power 
in land extensive conditions was costly and difficult (Herbst 2000). Secondly, the state’s 
power was always checked by elites who controlled the lineage groups to whom most of their 
free subjects owed their primary loyalty. Finally, as already mentioned, the Asante never 
maintained a permanent standing army (see below for a wider discussion on this point), 
instead relying on levies of troops from the very lineage groups it sought to control, which 
meant that it could rarely rely on violence to enforce its rule within the kingdom (Wilks 2003 
pp85–88). However, while there were a number of coups or ‘destoolments’ during the 1780s 
and 1790s, none of these seriously threatened the cohesion or stability of the ruling coalition 
over the eighteenth or early nineteenth centuries (Aidoo 1977, Wilks 1975, p372, McCaskie 
2003, p49). This success was predicated on the maintenance of a hierarchal system of 
patronage and reward which ultimately depended on control over the production and 
distribution of gold. 
Working with the framework developed by North et al. (2009, p43) the Asante kingdom can 
be characterised as a basic natural state which had developed a “…durable and stable 
organisational structure..” To remain in control the ruling coalition headed by the Asantehene 
had to reward the powerful elites for their support and ensure that their privileges, goals and 
organisations were closely aligned with the state. The system that developed was what Arhin 
(1990, p525) characterised as a patrimonial state based on a ‘regulated ranking system’. This 
is perhaps best illustrated by a schema developed by Wilks (1993, p145) in Figure 5.3. The 
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power of the Asantehene was represented by two symbolic artefacts: the Sika Dwa or Golden 
Stool representing his political/judicial supremacy and the Sika Mena or Golden Elephant’s 
tail, which again only an Asantehene could carry, symbolising his position at the top of the 
economic food chain.182 All wealth within the kingdom flowed upwards towards the king, 
who could then distribute favours down to the elites. The hierarchy was actively maintained 
through sumptuary laws and regulations designed to restrict the wealth of other elites through 
various forms of appropriation (Arhin 1990, p530, McCaskie 2003, p48).  
Figure 5.3. Wealth and authority in Asante: a schema 
 
Wilks (1993), p145 
However, wealth creation itself was actively encouraged, as long as it did not challenge the 
authority of the state. There was in Asante the principle of ‘accumulation’: a system in which 
all strata of society attempted to enrich themselves in order to separate themselves socially 
and politically from both those of lower social classes and from competitors within their own 
class through the conspicuous (but regulated) displays of wealth (Wilks 1975, p xlviii, Ahrin 
1990, McCaskie 2003 p37, Lovejoy 2011, p167). This was officially called Poatwa – the 
exhibition of wealth according to rules set out by the state which ensured that you could not 
put yourselves too far above your station or rank. Should you do so, this was ahomaso, which 
implied a threat to the social order (Arhin 1990, p532). When a man reached a certain level of 
wealth he could apply to the Asantehene to wear a certain kind of woven cloth called 
nyawɔho or “you have become rich”. A richer man could apply for the honour of carrying a 
horse tail switch and the very wealthiest would be allowed to carry an elephant tail switch. In 
essence this system does not differ substantially from that which existed in Dahomey (see 
Chapter 7) where the king’s authority and the social position of the elites also rested to a large 
degree on the conspicuous consumption of luxury goods and ostentatious displays of wealth. 
What set Asante apart was that all wealth was measured by, and usually based on, gold.  
The only recognised currency within the Asante kingdom, was gold dust, which had 
originally been based on Islamic gold coins known as the mithqal and uqiya (Johnson 
                                                 
182 Wilks (1993, p147) notes that the Asante went to war against the neighbouring kingdom of Gyaman, because 
the king there had created his own golden stool, thus symbolically placing himself as equal to the Asantehene.   
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1968).183 The literature agrees that at all levels of Asante society, the most important 
(although not the only) marker of wealth was the possession of gold, either in the form of 
currency or ornamentation (Wilks 1975 p xlviii, Garrard 1980 p66, Wilks 1993, p127, Austin 
1996, p9, Arhin 1990 pp532, 533, McCaskie 2003, p 38). A key part of official state policy, 
and one of the means by which an Asantehene maintained his legitimacy, was to ensure that 
the Adaka Kese, or Great Chest, kept at the treasury in Kumasi remained full. This alone 
required 400,000 oz of gold dust valued at around £1.5 million in the early nineteenth century 
(Wilks 1975, p 418, 445). Men seeking to advance themselves were given loans in gold dust 
by more senior elites and were expected to increase this wealth (Arhin 1990, p 529, Wilks 
1993, p133). Even commoners needed to acquire gold dust in order to buy more basic but 
necessary goods from markets such as salt, farm tools and household implements (Arhin 
1990, p527).  
While the export of captives was extremely important, control of the region’s gold was 
always the core focus of Asante policy over the eighteenth century (McCaskie 2007, p 9, 
Garrard 1980, p 63, Dummet 1998, pp41,44) as a means of financing warfare, providing an 
organising principle and justification for further expansion, and later allowing the Asante to 
receive tribute in slaves from conquered territories.184 An analysis of the location of major 
Asante military campaigns from 1740 to 1816 (Table 5.3) shows that there was far more 
activity in regions with gold deposits. Other political factors played a role but it wasn’t until 
1806 that they engaged in warfare directly against the Fante states, which marketed the 
majority of the region’s exported slaves (Wilks 1975, pp26,27,145). As suggested in Section 
5.4, this war was probably motivated by political considerations, rather than from a desire to 
control the marketing of the slave trade.  
A hesitancy to engage in warfare against southern states or coalitions was likely due to the 
fact that they were generally well armed and, in the case of the Fante, possessed fortified 
towns (Shumway 2014, pp144,145). However, these factors did not discourage the Asante 
from launching repeated attacks against the region of Wassa from 1765 to 1785 in order to 
gain control of its gold supplies. By contrast, the Dahomean kings, who were far more 
dependent on the slave trade for their wealth and power, conquered the key slave ‘port’ of 
Whydah in the 1720s and expended considerable effort holding it against repeated attacks 
from other hostile powers until the 1780s (see Chapter 7).  This suggests that control of the 
slave trade, while important, was not a key objective of the Asante state, unlike the gold trade.  
 
                                                 
183 There were two exceptions; in the northern regions and along the coast, cowry shells and barter were also 
accepted for the purposes of trade, but this was always forbidden in other areas of the empire as it was seen to be 
a threat to the collection of gold (Cruikshank (1853, Vol 2 pp41–44, Arhin 1990, p 527).  
184 For example, during their 1772 invasion of Dagomba captives who would otherwise have faced slavery were 
ransomed for gold or greater numbers of slaves. After the Fante wars in 1816 entire villages were founded in 
under developed regions by captives taken into slavery by victorious generals who thereby increased both their 
wealth, productive capacity and prestige (Maier 1990 pp122,123).  
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Table 5.3. Location of major Asante military campaigns 1740–1816  
Year Area 
Area(s) of 
Gold supplies 
Trade route to 
the savannah 
Trade route to 
the Atlantic 
1740 – 1741 Gyaman    
1742 Akyem, Accra    
1744 Akwamu    
1745 – 48 
Bassa, Kete Krakye, 
Dagomba 
   
1749 Krepi Akyem    
1751 – 1752 
Eastern and Central 
Gonja, Kpembe 
   
1753 
Wassa, Twifo, 
Denkyira, Akyem, 
Abuakwa 
   
1759 Gyaman    
1763 Bron, Kwawum, Akyem    
1764 Dahomey    
1764 – 1765 
Wassa, Twifo, 
Denkyira, Akyem, 
Abuakwa 
   
1766 – 1767 Gyaman    
1767 Akyem Abuakwa    
1772 Dagomba    
1772 Akuapem    
1773 Akyam Abuakwa    
1773 – 1774 Banda    
1798 – 1799 Gyaman     
1800 - 1801  Gbuipe     
1806 – 1807 Assin; Fante    
1809 – 1810 Elmina, Accra    
1811 - 1816  Akuapem, Krobo, Ada    
Sources: Campaign list from Maier (1990) p130, areas of gold supplies from Dickson (1969), p180, trade routes 
from Wilks (1975) p8 
This had profound implications for the market in slaves within the kingdom. After sufficient 
land had been cleared in the seventeenth century, a dual market developed that allowed the 
option to either sell slaves to Atlantic or Saharan traders, or to retain them as producers who 
could additionally augment the prestige of their owners (McCaskie 2003, p38). There was 
therefore always an internal demand that competed strongly with an external one. For most of 
the eighteenth century it seems that the kingdom was able to benefit from both the sale of 
slaves, and from using their labour to produce gold (Maier 1990, Shumway 2014, p 57). 
However, the centrality of gold in the social and economic fabric of society meant that slave 
labour was ultimately more important than their value as commodities, and in the late 
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eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the rising value of gold discouraged the export of 
slaves.  
McCaskie (2003, p 39) argues that gold only started to become scarce, and therefore more 
valuable, after abolition, when the kingdom was required to begin relying solely on the export 
of gold to purchase crucial European goods such as guns and gunpowder. This situation 
exacerbated other factors identified by Wilks (1993, p129), including the melting down of 
gold dust for ornaments, and hoarding. McCaskie is supported by Lovejoy (2011, p167) and 
to a lesser extent by Austin (1995, p101), who note that the glut of slaves in the kingdom post 
1808 helped the development of commodity production. However, the evidence indicates that 
gold was already becoming scarcer in the late eighteenth century. As it did so, demand rose, 
which encouraged output and diverted slaves from export to production.  
From the 1750s the domestic price of gold began to rise and from the 1770s exports 
contracted (Johnson 1966, Metcalf 1987). Barters were always converted into a trading 
currency called the ounce, which contained 16 ackies. This was a means by which complex 
assortments of goods from different points of origin could be valued in relation to the price of 
slaves. In the first half of the eighteenth century, the price of an actual ounce of gold to a trade 
ounce had doubled from 1:1 to 1:2. Johnson (1966) quotes a British trader in 1777 
complaining that it was necessary to buy gold in other parts of Africa at more than the prime 
cost of his goods in order to trade at Anomabo. In his analysis of the accounts of one British 
trader, Metcalf (1987) notes that by 1776 93.6% of his barters for slaves included gold, and 
that this constituted around ¼ the total cost. Both Metcalf and Johnson argue that gold was 
becoming more valuable and the Asante were therefore starting to hoard their supplies instead 
of exporting them. The rise in the value of gold, can also explain why fewer slaves were 
exported in the 1790s and the first 8 years of the nineteenth century, even though the prices 
for slaves on the coast were higher than they had ever been (Lovejoy and Richardson 1995a). 
As will be argued in Section 5.7, the increasing value of gold to all sections of society 
encouraged production, which required greater numbers of slaves.  
To conclude, the presence of gold was crucial to the development of both the institutions and 
trade patterns of the Gold Coast region. It was the basis of wealth and legitimacy for the 
elites, and the principal form of currency in a monetized economy, and therefore central to the 
lives of commoners. As it grew scarcer in the eighteenth century, the productive value of 
slaves would have increased relative to their value as commodities, especially given the rise 
in demand for kola nuts from the newly zealous Islamic states of the savannah. The next 
section will examine how this impacted on the labour decisions of both households and elites.  
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5.6. HOUSEHOLD LABOUR DECISIONS 
I have already argued that there were various reasons why elite groups within Asante were 
willing to actively support the growing commodity trade.185 However, why were households, 
who were the main unit of production for both gold and kola (Dummet 1998, 2010, Lovejoy 
1980, Abaka 2005), prepared to commit their (free and unfree) labour to the expansion of 
gold and kola production? This section will argue that, in common with households in the 
Bight of Biafra, the commodity trade allowed commoners far greater access to the Atlantic 
and savannah markets. This allowed them the opportunity to purchase goods that enhanced 
both their wealth and social status.  
The Asante state held the right to tax both a portion of every item of gold mined and also take 
a share of each person’s gold in the form of death duties (see Section 5.4). Such 
appropriations, while probably not onerous (Austin 1996, p20), naturally led to tax evasion 
and attempts to conceal individuals’ true worth (Wilks 1993, p150). However, there were 
other ways of keeping the states’ fingers off your family’s wealth.  Slaves, unlike gold, were 
not subject to death duties and therefore once purchased became the perpetual property of the 
household / lineage (Lovejoy 2011 p167).186 During the eighteenth century, most slaves were 
captured in wars or received as tribute, so their distribution was largely in the hands of the 
court at Kumasi (Maier 1990). Nevertheless, by engaging in the kola trade, commoners could 
directly purchase slaves from traders at Salaga. Sources from the time note that while kola 
could be exchanged directly for savannah products such as shea butter or manufactured goods 
like Kano cloth (Lovejoy 1980, p13), Asante traders were usually only interested in slaves 
(Lovejoy 1982, p268, Johnson 1986, p346). A further factor was that the Asante followed a 
matrilineal system which meant that property and titles were inherited, not by a man’s own 
children but by those of his sister or nearest female relative. Furthermore, a man’s children 
always had significant responsibilities towards their maternal relatives that often superseded 
those of their father’s. For men with sufficient wealth, the acquisition of slaves, either as 
wives or workers, provided dependants loyal to them, who could be fully exploited both for 
their reproductive and productive potential. 
Thus, another way of estimating the value to the economy of the kola trade is to convert the 
figures on the estimated output of kola into their value in slaves. Bowdich (1819) states that at 
the time he was in Asante a basket of kola was sufficient to purchase a slave from “the 
markets of the interior”.  If this was the case (and of course supposing that they only bought 
people) then the kola trade would have been worth between 1,200 and 15,000 slaves a year. 
To put this into perspective, during the last three decades of the slave trade Gold Coast 
                                                 
185 For example, there were investments in the market town of Salaga, which effectively connected Asante 
producers with their distant customers in the Sokoto caliphate. The state also maintained roads, and ensured that 
local producers did not have to suffer competitors by forbidding non-Asante, and especially Muslims, from 
engaging in either the transportation or production of nuts (Austin 2004). 
186 Bowdich (1819), p254 noted that; “The king is heir to the gold of every subject, from the highest to the lower; 
the fetish gold and the cloths are generally presented by him to the successor to the stool, from which the slaves 
and other property of the deceased are inseparable.” (my italics) 
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merchants (whose main supplier of slaves was Asante) bartered a high of 12,200 and a low of 
3,300 people in exchange for European goods.  
With regard to gold there were a number of other compelling reasons for households to direct 
their labour towards production. For a start, gold continued to increase in value during the 
nineteenth century, not least because the culture of conspicuous consumption at all levels of 
society led to gold dust being melted down and used as ornamentation (Garrard 1980, p112). 
This, and the practise of hoarding or burying gold to avoid taxes, meant that there was never 
sufficient gold in circulation to meet the needs of the entire population. Money was therefore 
very expensive, with loans in the early nineteenth century given 33.33% interest over 42 days 
(McCaskie 2003, p39, Wilks 1993, p129). However, this was of course also an incentive to 
acquire as much gold as possible.  
Furthermore, gold could also purchase greater social prestige in the form of luxury foreign 
products, and particularly cloth, that continued to flow into the country from the Atlantic 
(McCaskie 2003, p50). I have made some very rough estimates of per capita consumption of 
British products imported into the region from 1827187 to 1849 (See Appendix 5.3.a. which 
includes sources and method). By far the most important imports are cotton manufactures and 
cloth, although customers were also demanding significant quantities of glass, earthenware, 
and both manufactured and unmanufactured metals. These easily exceed the number of guns 
and gunpowder barrels essential for military campaigning, which suggests that the trade was 
geared towards luxury consumption and not to provide essential goods for the state.  
Wilks (1993, pp155-156) describes how these goods were distributed to the many smaller 
villages and towns of greater Asante. There were firstly the adwadifo, or small private traders, 
who bought goods in bulk and sold them through salesmen, called mpaafo, who went from 
village to village hawking their wares. They could only trade with permission from the state 
and were required to pay tolls on the main roads through Asante. Then there were the 
Akwantufo or official wholesalers, sometimes private, sometimes state, who were permitted to 
use the great roads free of charge and without interference. The cost of their goods was high, 
Wilks suggests a 500 to 600% mark-up from the coast. The fall in prices of many trade goods, 
due to the industrial revolution, was not, according to this analysis, passed on to their 
customers, with the proceeds instead being accrued as rents by the treasury. Austin (1996) 
questions this, arguing for a far greater involvement of smaller traders, but in any case, the 
situation was accepted by most Asantes as demonstrated by the ever-increasing imports of 
goods throughout the century. Households could buy slaves with kola and then use this 
additional labour to produce gold. This gold allowed them to increase their social status, 
either through display or the purchase of prestigious luxury goods. Alternatively, slaves might 
be used to grow more food, or simply afford more leisure time, thus increasing living 
standards.  
 
                                                 
187 The first year that the British customs records differentiate between regions 
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 5.7. CONCLUSION 
Over the longue durée the patterns of trade in the Asante and Fante areas of the Gold Coast 
region were overwhelmingly dominated by commodity exports, in particular gold, produced 
by a combination of household and unfree labour. It seems that ultimately the event of 
abolition only hastened an existing trend away from slave exports towards a more intensive 
use of captive labour for production. There is little evidence to suggest that had the Asante 
wished to continue selling slaves to American, Spanish or Portuguese traders, the British 
could have prevented them. Instead, this chapter has argued that the mid-to-late eighteenth 
century should be seen as an interregnum when slaves briefly supplanted commodities as the 
most important exports. The region’s initial trade contacts with Europe were very different to 
those of the Bight of Biafra and, more importantly, to the Bight of Benin. The initial 
expansion of Akan states in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was dependent on the 
importation of slaves for forest clearance, and then firearms for more effective armies, both of 
which were paid for by gold. This in turn meant the region’s various polities in the 
seventeenth century were always focused on the control of gold producing areas and the 
application of labour to mining and extraction. As will be seen later for the Bight of Benin, 
states instead focused their efforts on the control over the acquisition and marketing of people 
for export. Within Asante society, the possession and distribution of gold became the most 
important means by which both elites and common households could demonstrate and 
improve their social status and how the monarch could tax its subjects and maintain its own 
position. 
Demand for gold in Africa had the additional consequence that the Asante already had well 
developed trading links with the interior powers of the savannah by the end of the eighteenth 
century. They were therefore never entirely dependent on the Atlantic markets for their 
exports, and were fortunate that an Islamic revolution created huge demand for kola around 
the time of abolition. As the eighteenth century wore on, the evidence suggests that gold 
became scarcer, possibly due to the export of potential productive labour. It seems that the 
decline in slave exports in the 1780s, noted by Austin (2013), was because labour was already 
being diverted to the mines of Asante. The increase in the production of both gold and kola 
would almost certainly have required far more labour. A rise in commodity output was 
certainly to the advantage of households and lineage groups, who could profit far more from 
production than export slavery. For the elites, the absence of military threats meant that 
wealth creation through trade did not threaten their position or power. Instead, increased 
output of both gold and kola meant they gained through taxation and other rents.
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CHAPTER 6 
THE BIGHT OF BIAFRA; THE PURSUIT OF WEALTH BY ALL, AND 
BY ALL MEANS. FROM EXPORT SLAVERY TO SLAVE 
PRODUCTION. 
“King Peppel (of Bonny) was said to be rich. He had inherited his father’s 
wealth, reputed great, in Spanish doubloons and dollars, the price of slaves. And 
by his own palm-oil trade he had accumulated much, which he did not know 
what to do with.” Recorded in 1846 during a visit to Bonny by Waddell (1863, 
p273) 
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter has shown that the Gold Coast region reacted swiftly to the economic 
shock of Britain’s withdrawal from the slave trade. The Asante effectively halted the export of 
captives and instead used its slaves in the production of commodities for both African and 
Atlantic markets. The case of the Biafran region has both similarities and differences. Here, 
export slavery continued in conjunction with a growing commerce in palm oil for sale mainly 
in Britain, until the latter effectively eclipsed the former in the 1830s. In common with the 
Asante, households in Biafra took advantage of the opportunity to engage and benefit from 
the Atlantic market, but demanded a very different selection of products. Numerous studies 
have examined the commercial transitions in the region, although most have framed their 
analysis around the ‘crisis of adaption’ hypothesis set out by Hopkins (1973). The general 
consensus seems to be that the region’s palm oil and slave trades were relatively compatible 
and that the elites, who had previously dominated the slave trade, were able to remain in 
control of the commerce in palm oil, until at least the mid-nineteenth century.188  
Far fewer studies have specifically investigated the pre-abolition roots of palm oil production. 
Northrup (1976 pp361–64), supported by Dike and Ekejiuba (1990, p255) argues that the 
region was in “a state of economic preparedness” for the transition from slave to palm oil 
exporting. This was due to a combination of the networks and markets developed for and by 
export slavery in the eighteenth century, the region’s ecological suitability and, more 
specifically, by the fact that inland farmers were already supplying the coast with large 
                                                 
188 See particularly Northrup (1976), Manning (1986), Korieh (2000), Ejiogu and Njoku (2015) on compatibility 
of the two trades and the initial retention of power by elites. Ohadike (1998), Martin (1988), Lovejoy (2011, 
pp177–84), Law (1995, p12,15) on involvement of small producers. Wariboko (1998) on developments in the 
region’s commercial organisations. Nwokeji (2010, pp178–203) and Dike and Ekejiuba (1990 pp251–60) on the 
later nineteenth century, which did see an increase in competition, militarisation and violence.  
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quantities of foodstuffs for the provisioning of European and American ships. This view has 
recently found support in the volume by Law et al. (2013, p13), whose Chapters 2, 3 and 4 
provide quantitative support to the idea that there was a strong and growing pre-abolition 
export trade in non-slave products in the Bight of Biafran region. The palm oil sector grew 
rapidly, both before, and after 1808 (Lynn 1997, pp61–63), surpassing nominal value of the 
slave trade at its 1790s height in the 1850s (Eltis 2013, Nwokeji 2010, p180, Eltis and 
Jennings 1998, p946). This chapter will argue that commodity exports were becoming more 
attractive than slaves to the merchants of this region, especially from the 1820s as demand 
was more stable and the costs of key trading goods were falling. It will also investigate why 
households, the main unit of production, responded so actively to increased demand for palm 
oil, as was also the case in Asante. It will also ask why the traders and merchants who had 
previously profited so handsomely from the slave trade were prepared to transport and market 
palm oil, while the monarchy and aristocratic elites in Dahomey were unwilling to give up 
export slavery except under conditions of extreme duress in the 1850s.  
I will argue that there are two factors which so far have not been given sufficient attention in 
the literature of the commercial transition in Biafra. The first is with regards to the region’s 
trade relations with Britain, its principal trading partner for slaves in the eighteenth, and palm 
oil in the nineteenth century. Lynn (1997, pp83,84) has noted that many of the first British 
palm oil merchants had previously operated as slave traders and used their existing contacts 
and networks to enter into the new trade. However, I will argue that the role of the British 
state, particularly its policy on excise and import duties, may have played a more influential 
role than previously thought in stimulating investment in the palm oil business.  
Secondly, long-term political and institutional development in the Bight of Biafra was very 
different to the Bight of Benin and the Gold Coast, which were dominated by large, relatively 
centralised states. The expansion of export slavery was made possible by the trading network 
developed by the Aro people, who were to act as the crucial middlemen between the interior 
and the coast. However, this network was only to realise the full potential of the region’s 
slave exporting capacity from the 1730s. While export slavery had been a feature of the 
region’s economy for several centuries, it did not experience the enormous influx of European 
manufactures in the seventeenth century that had such an impact on the development of larger 
political entities on the Gold Coast and the Bight of Benin. Instead, a different form of 
economic and social organisation developed to handle the traffic in people, based on existing 
trade routes between the coast and the interior. The region was famous for having no ‘states’, 
although this did not mean that there was no authority or the ability to organise long distance 
trade (McIntosh 1999, pp11–13). However, as a result of its later entrance into the big leagues 
of slave exporters, the Bight of Biafra did not develop large scale, centralised polities with 
elite hierarchies dependent on external trade for the purchase of luxury goods, or slave 
raiding, as an organising principal of state power. In the Bight of Biafra, elite status was based 
largely on wealth creation through trade of all kinds. This chapter will argue that, as in the 
Asante kingdom, the region’s ‘big men’ benefited at least as much from household 
involvement in palm oil production as they did from the previous trade in slaves, which was 
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not the case in Dahomey. They were therefore willing to use their commercial networks and 
power to facilitate the growth of the palm oil trade. 
The layout of the chapter is as follows. Firstly, it provides an overview of the patterns and 
value of external trade across the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It then examines the 
role of the British state in promoting the palm oil trade, before considering how the region’s 
specific institutional development influenced both internal demand for labour and household 
production.  
 
Area of Study 
Map 6.1. Approximate regions of ‘Igboland’ + principal ports 
 
Source: Nwokeji (2010), pxi, Kolapo (2004), p124 
 
This chapter focuses on the area which can roughly be defined as east of the Niger River and 
South of the Benue river and contained three distinct types of terrain (Nwokeji 2010, p183). 
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Firstly, the low lying coastal regions which had little fertile land and traditionally relied on 
small scale agriculture, fishing and salt, which could be traded to inland regions that lacked 
natural sources of both salt and protein. Next, a broad belt of tropical rainforest which could 
support a much denser population. The indigenous staple crops were yams and the oil palm, 
which were usefully supplemented by those introduced from other world regions such as 
cocoyams, bananas and plantains from Asia, as well as tomatoes, cassava, maize and peppers 
from the Americas.189 The fertility of the soil of this region was quickly depleted in the 
rainforest environment so its inhabitants practised either long fallow agriculture, where land-
extensive conditions made this possible, or engaged in regular migrations to new areas (Dike 
and Ekejiuba 1990, pp36–28). These migrations required the clearance of the dense rainforest, 
helping to scatter palm kernels on fallow or abandoned land. This was to account for the 
density of wild oil palm trees across the region in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
(Northrup 1979, p8, Martin 1988, p22). Further north, the area generally referred to as the 
middle belt, consisted of more savannah like territory unable to support the population 
densities of the south due to its more unpredictable rainfall and poorer natural resources.190  
I will refer to the populations living in the central area of the Bight of Biafra as Igbos and the 
area as Igboland, and the area to the south as Ibibioland (see highlighted area on Map 6.1 
above). These terms are not precise and cover a multitude of different, but related, cultures 
and language groups living under a wide variety of institutional arrangements (see below). 
They are also controversial terms, as some have argued that they are a European construction 
stemming from the overgeneralisations of slave traders and colonialists (Byrd 2010, pp20,21). 
However, others have suggested that the region did possess a degree of cultural unity based 
on shared history, traditions and language.191 I take the view that, while acknowledging that 
both identity and borders were fluid concepts in this period, there is sufficient evidence to 
speak of this area as having a broad ‘Igbo’ or ‘Ibibio’ identity.192 
 
6.2. EXTERNAL TRADE  
The first account by a European of the Bight of Biafra was written between 1501 and 1508 by 
the Portuguese explorer Duarte Pacheco Pereira. He noted that a large village, which Fage 
(1980, p71) suggests was Bonny, was already engaged in significant trade with the interior. 
Salt produced at the coast was exchanged for yams, cattle and slaves, which were transported 
from the interior in canoes carrying up to eighty men. The Portuguese were able to participate 
in this trade through the exchange of ‘copper manillas’ for captives and provisions. It was 
                                                 
189 Isichei (1976) believes all of these crops might have been introduced by the Portuguese in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries (p7). 
190 Nwokeji (2000), quotes one author as saying that the area “...has all the diseases and problems of forest and 
savannah, but not compensating advantages, except a general absence of population pressure.” (p628). 
191 To get an idea of how contentious this debate can be, refer to a series of articles and responses in the journal 
Slavery and Abolition. See Northrup (2000), Chambers (2002), Kolapo (2004). 
192 See Isichei (1976), Dike and Ekejiuba (1990), Ohadike (1994), McIntosh (1999). 
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ultimately based on the requirements for salt and fish in the interior, and for agricultural 
produce on the coast which did not have a suitable ecology for farming. Similar circumstances 
were observed around 150 years later by the Dutch physician and traveller Olfert Dapper 
(1676, p136 – 137). He wrote that at Elem Kalabari: “The blacks bring their slaves for sale 
on the Calabar river, and take their boats up to our ships, the same traders also deal in food 
and sell yams, bananas, palm oil, goats and dogs.”193 In addition to slaves and provisions, 
Dutch merchants could also buy akori (coral beads), ivory and locally made knives. In terms 
of numbers of slaves exported into the Atlantic, the region averaged around 1,200 per year 
during the seventeenth century. As noted in Chapter 1, this was very like other regions of 
West Africa until the 1670s, when slave sales from the Bight of Benin increased rapidly.   
In the Bight of Biafra, it wasn’t until the Aro trade network expanded into the central and 
southern regions of Igboland in the 1730s (see below Section 5), that the region became a 
major exporter of slaves (Lovejoy and Richardson 1999, pp382,383, Nwokeji 2010, p20). 
Between 1700 and 1720 an average of 1,711 captives were embarked from Biafran ports, 
compared with an average of 13,388 in the last twenty years of the century. Throughout the 
period under study, the three ports of Bonny, Old Calabar and Elem Kalabari were 
responsible for over 90% of slave departures, with Bonny by far the most important at the 
time of abolition.194 Lovejoy and Richardson (1999, 2004) argue that Bonny’s success lay in 
more efficient institutions for the regulation of credit with Europeans, and for greater 
efficiency in terms of provisioning and loading times. While agreeing with this assessment, 
Nwokeji (2010) and Behrendt et al (2010, p107) argue that it was principally due to Bonny 
being better positioned on the trade routes from central Igboland, which contained the 
region’s densest concentrations of people and most efficient riverine connections to the coast 
(Map 6.2). Largely as a result, the Bight of Biafra had become West Africa’s most important 
slave embarkation point by the 1780s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
193 This is the author’s translation. The original reads: “De zwarten, die de slaven in reiere Kalbarien in hun 
kanoos te koop brengen, en daer mede aen boort van onze schepen komen, voeren ook eten voor dezelve mede, 
dat zy verkopen, als Injames, Bananessen, oil de Palm, Verkens, Bokjes en Hoenderen.” 
194 Europeans sometimes referred to coastal town of Elem Kalabari as ‘New Calabar’ to distinguish it from ‘Old 
Calabar’ on the Cross River estuary (Lovejoy & Richardson 1999, p335). This is actually a misnomer as Elem 
Kalabari is in fact an older settlement (Dike & Ekejiuba 1990, p33), but for the purposes of this thesis I will 
always refer to it as ‘Old Calabar’  
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Map 6.2. Trade routes from the interior to the coast in the Bight of Biafra 
 
Source: Chuku 2015, p43 
As noted above, all of these ports were in areas unsuited for the cultivation of yams195, and 
were always dependent on importing their food from the surrounding regions (Northrup 1979, 
p6).196 The existence of established trading networks for food goes a long way to explain why 
and how the region was able to develop the extensive provisioning trade for slave ships that 
was outlined in Chapter 3. From the middle of the eighteenth century, Old Calabar began to 
increase its output of commodities, perhaps in reaction to the growing dominance of Bonny in 
the slave trade and the impact of the American revolution on merchant shipping in the 
                                                 
195 Icichei (1976) writes of the central place of the yam in both the diet and culture of the region. She notes that 
in Biafra, the ‘hunger season’ did not necessarily indicate that there was no food, but that there were no yams 
available (p28).  
196 This was known to British traders at the time. For example, one trader, a Mr Penny, related to a Parliamentary 
Committee on the slave trade in 1788 that : “ At Bonny the country produces a few yams etc, but not sufficient for 
their subsistence. A great quantity of yams are produced at Andomey and Creek, which supply the town of 
Bonny, and are brought in canoes for the supply of the ships in the trade. At New Calabar the produce is much 
the same, and the inhabitants are obliged to be supplied with their provisions from the neighbouring countries.” 
(p70) 
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Atlantic (Behrendt et al. 2010, pp80–97 and Appendix 6.1). As shown in Chapter 4, sales of 
ivory and redwood grew rapidly from the 1760s, which was probably due to the establishment 
of trade links with Duala merchants who had access to larger herds of elephants, and trees, on 
the Cameroon grasslands (Behrendt et al. 2010 p92). From the 1770s, palm oil started to be 
exported from Old Calabar in response to increased European demand, which was initially 
met by households in the Ibibio region who had also supplied slave traders with yams and 
other provisions since at least the early eighteenth century.197  
After abolition, palm oil exports increased and, while slave sales did not rise to the levels 
reached at the end of the eighteenth century, they still recovered due to the return of vessels 
from Portugal/Brazil, France and Spain/Uruguay. Most importantly, until at least the 1840s, 
the palm oil and slave trades were largely compatible, as they were transported along Aro 
trade routes and handled through either the canoe house trading organisations at Bonny 
(Wariboko 1998, Manning 1986, p224, Lovejoy 2011, p180) or the ‘mercantile oligopoly’ at 
Old Calabar (Lynn 1997, p61). The region’s geography was a crucial factor in the rapid 
expansion of the palm oil trade. Not only were palm trees grown in abundance, but oil could 
be easily transported to the coast along navigable rivers and waterways (Lynn 1997, p37). As 
already noted, the region had developed an inland to coast trade on the ‘largest canoes in West 
Africa’ before European contacts (Northrup 1976, p362).198 During the era of the slave trade 
the waterways and canoes were a crucial part of the region’s ability to rapidly transport large 
numbers of captives to the coast (Byrd 2010, p28). In the nineteenth century, this riverine 
network was crucial to the development of the palm oil trade. Household producers could 
leave relatively small quantities of oil at bulking depots, which could then be loaded and 
transported in quantity down to coastal trade towns (Isichei 1976, p95, Northrup 1978, p195, 
Oriji 1992, p542). 
Until the 1820s Old Calabar was the region’s principal exporter of palm oil, but around this 
time Bonny entered the trade, and by the 1840s it had become by far the most important 
centre for oil exports.199 In the interior, the increased production of palm oil, especially in 
Ibibio and Igbo areas, created an important market for food imports from other regions. Igbo 
merchant adventurers began creating new settlements in the north eastern middle belt region, 
where slave villages were established for yam production (Northrup 1979, p10, Manning 
1986, p217, Lovejoy 2011, p179). Along the coast, the growth of towns also encouraged more 
                                                 
197 Northrup (1976, p363) quotes Barbot (1699) as saying that Old Calabar was being supplied with provisions 
by the kings of Agbisherea, a form of the Efik word for Ibibio. In the 1820s, Bold (1823, p78) says that the 
people of ‘Egbosherry’ were still among the major suppliers of palm oil. 
198 In the 1670s, the Dutch traveller and physician Dapper (1676, p136) saw “…..zeer grote kanoos daer in 
twintigh roeiers of scheppers op ieder zijde roeien, en wel zestigh ja tachtich mannen in kunnen gevoert 
worden…” In the nineteenth century Wariboko (1998, p146) notes that these canoes could carry up to 80 people 
in addition to large quantities of palm oil. 
199 Lynn (1997, pp20, 21) has made the most extensive study of output from Biafran ports. The earliest reliable 
statistics he quotes are from the early 1850s. These give Bonny as providing 36.6% and Old Calabar providing 
13.9% of all British palm oil imports. Another report from 1855 suggests that, within the Bight of Biafra, Bonny 
exported around 65% of oil and Old Calabar 16%.  
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intensive use of slaves in agriculture (Manning 1986, p12) and also for the transportation of 
palm oil and slaves. By the late 1830s the slave trade began a decline from which it did not 
recover, so that by the time of the parliamentary report on trade with Africa in 1842 the 
witnesses were able to state that the era of the slave trade was over.200  
The next question is whether this switch entailed significant opportunity costs for those 
involved with slave exports. In the following section, this will be examined from a purely 
monetary/financial perspective. In Sections 6 and 7, the wider impacts on labour and 
production in the region will also be analysed.  
 
6.3. THE VALUE OF THE COMMODITY TRADE AND ‘COMEY’ 
In her study of the slave trade at Bonny, Hargreaves (1987, pp196–198) suggests that the 
decline of slave exports was financially harmful, at least to the elites, as palm oil did not bring 
in as much revenue as captives. By contrast, Northrup (1978, p182) writes that “…the ports of 
the Bight of Biafra hardly seemed to miss an economic heartbeat…” and made a relatively 
painless transition into the era of ‘legitimate commerce’. This section compares the nominal 
value of the slave trade at its height with that of palm oil during the first half of the nineteenth 
century to test the extent to which the wider region’s economy suffered or thrived. My 
estimates are based on the average prices of slaves from 1795 to the 1850s on the coast, using 
data on the number of captives from the TSTD and prices from Lovejoy and Richardson 
(1995). Admittedly, the set of data on prices and estimated output of palm oil from Bonny and 
Old Calabar is limited (for sources see Figures 6.2a, 6.2b). The figures for palm oil are 
conservative as they only include output to Britain, and there is some evidence that other 
nations, especially the Americans, were also beginning to enter the market.201  
When comparing the nominal prices of slaves and commodities, it was only in the 1850s that 
palm oil overtook the late eighteenth century value of slave exports (Figure 6.1.a, 6.1.b), 
which confirms earlier estimations made by Eltis & Jennings (1988, pp939,946). There are, 
however, two important aspects to be taken into consideration. Firstly, palm oil was not traded 
for specie but for an assortment of trade goods.202 As noted in Chapter 4, the price of British 
trade goods to Africa had been falling since the 1780s. Recent research by Frankema et al. 
(2015, p37) has shown that terms of trade with Great Britain for those selling palm oil in 
Africa improved by just under a factor of 4 between 1800 and 1850, and this may be an 
                                                 
200 1842 (551) (551-II) Report from the Select Committee on the West Coast of Africa; together with the minutes 
of evidence, appendix, and index. Part I.--Report and evidence.  R. Levinge “Formally at Bonny I have seen 20 
vessels in the river all engaged in the slave trade; now there is not such a thing there.” 4000, p227/228.  Midley 
“A great number of the principle slave dealers in the Bonny river…..have given all their energies to palm oil..” 
4121 p233  
201 In the 1842 report, one merchant interview stated; “I believe a great deal of it goes to America, but nearly so 
much as to England” 2220 Dring, p113. It is possible that French ships may have come as they were starting 
their involvement in the palm oil trade at Whydah during the 1840s (see Chapter 7).   
202 See for example Bold (1823, p81) for the articles of trade commonly used to purchase palm oil 
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underestimation as it does not take into consideration significant falls in the value of key trade 
goods such as salt (see Sections 6.4, 6.7). As a result, African traders were receiving 
significantly more goods for the same nominal value of products traded and therefore, as 
noted by some at the time, profited more.203 Secondly, demand for palm oil during the first 
half of the nineteenth century was subject to considerably less volatility than the trade in 
slaves. For example, around 15,000 slaves were embarked on ships from the Bight of Biafra 
in 1774, which fell to 294 in 1779. In 1794, more than 25,000 captives left the area, while just 
over 2,000 did just one year later. In the nineteenth century, volatility was less, but still 
significant with differences of up to 5,000 from year to year even before the equipment act of 
1839 made British abolition efforts more effective (Appendix 6.2). By contrast, demand for 
palm oil rose steadily, and with few significant fluctuations throughout the first half of the 
nineteenth century.  
Figure 6.1.a. Estimated nominal value (GB £) of the slave and commodities trade at 
Bonny 1795-1850 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
203 1842 Report on the slave trade: Clegg (Supercargo for Tobin and Horsfall) Evidence p92 1649 “You have 
stated that the supply of goods from this country to the coast of Africa has greatly increased in your experience; 
has the tendency of that increased supply in your opinion been to lessen or increase the slave trade? To lessen 
the slave trade; they scarcely take the trouble of buying slaves in Bonny now, they get so well remunerated by 
palm oil.”  
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Figure 6.1.b. Estimated nominal value (GB £) of the slave and commodities trade at Old 
Calabar 1795-1850 
 
Sources: Slave Prices at the coast from Lovejoy and Richardson (1995). Slave numbers from TSTD, variables 
‘Principle Port of Embarkation/Slaves embarked*. Palm oil prices: Old Calabar 1820 Bold (1822), p81, Bonny 
1821 Adams (1823), p245, Old Calabar 1821 Adams (1823) p247, 1830 Old Calabar /Bonny Lynn (1992), p80, 
Bonny 1842 1842 (551) (551-II) Report from the Select Committee on the West Coast of Africa; together with 
the minutes of evidence, appendix, and index. Part I.--Report and evidence. Clegg Evidence 1652  p92, Old 
Calabar / Bonny 1855 Latham (1973), p71. Palm Oil quantities: Lynn (1997), pp13-21. 
The elites and workers of coastal ports also benefited from various taxes and payments for 
services which Europeans were obliged to pay in order to trade (these were often referred to 
as ‘customs’ or ‘comey’). These were in operation throughout the slave and palm oil trades, 
but there are so far no estimates about the relative value of these payments in the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to the people of the ports. The only reference to the 
income gained by coastal elites comes from a letter written by the commander of the anti-
slave trade patrol who suggested that King Pepple of Bonny earnt £4,000 a year “…arising 
from the tonnage duty levied upon British merchant vessels trading in the river.”204 Other 
traders and local citizens could also demand ‘comey’, so to estimate a figure for the port of 
Bonny as a whole, I have tried to discover how much each ship visiting would have had to 
pay. There are currently few accurate figures regarding exactly how many palm oil ships were 
trading and where exactly they went. The 1842 parliamentary report on West African trade 
states that in 1840, 36 British vessels visited Bonny for palm oil, which I have assumed to 
have stayed constant in the following two years.205 Adams (1823, p245) states that in the 
1820s every ship had to pay £150 ‘comey’ for the right to trade. Lynn (1992, p83) suggests 
that in the 1830s this may have been as high as £200 or as low as £50. I stay with a figure of 
£150 for my estimate, as reports at the time suggested the trade was becoming more, not less, 
                                                 
204 Capt Tucker to the Secretary of the Admiralty May 25 1841, 1847-48 [970] Papers relating to engagements 
entered into by King Pepple and the Chiefs of the Bonny with Her Majesty's naval officers, on the subject of the 
suppression of the slave trade, p15 
205 1842 (551) (551-II) Report from the Select Committee on the West Coast of Africa; together with the minutes 
of evidence, appendix, and index. Part II.—Appendix, Index and Map, p33. 
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expensive.206 Lynn (1997, p73) notes that in addition traders had to pay ‘custom’ on each 
puncheon of palm oil at a rate of 1 bar (equivalent to a British shilling in the 1840s207), as well 
as a ‘work bar’ for every 20 puncheons loaded. Furthermore, ‘dashes’ or tips were expected 
around every transaction amounting to around 5sh / puncheon (Lynn 1997, p 73). Lynn (1997, 
p19) estimates that Bonny was providing between 35% and 50% of Britain’s palm oil in 1840. 
Using the CUST records, and working with the ‘Bonny Puncheon’ of 240 gallons / ¾ ton 
(Law 1995b, p13), I can estimate roughly how many puncheons were exported from 1840 to 
1842, which can be seen in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1. Nominal value of palm oil customs at Bonny (GB £) 1840–1842 
Year 
Tons of 
Palm Oil 
exported 
Puncheons 
of Palm Oil 
exported  
Custom 
Bar £ 
Work 
Bar £ 
Dashes 
£ 
Comey 
£ 
Total 
Customs 
Palm Oil £ 
1840 6,703   8,379 3,491 175 3,491 5,400 12,557 
1841 8,438 10,547 4,395 220 4,395 5,400 14,409 
1842 8,929 11,161 4,650 233 4,650 5,400 14,933 
Sources: see text 
During the apogee of the slave trade the value of customs / comey was likely to have been 
higher, but probably not significantly so. Behrendt et al. (2010, p67) give a high figure of 
£1,800 paid by the Bristol merchant James Rogers in the late 1780s at Old Calabar. This 
however is unlikely to be representative for Bonny, as it was known to charge lower customs 
(Lovejoy and Richardson 2004, p371), and Rogers himself was known as a rather inefficient 
trader (Morgan 2003). There are also figures available for two Old Calabar bound ships, the 
Dobson and Fox in 1769 / 1770, who paid around £900 / ship (Behrendt et al. 2010, p67). I 
take an estimate of £1000 / ship for comey, dashes etc and, for lack of other data, assume that 
this remained the same over the period. This meant that the average for the period from 1797 
to 1840 was £10,119. If it is to be assumed the amounts paid remained the same after 
abolition, the average income earned from custom from 1808 to 1830 was £6,304.  However, 
as demonstrated by Figure 6.3, this masked a good deal of variation, with some years 
generating a lot of income and others very little. Furthermore, in the nineteenth century, the 
customs from slave ships was an additional income to that of palm oil to brokers who traded 
in both captives and commodities. In this respect, we must assume that the ending of export 
slavery did financially impact coastal merchants, although this was unlikely to have been 
                                                 
206 1842 Parliamentary Report on the Slave Trade pt1. Capt T Midgley interviewed: “4110 There has been a 
great increase of palm oil and it has got much dearer than it was some years ago, owing to the opposition in the 
trade a great number of merchants being embarked in it. 4112 The natives have become more aware of its 
value? – They have” 
207 1842 Parliamentary Report on the Slave Trade pt1. Clegg evidence p 89 1581  
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severe, due to the rising demand for palm oil and because income from the non-slave trade 
had the considerable advantage of being far less volatile.  
Figure 6.3. Estimated nominal value of customs at Bonny (GB£) 1797–1840  
 
Sources: TSTD (variable Principle Place of Embarkation/Voyage ID), references above 
The benefits of palm oil trading were not equally spread across the region. For example, the 
town of Elem Kalibari, which had previously been a major exporter of slaves, was not able to 
begin exporting oil in significant quantities until the 1850s due to competition and military 
aggression from Bonny (Wariboko 2014, pp106,107). However, for Bonny and Old Calabar 
and for the region as a whole, the costs associated with the region’s involvement in palm oil 
trade over the first half of the nineteenth century were certainly not high from a financial 
perspective. One reason for this was, as noted above, that demand from Great Britain grew 
rapidly, and steadily, especially from the 1820s. The next section examines the role of 
exogenous factors, in particular the role of British foreign and economic policies, on the 
development of the palm oil trade and the decline of slave exports.   
 
6.4. BRITAIN AND PALM OIL TRADING 
In terms of the output of slaves from the region, British abolition efforts had a modest impact 
for the first 25 years. Post abolition numbers were lower due to the slave trade shifting to the 
southern Atlantic (Eltis 2009), but recovered in the 1820s as prices in West Africa became 
more competitive (Appendix 6.3). However, the specific timing of Biafra’s exit from the 
Atlantic slave trade was at least partly influenced by British anti-slavery policy. The 
imposition of the ‘equipment clauses’, a policy which allowed British naval vessels to board 
and detain ships on the grounds that they contained the necessary equipment for carrying 
slaves, seems to have had some impact. After Spain reluctantly agreed to submit to this policy 
for their vessels in 1835, slave numbers fell precipitously (Figure 6.4). The equipment clause 
was then imposed unilaterally on Portuguese / Brazilian ships in 1839, but slave exports had 
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already been falling since the previous year. This may have been due to the fact that in 1837, 
the ruling elite at Bonny had signed a treaty with the British agreeing to the cessation of slave 
exports.208 This is unlikely to have been because they were unable to export slaves, as 
numbers of captives on Brazilian ships were rising at the time, and British merchants with 
some knowledge of Bonny admitted that ultimately there was little that could be done to 
prevent determined slave ships from taking captives.209 Officers from the slave trade patrol 
squadron made numerous complaints that the King of Bonny was regularly violating his 
agreement with the British and exporting slaves through other ports from 1838 to 1842.210 
However, what is striking is that even though the Bonny elites had the ability to continue their 
involvement in export slavery, the numbers sold were far less than the previous decade. Thus, 
while the slave trade patrols almost certainly played some role in reducing slave exports, there 
must have been other factors at play.  
Figure 6.4. Portuguese/Brazilian + Spanish/Uruguayan slave exports from the Bight of 
Biafra 1830 - 1850   
 
Source: TSTD 
                                                 
208 PP 1847-48 [970] Papers relating to engagements entered into by King Pepple and the Chiefs of the Bonny 
with Her Majesty's naval officers, on the subject of the suppression of the slave trade: April 9th 1837, p1  
209 In 1842, John Clegg and Richard Baily, both British merchants who traded at Bonny, told a parliamentary 
committee that if the chiefs at Bonny wished to resume slave trading then British cruisers would be unable to 
stop them 1842 (551) (551-II) Report from the Select Committee on the West Coast of Africa; together with the 
minutes of evidence, appendix, and index. Part I.--Report and evidence. 
210 One set of parliamentary papers provides the correspondence between naval officers and the British 
government during the period when the King of Bonny was negotiating a treaty to end his involvement in the 
slave trade (PP 1847-48 [970] Papers relating to engagements entered into by King Pepple and the Chiefs of the 
Bonny with Her Majesty's naval officers on the subject of the suppression of the slave trade). After the 
agreement was signed there were numerous complaints that he and other traders were still engaged in the export 
slave trade. For example; Lieutenant Burslem to Commander Tucker September 1840 “…a constant supply of 
slave are sent by canoes through the creeks to the Rivers Brass and Nun for shipment..”. Commander Tucker to 
the Secretary of the Admiralty February 1841 “….the King has the power to suppress the Slave Trade, but will 
not it being too lucrative…” Capt. Foote to the Secretary of the Admiralty August 1842 “….the more I see of 
these Kings and chiefs, the more I am convinced of the utter uselessness of entering into Treaties with them, for 
they will take all they can grasp from England and only carry on the slave trade to a greater extent with it.” …. 
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With regard to the development of the non-slave trade in the Bight of Biafra, demand side 
factors had some role in encouraging supply. During both the American War of Independence 
and French Revolutionary Wars, the Biafrans saw the most extreme fluctuations in the 
number of ships visiting their ports, as English merchant shipping was particularly affected by 
these conflicts (Appendix 6.1). Behrendt et al. (2010) argue this was a factor influencing 
merchants at Old Calabar to diversify their output. However, Bonny, the most important port, 
did not undergo the commercial transition to palm oil until the early 1820s, so these conflicts 
were not a decisive factor. More important was the fact that the British were the most 
significant customers for Biafran slave traders in the eighteenth century. As argued in Chapter 
4, slave merchants trading in Biafra were already beginning to buy significant quantities of 
palm oil and other commodities in addition to slaves after the 1770s. In the post abolition-
period many former Liverpool slave traders such as the Aspinall family, John Tobin, Jonas 
Bold and James Penny became successful oil traders by using their existing networks and 
contacts at Bonny and Old Calabar (Lynn 1997, p83). More importantly, many of these 
merchants had previously taken most of their slaves at Bonny and therefore focused their post 
abolition efforts on this port, thereby helping stimulate supply.211 However, regardless of 
whatever advantages they may have enjoyed in this market, unless the economic climate was 
favourable to their interests there was nothing preventing them from investing in other 
markets outside of Africa.  
 
Figure 6.5. Index of palm oil prices £/cwt 1770 – 1850 (1770=100) 
 
Sources: To 1816 see Chapter 4, 1816 – 1850 Prices Current Liverpool Mercury 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
211 The TSTD indicates that of the important early pioneers of the palm oil trade, George Case, the Aspinall 
family and John Tobin all focused their pre-abolition slave trading operations on Bonny. 
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Figure 6.6. Index of the volume palm oil imported into Great Britain 1770–1808 
(1770=100) 
 
Sources: TNA CUST 17/1-17/30 
Figure 6.7. Index of the volume of palm oil imported into Great Britain 1770–1850 
(1770=100) 
 
Source: TNA CUST 17/1-17/30, 4/5-4/45 
 
As can be seen from Figures 6.5 to 6.7, from 1770 to around 1808 increased output was 
matched by rapidly rising prices. There was then a sharp fall in price, which was briefly 
interrupted after the end of the Napoleonic wars. However, from the early 1820s prices went 
through a relatively stable three-decade period characterised by a slow upwards trend. 
Clearly, rising demand played a role and the stability of prices was also an important 
consideration, but increased mark-ups, which had been a feature of the palm oil trade from 
1770 (see Chapter 4), were no longer a potential motivating factor. Yet there is another 
possible element in the equation that has so far gone unremarked in the literature. The British 
government’s policies with regards to import and export duties, either deliberately or 
inadvertently, did much to support the growing British palm oil trade in the first half of the 
nineteenth century.  
In 1818, a parliamentary committee put forward new duties on African products, which 
required adjustment after the end of the Napoleonic conflict (Table 6.2). The price and 
quantity of all major African commodities fell quite substantially in British markets in the 
period 1814 - 1816 and this led to a fall in the amount of some imported commodities 
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(Appendix 6.4 and Appendix 6.5). While I have found no direct evidence, it appears that the 
committee decided to increase or maintain the duty payable on items being imported in 
smaller quantities, while decreasing that paid on commodities which were bought in greater 
volumes. This makes sense as duties were charged by weight, so to maintain its income the 
government needed to charge more for imports that were becoming relatively more scarce. 
However, for products such as palm oil, which was being imported in greater quantities, they 
could afford to decrease the duty by an impressive 61% (Table 6.2). Thus, for the Liverpool 
merchants who had dominated the trade with Biafra since at least the 1760s (Morgan 2007, 
Lynn 1997, p83), there was a positive circle of increased demand leading to lower duties, 
which helped to offset the falling prices in British markets after 1818 (Figure 9).  
 
Table 6.2. Parliamentary Papers: Committee for trade: Statement of Proposed Duties on 
African Imports, 1 December 1818 
   
Present Duty Proposed duty 
% increase 
/ decrease 
Articles of African 
Produce 
Duty 
weight 
£ Sh d £ sh d 
 
 
Elephants teeth 
cwt 3 19 2 4 
  
+1 
Gold Dust  
Duty 
free   
Duty 
free   
n/a 
Guinea Pepper lb 
 
1 7 
 
2 6 +58 
Gum Senegal cwt 
 
11 10 
 
12 
 
+1 
Hides Piece 
  
4 
  
6 +50 
Beeswax cwt 3 6 6 3 6 6 0 
Camwood ton 1 18 
  
15 
 
-61 
Ebony load 1 
 
7 
 
15 
 
-27 
Palm Oil  cwt  6 4 2 6 -61 
Redwood ton 1 18   15  -61 
Source: From Newbury (1965), p84 
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Figure 6.8. Palm oil prices £/ton + duty paid in £ on a ton of palm oil 1818 – 1845 
 
Sources: Prices: Liverpool Mercury: Prices Current 1817 – 1845, Duties: 1818/1819 Newbury (1965), p84; 
1834, 1840 1840 (601) Report from the Select Committee on Import Duties, Forster p129 512 – 519; 1843 
Newbury (1965), p84; 1845 Lynn (1997), p97  
Duties continued to be reduced after 1839 and this again coincided precisely with a period of 
falling prices on British markets. There is some evidence that the reduction in duties was 
directly linked to the wider policy of eradicating the slave trade through the promotion of 
‘legitimate commerce’. In an 1840 report on trade duties, the commissioners make the explicit 
link between the growth of ‘legitimate commerce’, the decline of slavery and the rates of duty 
imposed on African products. One merchant interviewed was no doubt acting in self-interest 
when he reported that the reduction in the duty on palm oil was responsible for a rise in 
quantity purchased by merchants, but it also seems logical that a decrease in transaction costs 
would be beneficial to traders.212 This issue was also raised in the 1842 parliamentary report 
on the slave trade. The report’s author was clear that promoting ‘legitimate commerce’ was a 
key strategy designed to stop the Atlantic slave trade,213 and another merchant also urged the 
                                                 
212 1840 (601) Report from the Select Committee on Import Duties; together with the minutes of evidence, an 
appendix, and index, p 129. Mr Ewart to Mr Forster: “1509 In a moral point of view is not it of great 
consequence as respects the question of slavery? Undoubtedly, because if ever slavery is to be done away with, 
you can only do away with it by introducing commerce and cultivation. 1510 The high duty puts a stop to the 
introduction of commerce in that article? – Clearly so. 1511 Have not the productions of that part of the coast of 
Africa very much increased when they have been allowed to come in on equitable terms; for instance, palm oil? 
– Considerably, there are persons still living I believe, who can recollect when the quantity of palm oil 
introduced into this country annually did not exceed a few tons. Now, I believe, it is from 15,000 to 20,000 tons a 
year.”  
213 1842 (551) (551-II) Report from the Select Committee on the West Coast of Africa; together with the minutes 
of evidence, appendix, and index. Part I.--Report and evidence. Mr Aldam to Madden, 9817, p638 “Do you think 
that the legitimate trade of the Bonny was one great cause of the slave trade being put down there? It had a very 
great influence there…” 
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commissioners to lower the duty on goods on the grounds that this was essential in the fight 
against slavery.214  
Even more important was the cut in the duty paid on salt, the essential trade good for Biafran 
palm oil (see Section 7) following parliamentary recommendations in 1818.215 Largely due to 
the reduction of duties, the price of salt dropped by over 7 times between 1820 and 1825 
(Table 6.3) which further offset the falling price of palm oil in the home market. Whether this 
support was intentional or not is unclear, but the reduction of duties on salt and palm oil 
greatly reduced business costs for British merchants.  
Table 6.3. Salt exports from Britain to Africa 1780 - 1825 
Year Salt Exports Africa (bushels) Salt Price / cwt (pence) 
1800 66,537 388.506 
1805 82,559 466.308 
1812 60,452 553.245 
1815 64,408 550.449 
1820 130,720 540.384 
1825 290,932   75.871 
Sources: TNA CUST 17/22, 17/27, 9/1, 9/3, 9/8, 9/12, Clark (2006) 
External factors were therefore significant. Firstly, there were merchants with relevant human 
and economic capital who were motivated to expand their palm oil businesses, and who could 
cater to an expanding British market for African commodities, especially palm oil. These 
merchants were in turn supported by fairly significant cuts in import and export duties. With 
the old duties on palm oil and salt, a merchant in 1816 was paying around 7.3% of the selling 
price of a ton of palm oil in Liverpool to the British treasury for importing oil and exporting 
salt. By 1825, this figure had reduced to 1.6% of the price of a ton in domestic markets.216 
Secondly, abolition efforts in the 1830s put some pressure on Biafra’s main slave trading 
centres. However, unlike in Dahomey (Chapter 7), there is little evidence that local merchants 
sought to develop alternative methods to evade or circumvent the slave trade patrols, even 
though this would have been more than feasible. For a full explanation, it is therefore 
necessary to turn to the endogenous factors that were influencing the region’s export trade 
patterns.  
 
                                                 
214 1842 (551) (551-II) Report from the Select Committee on the West Coast of Africa; together with the minutes 
of evidence, appendix, and index. Part I.--Report and evidence. Campbell 8879, p561 “….I think every 
restriction should if possible be taken away from the legitimate trader, in the way of tax or duty, making him give 
good security that he would in no way barter with, or introduce any of the usual article for the slave trade, more 
particularly spirits, gunpowder, arms.” 
215 (393) Report from the Select Committee on the Laws Relating to the Salt Duties 
216 Calculation based on the quantities of salt needed for a ton of palm oil from Bold (1823, p82) and the duties 
in Table 2. Palm oil prices from Price Current, Liverpool Mercury 1816 and 1825 (see Chapter 4).  
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6.5. INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN BIAFRA 
Since at least the ninth century, the region was settled by groups with complex political 
arrangements, practising long distance trade and supported by advanced iron working 
technology (Isichei 1976, pp7–14). As noted above, the trade in slaves did not become 
substantial until the mid-eighteenth century. This was for a number of reasons; firstly, local 
trade networks could not deliver sufficient numbers of slaves. Secondly, European traders and 
plantation owners in the Caribbean felt that slaves from the Bight of Biafra were more 
unhealthy and weaker than those from other regions (Nwokeji 2010, pp34–36).217 Thirdly, the 
expanding demands for export slaves from Northern European nations with recently acquired 
American possessions were being met by other areas, in particular the Bight of Benin and 
West Central Africa. Moreover, there were no gold deposits to attract commodity traders. 
Therefore, unlike the two other case study areas, the region did not experience the same 
degree of trade contact with European nations until relatively later. These contacts were one 
of the most significant spurs to the development of more centralised states in the Gold Coast 
and Bight of Benin (see Chapters 5 and 7). By contrast, the Bight of Biafra developed more 
decentralised political institutions, which shaped its trade relations with the Atlantic world. 
There were three broad types which are relevant to this thesis. Along the coast, and in 
particular at Bonny and Old Calabar, towns developed that had a particular focus on trade. In 
the interior, there were a plethora of village level groups which projected their power over a 
limited territory. Finally, there was the Aro confederacy, whose pan regional trading network 
was a necessary component in the transformation of the Bight of Biafra into the most 
important slave exporting region in West Africa by the 1750s.  
The Aro rose to prominence for two reasons. Firstly, their capital at Arochukwu lay close to 
major regional markets, such as Bende, and was also only 6 hours by canoe to Old Calabar, 
and 2 days to Bonny and Elem Kalabari (Dike and Ekejiuba 1990, p 44). Even more 
importantly, Arochukwu was home to one of the region’s most important religious centres, 
the Inbiniukpabi oracle. This functioned as ‘highest court of appeal, including for the coastal 
city-states and communities on the west side of the Niger River’ (Nwokeji 2010, p6), and gave 
the Aro a unique authority that transcended political and social boundaries (Northrup 1978, 
Dike and Ekejuiba 1990). Those taken to the oracle and judged guilty were metaphorically 
‘eaten’ and taken by the Aro for sale as slaves. This authority was crucial, as a high 
proportion of the region’s export slaves found themselves in the holds of American bound 
vessels resulting from judicial proceedings, as opposed to capture through violence (Nwokeji 
2010, pp130,179, Martin 1988, p27). Individuals did engage in the kidnapping of others in 
order to sell them to other traders, but this was a risky strategy as the penalties if they were 
caught were severe (Nwokeji 2010 p131, Ejiogu and Njoku 2015, p11–15).218 Furthermore, 
                                                 
217 Recent scholarship has shown that this bias was based on solid evidence as the mortality of captives 
embarked from the Bight of Biafra was higher than for other West African regions (Eltis 1989, Klein & 
Engerman 1997, Klein et al. 2001) 
218 The former slave Olaudah Equiano, whose autobiography was a key testimony for abolitionists (1794), was 
captured in this way, see pp31,32. However, he also notes his village sold “…such among us has had been 
convicted of kidnapping, or adultery and some other crimes we esteemed heinous.” pp12,13 
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the Aro did employ various Cross River and Aboh Igbo groups as mercenaries who they used 
both to gain additional captives and enforce their authority (Nwokeji 2010 p6,131).219 They 
also occasionally encouraged local communities to attack other villages.220 However, unlike 
in the other two case study regions, slave raiding did not contribute significant numbers of 
slaves, although small scale kidnapping was quite common (Behrendt et al. 2010, p103).  
The reason deserves some explanation. In both the Gold Coast and Dahomey the introduction 
of firearms on a large scale led to significant military revolutions in the seventeenth century, 
which involved mass deployments of musket wielding soldiers capable of large-scale military 
campaigns. By the time the Biafran region became an important slave exporting area, a very 
different set of institutions had developed, which allowed for the efficient ‘production’ of 
slaves to meet growing American demand without the raids common in the Gold Coast and 
Dahomey (Nwokeji 2010, p127). Thus, while the Aro did use guns, their mercenaries 
typically did not, relying instead on more traditional weapons and the element of surprise. 
Military operations were more successful in the semi-savannah areas of northern Igboland, 
but further south, the dense forest environment hampered coordination, and raids provoked 
effective defensive responses (Oriji 1992, p179, 180). In addition, local communities did not 
generally engage in raids or warfare that ‘produced’ slaves. Furthermore, the region was 
relatively densely populated (Nwokeji 2001), and the literature has suggested that this 
encouraged the development of social and legal institutions to manage conflict, further 
discouraging the use of large scale violence to acquire captives (Dike & Ekejuiba 1990, p162, 
Anywanwu 1992, Noah & Ekpo 1992, Ohadike 1992,1998). In such circumstances, slave 
raiding expeditions under the command of powerful elites were not an option. Instead, the 
region’s captives were acquired through the development of a complex trade network, which 
relied on effective cooperation between the Aro, local ‘big men’ and the commercial towns at 
the coast. This meant that the region’s elites developed a very different set of priorities to 
those in Dahomey.   
The Aro established themselves as slave traders in the seventeenth century by developing 
strong ties with elite groups in Old Calabar, and a trading network that allowed captives to be 
taken from regional markets to the coast. In the later seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries they began a pattern of expansion in which groups of Aro would migrate and set up 
Aro communities in other areas, known as mmuba or proliferation (Nwokeji 2010, p2). The 
first settlements were established around the Arochukwu and then spread eastwards into 
Ibioland and Central Igboland in the 1720s. Each community was linked back to the capital 
through their lineage group and was required to regularly return for festivals, to pay tribute 
and recognise the authority of their lineage heads and the king (Dike & Ekejiuba 1990, pp64–
                                                 
219 These groups had developed a social distinction between ufiem (heroes), who had seen battle and brought 
home heads from a campaign, and ufo (cowards) who had not. The latter group were seen as social outcasts until 
they had brought home heads. The Aro typically took any survivors as slaves (Oriji 1992, p179). 
220 Equiano (1794) noted that such conflicts were more common during times of famine or were encouraged by 
slave traders. However, the consequences of failure were high for those engaging in such actions “If he prevails 
and takes prisoners, he gratifies his avarice by selling them; but if his party is vanquished, and he falls into the 
hands of the enemy he is put to death…” (pp15,16). 
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70, Nwokeji 2010 p96). In the interior and at the coast they forged links with local elites 
through shared membership of secret societies, such as the Okonko in the Ngwa region 
(Martin 1988, p27), the Ekong in Ibibio territories (Noah and Ekpo 1992, pp189,190) and the 
Ekpe at Old Calabar (Behrendt et al. 2010, p31). These societies were common across many 
regions of Africa, providing horizontal or cross cutting lines of authority to manage disputes 
and enforce legal punishments (McIntosh 1999, Osafo-Kaako & Robinson 2013). Within 
Biafra they played an especially important role in the enforcement of contracts, which 
allowed Europeans to provide goods ‘on trust’ to coastal merchants, who could in turn rely on 
their ties to the Aro and interior elites to provide either commodities or slaves (Nwokeji 2010, 
pp6,78).  
The extent to which the Aro represented a pan region ‘state’ is debated. Northrup (1978) and 
McIntosh (1999, p11) argue that the Aro created nothing more than a trade network that 
allowed goods to be traded from the coast to the interior. By contrast, Dike & Ekejiuba (1999, 
p55) suggest that this organisation had ‘state like structures’, while Nwokeji (2010, p14) 
suggests that “The Aro were the only group in the region that deliberately and consistently 
established settlements abroad for the purposes of trade that were tied to the homeland 
through system-wide institutions.” He argues that while the various Aro settlements had a 
good deal of autonomy, they nevertheless were willing to submit to the distant authority of the 
capital to benefit from the prestige of representing the capital, and to deter enemies who were 
wary of offending the wider community. Another guide to understanding the nature of the Aro 
is through the work of North et al. (2009). They note that in pre-industrial societies most 
states did not contain strong institutions, relying instead on coalitions of elites which were, 
according to the context, passably effective at maintaining power. A ‘fragile order state’, 
which corresponds closely to the Aro, can be characterised by “...simple institutional 
structures / private elite organizations that can extend to province level….elites that only 
commit to observe laws to facilitate trade and in the face of external threats….patron-client 
networks….elites capable of organizing violence against internal threats and to maintain 
trade…. simple laws that govern the relationships among individuals based on social identity 
and stipulate a set of rules that patrons can use to make decisions.” (pp42-43). However, one 
characterises the Aro, they were highly efficient at managing the flow of people, commodities 
and trade goods to and from the coast, through their contacts and relationships with village 
elites and traders at the ports.  
Therefore, across the region the most common forms of political organisation contained elites, 
whose power and prestige did not rest on the maintenance of state structures such as 
bureaucracies, armies or the enforcement of tribute over dependent territories. The more 
common form of institutional organisation rarely went above village level. Here, rank and 
social prestige could be achieved through the purchase of titles in secret societies, and by 
acquiring wealth through trade (Ohadike 1994, p87). There were some exceptions; on the 
Niger River at towns like Aboh and Attah there were kings, although their authority seemed 
to have also largely rested on trade and it was unlikely they could project power much further 
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than the banks of the Niger.221 Along the coast, while certain families tended to monopolise 
power, individuals were never able to make their positions hereditary, and success depended 
on their continued wealth-generating capacities. For example, in the nineteenth century Duke 
Ephraim of Old Calabar had managed to secure lifelong positions as both head of the Ekpe 
secret society (Eyamba) and the town council (Obong), but was unable to pass these positions 
onto his children (Latham 1973, p115). During the eighteenth century one family or ‘trading 
house’, the Pepples, were able to gain an ascendancy over the other elites, but were still only 
first among equals and needed to rule in cooperation with other houses. In the nineteenth 
century, the Pepples remained the most powerful house, but no single individual was ever 
able to gain ascendancy over both trade and politics without provoking determined opposition 
(Hargreaves 1987, pp174,193–196).   
What linked these elites and regions was trade, be it in palm oil or people. Trade was not only 
beneficial but essential to elite power. However, there are two further important questions to 
consider. Firstly, did the region have sufficient labour available to both increase its output of 
palm oil and to continue exporting captives? Secondly, how did the focus on palm oil 
production impact on the Aro and their slave network? 
 
6.6. THE DEMAND FOR LABOUR AND THE INTERNAL SLAVE TRADE  
Martin (1988) has argued that production of palm oil was carried out largely by households 
through a greater exploitation of female labour. This has been criticised by Korieh (2000) and 
Lovejoy (2011) who argue that slaves were an essential labour component, even in the more 
densely populated areas of central Igboland that had largely avoided the negative 
demographic consequences of the eighteenth century slave trade (Nwokeji 2000). This is an 
important argument for this thesis as the Aro had built their wealth and influence on the slave 
trade. If palm oil production in the nineteenth century required more coerced labour, then any 
fall in slave exports to the Atlantic would have been compensated by rising internal demand. 
Conversely, if households did contain sufficient labour capacity then the Aro would have 
suffered a fall in income.  
Most of the literature indicates that the expansion of the palm oil trade did require a 
corresponding increase in the number slaves. Palm oil production was extremely labour-
intensive and the task fell disproportionately on females, who also had numerous other tasks 
including childcare, cooking, cleaning, agriculture and trading (Nwokeji 2010, p182). To get 
some idea of the scale of the increase it is possible to calculate roughly how many additional 
days’ labour were required. Palm oil during this period was classified as either ‘soft’ or 
                                                 
221 The explorers Laird and Oldfield (1837) described meeting the Kings of both Attah and Aboh. In the case of 
Aboh, they note that the king’s power came from his controlling the flow of palm oil and provisions on a key 
point of Niger (pp97,101,103). A more recent study by Nwaubani (1999, pp102–06) agrees that Aboh political 
economy was based on their ability to act as a market for trading coastal and interior products, and that the 
king’s power was limited to the river and could not be enforced much further inland.  
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‘hard’, depending on how much free fatty acid (FFA) it contained. Low levels of FFA meant 
it was soft and could be used for the manufacture of soap, glycerine and for machine 
lubrication. Hard oil with higher levels of FFA was used for candles and lower quality soap. 
The softer the oil the more labour-intensive the production process (Lynn 1997, pp46,47, 
Maier 2009). Northrup (1976, p361) quotes a study from the 1930s222, which suggests that 
semi-hard palm oil required around 250 days’ labour to produce a ton. Reid (1986, p348) 
takes estimates from the (unpublished) Phd dissertation of Patrick Manning to give a figure of 
315 days’ labour per ton, but does not specify if this is for hard or soft oil. An observation 
from the first half of the nineteenth century gave a rough estimate that a slave along the Niger 
could produce a ton of oil in a year.223 Lynn (1997, p49) is more specific, giving a figure of 
132 days for hard oil and 420 for soft, which roughly corresponds to Maier’s (2009 p15) 
estimation that the production of soft oil required five times as much labour. Since we do not 
know exactly what proportion of oil was soft or hard, I take a middle figure of 250 days’ 
labour / ton. 
Labour was also required to transport oil from villages to bulking centres next to the rivers, 
from where the oil would be transported to the coast (Martin 1988, p28, Lynn 1997, p48).224 
Ohadike (1998), quoting a text from the 1920s, suggests that “…a carrier could carry a head-
load of between 50 and 60 pounds…. between 15 and 25 miles a day.”225 Reid (1986) in a 
study on Dahomian palm oil suggests 35 lbs of oil (around 4 gallons) in containers weighing 
around 15 lbs, which seems reasonable as Lynn (1997, p48) suggests that most oil was carried 
in earthenware containers. Lynn’s (1997, p48) own estimations are that that oil may have 
been carried in multiple journeys with each load between 1 and 5 gallons. For the purposes of 
this study it will be conservatively assumed that porters took 4 gallons or 35lbs per trip, and 
that it took around a day to get to and from the bulking centre. Therefore, a day’s labour was 
required for every 4 gallons of palm oil, and 64 days for each ton. In terms of the quantities of 
palm oil, Lynn (1997, p20) quotes published figures showing that 65% of Great Britain’s oil 
                                                 
222 A. F. B. Bridges, 'Report on Oil Palm Survey in the Ibo, Ibibio and Cross River Area', 1938, appendix VII, 
MSS. Afr.s. 679, Rhodes House Library, Oxford; Daryll Forde and Richenda Scott, The Native Economies of 
Nigeria (London, I946), 52. 
223 "An able- bodied slave is at present worth about four pounds' worth of British goods, and when he is shipped 
he can produce nothing more. But supposing he was kept in his native country, he might be very slight exertion 
produce one ton of oil per annum, which would be worth eight pounds or purchase double the quantity of British 
goods." Oldfield & Laird (1837) Narrative of an expedition into the interior of Africa, by the river Niger, p 361 
224 This was described by Captain Becroft and his surgeon Mr King in the early 1840s, who described such a 
centre north of the Calabar on the Cross River. Palm oil was “….disposed of to the Eboes on the opposite side of 
the river, who at present dispose of it to the native traders from New Calabar and Bonny.” 
225 Reference: Alan McPhee The Economic Revolution in West Africa (1926 pp54,55). This estimate seems 
relatively accurate. Studies among the Luo in Eastern Africa have shown that women can carry up to 70% of 
their bodyweight through headloading. Modern experiments show that both men and women can carry 20% of 
their bodyweight on their heads, without expending additional energy, so long as they are skilled by learning this 
from childhood (Heglund et al. 1995). I take an estimation, of 50%. Eltis (1990) estimates that the mean height 
of Biafrans during this period was 163.7cm. Taking a modern height/weight and, making the reasonable 
assumption that slaves were generally likely to be on the border between a healthy weight and underweight, this 
would give a rough weight of 50kgs. This means each person could carry around 25 kilos or 55 lbs / trip. 
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was coming from Biafran ports in 1851. I take this as a very conservative figure as, in the 
1830s, areas such as the Bight of Benin and the Gold Coast were not exporting oil in great 
quantities, nor does it include exports to other countries. Taking these figures, we can estimate 
that by the 1830s palm oil production for the export trade required at least an additional 
2,000,000 days’ labour. This was equivalent to the full-time labour of around 5,500 people 
per year and the figure was to more than double by the 1850s (Figure 6.9). To put this into 
context, in the twenty years before abolition the Bight of Biafran region exported an average 
of 13,524 slaves a year. In the twenty years after 1807 the annual average was 5,641, which 
meant that captives who would previously have been exported were instead diverted into a 
growing internal economy.  
Figure 6.9. Additional days’ labour in the interior of the Bight of Biafra to produce palm 
oil for the British market 
Sources – see text above 
The degree of slave labour almost certainly varied from region to region. Korieh (2000, p603) 
suggests that outside of the Ngwa area studied by Martin (1993), many Igbo regions were 
enthusiastic users of slaves in the production of palm oil. This view is supported by Dike & 
Ekejuiba (1990, p257) and Ejiogu & Njoko (2015, p257) who argue that slaves were 
purchased in greater numbers in Igboland throughout the nineteenth century, either to 
augment household labour in the production of palm oil, or to grow food for areas where 
household labour was more fully engaged in palm oil production. This latter activity seems to 
have been especially important for the supply of captives in the internal market. Food 
shortages were reported in the coastal region in the late 1820s (Northrup 1979, p9) and 
European travellers were meeting farmers in the Niger delta region with up to 200 slaves, in 
the 1840s, who were at work growing yams for towns to the south (Ohadike 1992, p191). In 
Northern Igboland slave villages were set up to provide food for those in the palm belt region, 
often with direct Aro support and supplies (Northrup 1979, p10, Nwokeji 2010, p183). There 
was also increasing demand for slaves from households with rising levels of incomes, and 
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from elites who wanted people for sacrifices at the funerals of wealthy men and women (Dike 
and Ekejuiba 1990, p256),226 and for coastal canoe house trading organisations in need of 
labour to man canoes or headload the oil (Lovejoy 2011, p180). Thus, even areas with denser 
populations would have required additional coerced labour as argued by Lovejoy (2011, 
p144), and it should be noted that the falls in slave prices in the early nineteenth century (at 
least for male slaves) would have made fulfilling this requirement more feasible for a greater 
number of people (Nwaubani 1999, p101, Lovejoy and Richardson 1995b). In addition, these 
figures also show that the region could therefore not have continued to simultaneously export 
slaves and increase its output of palm oil. Indeed, a tipping point was reached around late 
1820s when exports of captives to the Atlantic began an irreversible decline (Figure 6.10). 
Figure 6.10. Palm oil imports (lbs) into Great Britain and slave embarkations from the 
Bight of Biafra with trend line 1808 - 1850 
 
Source: TSTD, TNA CUST 4/5-4/45 
Importantly, the literature strongly suggests that it was the Aro who were providing these 
slaves, and continued to do so until the British invasion in 1902 (Northrup 1979, p10, Korieh 
2000, p599, 608, Dike and Ekejuiba 1990, p235). This is not to say that the nineteenth century 
was not to cause problems for the Aro. As new producers entered the market, new trade routes 
opened that began to bypass the Aro (Dike & Ekejiuba 1990, p257, Martin 1988, p28). When 
Europeans began to establish factories in the 1860s and use steamboats to connect directly to 
local suppliers, the Aro began to lose control over the middleman trade (Dike & Ekejiuba 
1990, p257, Kolapo 2002, pp24,25). In addition, the slump in oil prices and the economic 
recession of the 1870s was extremely disruptive (Manning 1986, p226, Lynn 1997, p151). 
However, for the period under study, the Aro’s slave trading network was still just as busy 
transporting the higher value slaves, either for the external or internal markets, as it was palm 
                                                 
226 For a fuller discussion on the role of human sacrifice across West Africa see Law (1985). For his analysis of 
the increase in human sacrifice in the Biafran region, and his criticisms of an earlier paper by Isichei (1978, 
p469), see pages 70 – 72.  
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oil. The material power and interest of the region’s trading elites were therefore not affected 
by the development of the palm oil industry. The next question is, why were households 
prepared to invest so much labour into the production of oil (Northrup 1976, p361)? 
 
6.7. HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION OF PALM OIL 
This section will argue that non-elite households had a number of powerful incentives to 
invest their (free and unfree) labour in the production of palm oil. Primarily, the palm oil trade 
gave them access to the Atlantic market, which had previously been monopolised by elite 
groups. This meant that a far greater number of people had the opportunity to purchase goods 
that could improve their standard of living. Importantly, this did not mean that elite 
households lost out, as they continued to benefit from the commodity trade.  
As noted above, the Bight of Biafra was unusual in that the majority of its captives were sent 
into Atlantic slavery as a result of judicial punishments, as opposed to capture in raids or 
wars. This was made possible through cooperation between the Aro and local elites (Northrup 
1978, pp70-73, Nwokeji 2010, pp134-35). The provisioning trade seems mainly to have 
operated relatively close to Old Calabar and Bonny and was controlled by local elites running 
large plantations (Behrendt et al. 2010, p93). Therefore, during the period of the slave trade, 
participation in long-distance exchange was probably not an option for the majority of people 
living in the palm oil belt.   
Palm oil production led to non-elite households entering the market, which is suggested by 
changes in trade products brought to the region. One way to illustrate this is to examine the 
cargoes of different types of merchant ships from the port of Bristol. As noted in Chapter 4, 
the city was unique in the 1790s for sending both specialist slave and commodity ships to 
Africa. The Bristol port authorities published a twice-monthly newsletter called the Bristol 
Presentments, which detailed the import and export cargoes of ships entering the ports, in 
addition to their clearance and arrival dates. An analysis of the average quantity of different 
types of goods loaded onto commodity and slaving vessels heading to ports in the Bight of 
Biafra, shows that commodity vessels required a very different selection, which suggests that 
they were intended for a different group of consumers (see Appendix 6.5). The slaving vessels 
provided the same kinds of cargo that was demanded by elites in other regions, namely a large 
quantity of cloth, metals, guns, gunpowder and ammunition. By contrast the commodity 
vessels seem to have carried less expensive foreign cloth, and greater amounts of cheaper 
British fabric. There is far less metal and almost no gunpowder, weapons or ammunition. The 
most striking difference is the huge quantity of salt, which became the most important item of 
trade for palm oil, but was of little importance to the slave trade.227 
                                                 
227 In their analysis of trade goods on Biafran slaving vessels in the late 1760s/early 1770s, Behrendt at el. (2010, 
pp58–68) make no mention of salt. Latham (1973, p73) also notes that it was a product entirely associated with 
the palm oil trade. 
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One trader in the 1790s noted that at Old Calabar “Palm Oil is very plentiful. Ships carry very 
large quantities home of late from place – It is in general bought for salt, one measure or 
crew of salt for one of palm oil (p52)” and advises traders to “…take care and reserve as 
much salt as will do your business for palm oil...” 228. Capt. Thomas Cobb, writing to Bristol 
merchant James Rogers from Old Calabar in 1792, informs his employer that “I have 
discharged all the salt and taken on board nine butts four pipes ninety-one puncheon and 
three hogsheads of palm oil. It far exceeds your order for oil but the salt would not command 
redwood nor scarce any one article but oil…”229 This situation remained unchanged at Old 
Calabar until at least the 1820s, when Capt. Edward Bold (1823) noted that every assortment 
of trade goods used to barter for oil required salt at a ratio of around 4:6 and that “Salt is a 
very profitably and commanding article here, therefore you cannot bring too much….” 
Adams (1822 p263) writing about the expanding trade for palm oil at Bonny noted that “…as 
the palm oil trade increases…..salt, in all probability will become more in demand, vessels 
trading there take at present about fifty tons each.” The customs records also show that the 
expansion of the palm oil trade was accompanied by a corresponding increase in salt exports 
to Africa (see Table 6.1 above). 
This trend continued into the nineteenth century. From 1828 the British customs records begin 
to provide more accurate geographical information, both for goods going to and coming from 
Africa. Goods coming from the Gold Coast region were grouped under “Cape Coast Castle 
and the Gold Coast from Cape Apolonia to the Rio Volta” and it is fairly certain that most of 
the trade goods going to the region “Coast South of the Volta with the Island of Fernando Po” 
were destined for Biafra to be exchanged for palm oil.230 I have taken a sample from 1828 to 
1832 to compare the types of products that were being sent to the two different regions. 
Valued in current prices in British markets, the value of commodities from Biafra (around 
84% of which were palm oil) was around 1.75 times greater than those from the Gold Coast 
(see Appendix 6.6). The differences in the goods that were exchanged for these products is 
striking (Table 6.4). The Gold Coast region, despite the lower value of its exports, bought 
relatively more cloth and clothing and had a preference for iron manufactures. Ships going to 
Biafra catered for both the elites and non-elites. Thus, there are large numbers of iron bars, 
guns and gunpowder but also more low quality material (‘Slops and Negro Clothing’), as well 
as half a million pounds of salt, which is absent from trade goods going to the Gold Coast.  
 
 
                                                 
228 British Library, Add Mss 12131, ‘Mr Parfitt’s information on Trade between Sierra Leone and Cape Lopez w. 
Islands St Thomas etc’ and ‘Extract of a Diary Kept by E.L. Parfitt on the Board of the Sierra Leone Company’s 
Ship Calypso’, Papers Relating to Sierra Leone, ff. 174 – 320, p83 
229 C107/6 Letter from Thomas Cobb, Captain of the Triton, January 19th 1792 Old Calabar.  
230 South of the Volta essentially meant all of Africa from the borders of modern day Ghana to the Cape of Good 
Hope. However, as noted in Chapter 2, neither the Bight of Benin nor West Central Africa were exporting 
commodities during this time and therefore had very little trade with Britain. Palm oil dominated exports and the 
vast majority was bought in Biafra.  
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Table 6.4. Quantities of goods imported into the ‘Gold Coast’ and ‘Coast South of the 
Rio Volta’ regions 1828 - 1832 
Product Unit Gold Coast Coast South of Rio Volta 
Apparel Pieces 243,628 36,176 
Calicoes Pieces 867,381 1,588,744 
Cotton Manufactures Yards 2,663,696 2,742,946 
Woollens Manufactures Yards 5,243 517 
Hats Pieces 10,780 60,013 
Muslins Pieces 28,316 520 
Slops and Negro Clothing Pieces 28,224 196,896 
Brass lbs 62,374 96,826 
Copper lbs 0 5,040 
Iron Bar Pieces 1,157,248 8,816,640 
Iron Wrought lbs 130,676 20,048 
Tin lbs 8,988 4,256 
Glass Pieces 107,093 183,128 
Salt lbs 0 515,780 
Soap lbs 21,651 121,845 
Staves Pieces  4,730 62,684 
Gunpowder lbs 1,191,867 6,847,205 
Guns Pieces   70,263 195,690 
Source: TNA CUST 8/27 – 8/36, 10/19 – 10/23 
The differences indicate that the Gold Coast region was far more interested in what might be 
termed luxury items, which had a role in signalling status and wealth. By contrast in the Bight 
of Biafra, there were large numbers of customers who were more interested in items that 
improved more basic standards of living, such as soap for cleanliness, cheap clothes for 
themselves or perhaps their slaves and of course, salt. The latter item would have had a 
significant impact on the lives of less privileged households. In his study of salt in Western 
Sudan, Lovejoy (1986) notes that “Salt satisfies a physiological need, and it may well be that 
salt is also man’s earliest addiction.” (p1). In the rainforest belt of West Africa, this need 
may have been much higher for two reasons. Firstly, the heat of the tropics means people 
sweat more, which raises the craving for salt. Secondly, the tse-tse fly, with its debilitating 
impact on livestock production, meant that people living in this region had far less meat in 
their diet, which is a natural source of salt. Isichei (1976, p31) and Martin (1988, p28) note 
that the only alternative in the forest zone was potash (vegetable ash), a far less appealing 
source of salt than sodium chloride which was beginning to be mass produced cheaply in 
Britain at the turn of the nineteenth century (Lovejoy 1986, p18, Latham 1973, p74). More 
salt also allowed for the possibility of importing greater quantities of salted preserved meat to 
supplement the protein-deficient diets of those in the forest. Martin (1992, p28) notes that 
until the mid-twentieth century farmers in the Ngwa region spent a good deal of their income 
on salted fish from the coast, Europe or Northern Nigeria and that “…this scarcity of salt, 
cloth, meat and fish did not prejudice the survival of Ngwa farmers, but it did provide them 
with a strong incentive to engage in regional trade.” Equiano (1794, pp12,13) also suggests 
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that dried, salted fish was “...esteemed a great rarity…” in Igboland and was an important 
part of regional trade.231 
The general patterns of trade indicate that more households were entering the palm oil market 
to buy goods that could improve their standards of living.  However, this phenomenon did not 
threaten the power of existing elites who were able to benefit even more than commoner 
households (Manning 1986, p227, Lynn 1997, p58, Korieh 2000, p599). Village heads often 
had power over the allocation of communal land, where wild palms were common. In 
addition, they enjoyed access to greater resources of labour, as they generally had more 
wives/children and/or slaves. They were also more likely to be members of secret societies, 
such as the Okonko in the Ngwa region, whose contacts with local Aro merchants afforded 
easier access to more coerced labour, which in turn allowed them to increase production 
(Martin 1988, p32). Of course, these conditions were not unique to the Biafran region, but 
what was different was that, while local village-level elites probably gained more from the 
new trade, they did not dominate or monopolise it. The demand for goods was therefore not 
driven by a status conscious elite looking to preserve the existing hierarchy, as was the case in 
Dahomey and, to a lesser extent, Asante.  
These changes were not positive for everyone. By the mid-eighteenth century salt production 
at the coast, which had long been the basis of the local economy, was crowded out by cheaper 
foreign imports (Northrup 1978, p213).232 However, over the nineteenth century foreign 
imports greatly benefited producers of palm oil. Martin (1992, p29) and Lynn (1997, pp68,69) 
note that during this period the region saw an increase in cheaper products which, in addition 
to salt, included Lancashire textiles, tobacco from America and gin from the Netherlands. 
These became accepted as forms of currency for small scale transactions in the region, thus 
helping stimulate more market activity. In addition, like Asante, production for the market 
gave previously poorer households the possibility of acquiring additional labour in the form of 
slaves (Ohadike 1998, p192). This labour could be used to either gain more wealth or provide 
more leisure time to free members of the household. For the Aro, it had the additional benefit 
of bringing many new customers for their principal product (Dike & Ekejiuba 1990, p257). In 
short, there were plenty of very good reasons why households were motivated to greatly 
expand their production of palm oil in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
                                                 
231 There has been some doubt over whether Equiano was actually from Africa. Carretta 2005 has suggested that 
he was in fact born in Carolina and his African heritage was an invention to help promote the abolitionist cause. 
However, both Nwokeji (2006) and Lovejoy (2006) have argued strongly against this hypothesis, saying that it is 
far more likely that Equiano was born and raised in Igboland.  
232 Adams (1823, p139) noted that salt was still being produced in the western half of the Niger Delta and at 
Bonny and Calabar (pp118,122,139), and members of one of the Niger Expeditions saw that it was still an 
industry in Brass (Lander & Lander 1832, Vol 3, p237), but after this, sources do not list it as one of the local 
industries. 
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6.8. CONCLUSION 
Chapters 3 and 4 showed that in the Bight of Biafran region, the transatlantic slave trade did 
not crowd out other forms of commercial exchange, even after the rapid expansion of exports 
from the 1740s. Producers in the interior responded to demands for provisions and, from the 
1770s, for commodities. This was partly the result of having long established commercial 
networks between the interior and the coast, which were facilitated by efficient riverine trade 
routes. Furthermore, the region was particularly well endowed with natural resources, in 
particular oil palms and tropical hardwoods, for which there was a growing demand in the 
expanding industrial economies of Europe. However, this chapter has argued that these 
factors do not by themselves explain the nature and timing of the region’s commercial 
transition.  
Just as importantly, institutional development in the area was very different to that of either 
the Gold Coast or the Bight of Benin. Until the Aro opened the central Igbo region to 
transatlantic slavery in the early eighteenth century, embarkation numbers had never been 
high. Without the stimulus of luxury trade goods and military technology, the political 
competition and military revolutions that marked the other regions did not occur. Instead, 
systems of elite order developed that were able to monopolise external trade, without strongly 
hierarchal systems of order based on military power. For the Aro traders, the powerful ‘big 
men’ of the interior and the merchant elites at the coast, power and wealth were always 
ultimately dependent on trade of all kinds. The broadcast of authority, enforcement of tribute 
or military reputation, all of which were facilitated by slave raids, were never as important. 
Slaves were generally not acquired through large-scale, organised violence and were always 
traded alongside commercial agricultural products and commodities.  
This institutional setting meant that at the start of the nineteenth century, the region was not, 
like Dahomey, economically or politically dependent on the transatlantic slave trade. The 
unilateral and sudden withdrawal of the British was of course an economic shock, but the 
transition to palm oil was relatively smooth for three key reasons. Firstly, those who had 
previously grown rich from slave trading did not, in the long run, lose out financially and 
probably gained. The Aro could continue to sell slaves to a growing internal market, while 
still controlling the trade routes that handled palm oil. The ‘big men’ of the interior became 
the largest producers of oil and the merchants at the coast continued to gain from marketing a 
new product that was significantly less volatile than slaves. Secondly, commoners, who had 
previously been largely excluded from trade with the Atlantic, gained access to trade goods 
that could materially improve their standards of living. Thirdly, the British government helped 
to incentivise ex-slave traders to invest in palm oil, which ensured that the new market grew 
steadily over the first half of the nineteenth century.  
While the diplomatic and military campaign against transatlantic slavery remained relatively 
weak, both captives and commodities could continue to be traded side by side, as had been the 
case in the eighteenth century. However, a combination of increasing labour demands for the 
production of palm oil and food, combined with the impact of more effective measures 
against slavers in the 1830s, was sufficient to bring the export of captives to an end. This was 
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a largely positive choice, where merchants decided to focus on an export sector that had 
already been growing for more than 60 years. By contrast, the Dahomean monarchy and 
ruling elite only grudgingly began to support the development of palm oil exports in the late 
1830s, and strove to maintain their output of captives for as long as possible. The reasons why 
are the subject of the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 7 
THE BIGHT OF BENIN, DAHOMEY AND THE DOMINANCE OF 
EXPORT SLAVERY 
“It was the slave trade that made him terrible to his enemies, and loved, 
honoured and respected by his people. How could he give it up?” King Gezo of 
Dahomey, as reported by the British diplomat, Thomas Cruikshank (1848, p7) 
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter will tackle the question of why the region of the Bight of Benin that came to be 
controlled by Dahomey remained focused for so long on the export of captives, in contrast to 
the Gold Coast and the Bight of Biafra. The evidence presented in Chapter 2 suggests that an 
aversion to the non-slave trade characterised this area throughout the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. In Chapter 3 it has been argued that the region never seriously engaged 
in the provisioning trade throughout the long eighteenth century. In Chapter 4 it has been 
shown that Dahomean merchants did not respond to the rising European demand for African 
commodities in the late eighteenth century. Other studies of the region have also pointed out 
that the Dahomean elites remained committed to export slavery for longer than other areas of 
West Africa during the nineteenth century (Thomas 1999, Klein 2010, p65, p695 – 996, 
Lovejoy 2011, pp 171 – 172). This chapter will show that the slave trade in the Bight of Benin 
developed earlier, and with far greater intensity, than in either the Bight of Biafra or the Gold 
Coast. I will argue that this early engagement encouraged the development of more 
centralised, militarised states with elites, dependent on the slave trade to maintain their 
political and economic power. In addition, the region’s ecology ensured that states could not 
easily gain the kind of regional ascendancy enjoyed by the Asante. As a result, even the most 
powerful state along the coast, Dahomey, was continuously threatened by powerful 
neighbours until the 1820s, and always faced competitors for slave exports in the region. 
These conditions reinforced a state ideology based on military power and expansion in order 
to acquire more captives.  
The state of Dahomey thus developed an institutional rigidity which affected the late 
commercial transition in the nineteenth century. Greater centralisation and powerful elites 
monopolised much larger shares of the available female and coerced male labour force to 
serve their economic and political agendas. The kingdom’s armed forces were more 
professionalised, and mobilised far more regularly, than in the other case study areas, which 
meant that a greater amount of labour was required to produce food for larger numbers of 
non-productive people. Furthermore, warfare disrupted agriculture by taking away producers 
from the land when the military required extra manpower. In addition, the demographic 
impacts of the slave trade and its attending violence led to a severe demographic decline 
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across the region. While the kingdom of Dahomey may not have suffered as much as the areas 
that its armies raided, the fall in population limited the pool of both free and coerced labour 
available for other forms of economic activities. Therefore, households and lineage groups, 
which had driven the commercial transition in the other case study regions, had far fewer 
opportunities here to expand their output of export commodities. 
This interpretation goes against the ‘crisis of adaptation’ argument put forward by Hopkins 
(1973) and supports the broader conclusions of Soumonni (1995) that the gradual abolition of 
the transatlantic slave trade did not fundamentally undermine the power basis of the 
Dahomean elites. At the same time, however, this case confirms the intuition of Hopkins’ 
thesis, namely that a change from a slave export based economy would weaken the 
foundations of elite authority and provided non-elite households with the opportunity to 
increase their wealth and influence. I will argue that without elite support, an alternative 
export sector would not have emerged, and that the elites changed their focus only after the 
abolition policies of the British effectively shut down the transatlantic slave trade. Finally, I 
will argue that it seems plausible that the high demands of the state and its army were the 
reason why the Dahomeans abstained from exports of food provisions to slave ships during 
the long eighteenth century. 
The chapter is organised as follows. It presents an analysis of the long-term trade contacts, 
beginning in the seventeenth century when the region first became important for slave 
embarkations, and which supports the analysis of the region’s long-term commitment to slave 
trading given in Chapters 2 and 4. It then provides an analysis of the comparative value of the 
palm oil and slave trades, suggesting that the palm oil trade was less valuable to the 
Dahomean elites than the slave trade. The next section argues that the most important slaving 
nations in the region, Portugal and France, were not significant buyers of commodities, but 
that this was not a key variable. Instead it will be argued that the development of a highly 
stratified military state, and the labour demands of the elites and their armies, were the 
primary determinant of the continued focus on slave export trading up to the 1840s.  
 
Area of study 
Geographically, the Bight of Benin was a 200 mile / 320 km stretch of coast extending from 
the Cape of St Paul on the Rio Volta in the west to Cape Formosa in the east (Map 7.1).233 
The area was geographically united through what is known as the Benin Gap, where the 
rainforest belt is interrupted by a savannah landscape that was more characteristic of West 
Africa’s interior (Law 1991, p19). Nonetheless, as argued in Chapter 1, the region’s ecology 
was suitable for oil palms, with the potential to transport them to the coast. The origins of the 
Dahomean kingdom are unclear, but it was probably initially formed in the early seventeenth 
century by refugees or settlers who displaced or conquered the original inhabitants of the 
                                                 
233 The region was also referred to as the Slave Coast, which was a term to denote a trading region between the 
Volta River and the port of Lagos. 
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Abomey plateau. The plateau was situated around 100 km from the coast, bounded on two 
sides by the Koufo and the Zou (which became the Weme) rivers. The Dahomean state had 
initially expanded across the Abomey plateau during the seventeenth century, as a tributary of 
the more powerful kingdom of Allada. Under one of the first Dahomean kings, Wegbaja 
(1650–1680), a number of military reforms were carried out, including the adoption of and 
more effective use of firearms, and a centralization of warfare and justice under the king 
(Thornton 1999, p82, Reid 1986, p26). This process of political centralisation was continued 
by subsequent monarchs and the kingdom developed a level of military organisation that was 
far more potent than any of its southern neighbours (Reid 2012, pp 82, 83). Dahomey became 
the major inland supplier of slaves to the Alladans and Huedans (Law 1991, p185), and under 
King Agaja defeated and conquered these two states in the 1720s. The motives for Agaja’s 
expansion have been debated, but there seems to be a consensus that this move was designed 
to at once protect his own people from slave raiding, while also ensuring that the state could 
control both the supply and sale of captives to Europeans.234 Most of the kingdom’s slaves 
and goods were transported along the main road which began at the capital Abomey and went 
south through Cana and Agrime, the latter town marking the end of the plateau and state’s 
core region of power (Law 2004, p117,120). Travellers were then obliged to pass through the 
Lama swamp in order to proceed to the coast. The Dahomean state was the pre-eminent 
political and military power on the coast from the Popos to Seme from the 1720s until the 
onset of formal French colonial rule in 1892. Its control over both the key coastal port of 
Whydah, and the interior regions from which most slaves were captured, meant that the state 
exported the majority of the region’s slaves for the period from the seventeenth to the 
nineteenth centuries.235  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
234 Akinjogbin (1967) initially proposed the idea that Agaja’s intentions had been to secure control of the coast in 
order to abandon slave trading. Manning (1982), whilst agreeing that this would have been beneficial to the 
region’s long-term development, argues that his intentions were probably more likely to have been to ensure 
security from raiding for his own people and to gain control over the supply and sales of slaves. This 
interpretation is supported by Law (1991) and Bay (1998). 
235 Although in the nineteenth century, the port of Lagos was to overtake Whydah as the most important port for 
the transatlantic slave trade in the Bight of Benin (Mann 2007, pp39,40) 
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Map 7.1. The kingdom of Dahomey and its immediate neighbours 
  
Source: Law (2004) p51 
 
7.2. LONG-TERM TRENDS IN DAHOMEY’S TRADE 
The most significant difference between the Bight of Benin and the two other case study 
regions was that here the slave trade grew to significant proportions far earlier, and dominated 
the trade in captives in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries (Figure 7.1).236 The 
area had long been known as a source of slaves to Europeans, who had imported slaves from 
                                                 
236 Slaves from the Bight of Biafra may have been traded earlier than those from areas of the Bight of Benin 
which Dahomey came to control. There is evidence that the Portuguese were taking slaves from Old Calabar 
from at least the early seventeenth century, but the numbers were relatively small (Behrendt et al. 2010, p48). 
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the region into the Gold Coast from the sixteenth century (see Chapter 5). The British, French 
and Dutch began to demand labour for their growing American possessions in the seventeenth 
century and, as the Gold Coast was not exporting sufficient numbers of captives, they looked 
to the Bight of Benin to meet their requirements (Klein 2010, pp77-80).237 As the region 
possessed no gold, it came to specialise solely in the export of people, which was to determine 
the nature of the region’s Atlantic trade for the centuries to follow (Law 1991, pp118-22). 
Figure 7.1. Percentage of slaves embarked by region 1650 - 1730 
 
Source: TSTD 
This had important consequences for the people living in this region. Firstly, the trade was 
extremely lucrative, and led to high quantities of valuable European and Indian goods flowing 
into the region (Figure 7.2).238 This simultaneously increased competition for control over a 
new and growing source of income, and stimulated the development of more centralised, 
militarised states, geared towards capturing, transporting, buying and selling greater numbers 
of slaves (Norman 2012, p147). Indeed, in the Bight of Benin, the infamous ‘guns-for-slaves 
trade cycle’ hypothesis set out by Whatley (2014) came into full bloom.       
 
 
 
 
                                                 
237 Sources suggest that the introduction of new crops from the Americas led to strong population growth, which 
meant that the region had a large pool of people who could be enslaved (Manning 1982, p7, Law 1991, pp59-
60). 
238 If these figures are converted into 2005 GB£, then the slave coast saw an increase from around £4 million in 
the decade from 1650 to nearly £220 million worth of goods imported from 1720 to 1730. Calculated using the 
currency converter from The National Archives: http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/currency/default.asp#mid. 
Accessed 7/6/2016 
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Figure 7.2. Nominal Value of Slave Exports from the Bight of Benin 1650 - 1730 
 
Sources: Slave Prices from Manning (1982, p332), Slave Embarkations from TSTD 
As will be discussed later in the chapter, slave exports became crucial to the political and 
economic power of the Dahomean state. As a result, the monarchy and elite groups of the 
kingdom stuck to a slave raiding model, while their counterparts in the Gold Coast and the 
Bight of Biafra were diversifying their export economies. The difference is most clearly 
illustrated in reaction to the changed economic environment in the two decades following 
abolition. As shown in Figure 7.3, the region had seen declining revenues from transatlantic 
slave exports for some time due to the loss of the French trade in 1794,239 and 
Portuguese/Brazilian traders focusing their attention on Angola and Southeastern Africa (Eltis 
2009). Rather than exploring alternatives such as palm oil to compensate for the loss of 
revenue, the state instead focused its efforts on military campaigns and reviving the slave 
trade.  During the 1820s the king, Gezo, took advantage of the collapse of the Oyo kingdom 
to increase the extent and frequency of military expeditions to capture slaves and extend the 
kingdom’s power (Reid 1986, p33). Captives from areas such as Mahi and Yorubaland 
temporarily swelled the kingdom’s exports (Law 2004, p160). When British abolition efforts 
became more effective in the 1830s, the Dahomeans responded by developing more elaborate 
strategies to avoid the British blockade. These strategies included bringing larger numbers of 
slaves to the coast and keeping them there for longer periods so that boarding could take place 
more rapidly240, or by taking slaves to other ports such as Little Popo via the coastal 
                                                 
239 As a result of the French and Haitian revolutions. Although French slaving ships were to re-enter the trade 
just a decade later, it was in reduced numbers (TSTD). 
240 1842 (551) (551-II) Report from the Select Committee on the West Coast of Africa; together with the minutes 
of evidence, appendix, and index. Part I.--Report and evidence. F Swanzy to committee, p37, para 615 “….there 
is still an importation of slaves from Dahomey into Whydah; there they are kept till they can ship them; perhaps 
the half of them may be dead before they can be shipped.” 
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lagoons.241 Alternatively, Portuguese/Brazilian traders would arrange for two ships to be sent 
to the coast, one with trade goods and another to transport captives, which limited time at the 
coast and made it easier to evade the anti-slave patrol (Law 2004, pp158,191-93). 
Figure 7.3. Income from Slave Sales at Whydah (British £) 
 
Source: Prices from Manning (1982), slave numbers from TSTD 
Even after the virtual collapse of transatlantic slavery in the 1840s, and when the monarchy 
had finally begun to invest in the production of palm oil (Manning 1982, p17, Law 2004, 
pp222) there were still many in the ruling coalition who resisted change. Gezo’s successor, 
Glele, supported by powerful elements within the Dahomean elite, attempted to re-orientate 
the state back towards a slave raiding model, when demand for coerced labour on the sugar 
plantations of Cuba led to a brief revival in Atlantic slavery (Bergad et al. 1995, p58, 
Soumonni 1995, p90). To explore why, in contrast to the other case study regions, the 
Dahomean state remained so committed to the export of captives, I will begin by examining 
the relative profitability of both the commodity and slave trades. 
 
7.3. COMPARATIVE VALUE OF THE SLAVE AND COMMODITY TRADES   
For the Dahomean monarchy and its elite supporters, palm oil was far less profitable than 
slave trading. The price of a ton of palm oil was slightly higher than the cost of a slave 
(Figure 7.4), but the production costs of the former were clearly much higher. Reid (1986, 
pp346–50) calculated, very roughly, that one ton of palm oil required around 795 days’ labour 
to produce and transport to the coast from Abomey. This translates into the full-time labour of 
                                                 
241 Ibid. Lt Reinald Levinge RN to committee, p227, paras 3996 - 4000 “….it would be of no use blockading 
Whydah alone, without blockading the coast 20 miles on either side of it. Could you maintain an effectual 
blockade to that extent? No, I tried and could not do it, because they communicate by signal; if a vessel comes in 
the offing, they make a long telegraph to her to proceed to sea for some days, or to come upon the coast at Apee 
on a given day, where their slaves are waiting for them….” 
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around 10,000 slaves to produce 2,000 tons of oil a year. In 1850 silver dollar ($) prices, 
2,000 tons of palm oil would sell at $248,000, while selling 10,000 slaves would have brought 
in $600,000, along with far greater tax/customs revenues for the monarch.242 There were, in 
addition, other obstacles to overcome. Whydah was by no means an ideal port for the loading 
of palm oil as the beach was over 3 km from the town. Once there, the oil needed to be loaded 
into canoes and transported to ships 2km away through shark infested waters because the 
currents and waves were too dangerous close to the shore (Law 2004, p 213). Some of these 
problems were eventually overcome. For example, the town of Cotonou was developed, 
which allowed oil from the interior to be transported directly to the coast via the Wembe river, 
thus reducing transport costs. However, this was unlikely to have made a significant 
difference, to the fact that slaves remained a considerably more profitable trade. In addition, 
Dahomey soon faced competition from other ports in the Bight of Benin such as Porto Novo, 
Badagary and Lagos, which were also very suitable for oil exports due to access to interior 
markets through water transport, and having hinterlands that were ecologically favourable to 
palms (Mann 2007, pp 118 – 150).   
Figure 7.4. Average price per slave and ton of palm oil at Whydah 1834 – 1878, in silver 
dollars ($)
 
Source: Law (2004, pp159,208) 
Beyond the fact that slaves could make more money for the king and his elites, there were 
other reasons why palm oil was not a complement to the Dahomey slave trade in the same 
way it was for the elite merchants in the Bight of Biafra, or as gold was for the Asante. 
Firstly, the Dahomean monarchy and its elite supporters were able to control and monitor the 
                                                 
242 Gezo, the king during the 1840s, wrote to Queen Victoria saying "At present my people are a warlike people 
and unaccustomed to agricultural pursuits. I should not be enabled to keep up my revenue were I at once to stop 
the slave trade.” This view is restated by the British diplomat Cruikshank who wrote in his report on the 
negotiations with Gezo over the abolition of the slave trade “No other trade was known to his people. Palm oil, it 
was true. was now engaging the attention of some of them, but it was a slow-method of making money and 
brought only a small amount of duties into his coffers.” Quotes in Reid (1986, pp317,318) 
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trade in slaves far more effectively than the trade in palm oil. While private merchants 
collectively sold the majority of the region’s slaves, the king was always the single largest 
seller because of his key role in the military campaigns during which most captives were 
acquired (see below Section 7.5). All merchants had to pay the king for permission to trade, 
and their rights could be withdrawn (Bay 1998, pp 104–06, Law 2004, pp 113–18). 
Alternatively, the state could act as a middleman for trade in captives from other areas such as 
Yorubaland (Law 1989b). Their movement from the interior was closely monitored and 
subjected to tolls along the routes from plateau to the coast (Law 2004, p117). This kind of 
centralised control was much more difficult to achieve for palm oil, which was largely a result 
of the geography of the kingdom.  
While it was possible to produce and transport oil on the Abomey plateau, the area south of 
Lama swamp had a number of advantages. For a start, water was much scarcer on the plateau. 
In the capital of Abomey all sources of fresh water lay outside the city. Therefore, acquiring 
sufficient water was always a much more labour-intensive process, especially outside the 
rainy season (Reid 1986, p 51). Costs were also lower nearer to the coast, due to shortened 
transportation times and the fact that palm production was compatible with existing patterns 
of agriculture. However, the kingdom’s southern provinces always saw the Dahomeans as 
foreign occupiers and so the state’s power was much weaker than in its ‘core areas’ of power 
on the plateau (Law 2004, p276). Even on the plateau, extending royal power was costly and 
may have provoked resistance (Monroe 2007, 2012, 2015). Small-scale theft and illegal 
production, especially from the larger estates, and tax avoidance by the larger Whydan 
merchants, were common. It was ultimately far more difficult to monitor and control 
economic activity at the coast due to its distance from the capital and as a result, the 
monarchy could not control the revenues stemming from palm oil trading as effectively as it 
could with the slave trade (Law 1992, pp8-9).  
There was one further commodity that might also have been better exploited by the 
Dahomeans. Lovejoy’s (1980) study of the kola trade between the Asante and the Muslim 
savannah markets asks why the states around the Bight of Benin did not export this product 
until the early twentieth century (pp20, 21). Lovejoy’s focus is on Oyo, and he suggests that 
the restrictions on the movement of Muslim merchants, together with hostilities between them 
and the southern caliphates of Ilorin and Nupe, may have been responsible. Dahomey also 
possessed kola trees in its southern regions (Manning 1982, p 60) and there is evidence that 
merchants from the kingdom were active in northern states such as Borgu for the purpose of 
purchasing slaves (Law 1989b, p57). Kola trees did not need to be specifically cultivated as 
they grew naturally, so any production could occur in the context of existing agriculture 
(Agiri 1972, p 34). This meant that there was the potential for exchanging kola for slaves (as 
was the case with the Asante at Salaga) during the periods when Dahomey bought captives as 
well as raiding for them (Law 1989b).  
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However, with the exception of the small quantities exported to Brazil in the 1860s, there is 
no evidence that such a trade developed.243 One unpublished thesis suggests that in the 
context of Oyo, the kola nuts had some religious significance to the Yoruba who were 
therefore unwilling to export them to their northern neighbours (Agiri 1972, pp54,55). There 
is no evidence that this was the case in Dahomey, but other reasons may have been more 
significant. One such reason was that the type of kola which grew around the Bight of Benin 
was the genus c.acuminata, as opposed to the c.nitida cultivated by the Asante, and greatly 
valued on the savannah (Abaka 2005, pp18,19). Secondly, the instability caused by the 
conflicts between Oyo and its northern, Muslim neighbours, and the chaos that ensued when 
the Oyo kingdom fell, disrupted trade to the savannah (Law 1977, pp284–288). However, the 
explorer Clapperton, in 1829, noted that Dahomean slave merchants were operating on trade 
routes to Hausaland and therefore could have traded kola with the interior (Clapperton 1829, 
pp83, 84, 123). During the twentieth century kola nuts, including nitida, were traded between 
south eastern Nigeria and Benin and Hausa provinces to the north (Tachie-Obeng et al. 
2001244). The absence of such a trade reinforces the idea that the Dahomean state was, at the 
very least, not focused on the expansion of other sectors of its economy besides slaves.  
While it is clear that the Dahomean elites would likely always to have suffered a fall in 
revenue had they switched to an export economy based solely on palm oil and perhaps kola 
nuts, they could yet have developed the kind of dual model of the kind seen in Biafra in the 
1820s. It is therefore necessary to look at other factors influencing the rigid attachment to 
export slavery.  
 
7.4. TRADING PARTNERS 
In contrast to the Gold Coast and the Bight of Biafra, the Portuguese and the French, rather 
than the British, were the most important customers in the long eighteenth century (Table 
7.1). The Portuguese dominance of trade can at least partly be explained by local preferences 
for Portuguese exchange goods. Bahian merchants were particularly motivated to expand their 
presence in the region as they exported a certain kind of low grade tobacco soaked in cane 
spirit that was greatly prized in the Bight of Benin, but essentially unsellable in European 
markets. Pipe smoking was a symbol of elite status and Ribeiro (2008, p142) has argued that 
‘…the large expansion of the Bahian slave trade, and especially the traffic from the Costa da 
Mina, coincided with the establishment of the traffic in tobacco’. A further advantage for the 
                                                 
243 After the British occupation of Lagos, the Blue Books indicate that there was export trade of kola nuts to 
Brazil, possibly for the large numbers of slaves or former slaves from Oyo / Dahomean territories (Agiri 1972, 
pp58–62). However, this trade was very limited in the 1860s and 1870s, worth only £4,000 in 1871 (the highest 
figure for the period) compared to nearly £200,000 of exports of palm kernels in the same year. TNA CO151/2 – 
11, Blue Books Lagos 1863-1873 
244 “COLA NITIDA & COLA ACUMINATA A State of Knowledge Report undertaken for The Central African 
Regional Program for the Environment”, Tachie-Obeng, E. & Brown, N Brown, Oxford Forestry Institute 
Department of Plant Sciences, University of Oxford (2001) 
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Portuguese was that, during the first half of the eighteenth century, they were able to pay with 
the gold mined in the Minas Gerais mines (Law 1990b, pp106–111). The Dahomeans were 
eager purchasers of gold, perhaps due to the declining value of cowries, the region’s principal 
currency (Law 1991, pp307-8). While this trade only lasted until the mines were largely 
exhausted in the 1760s (Bergad 2006, pp xvii, 6), it did give Brazilian/Portuguese traders the 
status of Dahomey’s preferred trading partners. The reasons for the French to prefer trading in 
the Bight of Benin are less clear, but British dominance in other areas of West Africa may 
have been a contributing factor.  
Table 7.1. Percentage of slave embarkations from the Bight of Benin by nation 
Years Portugal / Brazil Netherlands France Great Britain 
1680 – 1720 43 17 11 26 
1721 – 1760 61 3 28 8 
1761 – 1808 57 0 23 19 
1761 – 1791* 49 0 33 17 
Source: TSTD. *1791 was the year the French revolutionary government temporarily withdrew from the slave 
trade 
The dominance of France and Brazil/Portugal had two possible consequences. Firstly, I have 
argued in the first part of this thesis that neither nation was a significant buyer of either 
provisions or commodities from the case study areas, instead focusing almost exclusively on 
the purchase of human captives. In Chapters 3 and 4 I showed that demand for provisions and 
‘legitimate commerce’ in the pre-abolition period were largely driven by British traders, 
especially from the 1770s. A relative lack of demand may have been a reason why the 
Dahomeans remained so focused on the slave trade to the detriment of developing other types 
of exports. This was certainly the analysis of one British trader in 1842, who argued that the 
relative lack of British traders at Whydah was the reason for the weak development of 
‘legitimate commerce’.245 Secondly, in the post-abolition era, it was probably easier for 
Brazilian/Portuguese vessels to circumvent British abolition efforts, at least until the 1830s. 
Slavers leaving Brazil could take legitimate passports to trade in Molembo or Cabinda in 
West Central Africa, which was in theory a legal slave trading zone until the Equipment Act  
was passed in 1839 (Thomas 1999, p659). These passports allowed them to stop at Sao Tome 
and Princes Island to provision themselves, and from there they could easily sail the short 
distance to Benin where they already had well-established trade contacts (Ribeiro 2008, 
p139). As a result, Dahomey did not suffer the same kind of shock experienced by the 
withdrawal of the British from the transatlantic slave trade.  
                                                 
245 1842 (551) (551-II) Report from the Select Committee on the West Coast of Africa; together with the minutes 
of evidence, appendix, and index. Part I.--Report and evidence. F Swanzy to committee, p45, para 758  
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Although demand of course influences supply, Lovejoy and Richardson (2007) argue that, 
ultimately, regional patterns of slave/non-slave exports were driven by what local markets 
were able or willing to provide.246 As shown in Part 1, the Bight of Benin never supplied a 
large quantity of provisions or commodities even when, from 1680 to 1730 it was Britain’s 
second most important region of slave embarkation, supplying around a third of its slaves. 
RAC ships usually stocked up on food at the Gold Coast before sailing on to Arda, Jakin or 
Whydah. In the mid-eighteenth century, the commodity vessels of the MCC did stop at some 
ports in the Bight of Benin but never bought more than small quantities of ivory. Furthermore, 
during the apogee of the transatlantic slave trade in the second half of the eighteenth century, 
one in five slaves from the Bight of Benin found themselves in ships that sailed from Bristol, 
London or Liverpool. Throughout the period under study there were therefore relatively large 
numbers of ships landing in harbors along the Slave Coast which would have been prepared to 
buy commodity exports or food provisions had these been available. Thus, while the 
nationality of Dahomey’s main trading partners may have had some role to play, it was 
certainly not a decisive one. Of far greater importance was Dahomey’s military culture.  
 
7.5. DAHOMEAN MILITARISM 
Dahomey’s continued focus on slave exports, against the long-term trend of revenue decline, 
cannot be fully appreciated without first understanding the institutional lock-in effects of 
slave-trade based militarism. In Dahomey, the military ethos of the ruling elite was, according 
to one recent analysis, the most extreme of any in pre-colonial Africa (Reid 2012, p 113). 
While the Asante were a highly-militarised society, I have argued in Chapter 5 that there were 
several reasons why alternative ‘peace parties’ could emerge, and the elite could both tolerate 
and support the development of commodity exports. In contrast, factors unique to the Bight of 
Benin prevented the ruling elite from tolerating the development of policies or factions 
supporting commodity exports. These factors are the region’s specific ecological make-up, 
and path-dependent institutional development, in the context of early specialisation in a 
centrally coordinated slave trade. 
 
The seventeenth-century roots of the Dahomean military state  
The Dahomean state, unlike that of Asante or polities of the Biafran area, developed and 
expanded in a region in which the Atlantic slave trade played a pivotal role in the economy 
and society. Law (1991, p267) has argued against early interpretations by Akinjogbin (1967) 
that the Dahomean state was radically different from its predecessors. Instead he suggests that 
its policies were based to a great degree on the traditions and ideologies of the seventeenth 
                                                 
246 “In every region the supply of captives for sale to European carriers remained essentially under African 
control…” Lovejoy and Richardson, 2007, p50 
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and early eighteenth century slave coast polities that preceded it. Three legacies were of 
particular importance. Firstly, the slave trade had been growing steadily for nearly 80 years 
and was providing ever greater quantities of valuable foreign goods (Figures 7.1 and 7.2). In 
contrast to the Asante, the Dahomean state came to power in a region where slaves were the 
only commodity exchanged for important imports such as guns and cloth. Even more 
importantly, they inherited a tradition in which the monarchy benefited most from the trade in 
people. For example, the kings of Hueda (the territory that included the port of Whydah) had 
the right to sell their slaves first, at set prices that were usually higher than the market value. 
Foreign traders were also expected to buy a certain number of slaves from the kings before 
they could begin trading with other merchants (Law 2004, pp117).  If one state was able to 
defeat its rivals and control both the coast and interior it could monopolise the ‘production’ of 
slaves, and the associated revenue flows would disproportionally benefit the king.247  
Secondly, the ability to control this wealth depended on the development of larger, more 
effective fighting forces. The first major slave exporting kingdom was that of Allada, which 
dominated the region in the mid-seventeenth century. However, during the latter half of the 
century the Hueda Kingdom, situated on the coast with its capital at Savi, became the single 
most important embarkation point of slaves to the Atlantic market on the West Coast of 
Africa. Having broken free from its former Alladan rulers in the 1670s, the elites of the 
kingdom developed a more efficient, centrally controlled and taxed, slave export operation 
(Law 1991, p51, Norman 2009, p147).248 Competition between Hueda and Allada further 
enhanced the focus on “…funneling war captives to the sea and taxing traders moving 
through their territories...” (Norman 2012, p147). Conflicts between Hueda, Allada and other 
powers along the coast also led to a change in the nature of war which was very similar to the 
military revolutions within the Akan region in the same period. Imported firearms led to a 
greater professionalisation of warfare. Larger armies needed greater central control to 
organise, provision and lead. Contemporary sources suggest that the size of Allada’s army in 
the 1670s was between 40,000 to 50,000, out of a total population of around 200,000, which 
would suggest that virtually all adult males were called up to fight (Law 1991, pp58, 97). 
While Law (1991, p235) is cautious in attributing warfare during the period to a desire to 
simply capture slaves, the possibility of profitably selling your captives certainly made 
conflict more lucrative than in the past, and also provided the means to keep warfare going. 
As victory meant gaining a greater share of the slave trade, it heightened the stakes in any 
conflict (Klein 2010, p119).  
Finally, the goods imported from the Atlantic allowed these kings and other influential elites 
to differentiate themselves from the common herd through conspicuous consumption. It also 
allowed them to develop and maintain systems of patronage and redistribution to maintain the 
loyalty of the populace. Archaeological studies from the region controlled by the Hueda kings 
                                                 
247 Bay (1998, p43) states that for Dahomey “….income from the (slave) trade was indisputably a central source 
of state revenue for at least half the life of the kingdom..” 
248 However, it was still the case that the majority of slaves were probably still supplied by Allada, and perhaps 
ultimately Dahomey (Law 2004, p48). 
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find that from the late seventeenth century, the monarchy and elites were building large 
compounds for themselves, and were filling these with imported goods from Atlantic slave 
merchants (Table 7.2).249  
Table 7.2. The number of late seventeenth / early eighteenth century imported artefacts 
found at the Savi palace site and Huedan countryside / settlement centres 
Artefact 
Comparisons 
Imported 
Smoking Pipe 
(#) 
Metal 
Objects (#) 
Imported 
Ceramics (#) 
Beads (local & 
imported) (#) 
Imported 
Glass (#) 
Savi Palace 
Excavations 
4,879 542 946 1,031 5,661 
Countryside 
/Settlement 
Centres 
372 52 9 30 83 
Source: Norman (2009), p404; Palace data from Kelly (1995) 
In a tradition apparently inherited from Allada, Huedan kings were required to parade 
annually and redistribute some of the wealth gained from the Atlantic trade to elites and the 
general populace. This was seen as perhaps a just recompense for the privileges they enjoyed, 
which, as argued above, allowed them a far greater share of the profits of the slave trade. 
However, Norman (2012, p149) suggests that the last three Huedan monarchs came to see this 
as a burden and began to distance themselves from these ceremonies, which in turn alienated 
them from their subjects and created internal tensions that could be exploited by their 
enemies. From 1714 on, the Alladans launched a series of attacks and attempted to redirect 
the slave trade away from Huedan territory. Neither side achieved anything beyond 
weakening themselves, which gave the Dahomeans the opportunity to attack and defeat both 
states in the late 1720s.  
To conclude, the Allada and Hueda kingdoms bequeathed Dahomey a model of statehood 
which rewarded military prowess through a growing transatlantic slave trade. Moreover, this 
history also contained some clear lessons about what might happen to prospective rulers when 
they ever ceased to distribute sufficient rewards to their followers, or when they failed as 
military commanders.  
 
                                                 
249 Norman (2009 pp408, 409) suggests that the imports that have survived tend to be ‘concentrated in offering 
and ritual spaces’ which suggests that such items were used by elites to gain the favour of various ‘cosmological 
actors’. However, this would also signal to the rest of the population that those giving such generous gifts in 
such quantities were blessed with divine favour and were therefore worthy of their positions.  
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Regional politics and the maintenance of militarism 
The second major influence on the institutional development of the Dahomean state was the 
fact that it was never able to achieve the same kind of regional hegemony enjoyed by the 
Asante, until perhaps the 1820s/1830s, after the collapse of Oyo. As argued in Chapter 5, after 
the 1740s the Asante faced no significant threat from neighbouring states and also held a near 
monopoly over their most important export product, gold. By contrast, the Dahomeans always 
faced threats to both their territorial integrity and their control over their key export, slaves. 
Both conditions provided a clear incentive to strengthen the formal and informal institutions 
underpinning the slave trade.   
After King Agaja had conquered the states of Allada and Hueda in the 1720s, he was unable 
to enjoy the relative security enjoyed by the Asantahene, in large part due to the unique 
ecology of the region. To the north east of Dahomey lay the territories of the Oyo empire. The 
heartlands of this kingdom lay in the savannah belt of the Dahomean gap and were therefore 
largely free of the trypanosomiasis carrying tse tse fly (Alsan 2015, p386). This allowed the 
Oyo to import horses of sufficient size and strength from their northern neighbours and 
maintain the region’s only cavalry based army (Law 1976, p184, Reid 2012, p80). This force 
was a far superior military tool to the musket wielding infantry forces fielded by the states 
nearer the coast, and until the nineteenth century the Dahomeans were never able to devise an 
effective strategy to resist it.250 Oyo firstly invaded after Agaja’s victories in 1727, supposedly 
on behalf of the Huedan kings, and continued to launch attacks until the late 1740s (Law 
1991, pp288-95,318-23). In every case the Dahomeans were forced to retreat into the bush, 
and let their territories be plundered. However, shortages of provisions and the presence of the 
tse tse fly, especially during the rainy season, meant that Oyo could never keep its army in the 
field for long, not least because the horses were extremely expensive to import and maintain 
(Law 1976, p186, Reid 2012, p80). Around 1748, the Dahomeans had to agree to become a 
tributary of Oyo and therefore, until the collapse of Oyo in the 1820s, always suffered a 
significant existential threat to its existence.  
Meanwhile on the coast, the Hueda leadership fled westwards where they eventually settled 
around Lake Aheme and remained a threat to Whydah until defeated in the 1770s (Law 1991, 
p286). While the Dahomean military had a reputation for both ferocity and effectiveness (Law 
1991 p270), geography again played a role in ensuring that its conflicts with these coastal 
rivals took so long to resolve. Firstly, Dahomey’s enemies had the option of calling on 
assistance from Oyo, which often prevented them from applying sustained military pressure in 
other conflicts. Secondly, the new towns founded by refugees and members of the royal 
                                                 
250 This had been the case for earlier states as well. Oyo had invaded and defeated Allada in 1698, apparently due 
to the murder of an ambassador sent by the former power (Law 1991, p237). According to Bosman (1705, p397) 
“….in a short time mastered half of the King of Ardra’s (i.e. Allada) territories, and made such a slaughter 
amongst his subjects that the number of the dead being innumerable, was commonly expressed by saying they 
were like the grains of corn in the field.” 
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houses of Allada such as Apa, Badagary, Porto Novo and Epe were on the eastern side of the 
Slave Coast. They were generally situated around lagoons and waterways, requiring canoe-
based warfare, which the Dahomeans never effectively developed as their forces mainly came 
from the drier Abomey plateau (Smith 1989, p52, Law 1991, p314).251 Thornton (1999, p76), 
sums up this position “…Dahomey….could never control the coast because it lacked an 
adequate fleet….it was constantly harassed from the north because it could not maintain a 
cavalry. It is not surprising that Dahomey’s rulers lived so much by war for they were almost 
incapable of winning any war decisively and were constantly vulnerable.” 
There were two main consequences over the long term. Firstly, the threat of invasions meant 
that the state needed to continue to devote considerable resources to the army and therefore 
retain the highly-militarised structure it had developed in the seventeenth century. Secondly, it 
always faced considerable competition in the trade for slaves from other areas of the Slave 
Coast and from Oyo, who could send slaves through other ports in the east hostile to 
Dahomey. The state had to maintain a high slave output through raiding and military 
expeditions otherwise Whydah would lose its position as the region’s main port, and the state 
would lose crucial revenues and goods.252 It did of course use its military forces to weaken the 
opposition. For example, after 1770 the port of Badagary, supplied with captives from Oyo, 
was beginning to export more captives than Whydah, which led to the Dahomeans invading 
and destroying the town (Ribeiro 2008, p143). However, the Dahomeans were still not free of 
external threats until after the fall of Oyo in the 1820s.  
The Dahomeans did initially benefit by expanding their raiding activities into the previously 
closed areas of Yorubaland (see Section 7.2).253 However, the increased violence and 
instability also created opportunities for the new Yoruba states, in particular Ibadan, Ijaye and 
Abeokuta, to participate in the transatlantic slave trade. These new states switched from 
cavalry-based warfare to gun-wielding infantry commanded by warriors whose power, like 
that of the Dahomean elites, rested on their military prowess and ability to redistribute wealth 
acquired through slave raiding (Reid 2012, pp7-8). Their main outlet was the port of Lagos 
which had eclipsed Whydah as the most important slave entrepot by the late 1820s (Mann 
2007, pp40-42). Not only did the Dahomeans have to deal with the new competition, they also 
became involved in a destructive conflict with Abeokuta. This culminated in a disastrous war 
in 1851 during which most of the Dahomean army was destroyed, and took away their ability 
to effectively raid for slaves (Reid 1986, pp288-89, Reid 2012, p113). This was ultimately a 
                                                 
251 This is mentioned by Norris (1789) who noted that during a campaign against the exiled Huedan king in the 
1770s, their enemies were able to escape by fleeing to an island in the coastal lagoons and were safe because 
“…the Dahomeans had no canoes, and indeed know nothing of the management of them…” 
252 This was largely achieved by Agaja’s successor Tegbesu who reversed many of the previously unpopular 
policies of his predecessor and helped reestablish good relations with Europeans after the wars of Agaja nearly 
brought trade to a halt (Ribeiro 2008, p143). He also helped strengthen the monarchy’s control over their core 
territories on the Abomey plateau, secured peace with Oyo and once again established an efficient and increasing 
flow of slaves to the coast (Bay 1998, p119, Law 1989b). 
253 For the first time, Yoruba, as opposed to Aja, captives made up the majority slaves exported (Manning 1982, 
p31). 
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temporary set-back as the army was rebuilt and was to begin slave raiding again within a 
decade in response to the aforementioned demand from Cuba. However, the revival was short 
lived after British-led efforts eventually forced the closure of this last American market for 
slaves in the early 1860s (Klein 2010, pp206–11). 
 
Militarism and elite power 
This militaristic culture provided a remarkably effective and stable basis for elite power. 
There were just 9 kings from 1645 to 1889 who ruled for an average of around 27 years, 
comparing favourably to the Asante whose rulers stayed on the Golden Stool for an average 
of 15 years each during the period 1720 to 1884. Bay (1998) sets out in detail how successive 
kings used both religion and developed a unique role for powerful women to legitimise and 
cement their rule. However, time in office was ultimately dependent on military prowess, 
legitimacy in the eyes of the elite military caste, and effectively rewarding supporters through 
wealth generated by the slave trade (Smith 1989, p53). Successful military campaigns were 
thus crucial to the monarch and the ruling elites. Royal officials and dependants could be 
granted land and villages in new territories, which provided them with food and wealth for 
distribution to support their own dependants (Bay 1998, p103). Captives taken in war were, 
by Dahomean law, the property of the man who controlled the soldiers. As the king controlled 
the largest army he could expect the most slaves for sale, sacrifice or capture, but as all his 
leading officials were also required to contribute soldiers, they too had plenty of motivation to 
take an active role in the annual campaigns (Reid 1986, p69).254 Common soldiers also 
benefited as they were paid a certain amount in cowry shells for each head and live captive 
they brought back to their commanders (Reid 1986, p 70). Thus, the monarch was able to 
harness the potential for violence of his elites and their dependents and channel it into an 
economically rewarding pursuit under his control.255  
Another institution dependent on the transatlantic slave trade inherited from the Alladans and 
Huedans was the annual ‘customs’. This was an event at which the ruling coalition of the king 
                                                 
254 A British diplomat estimated that 40% of captives in late 1840s were taken by the king (Parl. Papers Col. 
Africa Vol. 50., 1849 (399), vol. XXXIV: Mission to the Kings of Ashantee and Dahomey, Report by B. 
Cruickshank 9/11/1848, quoted in Reid 1986, p70) 
255 As King Gezo told the British diplomat Cruikshank in 1848 during negotiations to abolish the slave trade: “It 
was the slave trade that made him terrible to his enemies, and loved, honoured and respected by his people. How 
could he give it up? It had been the ruling principle of action with himself and his subjects from their earliest 
childhood. Their thoughts, their habits, their discipline, their mode of life had been formed with reference to this 
all-engrossing occupation; even the very songs with which the mother stilled her crying infant, told of triumph 
over foes reduced to slavery. Could he, by signing this treaty, change the sentiments of a whole people? It could 
not be (quoted in Law 1992, p10). It should be noted that this statement was made in the context of negotiations 
about the compensation that would be paid to Gezo by the British government to give up slave exports. 
Therefore, it is natural that his negotiators would want to emphasise the difficulties of such a request in order to 
increase the potential pay-off. Nonetheless, it still does reflect the fact that most contemporary and modern 
literature has argued, that the Dahomean rulers did rely on the revenues accrued from the Atlantic and the 
ideology of militarism.  
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and elites could publically display their military might through parades, their devotion to 
ancestors though the sacrifice of slaves and prisoners of war, and their wealth through 
conspicuous displays of gift giving to both commoners and elite supporters. Both Law (1991, 
p277) and Bay (1998, pp66-7, 128) argue that these ceremonies formed the core basis of the 
legitimacy of the rulers. The king in particular needed to show that he sat firmly at the apex of 
a pyramid of power and wealth. He needed to prove that he was not only able to distribute 
more largess and sacrifice greater numbers of people256 than those around him, but that he 
also exceeded his predecessors in terms of riches and generosity (Law 1997b, pp215-16). 
Hosting insufficiently impressive customs could be very costly to the monarchy. As already 
noted, the final Huedan kings may have provoked internal opposition to their rule by their 
failure to adequately redistribute their profits from the slave trade (Norman 2012, p149). 
Soumonni (1995, p80, 81) suggests that one of the principal reasons for the deposition of 
King Gezo’s predecessor, Adanzan, in 1818, were his ‘irregular and unimpressive Annual 
Customs’.  
This is to be compared with the Asante kings and elites whose wealth, power and prestige was 
ultimately based on gold, which required that they supported the application of labour to 
production. The absence of gold within the Bight of Benin, and the early impact of the 
transatlantic slave trade, meant that the region’s elites developed a very different attitude 
towards both free and coerced labour, which will be the subject of the next section.  
 
7.6. MILITARISM AND LABOUR  
The institutional development of the Dahomean state had a very significant impact on the 
allocation of labour within the kingdom. Firstly, warfare and the slave trade greatly reduced 
the population in the region as a whole, thus decreasing the pool of both free and coerced 
labour. Secondly, the powerful elite could exert a far greater control over scarce female labour 
and direct it towards its own needs and priorities. Thirdly, military activities and slaving 
activities took farmers away from their land, while at the same time requiring labour for food 
production for non-productive soldiers and slaves. This meant that, unlike in the Gold Coast 
and Biafra, there was far less free or coerced labour available to develop an export 
commodities trade. In the absence of elite support, such a trade was not feasible. 
 
 
                                                 
256 Bay (1998, p 66) notes that “…in a society where wealth was measured in terms of the numbers of 
dependants under a person’s control, human sacrifice signalled the greatest possible expenditure of wealth. It 
also signalled military power and an implicit threat to Dahomey's neighbours, for those who were sacrificed 
were captives of war.”  
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Demographic impact 
The early intensity of the slave trade had a major demographic impact. At least until the 
nineteenth century, the majority of slaves, were captured within around 200 km of the coast257 
and enslaved by violence258 (Klein 2010, p119, Law 1991, p182). Manning (1982, p32) 
estimates that from the 1680s to the 1730s the area around the Bight of Benin experienced an 
annual population loss of around 3%. This resulted in a fall of the population in the entire 
region from around 511,000 in the mid-1680s to around 280,000 at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. It should also be noted that the kingdom of Dahomey was spared the 
worst excesses of this demographic decline. There was firstly the rule, apparently instituted by 
the founding king of the dynasty Wegbaja, that no native born Dahomean could be sold 
outside of the kingdom. While this rule was occasionally broken, such as during the reign of 
Tegbesu, Dahomeans were far less likely than their neighbours to end up in the holds of 
European ships (Bay 1998, pp145–46). Secondly, the Dahomeans (and the Alladans and 
Huedans before them) also retained considerable numbers of slaves to work in the domestic 
economy (Law 1991, p67). Exact numbers are not available but they probably made up a 
substantial proportion of the population.259 
However, even in Dahomey there was a decline in population (Bay 1998, pp 145–46). As well 
as regular warfare having a destructive impact on agriculture/food production, many were 
killed during conflicts which were more or less constant, given the lack of regional hegemony 
and the material and ideological demands of the elites (Law 1991, p61). For example, Bay 
(1998, pp58–59) estimates some 5,000 were killed and 10,000 to 11,000 were taken prisoner 
during the conquest of Whydah by Agaja. Armies risked heavy losses through diseases such 
as smallpox, and the Dahomeans suffered a number of serious defeats against Oyo and coastal 
states such as Popo, which saw them lose large numbers of men (Law 1991, p62,319). 
Warfare was a damaging activity, not only because of the potentially high numbers of 
casualties, but also because of the premium placed on young adults of both sexes as soldiers 
and captives.260 They were disproportionally targeted during raids and wars and as a result 
probably suffered higher rates of mortality, either during combat or due to the harsh 
                                                 
257 Manning (1982, p32), although Law (1991, pp182– 90) suggests that many slaves may have been captured 
from further afield, especially in Yoruba areas where they were sold in a succession of markets until they 
reached the coast. However, the evidence is not conclusive, especially so before the nineteenth century. Lovejoy 
(2011, pp79-80) supports Manning’s view that until at least mid-eighteenth century nearly all slaves were 
coming from Aja areas no more than 200km from slave ports. 
258 I.e. slave raiding, taken as captives during war or kidnapped.  
259 Norris (1789, p157) notes that “..the bulk of the people are slaves to a few freedman…” Forbes (1851 Vol I, 
p14) writes that “…of the whole population (of 200,000) not more than 20,000 are free, the remainder slaves.” 
Both of these are likely exaggerations, based on their belief in the absolute power of the king over his subjects 
(Norris 1789, p157 and Forbes 1851 Vol I, p37). However, they do probably reflect the fact that there were 
considerable numbers of non-free people within the kingdom.  
260 The so-called ‘Amazon’ regiment of female soldiers became increasingly important during the nineteenth 
century and may have made up around half of the Dahomean forces who battled French forces at the end of the 
1880s (Ross 1971, p156) 
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conditions during transportation for sale as slaves, thus reducing the general reproductive 
potential of the population (Bay 1998, p146). 
To put this population decline in comparative perspective, the metropolitan region of Asante 
was around 16,000 km2 (Wilks 1975, p80) and probably contained a population of around 
350,000 in the mid-nineteenth century (see Appendix 5.3.b.) which gives a population density 
of 21.7 / km2. This was hardly crowded, and far lower than the figure for England and Wales 
of 35 / km2 in 1700.261 Law (1991, p58) gives a figure of around 200,000 people in the 
kingdom of Dahomey in the mid-nineteenth century, and also suggests that there were fewer 
people than two centuries before. During the same period Dahomey had an approximate area 
of 29,000 km2, which gives a far lower population density of 6.9 / km2.262 Thus, there was a 
greatly reduced pool of labour available to produce either surplus food to provision slave 
ships or develop the kind of dual-commodity/slave export model seen in the Bight of Biafra. 
However, a relatively light population density was not the only impediment. Elites in 
Dahomey monopolised both free and coerced labour to a far greater extent than in the other 
case study areas, and used it in pursuit of their own wealth and power. This denied 
commoners the opportunity to engage in production for the Atlantic market.  
 
Female labour 
Law (1991 p64) notes that sources in the late seventeenth century suggest that both men and 
women were engaged in agriculture, while a century later only females seem to be working 
the fields. He suggests this was a result of the development of a “…a warrior ethos which 
involved a disdain for agriculture, and which might well have discouraged its free males from 
participation in agricultural work.”. This would have firstly meant there were fewer available 
sources of labour, in an area experiencing a strong demographic decline. However, this was 
exacerbated by the fact that elite men in Dahomey were always highly motivated and able to 
acquire as many wives and female slaves as possible to enhance their wealth and social 
standing (Law 1991, p67). Agaja was said to have had 2,000 wives in 1724 (Bay 1998, p50), 
while Bosman (1705, p344), writing about the Huedan kings, suggests they had between four 
and five thousand, with leading nobles having up to a thousand.263 Writing in the later 
eighteenth century, Norris (1789, p99) estimated that the royal wives numbered “….between 
three and four thousand; his principal men have from one to three or four hundred wives each 
and people in humbler stations from half a dozen to twenty…” Polygamy was the norm, rather 
than the exception, in all three case study regions but Law (1991, p65) argues that it was 
                                                 
261 Based on a population of 5,290,000 from Floud et al. 1994, 151,013 km2 from www.ons.gov.uk , accessed 
25/10/2016 
262 Based on the size of départment in the modern country of Benin, compared to the approximate borders of the 
kingdom in the nineteenth century. Data from http://www.geohive.com/cntry/benin.aspx, accessed 8/9/2016, 
Manning (1982, p60) 
263 Law (1991, p79) suggests that the Dahomean and Huedan kings had from 800 to 3,000 wives, both in their 
palaces and around the kingdom. 
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particularly extreme in Dahomey, especially in the way that females were monopolised by the 
elites. Norris (1789, p99) wrote that the monarchy and aristocracy “…engross the major part 
of the women…” Writers in the nineteenth century noted that the state had the right to demand 
a daughter from every family in kingdom, who could be assigned to the female regiment in 
the army, kept in the palace or “…dashed to the deserving soldiers as wives…” (Skertchly 
1874: 454 – 455, Law 2004, p94). This meant that common men had a much reduced chance 
of finding a wife, which is perhaps best illustrated by the existence of state controlled 
prostitution. In 1705, Bosman noted that:  
“In Fida (Whydah) and the country around it and in all the land of Fida, is a very great 
plenty of whores and at a cheaper price than on the Gold Coast….these countries being very 
populous, the slaves vastly numerous and the married women kept up very strict…..’tis 
customary for some of the most considerable and rich negro ladies, when lying upon their 
death bed to buy some of these foreign female slaves and make a present of them to the 
publick..” (p214)264 
This tradition carried on into the Dahomean era. Bay (1998 pp148,149), working on data from 
Law (1991, p54), notes that prostitutes were either provided by the state or endowed to the 
people by wealthy women, with prices controlled and far below market value.265 This service 
was provided because elites were denying younger and lower ranked men the ability to find a 
wife. It also meant that most of the kingdom’s female labour was harnessed and controlled by 
elite men. Extremely strict rules about adultery for both men and women (Klein 2010 p 122) 
meant that many women, even in smaller households, would never produce as many children 
as they were capable of, simply as a result of sharing their husband with so many others.266 
The result was a lower birth rate which in turn exacerbated the existing problem of a falling 
population. It also meant that a great share of the kingdom’s labour force was exploited by 
elite men and not by common households. This was important, as elites probably had far less 
motivation than commoners to use the labour available to them in the production of export 
commodities.  
Wives, after all, might have been used in palm oil production, considering that in the other 
case study areas, this was primarily the women’s responsibility. In general, men only cleared 
the land and harvested the fruits, although there is evidence that in the second half of the 
nineteenth century male slaves supplemented female labour when production demands were 
higher (Law 1995c, p206). Even so, women seem to have been the principal producers. Why 
                                                 
264 While this practise was unusual enough for Bosman to note, it was apparently not unique. To the west of the 
Fante region on the Gold Coast local citizens could apparently petition the local Caboceroes (i.e. wealthy 
traders) to provide a certain number of prostitutes who, after a truly bizarre ceremony “…for the remainder of 
her life obliged to refuse no man the use of her body though he offers never so small a sum…” (pp211, 212) 
265 For example, at the end of the seventeenth century, sex cost 3 cowries, and a chicken 96. By 1710 sex had 
risen to 5 cowries, and chickens to 160. By the 1850s, an ‘official’ prostitute cost 20 cowries while chickens had 
risen to 280 
266 We might further speculate that there may have also been problems with the ‘quality’ of the offspring, if this 
continues over generations. See Henrich et al. (2012) for some discussion of the downsides of polygamous 
relationships, albeit in a modern context. 
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then did elite households not produce more palm oil when there had been a clear demand 
since the late eighteenth century? For a start, women were heavily involved in agriculture, 
child rearing and food preparation, which was crucial given the high number of unproductive 
men involved in military activities (see below) (Bay 1998, p146, 197, Law 1991, p66). In 
addition, the wives of elite men, especially those of the royal family, were also significant 
producers of wealth for their husbands. The wives of the Huedan monarch had monopolies 
over certain market activities such as beer brewing (Norman 2012, p155). Under the 
Dahomeans, palace wives and slaves controlled the trade in pottery and the stringing of cowry 
shells (Bay 1998, p210). Women were also heavily involved in the production of goods for 
local markets such as prepared food and locally dyed cloth (Bay 1998, p212), and seem to 
have been the principal traders in those markets (Law 2004, p76). Contrary to what Inikori 
suggests (2007, 2011), there was a strong market for goods within Dahomey (Law 1991, p47). 
Contemporary sources noted that markets at both Savi, during the time of the Alladans, and 
Whydah, after the Dahomean conquest, were full of a range of both locally produced goods 
together with trade items from the Atlantic as well as the African interior (Norman 2012, 
p148, Law 2004, p82). Such markets were also an important source of revenue for rulers, who 
claimed taxes on market sales (Law 1991, pp92,93). Thus, directing available labour towards 
internal production and trade was potentially very lucrative for elite men.  
However, slaves might also have been used in palm oil production. While labour had become 
scarcer for most of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the situation changed in the 
1820s with the collapse of the Oyo empire. The consequence was that the territories open to 
Dahomean raids increased dramatically, especially in the Yoruba areas on their eastern 
borders. It therefore became possible to both export sufficient numbers of slaves, whilst at the 
same time retaining more for the production of export crops. As argued in Chapter 5, ‘foreign’ 
slaves were usually preferred as their labour could be more intensively exploited than slaves 
who shared a common cultural / linguistic heritage with their masters. The influx of Yoruba 
slaves into Dahomey led to the development of a clear distinction between anato or free 
commoners and kannumon or slaves. The latter category was not fixed and some slaves might 
have anato children or become anato themselves. However, some groups of slaves were 
denied such a possibility and they and their descendants were considered kannumon in 
perpetuity. This was usually the fate of Yoruba slaves (Bay 1998, p 192) and, as such, it 
seems that they were not afforded the rights of Aja slaves. Thus, male Yoruba slaves were 
among the first to be used to increase palm oil production, despite their unwillingness to be 
involved in what was considered ‘female work’ (Bay 1998, p188, 196 - 197). However, 
although some slaves were used in this way in the 1840s, it was not common practice until the 
1850s. There were potential security risks, as slaves imported from outside the Aja areas to 
work on plantations were likely worked harder than other slaves, and could not be so easily 
incorporated into local societies. Manning (1982, p54) and Reid (1986, p420) note that there 
were rumours (which were taken very seriously by the state) of a conspiracy between the 
Egba confederacy267 and Yoruba slaves on the Abomey plateau in 1855.  
                                                 
267 One of the Oyo successor states and a rival for regional power 
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However, fears of uprisings did not prevent their use in production throughout the second half 
of the nineteenth century (Law 1995b), so we must look to additional reasons why the 
kingdom’s labour resources were not channelled earlier into the production of export crops. In 
the next section, I argue that regular military expeditions were a substantial drain on 
manpower, which further compounded the relative scarcity of surplus labour for production.  
 
Production for the army 
The exact nature of the Dahomean military machine has been debated for many decades. Most 
literature agrees that the Dahomean military was more effective and more highly trained than 
other armies in the region (Snelgrave 1734, pp77–79, Dalzel 1795, p47, Forbes 1851 Vol I, 
pp19, 20, Law 1991, p96).268 However, there is some dispute as to whether there was a full-
time standing army, which would have made Dahomey unique amongst the case study 
regions. Some contemporary sources certainly suggest that this was the case (Dalzel 1795, px, 
Forbes 1851 Vol. I, p14,15). Forbes (1851 Vol I, p14,15), writing in the late 1840s, states that 
this consisted of 12,000 full-time soldiers, supported by a further 12,000 troops levied from 
the provinces and a similar number of auxiliaries, although these numbers are likely to be 
estimates based on a possible misunderstanding of local languages.269 Some modern scholars 
(Akinjobin 1967, p38, Smith 1989, p56, Thornton 1999, p91) have argued that there was 
indeed a full-time professional force of soldiers, numbering around 3,000 and recruited from 
the ‘core’ regions on the plateau and stationed around the capital. However, this assessment 
has been disputed for some time (Argyle 1966, pp81–89). Ross (1971, p148) suggests that 
while there were 2,000 to 3,000 men stationed around the capital, they did not constitute a 
standing army and outside of the annual slave hunts were mainly engaged in ceremonial 
duties. Law (1991, pp270,271) suggests that there was no full-time army as the soldiers 
apparently also engaged in agriculture, but they were nonetheless much better trained than 
other soldiers in the region.  
While it is not possible to say with any certainty that the state maintained a full-time army, it 
does seem likely that large numbers of non-productive soldiers were employed for a 
considerable part of the year, and needed to be supported by the kingdom’s agricultural labour 
force. Moreover, unlike in Asante, kings were obliged to go to war on an annual basis, with 
these campaigns being tied to the aforementioned ‘customs’ both before and after fighting 
                                                 
268 This is not to say that it was invincible. Battle tactics remained rudimentary, involving lines of men rushing 
forward to fire volleys before retreating to reload. Most attacks consisted of raids on less numerous or well-
armed foes. While effective in the circumstances of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, it wasn’t 
sufficient against the French or Yoruba successor states (Ross 1971, pp154,155, Smith 1989, p87) 
269  According to Segurola & Rassinoux in the “Dictionnaire Fon-Français” (2000), p. 125, multiples of 4,000, 
are translated as meaning ‘nombre indéfini’. It comes from a unit of cowry currency called a ‘cabess’ or ‘head’ 
which numbers 4,000 cowries. Thus, a force of 24,000 might simply mean “a lot”. I would like to thank Robin 
Law for providing me with this information.  
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(Forbes 1851 Vol I, p15–19).270 The monarchy retained the right to forcibly enlist young boys 
to act as a kind of page to more experienced soldiers in order to learn how to fight, which took 
valuable labour away from farms (Norris, 1795, p48, Thornton 1999, p91). High ranking 
elites also maintained full-time professional soldiers271 and all leading officials were required 
to levy troops for annual military campaigns (or ‘slave hunts’) (Bay 1998, p105). These were 
raised from their own lands and might be expected to have at least some military training 
(Smith 1989, p56). Numbers vary but there are reports of such contingents being anywhere 
between 3,000 and 20,000 men (Thornton 1999, p92).272 Providing sufficient provisions for 
these forces would have been exceptionally challenging, and required that elites used the 
coerced labour at their dispersal to grow food for the army (Smith 1989, p58, Law 1991, p67). 
It is possible to estimate the labour inputs required (see Table 7.3). Wilks (1993 pp44–63) has 
calculated the yields and labour requirements of a typical farm within the Asante region, 
which produced the staple foods of the forest region, namely plantain, maize, yams, cassava 
and cocoyams. These, with the addition of beans, are also noted as the principal foodstuffs in 
Dahomey and Whydah in the eighteenth century.273 He suggests that a family of five working 
a single small farm for three years (the length of time the land could be cultivated before it 
lost fertility) could produce around 12 tons or 14.5 million calories of these staples, which 
probably made up around 80% of a farmer’s caloric intake. The intensity of labour varied 
considerably, with some years requiring much more work to clear and prepare fallow land. 
However, he also suggests that a family would not work as hard as coerced labour, so I it will 
be assumed that two more intensively exploited slaves could do the work. Active soldiers 
consume more calories than the 2,500/day recommended by the WHO for a sedentary 
lifestyle (see Chapter 2, p10) and could expect to be better fed than farmers, who Wilks 
(1993, p59) suggests consumed 1,773 calories / day. I will take an estimate of 3,000 calories a 
day which meant each soldier would require 3.29 million calories every 3 years. Therefore, 
one farm or two slaves could provide for 5.5 soldiers, meaning that the monarchy would need 
to have over 3,403 free, or 1,361 unfree, farmers to keep 3,000 soldiers supplied with staples. 
However, for each soldier there were also the boys assigned to them, along with any other 
dependants such as wives and children, and the slaves on farms also needed to eat. 
Furthermore, the capital Abomey and the second city of Cana had populations of around 
                                                 
270 For an account based on Dahomean traditions, see Abbé Thomas Moulero, ‘Guézo ou Guédizo Massigbe’, 
Études dahoméennes, nouvelle série 4 (1965), pp51-59, which says of Gezo, ‘Il ne passa aucune année qu’il n’ait 
fait une guerre annuelle’, and gives a complete list of these ‘guerres annuelles’ (while noting that there were also 
‘autres guerres’) (pp52,53). Thanks are due once again to Robin Law for passing on this reference.  
271 For example, an official at Whydah in the 1740s was noted as having a permanent guard of full time soldiers 
(Thornton 1999, p93). 
272 The state and their representatives could potentially call on all adult males and a large number of females to 
fight or act as porters (Law 1995c, pp206,207). 
273 Bosman (1705, 389) notes that at Whydah people ate “…oxen, Cows, Goats, Sheep, Hogs (also found on gold 
coast), turkeys, ducks chickens, lots of wild game birds, corn, millet, beer, sweet potatoes, yams, different types 
of beans, onions, ginger, lemons, oranges, bananas, tamarind trees, peppers…” “Dalzel (1793, piii 
introduction) commenting on Dahomey, mentions “…maize, millet, or Guinea-corn of different sorts; a kind of 
pea or rather kidney beans, called callavances, and also a species of beans, called ground-beans…yams, 
potatoes of two sorts, the cassava, or manioka, the plantain, and the banana…”  
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15,000 and 24,000 respectively (Law 2004, pp72,73). While there is no data on the precise 
numbers of courtiers, artisans and other (agriculturally) non-productive people living there, it 
can be at least assumed that these towns needed to import a significant amount of food.  
The burden of feeding the army on campaign was the responsibility of the war leaders, as the 
king was only responsible for providing ammunition and powder (Thornton 1999, p93). Ross 
(1971, p153) suggests that soldiers carried around two weeks’ worth of provisions although it 
would also have been possible to grow food during long sieges. It was also possible to ‘live 
off the land’ for short periods as soldiers were accompanied by large numbers of ‘auxiliaries’ 
who carried their provisions, as well as hunted, looted or scavenged for them, but there was 
always an acute risk of running out of food and/or water (Reid 2012, p86). Any food taken 
along needed to last, be portable and not require cooking. According to Smith (1999, p59) the 
Dahomeans apparently ate “toasted grains and bean cake” the latter made of beans and maize 
flour. As these campaigns yielded the captives who formed the basis of the wealth and power 
of the elites, it is unsurprising that they had little interest in allowing households to become 
involved in the production of export crops. Feeding the full army of 50,000 soldiers would 
require 150 million calories of food each day which, going on the above assumptions would 
have been the equivalent to the 3-year output of around 10 family farms. If we make the 
rather simplistic assumption that each farm, worked by 5 people or two slaves, produced 4.8 
million calories a year, and everything they produced was requisitioned by the army, then it 
would take the full-time yearly labour of 4,666 free or 1,864 unfree farmers just to keep 
forces in the field for a month.274  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
274 From Wilks’ estimation that 14.5 million was produced every three years, thus 4.8 million was produced a 
year.  Thus, dividing the total caloric requirement of 150 million by 4.8 we assume that 31.25 farms were 
needed. Each farm had 5 workers and there are 30 days in a month, making a total 4,687 people.  
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Table 7.3. Estimated agricultural labour required to support Dahomean armed forces 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Family 
farm of 5 
free /  2 
unfree 
Calories 
produced 
every 3 years 
(million) 
Calories 
produced 
per year 
(million) 
Calories 
consumed 
by soldiers 
/ day 
Calories consumed 
by 1 soldier every 
3 years (millions) 
Calories consumed 
by full-time army 
of 3,000 men every 
3 years (millions) 
  
Col. 2 / 3 
 
Col. 4*365*3 Col. 5*3 
1 14.5 4.8 3,000 3.29 9,870 
 
7 8 9 10 11 12 
Number of 
free / unfree 
farmers 
required for 
the full-time 
army 
Number of 
soldiers on 
a major 
campaign 
Full army 
calorie 
requirements 
/ day 
(millions) 
Full army 
calorie 
requirement
s for a 
month 
Years taken for 
one family farm or 
2 slaves to 
produce calorie 
requirements 
Yearly Labour 
requirement 
(free / unfree) 
Col. 6*5 / 2 
 
Col. 8*3,000 Col.9*30 Col. 11 / Col. 2 Col.12*5 / 2 
3,403 / 1,361 50,000 150 4,500 932 4,660 / 1,864 
Source: see text 
This is of course a very conservative estimate as these farmers needed to keep at least some 
food for themselves. It also does not factor in the highly disruptive impacts of military 
activities on agriculture, which meant that farmers may not have been able to produce as 
much as was possible. The manpower requirements of the army meant that labour might be 
withdrawn from farms at important times during the year. For example, a Dahomean general, 
after being temporarily defeated in an engagement with the coastal town of Popo in 1763, 
took farmers away from their fields during the planting season to reinforce his army 
(Thornton 1999, p94). Palm oil was particularly affected as the start of annual campaign in 
February coincided “….with the optimum season for the oil harvest, whose consequent 
deferral meant that the crop actually realized was inferior both in quantity and quality to its 
potential…” (Law 1989a, p67). In the second half of the nineteenth century the resumption of 
slave raiding and military activities by Glele which seriously disrupted the palm oil trade by 
taking away workers (Law 1997b, pp229). 
In Asante and the Bight of Biafra the expansion of the output of commodities depended on 
households being free to divert their labour into other forms of economic activity, to have 
access to slaves to supplement or expand their production capacity and to have the willing 
support of local elites for the transport and marketing of their products. None of these factors 
were present in Dahomey. The elite monopolised coerced and female labour to enhance their 
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own wealth or to support the military which formed the core of their power. For example, one 
visitor in the 1850s was told that “Industry and agriculture are not encouraged…” because 
“…the king is aware that, if the enjoyment of home, and the luxuries of health and happiness, 
were once obtained, he would fail in volunteers for the annual slave hunt.” (Forbes, 1851, Vol 
1, p 21).  
 
7.7. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has argued that there were strong path dependent causes as to why the Dahomean 
state never shifted to commodity export trade until forced under the extreme conditions of the 
1850s. This path had developed in the seventeenth century, when elites were able to capture 
the ever-rising riches from the transatlantic slave trade and significantly increase their own 
power through the development of a highly militaristic state. Three factors reinforced and 
strengthened this development. Firstly, there were environmental reasons. As the region 
lacked gold deposits, slaves became the only ‘product’ that could be marketed for the guns, 
cloth and other luxury goods on which their power came to depend, and these were most 
effectively acquired by mobilising and arming large numbers of professional soldiers and 
conscripts. The geography of the kingdom also worked against the development of palm oil 
exports which, from the point of view of the elites on the Abomey plateau, would always be 
less profitable than slaves. Secondly, the inability to impose any kind of regional hegemony 
due to the region’s unique geography meant the state was always threatened by credibly 
powerful enemies who were not only capable of threatening their territorial integrity, but were 
also serious competitors as slave exporters. This meant maintaining a strong army was a 
matter of survival as much as a means to acquire wealth. Finally, and perhaps least 
importantly, there were sufficient numbers of slaving vessels that were only interested in 
buying captives.  
The result was that from the seventeenth to the middle of the nineteenth century it was never 
in the interests of the elites to stimulate a non-slave export trade. Militarism was 
demographically costly and the elites had high demands on the remaining females and 
coerced labour to enhance their status and wealth, as well as needing them to produce food for 
the army. Taking away labour from these activities would have risked both the security of the 
state and the wealth of elites. This practical consideration was strengthened by the 
development of an elite ideology that glorified war and opposed any other trade except in 
slaves. This was strong enough to survive into the nineteenth century in spite of the general 
decline of the transatlantic slave trade.  
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CHAPTER 8  
CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has presented a new analysis of the commercial transition in West Africa. It has 
examined from a comparative perspective why the speed and nature of the change from 
export slavery to ‘legitimate commerce’ differed to such an extent across West Africa’s most 
important slave trading regions. I have argued that over the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries various interrelated factors evolved and shaped the initial patterns of trade between 
West Africa and the Atlantic world, and continued to determine the exports of different areas 
after 1807. These factors are ecology, the regional political context, trade partners, the nature 
and duration of trade relations and the institutional relationship between elite groups and 
household producers. 
This is the first time that a long-term, comparative analysis has been applied to the Gold 
Coast, the Bight of Benin and the Bight of Biafra, which together accounted for around eighty 
percent of all captives embarked in West Africa. Until now the literature on the commercial 
transition has largely focused on the nineteenth century, with particular attention paid to how 
those who had previously profited from the slave trade reacted to the economic shock of 
abolition. In particular, the ‘crisis of adaption’ hypothesis set out by Hopkins (1969, 1973) has 
profoundly influenced debates on the topic (Law et al. 1995, 2013). As I argued in the 
introduction, this has stemmed from the fact that scholars have tended to focus on 
transatlantic slavery and largely ignore the trade in commodities. This means that we have not 
had, until now, a full picture of West Africa’s commercial relations with the Atlantic world.  
The impact of the commercial transition has generally only been analysed through studies of 
individual regions or states.275 It has therefore not been possible to identify which broader 
internal or external factors were ultimately most important in determining how and why 
different areas moved to an export economy based on commodities. This thesis has outlined a 
new narrative in which the ecology and local political contexts interacted to shape the nature 
of external trade, which in turn profoundly influenced institutional development. This was key 
to determining how the states and societies that had dominated export slavery in the 
eighteenth century reacted to the changing environment of the nineteenth century.  
 
  
                                                 
275 See Chapter 1, footnote 10 
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8.1. LONG-TERM PATTERNS OF TRADE 
The quantitative analysis in Part 1 showed that the change from slaves to ‘legitimate 
commerce’ continued patterns of trade that had been established in the centuries before 1807. 
In addition, it contributed a number of important new datasets that provide a more complete 
picture of Africa’s trade with the Atlantic during the eighteenth century (Manning 2012, 
Jerven et al. 2012). Chapter 2 reviews qualitative sources as well as the trading accounts of 
the British Royal Africa Company (RAC) and the Dutch Middelburgsche Commercie 
Compagnie (MCC). These indicate that over the course of the eighteenth century, European 
traders always bought commodities in addition to slaves from the Gold Coast and Bight of 
Biafran regions, while the area that came to be controlled by the Dahomeans dealt almost 
exclusively in the export of people. It also notes that gold had been traded in the Gold Coast 
region since the fifteenth century, and that both gold and slave exports began to decline from 
at least the 1780s.  
Chapter 3 shows, contrary to the conclusions of Eltis (2013), that for most areas of West 
Africa the trade in provisions was not substantial enough to stimulate the development of 
commercial agriculture. However, in some areas this was an important economic sector. The 
Gold Coast supplied provisions throughout the eighteenth century. Merchants in the Bight of 
Biafra sold substantial quantities of yams, pepper and palm oil for the middle passage and I  
argue that this may have been a factor in its growth as a major slave exporting centre. There 
was no evidence that traders going to the Bight of Benin ever bought significant quantities of 
food.  
In Chapter 4, I explore the shift in commodity trading from the western to eastern side of the 
West African coast and explicitly link this to the commercial transition. The chapter shows 
that there was a huge expansion of commodity exports in the late eighteenth century, bought 
mainly by slave traders and focused on the Bight of Biafra. Again, the region controlled by 
Dahomey did not respond to the new demand for palm oil, ivory and sylvan products. This 
finding is based on a new dataset that provides the most accurate current overview of Western 
Africa’s commodity trade with Great Britain in the eighteenth century, and provides an 
important update to the work of Johnson et al. (1990).  
After 1807, these long-term patterns of trade continued to influence export behaviour. The 
Gold Coast quickly abandoned slave exports, increased gold production, and therefore 
reverted to the system of trade that had dominated external relations for most of the region’s 
history. The Bight of Biafra gradually expanded its already growing palm oil industry, 
eventually abandoning export slavery in the late 1830s. By contrast, in the Bight of Benin 
slavery was the sole export until the late 1830s, when the increasing effectiveness of the slave 
trade patrol forced the development of alternative exports.  
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8.2. DIVERGING TRAJECTORIES  
In Chapters 5-7, I examine the variables that explain these long-term patterns of export in the 
three case study regions. In each case the direction of the interaction was similar and is set out 
in the modified explanatory model (Figure 8.1). The nature and duration of external trade 
relations were a product of each region’s ecology, the regional political context and its 
external trade partners. In addition, local politics were themselves highly influenced by the 
very different ecologies of each area. External trade in turn had a profound influence on 
institutional development and in particular on the attitudes of monarchies, aristocratic elites 
and wealthy merchants towards household production for the Atlantic and external interior 
markets. This determined the output of commodities and slaves over the eighteenth century 
and, more importantly, drove the region-specific commercial transitions in the nineteenth 
century. 
Figure 8.1. Modified explanatory model for region-specific commercial transitions  
 
For the Gold Coast region, the seams of gold within the territories that came to be held by the 
Asante were key to understanding both long-term trade patterns and the nature of the 
commercial transition. It was, with the exception of the relatively short eighteenth century 
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interregnum, the region’s most important export for nearly four centuries and led to a 
‘trajectory of gold’. The struggle over the possession of gold fields was a key factor fuelling 
political conflict and consolidation in the seventeenth century. Sales of the precious metal also 
bought the guns that led to a revolution in warfare allowing for mass mobilisation of larger 
numbers of troops. Eventually these two factors led to the Asante becoming the region’s 
superpower and gaining a monopoly over gold output. In the Bight of Benin, the rapidly 
increasing demand for captives at the end of the seventeenth century also encouraged political 
competition and military innovation in the states of Allada, Hueda and Dahomey. However, 
the presence of the Benin Gap and the coastal lagoons meant that no single state could ever 
fully monopolise power or external trade. This led to a ‘slave raiding trajectory’ for the 
kingdom of Dahomey. The particular ecology of the Bight of Biafra meant that there had 
always been a sophisticated trade network connecting the coast and interior. This always 
handled a range of commodities, foodstuffs for the agriculturally unproductive coastal towns 
and slave provisions in addition to captives. Crucially, it was not until the Aro expanded their 
network into central Igboland in the early eighteenth century that slave exports could 
significantly expand. This saw the region experience a ‘trajectory of trade’. In all three areas, 
the major trading partners helped reinforce these trends. The British, who were always more 
enthusiastic buyers of both provisions and commodities, focused their efforts on the Bight of 
Biafra and the Gold Coast. By contrast, the French and Portuguese / Brazilians, who were 
generally only interested in captives, did most of their trading in the Bight of Benin.276  
This all led to very different institutional outcomes. In Asante, gold became the most 
important marker of status and wealth. The quantity an individual possessed was a key 
determinant of rank for everyone from commoners to the king. As a result, there was always a 
need for captive labour to mine or pan for gold, or to support free households engaged in 
these activities. While the transatlantic slave trade generated considerable wealth, the export 
of captives could never take away so much coerced labour that it threatened gold supplies. It 
therefore meant that the monarchy and aristocratic elites always had a vested interest in the 
commodity trade. At the turn of the nineteenth century, the Asante economy was already 
undergoing significant adjustments. Europeans saw declining sales of both gold and slaves, 
while at the same time the state was already beginning to invest in trade to the markets of the 
savannah. The withdrawal of the British from the transatlantic slave trade was sufficient to 
accelerate the process of reversion to more traditional external trade relations based on the 
export of gold and the expansion of kola sales to the newly formed Sokoto caliphate. This 
changing economic environment was also favourable to commoners, who by engaging more 
in production of both kola and gold, gained more access to external markets than was possible 
during the era dominated by slave exports.  
In the Bight of Biafra trade relations led to a very different type of institutional arrangement. 
With no early expansion of external trade to stimulate the development of states, the region 
remained characterised by decentralised political entities, with long distance trade organised 
largely by the Aro. The lack of competing states also meant that trade did not have to generate 
                                                 
276 The French did buy African commodities but almost all of them came from Senegambia 
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wealth to maintain the hierarchal political orders characteristic of the other case study regions, 
or to cover the costs of military expenditure. Furthermore, status was not acquired through 
prowess on the battlefield, and was instead predicated on wealth generated by all kinds of 
trade. From the 1770s, the increasing demand for palm oil provided opportunities to 
households to access the Atlantic market for goods that could improve their living standards. 
Those who had previously grown rich from the transatlantic slave trade were prepared to 
support the expansion of palm oil, as it in no way undermined their social status or power and 
furthermore offered a less volatile form of trade. 
In the Bight of Benin export slavery generated great wealth and, for the Dahomeans, it 
stimulated the development of institutions that very effectively maintained the power and 
prestige of its elites. Regular warfare allowed the monarchy to monopolise the capacity for 
violence of its elite supporters. The sale of captives meant that all those involved in warfare 
could profit from the fighting, while also allowing the king to ensure that his share was 
always greatest. Militarism also provided the spiritual and ideological cohesion to the elite 
coalition that supported the monarchy, and kept the commoners obedient. However, 
maintaining this military machine was extremely costly in terms of expenditure and labour. It 
also demanded continuous success or the monarch risked being overthrown. Mobilising the 
army for slave raiding was the most effective means of keeping sufficient wealth flowing into 
the state’s coffers and satisfying the demands of a militaristic culture. There was therefore no 
real incentive for those in power to develop or support any other form of commerce except 
under the extreme conditions of the 1840s.  
 
8.3. THE REAL IMPACT OF BRITAIN’S ABOLITION CAMPAIGN 
This thesis thus sheds a new light on the actual impact of abolition on West Africa’s 
economies. It argues that the military and diplomatic campaign waged primarily by the British 
had very different impacts depending on the region. It is true that the act of forcibly 
withdrawing its merchant shipping from transatlantic slave trading was an economic shock, 
especially in the Gold Coast and the Bight of Biafra. However, as noted above, this 
predominantly served to accelerate existing trends. There were always opportunities for 
African merchants in these areas to sell more slaves, given the relative ineffectiveness of the 
early slave trade patrol and the hostility towards abolition on the part of other slave trading 
nations. However, in both areas exports of captives were already in decline, and more coerced 
labour was being harnessed for production, long before the military campaign became a 
success. Thus, it was the decision of local rulers and merchants to move away from export 
slavery, not external pressure, that was responsible for the rise of ‘legitimate commerce’ in 
the Gold Coast and the Bight of Biafra.  
Only in the case of Dahomey was the abolition campaign responsible for finally halting slave 
exports. While of dubious legality, measures including the Equipment Act of 1839, attacking 
shipping in Brazilian territorial waters and sustained diplomatic bullying, were a necessary 
precursor to the ending of transatlantic slavery in the region. Without such efforts, the 
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continued demand for African slaves in Brazil and, from the 1850s in Cuba, would have 
ensured that the Dahomeans continued to sell captives to the Atlantic market. 
 
8.4. IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study has shown the value of data driven, comparative studies for pre-colonial West 
African history. It demonstrates that archival sources still offer considerable potential to 
provide new insights into the long-term paths of economic development in different regions in 
Africa. In addition, it shows that the impact of the non-slave trade on the economic and 
political trajectories of different regions has been undervalued in the literature. Only by 
considering the entirety of West Africa’s trade with the Atlantic world can we gain the full 
picture of its impact on the societies and peoples of the region.  
The model of analysis could also be extended to other areas along the West African coast 
which traded both slaves and later commodities with the Atlantic world. Regions such as the 
Windward Coast and the Loango Coast of West Central Africa have been the subject of study, 
but not specifically in relation to the commercial transition, and not in a broader comparative 
perspective.277 The Angola region, responsible for the largest number of slave embarkations, 
has largely been studied in isolation. The change from slave to commodity exports has not 
been investigated in relation to other areas. Furthermore, the nature of trade from Angola was 
markedly different from the case study regions as it was largely dominated by Portuguese / 
Brazilian merchants sailing directly between Brazil and Africa. It would be interesting to 
investigate whether the model developed in the context of West Africa would be suitable in 
this context, or if it would require significant adjustment and, if so, why. This could reveal 
much about the impact of different external trading relations on economic and institutional 
development in Africa. Finally, the model could also be applied to other slave trading regions 
of the world, in particular Asia, to see the extent to which local reactions to increased demand 
for slaves from the British, French and Dutch in the same period (Allen, 2015) differed or 
resembled those in West Africa.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
277 See, for example, Jelmer 2009, Hawthorne 2003, da Silva & Sommerdyk 2010, Sommerdyk 2012, 2015, 
Martin 1972, 1986 
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SUMMARY 
The nineteenth century ‘commercial transition’ from export economies based on slaves to 
ones dominated by commodities like palm oil has been a central theme in West African 
history. However, most studies have tended to focus on the impact of the change and assumed 
that its causes were largely a result of the British decision to abolish their transatlantic slave 
trade in 1807 and subsequently persuading or forcing other nations to do the same. This thesis 
makes two principal contributions to this debate. Firstly, it reviews new evidence which 
shows that the commercial transition in West Africa’s most important slave exporting regions, 
the Gold Coast, the Bight of Biafra and the Bight of Benin, can be predicted by the patterns of 
trade established in previous centuries. It then presents a model of analysis which sets out 
which interrelated factors shaped their export economies and ultimately determined how they 
responded to the changing political and economic environment of the Atlantic world from the 
seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries. This study offers an important comparative, long term 
quantitative perspective on the transition from slave exports to so-called ‘legitimate 
commerce’.  
Chapter 1 shows that the speed and timing of the nineteenth century commercial transition 
differed considerably across the case study regions. Along the Gold Coast there was a sudden, 
and effectively total end to transatlantic slave trading after 1807. In the Bight of Biafra slave 
exports gradually declined until largely ceasing in the 1830s. Lastly in the Bight of Benin 
export slavery continued until the 1850s. The chapter argues that earlier studies have tended 
to ignore long term trends and also lack a comparative approach, as many are focused on 
individual regions. It then suggests a new model of analysis and dismisses two factors as 
irrelevant; the British slave trade patrol and changing demands for, or changing supply of, 
African slaves. The chapter argues that regional variations can be explained by five key 
factors: 1) the nature and duration of long-term trade relations; 2) the identity of the principal 
European trade partner; 3) certain aspects of the ecology of the different regions; 4) the 
regional political contexts; and 5) the development of institutions that either encouraged or 
discouraged elite participation in non-slave exports. 
Chapter 2 provides a broad overview of each case study region’s patterns of trade from the 
fifteenth to the eighteenth Centuries based on secondary and primary qualitative sources. It 
then reviews quantitative evidence of commodity trading patterns from the earlier eighteenth 
century from British and Dutch commodity traders and slaving vessels that bought 
commodities. It argues that the expansion of slavery in the Bight of Biafra did not crowd out 
other forms of commerce. On the Gold Coast the early eighteenth century saw continued 
engagement in commodity exports while the slave trade expanded. However, by the 1780s, 
both slave and commodity exports seem to have begun to decline.  In the Dahomean-
controlled area of the Bight of Benin, there is no evidence of slavery crowding out other 
forms of commerce, as captives were always the only item of trade with the Atlantic world.   
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Chapter 3 investigates the extent to which the 18th century intensification of the trans-Atlantic 
slave trade boosted commercial agriculture in the coastal areas of West Africa and in 
particular in the case study regions. It explores the provisioning strategies of 187 British, 
French, Dutch and Danish slave voyages conducted between 1681 and 1807, and calls for a 
major downward adjustment of available estimates of the slave trade induced demand 
impulse. It shows that during the 18th century, an increasing share of the foodstuffs required 
to feed African slaves were taken on board in Europe instead of West Africa. However, there 
was considerable variation in provisioning strategies among slave trading nations and across 
main regions of slave embarkation. The Bight of Benin never significantly engaged in 
provisioning trade. Traders along the Gold Coast provided relatively large quantities of food 
to slaving vessels, but in the Bight of Biafra, British demand stimulated a considerable trade 
in foodstuffs. The chapter explains these trends and variation in terms of the relative 
(seasonal) security of European versus African food supplies, the falling relative costs of 
European provisions and the increasing risks in the late 18th century trade, putting a premium 
on faster embarkation times. 
Chapter 4 uses a newly constructed dataset on the quantities and prices of African 
commodities on the coast and in British markets over the long eighteenth century and 
provides new insights into the changing nature of Britain’s non-slave trade. It improves on 
previous work by Johnson et al. (1990) and finds that earlier estimates of the volume and 
value of commodity trade have been underestimates and fail to account for regional changes 
in output. The data suggests that from the 1770s the focus of Britain’s commodity trade 
shifted from Senegambia to the Bight of Biafra and that in the later eighteenth century non-
slave goods were primarily purchased by slave ships, not specialist bi-lateral traders. The 
chapter argues that these changes were motivated by a number of factors; conflicts between 
Atlantic powers, the prices of British trade goods and African imports, increasing levels of 
risk faced by British slave merchants and the fact that traders in the Bight of Biafra were both 
willing and able to supply desirable commodities. 
Part 1 establishes that the Gold Coast had a far long history of commodity trading and seemed 
to have been moving away from the slave trade at the end of the eighteenth century. The 
region of the Bight of Benin controlled by Dahomey always focused exclusively on slaves. 
The Bight of Biafra had a considerable non-slave export economy that was growing at the end 
of the eighteenth century. Part 2 of the thesis applies the model of analysis to the case study 
regions.  
Chapter 5 argues that that for the Gold Coast and more particularly the Asante empire British 
abolition policies and the slave forts can explain the timing of the end of transatlantic slavery 
but not why it ended. Following the model of analysis, the chapter shows that the presence of 
gold determined both long term political development and the nature of the region’s trade 
relationship with the Atlantic. In addition, gold became essential as a means of marking status 
and wealth at all levels of society and for domestic exchange. This meant that slaves were 
always essential for the production of gold, meaning that there was an important competing 
domestic market for coerced labour. Over the eighteenth-century gold became scarcer leading 
to slaves being pulled out of the Atlantic market to focus on production. In addition, well-
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developed trade relations with the interior and a rise in demand from the Islamic states in the 
Sokoto caliphate led to an expansion of kola exports which demanded yet more labour. Most 
importantly, the chapter argues that both households and elite groups could profit more from 
commodity than slave exports which explains the rapid move away from the transatlantic 
slavery and towards the production of commodities.  
In Chapter 6 it is argued that in the Bight of Biafra, the slave and commodity trades were not 
only compatible but complementary. The region’s riverine transport networks, long 
established coastal-interior trade relations and suitability for the growing of yams, palm oil 
and tropical hardwoods meant that the provisioning and commodity trades could function 
alongside slave exports. The relatively late opening of central Igboland to the Atlantic slave 
markets meant that the region did not see the influx of wealth in the seventeenth century that 
spurred the development of states in the other case study areas. Instead the region followed a 
different institutional path which saw the development small political entities linked together 
through the Aro trade network. Elites in the interior and at the coast were reliant on trade for 
both power and status, but not specifically the slave trade. As a result, abolition was not a 
serious economic shock as commodities and slaves had always been traded side by side. As in 
Gold Coast both commoners and elites benefited from commodity trading. Atlantic goods 
allowed many more people to purchase goods to improve their standards of living, while 
elites benefitted from the less volatile commodity trade. Furthermore, the British state also 
perhaps unintentionally supported the development of the palm oil trade through its customs 
policies. Eventually, this led to palm oil crowding out slave exports through greater demands 
for domestic labour. 
Chapter 7 investigates why the region of the Bight of Benin controlled by Dahomey only ever 
exported slaves. It shows that this region possessed no gold and had less favourable 
geography for commodity exports than the Bight of Biafra. The early expansion of export 
slavery in the seventeenth century spurred the development of states and elites who were 
entirely dependent on slave exports to maintain their wealth and power. It led to the 
development of a militaristic culture and institutions based on large scale slave raiding that 
were highly effective as a means of controlling and harnessing elite violence, generating 
wealth and defending the state from powerful external threats and economic competition. The 
demands of the army and elites took much of the kingdom’s potential labour away from 
households. In addition, constant warfare led to a serious demographic decline across the 
region further reducing the amount of available labour. The chapter argues that it was never in 
the interests of elites to switch to an alternative economic system and there was, until the 
1850s, always sufficient external demand. In the end abolition efforts were a necessary 
condition to ending the slave trade.  
Chapter 8 concludes with a summary of the main contributions of thesis; the importance of 
long term patterns of trade in determining nineteenth century commercial transition and a 
modified model of analysis to explain the diverging trajectories of the different case study 
regions. It also argues that the impact of Britain’s abolition campaign should be reassessed. In 
the Gold Coast and the Bight of Biafra it was not an important factor in ending transatlantic 
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slavery, while in the Bight of Benin it was. The chapter ends with suggestions for future 
research.   
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APPENDICES  
CHAPTER 1 
Appendix 1.1. Slave Exports from the Bight of Biafra and trendline + mean price (GB£) of 
slaves in West Africa and Angola 1798 – 1826
 
Sources: slavevoyages.org, Lovejoy and Richardson (1995) 
Appendix 1.2. Slave Exports from the Bight of Benin and trendline + mean price (GB£) of 
slaves in West Africa and Angola 1798 – 1826
 
Sources: slavevoyages.org, Lovejoy and Richardson (1995) 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Appendix 3.1. Eltis’ estimates of the five-year average annual value of African-sourced 
provisions in the Atlantic slave trade, 1681-1807 (all estimates in GB£ 1700) 
Source: Eltis (2013) Table 1.2, p. 39; Column 1 is taken from Table 1.1, p. 33.  
Note: By taking 25% of slave purchasing prices for 1681-1807 and multiplying these with slave export volumes 
(column 1) from the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database (Eltis and Richardson 2010), Eltis expressed the 
average annual value of West African food exports in European exchange goods f.o.b. (column 2)278. These were 
then multiplied by two to account for the costs of freight and insurance (c.i.f.) in the transportation of European 
exchange commodities to the regions of slave purchase (column 3). Adding a share of 3% to account for 
African-sourced provisions for slave ship crews (column 4), his final estimates (column 5) indeed suggest a total 
annual average demand impulse of close to one million British Pounds.   
                                                 
278 Slave prices series for 1681-1699 were derived from Eltis (2000, 296) and for 1700-1807 from Richardson 
(1991, 52-56). 
Average annual 
value of slaves 
purchased (fob 
Europe/Americas)
Average annual value of 
African-sourced 
provisions (fob 
Europe/Americas)
Average annual 
value of African-
sourced provisions 
(cif Africa)
Average annual 
value of African-
sourced provisions 
for slave ship crews 
Average annual 
value of African-
sourced provisions 
(total) 
1 2 3 4 5
1681-1685 107,587 26,897 53,794 1,614 55,407
1686-1690 86,610 21,653 43,305 1,299 44,604
1691-1695 110,731 27,683 55,366 1,661 57,026
1696-1700 202,723 50,681 101,362 3,041 104,402
1701-1705 196,478 49,120 98,239 2,947 101,186
1706-1710 196,241 49,060 98,121 2,944 101,064
1711-1715 248,689 62,172 124,345 3,730 128,075
1716-1720 361,423 90,356 180,712 5,421 186,133
1721-1725 512,750 128,188 256,375 7,691 264,066
1726-1730 392,838 98,210 196,419 5,893 202,312
1731-1735 262,800 65,700 131,400 3,942 135,342
1736-1740 385,436 96,359 192,718 5,782 198,500
1741-1745 405,049 101,262 202,525 6,076 208,600
1746-1750 449,280 112,320 224,640 6,739 231,379
1751-1755 537,147 134,287 268,574 8,057 276,631
1756-1760 396,019 99,005 198,010 5,940 203,950
1761-1765 796,786 199,197 398,393 11,952 410,345
1766-1770 1,246,728 311,682 623,364 18,701 642,065
1771-1775 1,503,464 375,866 751,732 22,552 774,284
1776-1780 698,969 174,742 349,485 10,485 359,969
1781-1785 1,317,247 329,312 658,624 19,759 678,382
1786-1790 2,381,871 595,468 1,190,936 35,728 1,226,664
1791-1795 1,717,428 429,357 858,714 25,761 884,475
1796-1800 1,812,184 453,046 906,092 27,183 933,275
1801-1807 2,165,957 541,489 1,082,979 32,489 1,115,468
1681-1807 762,158 186,494 372,989 11,190 384,179
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Appendix 3.2.a. Summary statistics of the sample of 187 voyages 
No 
voyage 
no. 
TSTD Name Vessel 
Year 
Arrived Nation 
No. of 
slaves 
embarked 
Main 
provisions 
Total kcal 
taken on 
board in 
Europe 
(millions)  
Main 
African 
provisions 
Total kcal 
taken on 
board in 
Africa 
(millions) 
Major Region of 
Slave 
Embarkation 
Average no. of 
days on board at 
African Coast 
(TAC) 
Average no. of 
days on board 
during Middle 
Passage (MP) + 1 
st. dev. 
No. daily 
rations 
required  
% share 
European 
provisions of 
total required 
(kcal) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 35161 
Cron Printz 
Christian 1755 DK 125 
Beans, 
Stockfish 27.14 
Millet, Palm 
Oil 7.72 Gold Coast 134 150 27,125 50.0 
2 35181 Fredensborg 1768 DK 265 
Beans, 
Barley 76.29 
Millet, Palm 
Oil 25.25 Gold Coast 130 117 48,230 79.1 
3 33330 Diligent 1732 FR 256 Beans 50.80 
Corn, 
Cassava 5.25 Bight of Benin 113 128 47,232 53.8 
4 30484 Reine de France 1744 FR 404 
Beans, 
Rice 63.91 
Corn, Yams, 
Cassava 23.37 Bight of Benin 152 154 92,920 34.4 
5 30754 Thélémaque 1764 FR 365 
Beans, 
Rice 76.67 
Corn, Yams, 
Cassava 7.23 
West Central 
Africa North 163 83 60,043 63.8 
6 30911 Pompée 1770 FR 390 
Beans, 
Rice 148.01 
Corn, Palm 
Oil, Yams, 
Cassava 61.63 
West Central 
Africa North 163 83 64,155 115.4 
7 32283 Duc de Laval 1775 FR 393 
Beans, 
Rice 152.42 N/D N/D 
West Central 
Africa North 163 83 64,649 117.9 
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8 31639 Pactole 1784 FR 428 
Beans, 
Rice 63.91 
Corn, Rice, 
Palm Oil, 
Yams, 
Cassava, 
Plantains 75.29 Bight of Benin 130 96 68,908 46.4 
9 30808 Jeune Reine 1765 FR 169 Beans 40.64 N/D N/D Senegambia 90 53 16,562 122.7 
10 30864 Saint François 1768 FR 534 
Biscuits, 
Beans 140.56 N/D N/D 
West Central 
Africa North 328 109 145,782 48.2 
11 30874 Saint Jacques 1769 FR 528 Beans 106.67 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 365 36 115,368 46.2 
12 30875 Mars 1768 FR 373 Beans 45.64 N/D N/D Other Africa 216 140 92,504 24.7 
13 30882 Saint Laurent 1769 FR 473 
Biscuits, 
Beans, 
Rice 140.56 N/D N/D 
West Central 
Africa North 137 70 65,511 107.3 
14 30893 Prince Grasse 1769 FR 415 
Beans, 
Rice 115.41 N/D N/D 
West Central 
Africa North 208 61 68,475 84.3 
15 30926 Saint François 1770 FR 520 
Biscuits, 
Beans 147.94 N/D N/D 
West Central 
Africa North 164 60 73,840 100.2 
16 30927 Saint Jacques 1770 FR 582 
Biscuits, 
Beans 174.81 N/D N/D 
West Central 
Africa North 163 58 81,189 107.7 
17 30948 
Saint Jean 
Baptiste 1772 FR 571 
Beans, 
Rice 121.35 N/D N/D 
West Central 
Africa North 139 50 68,235 88.9 
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18 30967 Glaneuse 1772 FR 172 
Beans, 
Rice 36.91 N/D N/D 
West Central 
Africa North 60 62 15,824 116.6 
19 30970 Nymphe 1772 FR 336 
Beans, 
Rice 50.70 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 137 56 41,832 60.6 
20 31000 
Saint Jean 
Baptiste 1774 FR 462 
Beans, 
Rice 124.76 N/D N/D 
West Central 
Africa North 93 47 43,197 144.4 
21 31009 Nymphe 1775 FR 460 
Biscuits, 
Beans, 
Rice 154.05 N/D N/D 
West Central 
Africa North 267 57 87,630 87.9 
22 31026 
Saint Jean 
Baptiste 1776 FR 435 
Beans, 
Rice 121.26 N/D N/D 
West Central 
Africa North 87 59 44,588 136.0 
23 31180 Madame 1787 FR 643 
Beans, 
Rice 210.03 N/D N/D 
Southeast Africa 
and Indian 
Ocean islands 134 102 108,667 96.6 
24 31184 Fine 1787 FR 198 
Beans, 
Rice 51.13 N/D N/D 
West Central 
Africa North 207 59 32,175 79.5 
25 31188 Bailli de Suffren 1787 FR 569 
Beans, 
Rice 107.72 N/D N/D 
West Central 
Africa North 174 53 79,660 67.6 
26 31189 Passepartout 1787 FR 14 
Beans, 
Rice 4.21 N/D N/D 
West Central 
Africa North 139 58 1,785 117.8 
27 31209 Jeanne Thérèse 1788 FR 258 
Beans, 
Rice 80.25 N/D N/D Bight of Benin 164 198 72,240 55.5 
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28 31220 Aimable Aline 1787 FR 516 
Biscuits, 
Beans, 
Rice 121.20 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 97 57 54,438 111.3 
29 31224 Louis 1788 FR 274 
Beans, 
Rice 107.49 N/D N/D Bight of Benin 126 88 41,374 129.9 
30 31279 Bailli de Suffren 1790 FR 440 
Beans, 
Rice 115.25 N/D N/D 
West Central 
Africa North 199 56 68,420 84.2 
31 9917 Charles 1681 GB 288   N/D Corn 113.08 Bight of Benin 73 117 44,208 N/D 
32 9870 
Merchant 
Bonadventure 1683 GB 448   N/D Corn 160.83 Bight of Benin 73 117 68,768 N/D 
33 15074 Mary 1683 GB 507 Beans 0.61 Corn 179.49 Gold Coast 107 110 82,895 0.4 
34 20112 Saint George 1683 GB 550   N/D Corn 251.29 Bight of Benin 73 117 84,425 N/D 
35 9669 Jefferie 1685 GB 310 Beans 0.33 Corn 114.88 Gold Coast 107 110 50,685 0.3 
36 9668 Good Hope 1685 GB 376 Beans 0.58 Corn 118.47 
West Central 
Africa North 78 119 59,408 0.5 
37 9684 
Sarah 
Bonadventure 1686 GB 404   N/D Corn 179.85 Bight of Benin 73 117 62,014 N/D 
38 9702 Kendall 1694 GB 600   N/D Corn 187.39 Bight of Benin 73 117 92,100 N/D 
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39 9714 Hannibal 1694 GB 700 Beans 2.90 Corn 200.32 Gold Coast 107 110 114,450 1.3 
40 9701 Katherine 1694 GB 600   N/D Corn 252.37 Bight of Benin 73 117 92,100 N/D 
41 9726 
Fauconberg (a) 
Falconberg 1696 GB 605 Beans 2.54 Corn 280.01 Bight of Benin 73 117 92,868 1.4 
42 75599 Hannibal 1721 GB 273   N/D Rice 2.56 Gold Coast 117 112 46,547 N/D 
43 76371 
Sherborough 
Gally 1721 GB 231   N/D 
Rice, Palm 
Oil 22.57 Sierra Leone 137 75 33,149 N/D 
44 75956 Otter 1721 GB 209 Beans 0.73 Corn 32.31 Senegambia 132 100 34,694 1.0 
45 75330 Dispatch 1721 GB 110   N/D 
Corn, Palm 
Oil    49.55 Gold Coast 117 112 18,755 N/D 
46 76147 Sarah Gally 1721 GB 250 Beans 1.45 
Corn, Rice, 
Palm Oil   85.09 Gold Coast 117 112 42,625 1.7 
47 76399 Henry 1722 GB 367 Beans 1.86 
Corn, Rice, 
Palm Oil 113.27 Bight of Benin 113 128 67,712 1.4 
48 76405 Judith 1722 GB 107 Beans 0.51 N/D   Senegambia 132 100 17,762 1.4 
49 76960 King Solomon 1722 GB 300 Beans 2.18 
Corn, Rice, 
Palm Oil N/D Gold Coast 117 112 51,150 2.1 
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50 76435 Sarah Gally 1723 GB 273 Beans 0.91 
Corn, Palm 
Oil, Yams   70.01 Gold Coast 117 112 46,547 1.0 
51 75181 Bladen Frigate 1723 GB 250 Beans 3.39 N/D N/D Bight of Benin 113 128 46,125 3.7 
52 76192 Squirrell 1723 GB 121 Beans 3.81 N/D N/D Bight of Benin 113 128 22,325 8.5 
53 76693 Lady Rachel 1723 GB 221 Beans 2.18 Corn, Rice 24.92 Senegambia 132 100 36,686 3.0 
54 75286 Clarendon 1723 GB 69 Beans 0.63 Corn, Rice 33.56 
West Central 
Africa North 139 83 10,523 3.0 
55 76542 Diligence 1723 GB 200   N/D 
Corn, Palm 
Oil 58.37 Gold Coast 117 112 34,100 N/D 
56 76176 Sloper 1723 GB 282 Beans 2.54 
Corn, Palm 
Oil 69.05 Gold Coast 117 112 48,081 2.6 
57 75181 Bladen Frigate 1723 GB 250   N/D Corn 179.49 Bight of Benin 113 128 46,125 N/D 
58 76965 Dove 1723 GB 237 Beans 0.85 Corn, Rice 43.96 Bight of Benin 113 128 43,727 1.0 
59 76348 Whidah Frigate 1724 GB 300 Beans 6.77 Corn 35.90 Bight of Benin 113 128 55,350 6.1 
60 76695 
Cape Coast 
Frigate 1724 GB 205 Beans 2.12 Corn 42.36 Senegambia 132 100 34,030 3.1 
61 75258 Chandos 1724 GB 556 Beans 3.63 
Corn, Palm 
161.73 Bight of Benin 113 128 102,582 1.8 
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Oil 
62 76095 
Royal African 
Packet 1724 GB 645   N/D 
Corn, Palm 
Oil 184.20 Gold Coast 117 112 109,973 N/D 
63 76617 Portugal 1729 GB 327 Beans 40.64 
Corn, Rice, 
Palm Oil, 
Yams 103.72 Gold Coast 117 112 55,754 36.4 
64 90937 Plumper 1763 GB 304 
Beans, 
Stockfish 8.70 N/D N/D 
Windward 
Coast 232 103 66,576 6.5 
65 91213 William 1765 GB 77 
Beans, 
Rice 19.89 N/D N/D Senegambia 90 94 10,703 92.9 
66 92315 Sisters 1766 GB 280 
Beans, 
Pease 20.33 N/D N/D Bight of Benin 155 103 50,540 20.1 
67 91219 Dalrymple 1767 GB 383 
Beans, 
Rice 24.36 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 155 103 69,132 17.6 
68 91427 Neptune 1768 GB 169 
Beans, 
Rice 9.91 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 155 103 30,505 16.2 
69 91577 Little Britain 1769 GB 148 
Beans, 
Rice 14.54 N/D N/D 
Windward 
Coast 232 103 32,412 22.4 
70 91428 Plumper 1769 GB 326 
Beans, 
Barley, 
Rice 33.50 N/D N/D Bight of Benin 155 103 58,843 28.5 
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71 91553 Fox 1769 GB 180   N/D Yams 3669.87 Bight of Biafra 155 103 32,490 N/D 
72 91594 Andromache 1770 GB 162 
Rice, 
Beans, 
Stockfish 8.49 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 155 103 29,241 14.5 
73 91221 Dalrymple 1770 GB 342 
Rice, 
Beans, 
Stockfish 33.60 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 155 103 61,731 27.2 
74 91573 Hector 1770 GB 260 
Rice, 
Beans, 
Stockfish 30.48 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 155 103 46,930 32.5 
75 91409 King of Prussia 1770 GB 164 
Rice, Peas, 
Beans, 
Stockfish 16.68 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 155 103 29,602 28.2 
76 91653 Swift 1770 GB 167 
Beans, 
Rice, 
Stockfish, 
Pease 22.02 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 155 103 30,144 36.5 
77 91545 Dobson 1770 GB 355   N/D Yams 3669.87 Bight of Biafra 155 103 64,078 N/D 
78 91595 Andromache 1771 GB 190 
Rice, 
Beans, 
Stockfish 11.98 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 155 103 34,295 17.5 
79 91743 May 1771 GB 176 Rice 15.78 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 155 103 31,768 24.8 
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80 91430 Plumper 1771 GB 348 
Beans, 
Barley, 
Stockfish 20.50 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 155 103 62,814 16.3 
81 91643 True Blue 1771 GB 365 
Beans, 
Barley, 
Rice 19.69 N/D N/D Bight of Benin 155 103 65,883 14.9 
82 91752 Dalrymple 1772 GB 243 
Rice, 
Beans, 
Stockfish 28.82 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 155 103 43,862 32.8 
83 91574 Hector 1772 GB 250 
Rice, 
Beans, 
Stockfish 26.78 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 155 103 45,125 29.7 
84 91410 King of Prussia 1772 GB 239 
Rice, Peas, 
Beans, 
Stockfish 18.49 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 155 103 43,140 21.4 
85 91979 Andromache 1774 GB 210 
Rice, 
Beans, 
Stockfish 16.05 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 155 103 37,905 21.2 
86 91813 Badger 1774 GB 243 Rice, Peas 15.24 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 155 103 43,862 17.4 
87 91814 Badger 1775 GB 238 
Peas, 
Beans, 
Rice 19.14 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 155 103 42,959 22.3 
88 91575 Hector 1775 GB 141 
Rice, 
Beans, 
Stockfish 27.49 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 155 103 25,451 54.0 
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89 92536 Badger 1777 GB 421 
Peas, 
Beans, 
Stockfish 25.69 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 155 103 75,991 16.9 
90 91576 Hector 1777 GB 236 
Rice, 
Stockfish, 
Peas 20.22 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 155 103 42,598 23.7 
91 91794 Swift 1777 GB 211 
Beans, 
Stockfish, 
Pease 7.01 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 155 103 38,086 9.2 
92 83174 Preston 1780 GB 210 
Stockfish, 
Pease 1.72 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 155 103 37,905 2.3 
93 83175 Preston 1782 GB 221 
Beans, 
Pease 0.81 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 98 33,040 1.2 
94 83176 Preston 1784 GB 302 
Barley, 
Rice, Pease 1.80 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 98 45,149 2.0 
95 17983 Alert 1789 GB 276 
Beans, 
Rice 12.28 N/D N/D Gold Coast 147 95 46,506 13.2 
96 80687 Brothers 1789 GB 455   N/D Yams 146.03 Bight of Biafra 103 98 68,023 N/D 
97 18057 Thomas 1790 GB 359 Beans 10.16 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 98 53,671 9.5 
98 18068 Eliza 1790 GB 291 Beans 16.93 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 98 43,505 19.5 
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99 18080 Prince 1790 GB 396 
Beans, 
Rice 14.68 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 98 59,202 12.4 
100 18088 Wasp 1790 GB 249 
Beans, 
Rice 19.70 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 98 37,226 26.5 
101 18071 Hector 1791 GB 764 Beans 33.86 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 98 114,218 14.8 
102 18112 Pilgrim 1791 GB 381 
Beans, 
Rice 25.74 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 98 56,960 22.6 
103 18077 Mermaid 1791 GB 140 
Beans, 
Rice 35.68 N/D N/D Gold Coast 147 95 23,590 75.6 
104 18082 Royal Charlotte 1791 GB 140 Beans 14.90 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 98 20,930 35.6 
105 18060 Albion 1791 GB 262 Beans 2.12 N/D N/D Sierra Leone 192 57 40,086 2.6 
106 18092 Brothers 1791 GB 279 
Beans, 
Rice 78.76 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 98 41,711 94.4 
107 18083 Royal Charlotte 1791 GB 336 Rice 8.81 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 98 50,232 8.8 
108 18062 Alfred 1791 GB 316 
Beans, 
Rice 16.49 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 98 47,242 17.5 
109 18103 James 1791 GB 176 
Beans, 
Rice 25.57 N/D N/D 
Windward 
Coast 211 68 30,536 41.9 
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110 18075 King George 1791 GB 369 
Beans, 
Rice 10.93 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 98 55,166 9.9 
111 18097 Eliza 1791 GB 291 
Beans, 
Rice 57.47 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 98 43,505 66.0 
112 18096 Daniel 1791 GB 146 
Beans, 
Rice 8.47 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 98 21,827 19.4 
113 18117 Rodney 1791 GB 371 
Beans, 
Rice 34.51 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 98 55,465 31.1 
114 18120 Sarah 1791 GB 231 
Beans, 
Rice 24.96 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 98 34,535 36.1 
115 18078 Pearl 1791 GB 372 
Beans, 
Rice N/D N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 98 55,614 N/D 
116 18115 Recovery 1791 GB 304 
Beans, 
Rice 49.10 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 98 45,448 54.0 
117 18158 Pilgrim 1792 GB 412 
Beans, 
Rice 19.70 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 98 61,594 16.0 
118 18142 General Orde 1792 GB 240 Beans 135.46 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 98 35,880 188.8 
119 18101 Hester 1792 GB 243 
Beans, 
Rice 33.31 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 98 36,329 45.8 
120 18104 Lion 1792 GB 328 Beans 1.27 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 98 49,036 1.3 
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121 18131 Alfred 1792 GB 326 
Beans, 
Rice 23.95 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 98 48,737 24.6 
122 18113 Prince 1792 GB 359 Rice 17.62 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 98 53,671 16.4 
123 18152 Mermaid 1792 GB 159 
Beans, 
Rice 10.08 N/D N/D Senegambia 79 71 17,570 28.7 
124 18153 Morning Star 1792 GB 56 
Beans, 
Rice 9.62 N/D N/D Sierra Leone 192 57 8,568 56.1 
125 18122 Swift 1792 GB 380 
Beans, 
Rice 1.06 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 98 56,810 0.9 
126 18138 Fame 1792 GB 200 
Beans, 
Rice 79.99 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 98 29,900 133.8 
127 18124 Trelawney 1792 GB 333 
Beans, 
Rice 6.60 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 98 49,784 6.6 
128 18113 Prince 1792 GB 359 
Beans, 
Rice 18.63 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 98 53,671 17.4 
129 18126 Wasp 1792 GB 235 
Beans, 
Rice 16.93 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 98 35,133 24.1 
130 18144 Hector 1793 GB 596 Beans 50.80 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 98 89,102 28.5 
131 18140 Favourite 1793 GB 156 
Beans, 
Rice 26.48 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 98 23,322 56.8 
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132 18182 Langrishe 1793 GB 416 
Beans, 
Rice 21.51 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 98 62,192 17.3 
133 18186 Royal Charlotte 1793 GB 210   74.50 N/D N/D 
Windward 
Coast 211 68 36,435 102.2 
134 18130 Albion 1793 GB 239 Beans 1.18 N/D N/D Sierra Leone 192 57 36,567 1.6 
135 18177 Catherine 1793 GB 345 
Beans, 
Rice 41.21 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 98 51,578 39.9 
136 18156 Nassau 1793 GB 190 
Beans, 
Rice 17.54 N/D N/D Sierra Leone 192 57 29,070 30.2 
137 18163 Roman Emperor 1793 GB 382 Rice 34.51 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 98 57,109 30.2 
138 18146 Jupiter 1793 GB 400 
Beans, 
Rice 27.95 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 98 59,800 23.4 
139 18157 Pearl 1793 GB 400 
Beans, 
Rice 34.51 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 98 59,800 28.9 
140 18159 Prince 1793 GB 311 
Beans, 
Rice 37.32 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 98 46,495 40.1 
141 18214 Pilgrim 1796 GB 404 Beans 16.93 N/D N/D Sierra Leone 192 57 61,812 13.7 
142 18259 Swift 1803 GB 389 Beans 37.25 N/D N/D Gold Coast 147 95 65,547 28.4 
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143 18267 Alert 1806 GB 277 
Beans, 
Rice 27.72 N/D N/D Sierra Leone 192 57 42,381 32.7 
144 82379 Lottery 1798 GB 460 
Beans, 
Rice 48.40 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 157 95,910 25.2 
145 82382 Lottery 1802 GB 305 
Beans, 
Rice 32.39 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 193 74,573 21.7 
146 81302 Enterprize 1804 GB 412 
Beans, 
Rice 44.96 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 103 173 92,494 24.3 
147 81497 Fortune 1805 GB 343 
Beans, 
Rice 75.95 N/D N/D 
West Central 
Africa North 139 240 106,159 35.8 
148 10212 Leusden 1721 NL 446 
Beans, 
Barley 196.86 N/D N/D 
West Central 
Africa North 139 83 68,015 144.7 
149 10213 Leusden 1722 NL 461 
Beans, 
Barley 150.90 N/D N/D Bight of Benin 113 128 85,055 88.7 
150 ? Francis 1723 GB 200 Beans 2.54 
Corn, Palm 
Oil 83.71 Gold Coast 117 112 34,100 3.7 
151 10976 
Raadhuis van 
Middelburg 1742 NL 272 
Beans, 
Barley 61.47 N/D N/D 
Windward + 
Ivory + Gold + 
Benin 152 154 62,560 49.1 
152 10626 Groot Prooijen 1748 NL 328 
Beans, 
Barley 78.68 N/D N/D 
West Central 
Africa North 179 65 50,676 77.6 
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153 10620 Granadier 1749 NL 270 
Beans, 
Barley 114.74 N/D N/D 
West Central 
Africa North 179 65 41,715 137.5 
154 10957 
Prins Willem de 
Vijfde 1754 NL 232 
Beans, 
Barley 87.75 N/D N/D Gold Coast 134 150 50,344 87.2 
155 10869 
Middelburgs 
Welvaren 1754 NL 270 
Beans, 
Barley 90.95 Corn, Rice 126.20 
Windward + 
Ivory + Gold + 
Benin 152 154 62,100 73.2 
156 10870 
Middelburgs 
Welvaren 1755 NL 289 
Beans, 
Barley 48.25 
Corn, Rice, 
Palm Oil, 
Yam 337.61 
Windward 
Coast 172 93 51,731 46.6 
157 10527 Drie Gezusters 1756 NL 234 
Beans, 
Barley 91.95 N/D N/D Gold Coast 134 150 50,778 90.5 
158 10958 
Prins Willem de 
Vijfde 1756 NL 348 
Beans, 
Barley 123.76 N/D N/D 
West Central 
Africa North 179 65 53,766 115.1 
159 11114 
Vrouw Johanna 
Cores 1757 NL 282 
Beans, 
Barley 89.95 Rice 5.07 
Windward + 
Ivory + Gold + 
Benin 152 154 64,860 69.3 
160 11088 Vliegende Faam 1757 NL 281 
Beans, 
Barley 67.37 Corn, Millet 273.81 
Windward + 
Ivory + Gold + 
Benin 152 154 64,630 52.1 
161 10528 Drie Gezusters 1758 NL 405 
Beans, 
Barley 97.12 N/D N/D 
West Central 
Africa North 179 65 62,573 77.6 
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162 10959 
Prins Willem de 
Vijfde 1758 NL 465 
Beans, 
Barley 98.35 N/D N/D 
West Central 
Africa North 179 65 71,843 68.4 
163 10965 
Prins Willem de 
Vijfde 1758 NL 377 
Beans, 
Barley 123.76 N/D N/D 
West Central 
Africa North 179 65 58,247 106.2 
164 11116 
Vrouw Johanna 
Cores 1761 NL 381 
Beans, 
Barley 81.96 N/D N/D 
West Central 
Africa North 168 83 63,627 64.4 
165 10906 Nieuwe Hoop 1765 NL 351 
Beans, 
Barley 115.56 N/D N/D 
West Central 
Africa North 168 83 58,617 98.6 
166 10963 
Prins Willem de 
Vijfde 1766 NL 238 
Beans, 
Barley 84.78 Corn 3.59 Gold Coast 130 117 43,316 97.9 
167 10907 Nieuwe Hoop 1767 NL 329 
Beans, 
Barley 100.70 
Rice, Palm 
Oil 5.82 Gold Coast 130 117 59,878 84.1 
168 10544 Enigheid 1767 NL 315 
Beans, 
Barley 111.47 N/D N/D 
West Central 
Africa North 168 83 52,605 105.9 
169 11119 
Vrouw Johanna 
Cores 1768 NL 249 
Beans, 
Barley 102.50 N/D N/D 
Windward + 
Ivory + Gold + 
Benin 191 132 56,648 90.5 
170 11178 Zanggodin 1770 NL 67 
Beans, 
Barley 36.31 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 155 103 12,094 150.1 
171 11125 Watergeus 1774 NL 375 
Beans, 
Barley 179.90 N/D N/D 
West Central 
Africa North 168 83 62,625 143.6 
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172 11134 Welmenende 1774 NL 203 
Beans, 
Barley 59.27 N/D N/D 
Windward + 
Ivory + Gold + 
Benin 191 132 46,183 64.2 
173 10787 Jonge Willem 1775 NL 163 
Beans, 
Barley 71.66 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 155 103 29,422 121.8 
174 11085 Vis 1775 NL 238 
Beans, 
Barley 103.40 N/D N/D 
Windward + 
Ivory + Gold + 
Benin 191 132 54,145 95.5 
175 10590 
Geertruida en 
Christina 1775 NL 335 
Beans, 
Barley 109.10 Millet   40.04 
Windward + 
Ivory + Gold + 
Benin 191 132 76,213 71.6 
176 11180 Zanggodin 1775 NL 127 
Beans, 
Barley 58.61 N/D N/D Bight of Biafra 155 103 22,924 127.8 
177 10591 
Geertruida en 
Christina 1777 NL 303 
Beans, 
Barley 103.90 N/D N/D Gold Coast 130 117 55,146 94.2 
178 11126 Watergeus 1777 NL 325 
Beans, 
Barley 179.90 N/D N/D 
West Central 
Africa North 168 83 54,275 165.7 
179 11210 Zorg 1778 NL 246 
Beans, 
Barley 76.86 Rice 5.07 Gold Coast 130 117 44,772 85.8 
180 10666 
Haast U 
Langzaam 1780 NL 373 
Beans, 
Barley 101.30 
Corn, Rice, 
Palm Oil 31.71 
Windward + 
Ivory + Gold + 
Benin 191 132 84,858 59.7 
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181 10913 Nieuwe Hoop 1785 NL 215 
Beans, 
Barley 101.30 N/D N/D Gold Coast 147 95 36,228 139.8 
182 11056 Vergenoegen 1787 NL 386 
Beans, 
Barley 108.75 Corn, Rice 18.64 Gold Coast 147 95 65,041 83.6 
183 11182 Zeemercuur 1789 NL 270 
Beans, 
Barley 118.54 
Rice, Palm 
Oil, Yams 33.30 Gold Coast 147 95 45,495 130.3 
184 11057 Vergenoegen 1790 NL 266 
Beans, 
Barley 131.14 N/D N/D 
West Central 
Africa North 168 83 44,422 147.6 
185 10463 Brandenburg 1792 NL 226 
Beans, 
Barley 110.34 N/D N/D 
Windward + 
Ivory + Gold + 
Benin 130 96 36,386 151.6 
186 11183 Zeemercuur 1793 NL 174 
Beans, 
Barley 119.80 
Corn, Rice, 
Palm Oil, 
Yams 17.80 
Windward + 
Ivory + Gold + 
Benin 130 96 28,014 213.8 
187 11058 Vergenoegen 1795 NL 367 
Beans, 
Barley 131.14 N/D N/D 
West Central 
Africa North 168 83 61,289 107.0 
Source: see text 
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Appendix 3.2.b. Summary statistics of 36 ‘full data’ voyages 
No 
voyage 
no. 
TSTD Name Vessel 
Year 
Arrive Nation 
No. of 
slaves 
embarked 
Main European 
provisions 
Total kcal 
taken on 
board in 
Europe 
(millions)  
Main African 
provisions 
Total kcal 
taken on 
board in 
Africa 
(millions) 
Major Region of 
Slave 
Embarkation 
% total 
provisions 
from 
Europe 
% total 
provisions 
from 
Africa 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 35161 
Cron Printz 
Christian 1755 DK 125 
Beans, 
Stockfish 27.14 
Millet, Palm 
Oil 7.72 Gold Coast 77.9 22.1 
2 35181 Fredensborg 1768 DK 265 Beans, Barley 76.29 
Millet, Palm 
Oil 25.25 Gold Coast 75.1 24.9 
3 33330 Diligent 1732 FR 256 Beans 50.8 Corn, Cassava 5.25 Bight of Benin 90.6 9.4 
4 30484 Reine de France 1744 FR 404 Beans, Rice 63.91 
Corn, Yams, 
Cassava 23.37 Bight of Benin 73.2 26.8 
5 30754 Thélémaque 1764 FR 365 Beans, Rice 76.67 
Corn, Yams, 
Cassava 7.23 
West Central 
Africa North 91.4 8.6 
6 30911 Pompée 1770 FR 390 Beans, Rice 148.01 
Corn, Palm Oil, 
Yams, Cassava 61.63 
West Central 
Africa North 70.6 29.4 
8 31639 Pactole 1784 FR 428 Beans, Rice 63.91 
Corn, Rice, 
Palm Oil, 
Yams, Cassava, 
Plantains 75.29 Bight of Benin 45.9 54.1 
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34 15074 Mary 1683 GB 507 Beans 0.61 Corn 179.49 Gold Coast 0.3 99.7 
36 9669 Jefferie 1685 GB 310 Beans 0.33 Corn 114.88 Gold Coast 0.3 99.7 
37 9668 Good Hope 1685 GB 376 Beans 0.58 Corn 118.47 
West Central 
Africa North 0.5 99.5 
40 9714 Hannibal 1694 GB 700 Beans 2.9 Corn 200.32 Gold Coast 1.4 98.6 
42 9726 
Fauconberg (a) 
Falconberg 1696 GB 605 Beans 2.54 Corn 280.01 Bight of Benin 0.9 99.1 
45 75956 Otter 1721 GB 209 Beans 0.73 Corn 32.31 Senegambia 2.2 97.8 
47 76147 Sarah Gally 1721 GB 250 Beans 1.45 
Corn, Rice, 
Palm Oil   85.09 Gold Coast 1.7 98.3 
48 76399 Henry 1722 GB 367 Beans 1.86 
Corn, Rice, 
Palm Oil 113.27 Bight of Benin 1.6 98.4 
51 76435 Sarah Gally 1723 GB 273 Beans 0.91 
Corn, Palm Oil, 
Yams   70.01 Gold Coast 1.3 98.7 
54 76693 Lady Rachel 1723 GB 221 Beans 2.18 Corn, Rice 24.92 Senegambia 8.0 92.0 
55 75286 Clarendon 1723 GB 69 Beans 0.63 Corn, Rice 33.56 
West Central 
Africa North 1.8 98.2 
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57 76176 Sloper 1723 GB 282 Beans 2.54 Corn, Palm Oil 69.05 Gold Coast 3.5 96.5 
59 76965 Dove 1723 GB 237 Beans 0.85 Corn, Rice 43.96 Bight of Benin 1.9 98.1 
60 76348 Whidah Frigate 1724 GB 300 Beans 6.77 Corn 35.9 Bight of Benin 15.9 84.1 
61 76695 
Cape Coast 
Frigate 1724 GB 205 Beans 2.12 Corn 42.36 Senegambia 4.8 95.2 
62 75258 Chandos 1724 GB 556 Beans 3.63 Corn, Palm Oil 161.73 Bight of Benin 2.2 97.8 
64 76617 Portugal 1729 GB 327 Beans 40.64 
Corn, Rice, 
Palm Oil, Yams 103.72 Gold Coast 28.2 71.8 
149 ? Francis 1723 GB 200 Beans 2.54 Corn, Palm Oil 83.71 Gold Coast 2.9 97.1 
157 10869 
Middelburgs 
Welvaren 1754 NL 270 Beans, Barley 90.95 Corn, Rice 126.2 
Windward + 
Ivory + Gold + 
Benin 41.9 58.1 
158 10870 
Middelburgs 
Welvaren 1755 NL 289 Beans, Barley 48.25 
Corn, Rice, 
Palm Oil, Yam 337.61 Windward Coast 12.5 87.5 
161 11114 
Vrouw Johanna 
Cores 1757 NL 282 Beans, Barley 89.95 Rice 5.07 
Windward + 
Ivory + Gold + 
Benin 94.7 5.3 
162 11088 
Vliegende 
Faam 1757 NL 281 Beans, Barley 67.37 Corn, Millet 273.81 Windward + 
Ivory + Gold + 
19.7 80.3 
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Benin 
168 10963 
Prins Willem de 
Vijfde 1766 NL 238 Beans, Barley 84.78 Corn 3.59 Gold Coast 95.9 4.1 
169 10907 Nieuwe Hoop 1767 NL 329 Beans, Barley 100.7 Rice, Palm Oil 5.82 Gold Coast 94.5 5.5 
177 10590 
Geertruida en 
Christina 1775 NL 335 Beans, Barley 109.1 Millet   40.04 
Windward + 
Ivory + Gold + 
Benin 73.2 26.8 
181 11210 Zorg 1778 NL 246 Beans, Barley 76.86 Rice 5.07 Gold Coast 93.8 6.2 
182 10666 
Haast U 
Langzaam 1780 NL 373 Beans, Barley 101.3 
Corn, Rice, 
Palm Oil 31.71 
Windward + 
Ivory + Gold + 
Benin 76.2 23.8 
184 11056 Vergenoegen 1787 NL 386 Beans, Barley 108.75 Corn, Rice 18.64 Gold Coast 85.4 14.6 
185 11182 Zeemercuur 1789 NL 270 Beans, Barley 118.54 
Rice, Palm Oil, 
Yams 33.3 Gold Coast 78.1 21.9 
Source: See text 
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Appendix 3.3. Weights, measures and nutritional contents  
Food type Quantity Measure Kg Kcal / kg Protein / kg
Barley Lb (Br) 0.45 3500 82
Barly Lb (Middleberg) 0.47 3500 82
Barley Sack 60.00 3500 82
Barley Litre 6.20 3500 82
Barley Last (Muddle,Schepel) 2000.00 3500 82
Beef flesh Hogshead (Hhd) 228.82 1150 220
Bread White Hundred Weight (cwt) 50.85 3410 77
Cassava flour Bushel 0.00 3440 16
Cassava flour Alquiers 14.00 3440 16
Corn Ears/Cobs Piece 0.00 2450 20
Fish, dried, salted Lbs (Br) 0.45 2250 470
Kidney beans, dry Quarter 12.71 3330 236
Kidney beans, dry Bushel 0.00 3330 236
Kidney beans, dry Ton 1016.96 3330 236
Kidney beans, dry Sack 60.00 3330 236
Kidney beans, dry Last (Muddle,Schepel) 2133.80 3330 236
Maize flour, whole Lb (Br) 0.45 3530 93
Maize flour, whole English Chest 101.70 3530 93
Maize flour, whole Dutch Chest 104.83 3530 93
Maize flour, whole Stekan 1.77 3530 93
Millet, bulrush Stekan 1.77 3410 104
Millet, bulrush Chest 104.83 3410 104
Palm oil Litres 1.00 8840 0
Palm Oil Gallon 3.50 8840 0
Palm Oil Aume 0.00 8840 0
Palm Oil Anker 0.00 8850 10
Pigeon peas, dry Lb (Br) 0.45 3430 217
Rice Polished Lb (Br) 0.45 3610 65
Rice Polished Lb (Middleberg) 0.47 3610 65
Rice Polished Alquiers 14.00 3610 65
Rice Polished Barrels 81.72 3620 75
Wheat, whole Hundred Weight (cwt) 50.85 3230 126
Wheat, whole Hundred Weight (cwt) 50.85 3230 126
Yam Piece 7.50 1180 15
Plantain Piece 0.30 1350 12
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Appendix 3.4. Average time spent on board a slave vessel per region of embarkation, 1681-1807, 20-year time intervals 
 
Senegambia Total Mean
Decades Mean Median S.D N Mean Median Sd N TAC + MP
1680 - 1700 91 80 41 13 42 36 19 31 133
1701 - 1720 60 61 24 12 47 43 15 28 106
1721 - 1740 132 104 83 69 52 42 48 70 184
1741 - 1760 116 83 85 80 47 43 20 65 163
1761 - 1780 90 62 81 58 53 42 41 71 143
1781 - 1800 79 63 55 91 45 38 26 117 124
Sierra Leone Total Mean
Decades Mean Median S.D N Mean Median Sd N TAC + MP
1680 - 1799 160 155 65 4 56 48 21 10 216
1701 - 1720 49 49 33 2 65 56 26 4 114
1721 - 1740 137 117 30 3 56 56 19 5 193
1741 - 1760 186 141 133 17 60 52 24 15 246
1760 - 1780 244 227 168 15 55 54 18 25 298
1781 - 1800 192 168 116 54 44 43 13 76 235
Windward Coast Total Mean
Decades Mean Median S.D N Mean Median S.D N TAC + MP
1680 - 1700 ND ND ND ND ND ND ND ND ND
1701 - 1720 29 29 23 2 60 59 17 4 88
1721 - 1740 55 55 8 2 80 80 34 2 135
1741 - 1760 172 173 55 23 70 61 23 22 242
1761 - 1780 232 204 95 20 74 62 29 21 306
1781 - 1800 211 161 142 38 52 50 16 46 263
Senegambia TAC Senegambia MP
Sierra Leone TAC Sierra Leone MP
Windward Coast TAC Windward Coast MP
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Gold Coast Total Mean
Decades Mean Median S.D N Mean Median S.D N TAC + MP
1680 - 1700 107 95 76 8 78 73 22 15 184
1701 - 1720 133 87 154 63 68 63 20 119 201
1721 - 1740 117 105 85 110 82 75 30 90 199
1741 - 1760 134 120 91 86 94 85 56 104 229
1761 - 1780 130 111 76 156 84 77 33 151 214
1781 - 1800 147 124 109 204 68 63 27 240 215
Bight of Benin Total Mean
Decades Mean Median S.D N Mean Median S.D N TAC + MP
1680 - 1700 73 53 61 41 91 87 26 70 164
1701 - 1720 96 85 85 137 85 76 39 175 182
1721 - 1740 113 99 58 184 97 94 31 196 210
1741 - 1760 152 137 74 120 117 112 37 126 269
1761 - 1780 191 177 88 168 100 99 32 149 291
1781 - 1800 130 117 72 96 64 52 32 244 194
Bight of Biafra Total Mean
Decades Mean Median S.D N Mean Median S.D N TAC + MP
1680 - 1700 ND ND ND ND 93 85 28 16 ND
1701 - 1720 ND ND ND ND 91 83 32 23 ND
1721 - 1740 72 72 0 1 127 94 80 3 199
1741 - 1760 118 128 63 17 86 82 24 19 203
1761 - 1780 155 127 114 42 78 78 25 57 234
1781 - 1800 103 91 76 195 66 60 32 243 169
Gold Coast TAC Gold Coast MP
Bight of Benin TAC Bight of Benin MP
Bight of Biafra TAC Bight of Biafra MP
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Source: slavevoyages.org 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
West Central Africa Total Mean
Decades Mean Median S.D N Mean Median S.D N TAC + MP
1680 - 1700 78 56 58 5 84 83 35 6 162
1701 - 1720 115 137 55 17 58 59 17 17 174
1721 - 1740 139 131 82 103 58 51 25 81 197
1741 - 1760 179 152 109 240 49 49 16 85 228
1761 - 1780 163 156 90 401 58 56 25 259 222
1781  -1800 139 133 71 361 53 50 17 488 192
West Central Africa TAC West Central Africa MP
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Appendix 3.5. Price index of staple food basket (barley, beans, rice) on English and Dutch 
markets, 1681-1800 (1701 = 100) 
 
Source: see text 
 
 
 
year Britain NL year Britain NL year Britain NL
1681 103.9 1721 93.1 1761 81.2
1682 111.5 1722 85.4 75.2 1762 76.6
1683 104.2 1723 87.4 1763 96.1
1684 106.6 1724 96.7 1764 93.6
1685 119.5 1725 93.9 1765 92.4
1686 108.2 86.4 1726 94.3 1766 96.1
1687 73.0 1727 95.8 1767 96.1
1688 70.1 86.2 1728 108.1 85.1 1768 91.9
1689 81.1 94.9 1729 101.9 1769 73.7
1690 79.8 1730 91.3 1770 74.7
1691 79.1 1731 91.6 73.0 1771 87.6
1692 86.5 112.0 1732 89.4 1772 95.8
1693 101.7 1733 87.6 1773 98.6
1694 99.6 1734 87.5 1774 96.7
1695 99.2 1735 88.1 1775 92.3
1696 122.9 1736 89.5 1776 91.5 112.4
1697 123.9 1737 97.4 1777 83.1 104.0
1698 127.2 1738 92.1 83.2 1778 91.0 111.6
1699 119.1 1739 95.4 82.9 1779 91.8 133.0
1700 108.2 1740 102.8 1780 120.9 129.6
1701 100.0 100.0 1741 98.5 1781 109.5 137.8
1702 101.9 1742 101.5 1782 112.5 124.8
1703 99.3 1743 93.8 1783 131.6
1704 99.1 1744 88.4 1784 116.0 139.2
1705 87.9 103.5 1745 87.9 1785 109.0 119.5
1706 92.5 1746 81.8 1786 105.9
1707 92.9 1747 87.2 1787 101.4 122.3
1708 96.9 1748 92.1 1788 96.5 116.3
1709 100.9 1749 96.1 1789 95.3 114.8
1710 108.0 1750 93.3 1790 102.1
1711 107.0 1751 96.2 1791 103.1
1712 100.8 1752 96.4 1792 108.5
1713 97.3 1753 94.6 1793 117.0
1714 97.3 1754 87.5 1794 119.1
1715 98.0 1755 81.0 1795 140.3
1716 92.2 1756 80.0 1796 134.6
1717 89.5 1757 106.6 1797 104.7
1718 87.2 100.2 1758 96.0 1798 103.4
1719 92.4 1759 84.1 1799 125.7
1720 100.3 1760 83.1 104.1 1800 191.3
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Appendix 3.6. Estimates of the five-year average annual value of African-sourced provisions 
in the Atlantic slave trade, 1681-1807 (all estimates in constant British Pound sterling of 
1700, new world provisions at 20%) 
Source: see text 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Average annual value of 
slaves purchased (fob 
Europe/Americas)
Average annual value 
of slave provisions (fob 
Europe/Americas)
Average annual value of 
African-sourced slave 
provisions (fob 
Europe/Americas)
Average annual value 
of African-sourced 
provisions (c.i.f) 
(OUR ESTIMATES)
Average annual 
value of African-
sourced provisions 
(ELTIS) 
1 2 3 4 5
1681-1685 107,587 21,517 16,000 32,480 55,407
1686-1690 86,610 17,322 12,043 24,447 44,604
1691-1695 110,731 22,146 15,097 30,647 57,026
1696-1700 202,723 40,545 31,710 64,371 104,402
1701-1705 196,478 41,986 32,789 66,562 101,186
1706-1710 196,241 37,383 28,665 58,191 101,064
1711-1715 248,689 59,579 45,936 93,250 128,075
1716-1720 361,423 78,978 62,297 126,464 186,133
1721-1725 512,750 87,627 67,742 137,516 264,066
1726-1730 392,838 68,864 54,658 110,955 202,312
1731-1735 262,800 60,350 47,170 95,754 135,342
1736-1740 385,436 87,318 67,764 137,561 198,500
1741-1745 405,049 78,565 49,726 100,943 208,600
1746-1750 449,280 67,117 47,714 96,859 231,379
1751-1755 537,147 84,801 54,153 109,930 276,631
1756-1760 396,019 61,509 44,798 90,940 203,950
1761-1765 796,786 84,934 57,943 117,624 410,345
1766-1770 1,246,728 96,768 59,459 120,702 642,065
1771-1775 1,503,464 105,134 64,839 131,622 774,284
1776-1780 698,969 56,824 31,983 64,926 359,969
1781-1785 1,317,247 113,308 68,133 138,310 678,382
1786-1790 2,381,871 146,573 73,085 148,363 1,226,664
1791-1795 1,717,428 126,445 78,975 160,319 884,475
1796-1800 1,812,184 107,428 74,118 150,459 933,275
1801-1807 2,165,957 108,298 75,091 152,435 1,115,468
1681-1807 762,158 76,318 51,832 105,220 421,430
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Appendix 4.1. Bristol slaving vessels carrying just slaves or slaves and commodities 1790 – 
1807 by main region of slave embarkation 
 
Source: Bristol Presentments 1790 – 1807 
 
Appendix 4.2.a. Number of commodity ships sent to Africa by nation 1680 to 1808 
 
Source: Eltis (2013) 
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Appendix 4.2.b. Commodity ship departures by British port 
 
Source: Eltis (2013) 
 
Appendix 4.3. Quantity of ivory (lbs) imported into Great Britain (1737 – 1808) 
 
Source: CUST (see text) 
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Appendix 4.4. Descriptive statistics coastal prices of commodities 1740 - 1793  
  Beeswax Camwood Ebony Gum Malluguetta 
Palm 
Oil Redwood 
        Mean 5.45 0.28 0.11 4.63 1.69 7.08 0.07 
Median 5.87 0.28 0.11 4.02 1.63 6.87 0.05 
Standard 
Deviation 1.12 0.04 0.01 2.44 0.69 3.38 0.09 
Minimum 2.72 0.25 0.10 2.50 0.45 0.88 0.02 
Maximum 7.32 0.30 0.12 8.00 2.83 13.75 0.35 
Sample Size 22 2 2 4 14 10 13 
Source: see text 
 
MCC ships 
1742 - 1803 
Lovejoy and 
Richardson (1995) 
1784 – 1808 
Average 
Commodities 
1742 - 1793 
    Mean 12.26 22.51 2.76 
Median 11.26 19.50 2.69 
Standard 
Deviation 4.49 6.63 1.11 
Minimum 5.32 15.60 0.99 
Maximum 24.22 33.20 4.67 
Sample Size 29 26 67 
    
Source: see text, Lovejoy & Richardson (1995) 
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CHAPTER 5 
Appendix 5.1.  Estimates of the value of the kola trade at Salaga in the nineteenth century 
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Appendix 5.2. Estimated number of kola trees in Asante in the first half of the nineteenth century 
No. Headloads                  
Low estimate  
No. Headloads                  
High Estimate 
No. Headloads 
Median Estimate 
Number of Kola nuts 
/ apakan or headload 
(Source Wilks p 268) 
1 2 3 4 
1200 15000 8100 2000 
    
Kola nuts 
produced       
Low estimate         
Col 1 * Col 4 
Kola nuts 
produced       
High estimate             
Col 2 * Col 4 
Kola nuts produced 
Median estimate    
Col 2 * Col 4 
Av Yield / Tree 
1916/1917 (Abaka 
p33)  
5 6 7 8 
2400000 30000000 16200000 765 
    No. of Kola 
Trees in Asante 
Low Estimate                      
Col 5/Col 8 
No. Kola Trees in 
Asante High 
Estimate                      
Col 6/ Col 8 
No. Kola Trees in 
Asante Median 
Estimate                      
Col 7 / Col 8 
 8 9 10 
 3137 39216 21176 
 Source: see text 
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Appendix 5.3.a.  Estimated per capita consumption of British imported goods into the Gold Coast region 
  
Clothes 
(lbs) 
Glass 
(lbs) 
Metal 
Manufactures 
(lbs) 
Soap 
(lbs) 
Metals 
(lbs) 
Cotton  
Manufactures 
(yards) 
Earthenware 
(pieces) 
Gunpowder 
(barrels) 
Woollen 
Manufactures 
(pieces) 
Guns 
(pieces) 
Grand Total: 1827 - 1849 7,355,688 1,484,678 1,248,807 782,724 19,606,829 86,514,756 2,177,872 7,733,948 68,787 276,308 
Per capita consumption, 
population Ghana 1850: 
1,981,047 (Jervan & 
Frankema 2014) 4 1 1 0 10 44 1 4 0 0 
Per Capita consumption, 
population Metropolitan 
Asante 1860: 350,000 
(Austin 2005, p59) 21 4 4 2 56 247 6 22 0 1 
Per capita consumtion, 
population Southern + 
Metropolitan Asante 
1860: 800,000 (Austin 
2005, p50, Wilks 1975, 
p243) 9 2 2 1 25 108 3 10 0 0 
Source: Imports: TNA CUST 
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Appendix 5.3.b. Sources on Asante population 
Sources on the population of the region in the nineteenth century are far from reliable, 
although this is the case for all pre-colonial Africa with the possible exception of the Cape 
Colony. Wilks (1975, pp87–95,126,127,243) based his estimates for the metropolitan, 
southern and northern provinces of the Asante empire in the nineteenth century on number of 
men each district was required to muster for army campaigns and 20th century census figures. 
These were criticised by both Johnson (1978) and Austin (2005) as being far too high. In his 
review of the available evidence and research Austin (2005, p59) concludes the first census in 
1911 was almost certainly not accurate: 
“We can assume that the real figure for 1911 was higher than the recorded one, meaning that 
there were probably between 300,000 and 350,000 people within the colonial boarders of 
Asante, and more riskily that the real number for 1860 would have been similar to that for 
1817 and probably quite close to the 1911 level.” 
The metropolitan region of the Asante empire contained some of the gold producing areas and 
it is likely that much of the production and consumption of export commodities occurred 
there. However, many of the gold fields were also located in the southern provinces and it was 
here that other export commodities, especially palm oil was also produced (see maps 3 and 4), 
so the populations of these regions should be taken into account for per capita consumption. I 
have taken three figures to provide high, median and low estimates. Jerven and Frankema 
(2014) have calculated a figure for the area of what is today Ghana, which therefore assumes 
that all the provinces of the empire were engaged in export and consumption of Atlantic 
goods. The median figure combines Austin’s estimate of the population of the metropolitan 
region with Wilks’ figure for the southern region which is also based on observations by 
European officials. For the low figure, I only use Austin’s number for the central area. These 
figures naturally assume that consumption was spread evenly across the population, which is 
of course in reality unlikely to have been the case. The intention is primarily to illustrate the 
relative importance of different imports to the region’s consumers.         
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Appendix 6.1. Number of slaving ships visiting the three case study regions 1770 – 1800 
 
Source: slavevoyages.org 
 
 
Appendix 6.2. Slave embarkations from the Bight of Biafra 1770 – 1838 
 
Source: slavevoyages.org 
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Appendix 6.3. Slave exports Bight of Biafra + Slave prices West Africa and Angola 1798 - 
1830 
 
Source: slavevoyages.org, Lovejoy & Richardson 1995a 
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Appendix 6.4. Percentage fall in the value of the principle African commodities imported into 
Britain between 1814 and 1816 
Beeswax Camwood Ebony 
Gum 
Senegal 
Hides Ivory Palm Oil Pepper Redwood 
-67% -40% -70% -83% -71% -27% -38% -79% -67% 
Source: Parliamentary Papers 1816 (506) Report from the Select Committee on Papers Relating to the African 
Forts 
Appendix 6.5 Index of the quantity of goods imported into Great Britain from Africa 
(1811=100) 
Year Beeswax  Camwood Ebony 
Gum 
Senegal 
Hides Ivory Palm Oil Pepper Redwood 
1811 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1812 93 99 138 16 83 46 49   144 
1814 81 89 63 59 318 53 8 47 143 
1815 6 116 228 67 320 65 175 198 191 
1816 1 42 164 61 64 46 101 194 140 
1817 12 15 201 37 52 34 126 136 136 
1818 8 89 169 35 165 50 124 42 84 
1819 48 99 63 6 0 54 314 47 53 
1820 34 90 0 0.1 236 56 76 39 2 
Source: CUST 
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Appendix 6.6. Average quantity of trade goods on Bristol ships trading in the Bight of Biafra 
1790 – 1791 
Cloths and Clothing (puncheons) 
  
Year 
Slave / 
Commodity Linen 
British 
Cotton 
India 
Goods 
  1790 Slave 3.6 8.6 18 
  1790 Commodity 
 
6 0.125 
  1791 Slave 25 1 13 
  1791 Commodity 0 0 13 
   
Wrought and Unwrought Metals 
Year 
Slave / 
Commodity Iron Bars 
Lead 
Bars 
Wrought 
Iron 
Chests 
Copper / 
Brass 
manufactures 
Chests 
Iron 
Pots / 
Brass 
Pans 
1790 Slave 1791 487 48 47.5 637 
1790 Commodity 160 0 31 0 0 
1791 Slave 911 294 35 19 994 
1791 Commodity 140 0 28 40 50 
 
Weapons and Ammunition 
 
Year 
Slave / 
Commodity 
Kegs 
Gunpowder 
Bags 
Lead 
and 
Shot 
Chests 
Muskets 
Casks 
Gunflints 
 1790 Slave 1,194 167 11 11 
 1790 Commodity 0 0 0 0 
 1791 Slave 9237 37 3.5 5.5 
 1791 Commodity 100 0 0 3 
  
Other 
  
Year 
Slave / 
Commodity 
Chest 
Bugle 
Punch 
Spirits Salt 
  1790 Slave 3 45 482 
  1790 Commodity 0 2 9306 
  1791 Slave 3 40.5 334 
  1791 Commodity 4 37 4380 
  
Source: Bristol Presentments 
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Appendix 6.7. Value (GB £) of commodities from the two case study regions 1828 – 1832 
  Beeswax  Camwood  Ebony  Palm Oil  Pepper  Redwood  Ivory  Gold  Total  
Coast South of the 
Rio Volta with the 
Island of Fernando 
Po 
2126 1767 1844 1143628 150 134966 82447 0 1366929 
Cape Coast Castle 
and the Gold Coast 
from Cape 
Apolonia to the 
Rio Volta 
420 1003 45113 87313 9455 14 39185 593880 776384 
Sources: CUST, Liverpool Mercurcy Prices Current. Ivory price from Parliamentary Papers 1816 (506) Report 
from the Select Committee on Papers Relating to the African Forts 
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